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Preface
This is a book  about the nature of Pacific Island politics under colonial 
rule. By the late nineteenth century and the partition  of the Pacific 
am ong the European Powers, violence and conquest were established 
features of cultural contact. Colonialism was a dirty business, even to 
contem poraries who believed in the white m an’s burden. The Governor 
of G erm an East Africa told the Reichstag candidly in 1905: ‘Kolon­
ialpolitik has always been the politics of conquest, and nowhere in the 
world does the occupation of a land by a foreign people succeed w ithout 
conflict’. G overnor A lbert Hahl in G erm an New Guinea frequently 
took exception to press reports sensationalising acts of violence 
because, as he pointed out, they were simply p a rt of the inevitable 
conflict between ‘culture’ and ‘savagery’. Colonial settlers in general 
worked and lived on the assum ption that ‘the natives’ were constantly 
waiting for the opportunity  to m urder the white people and seize their 
treasures. M any believed that Pacific Islanders would not accept foreign 
dom ination, that when a foreign flag went up over their islands the 
people would be ready to rise up against it and m ust be stopped from 
doing so, if necessary by force.
In this book I have endeavoured to correct these assum ptions, which 
have found their way down even to fairly recent histories of the Pacific 
Islands. The study deals with a whole range of political and econom ic 
activities which were characterised as resistance by fearful adm inis­
trators and settlers. It sets out to show that, for the Germ an Pacific 
empire, violence was no t autom atic nor always the prerogative of the 
Islander, and that resistance to Germans and their policies, when it did 
occur, was a great deal more subtle and limited than contem porary 
G erm an colonists, and indeed a long line of later historians, were 
prepared to accept. Over all it dem onstrates the power and ability of 
Pacific Islanders to make their own adjustm ents— of interest and of 
ideology— to the dem ands of a foreign regime and to the social changes 
tha t followed.
While the Islanders play the leading roles in these pages, I have tried 
also to provide a wider and deeper understanding of colonisation as it
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was perceived and practised by the G erm an rulers of the islands. 
Consequently, there is much in the book th a t relates to Germ an colonial 
attitudes and policy, to their m ethods of adm inistration and control. 
This by no means am ounts to an exhaustive analysis of German 
adm inistration in the Pacific. M y m ain interest was in the dem ands that 
the Germans made on the Pacific Islanders and the way in which 
G erm an officials handled conflicts between the two communities.
The book is divided into two parts. The first consists of ‘case studies’ 
of G erm any’s three colonial areas in the Pacific, Samoa (now W estern 
Samoa), New Guinea, and Ponape in M icronesia. If the treatm ent of 
Ponape, an island only some 334 square kilometres in area, seems to 
exaggerate its im portance within the Pacific em pire, that is because its 
people became the m ost serious th rea t to imperial dom ination within 
M icronesia, perhaps within the whole Pacific. For this reason it is also 
a convenient basis for com parison with Samoa: both were the scenes 
of large­scale, open opposition to G erm an policy which required a 
massive response from the Reich in order to overcome. There are other 
reasons for comparison: both presented similar problem s of scale to the 
Germ an adm inistrations, with relatively small, hom ogeneous popula­
tions enjoying com parable econom ic standards; both had superficially 
similar cultures; both could boast of well­developed political systems 
which had a long history of fam iliarity with European civilisation. The 
small size and isolation of Ponape and Samoa from m etropolitan 
centres m eant also that the character of G erm an rule on both  islands 
bore very much the im print of their individual chief adm inistrators.
Germ an New Guinea provides a special case study. In its geographic 
size, in its diversity of population groups, of cultures and languages, 
New Guinea represented a different sort of colony from the com pa­
ratively small islands of Samoa and Ponape, indeed from any other 
colony in Africa or the Far East. The history of contact here is of a 
unique quality, for the Germ an period was one largely of discovery and 
exploration, and much of the contact with local inhabitants was 
desultory and fleeting. The records on G erm an New Guinea are 
impressionistic, of whole populations rather than of individual people, 
except in the areas of dense white settlem ent. To avoid too uneven a 
treatm ent, therefore, I have concentrated on three areas within the 
protectorate for which there was an abundance of evidence about the 
changing pattern of colonial rule. These are the Gazelle Peninsula in 
New Britain, M adang and the Astrolabe coast on the m ainland, and the 
H uon Peninsula, also on the m ainland, south of M adang. As an area
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of subsidiary interest the Admiralty Islands, M anus especially, have 
been touched upon because they afford a special insight into changes 
in traditional leadership structures brought about by German rule.
The seven chapters of Part I are intended to be analytical as well as 
descriptive, providing genuine histories of change and resistance in the 
islands. Part II of the book is an attempt to draw the three studies 
together in order to define what Pacific Island opposition was all about.
I have not attempted to construct an abstract model about social 
relationships which would have universal validity whatever the his­
torical context. Models are useful research tools and they do have 
explanatory value but, at least in history, they do not have a life of their 
own which will reduce human actions through time and over several 
societies to a predictive formula. Instead, I have used the case studies 
as a framework for interpreting and explaining ‘resistance’ in all its 
manifestations in the German Pacific, proceeding on the assumption 
that research on the Pacific has reached the stage where a comparative 
approach would help to underline cross­cultural regularities and 
enlarge our understanding of island societies under varying conditions 
of political and social stress. History may deal in the vagaries of human 
behaviour and the so­called uniqueness of events, but this behaviour 
and these events contain common elements which make them amenable 
to generalisation. There are sufficient similarities and differences 
between Samoa, Ponape and German New Guinea to provide the raw 
material for a serious comparison of the experience of Pacific Islanders 
under German rule.
Having laid out the ground plan, let me enter a caution about the 
book’s pretensions where the history of German New Guinea is 
concerned. The problems of field research, of interpretation for the 
entire range of New Guinean societies under German rule, or even for 
the three areas chosen, were in the end so overwhelming that I have 
relied mainly on European documents (as wide a range as possible) 
supplemented by a large body of anthropological research, both 
latter­day and contemporary, in which German New Guinea is fairly 
well served.
However, I am aware that these sources alone fail to do justice to the 
whole history of Papua New Guineans. M any events, conflicts and 
interpretations which Papua New Guineans themselves consider 
important have been neglected, while the bald account of colonial rule 
over large areas of German New Guinea lacks the sense of regional 
identity which helps to stamp and explain the relations of one group
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of New Guineans with another and with European governments. 
Nonetheless I have been persuaded to publish the account of New 
Guinea under German rule with all its deficiencies, because basic 
information about the German period is still very incomplete. It is 
imperative to present Papua New Guineans, indeed Pacific Islanders in 
general, with as much information about those early times as possible 
so that they may refine and balance the interpretations from their own 
store of social knowledge and oral tradition. The work is offered in this 
spirit: that it may serve as a useful building block in the construction 
of a proper, Islands­written history of the Pacific. In the final analysis, 
only the Pacific Islanders can capture the full dimension which they give 
to their own past, and to time and change.
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The Pacific colonies of Germany were a far­flung post of empire in more 
ways than one. They were a long way from Europe, by sail three to four 
months away. They were small; all except for New Guinea, mere dots 
in an endless sea. And they were separated from each other by 
thousands of miles of blue, unrelenting ocean: German New Guinea 
and Micronesia were each composed of a myriad of islands scattered 
over hundreds of miles. To begin with, let us look at Samoa, a perfect 
example of isolation and economy of scale.
The Samoan group is a chain of islands stretching west to east about 
480 kilometres north­east of Tonga and forming the northern apex of 
a triangle with Tonga and Fiji, further to the west. It consists of three 
main islands, Savai’i in the west, with an area of 1800 square 
kilometres; Upolu across the straits of Apolima, about seventy­six 
kilometres long and 1036 square kilometres in area; and, 111 
kilometres to the east, Tutuila, a steep, densely­forested island of 140 
square kilometres, nearly cut in two by the magnificent harbour of Pago 
Pago. Savai’i and Upolu, with the smaller islands of M anono and 
Apolima lying between them, form what was the former colony of 
German Samoa and is today the independent state of Western Samoa. 
Tutuila is the principal island of American Samoa, which includes the 
M an u ’a group and Rose atoll further eastwards.
Savai’i is the largest island in the Samoan group. It has no good 
harbours, is rocky and mountainous, rising to over 1829 metres, and 
has been susceptible to volcanic eruptions, the last from 1905 to 1911. 
Most of the relatively sparse population lives in the extreme east, on 
a low, flat, fertile strip of coast across the straits from Upolu.
Upolu has always been the social and commercial centre of Samoa. 
It is densely populated, the people living in open, airy and well­ 
organised villages along the shorelines, predominantly in the north­
west. A mountain ridge topped by the cones of extinct volcanoes runs 
the length of Upolu like a backbone, but the coast, at least in the 
north­west, is flat and sandy, gradually becoming rocky and moun­
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tainous in the east beyond Saluafata. Western Samoa’s major port and 
only large town is Apia, roughly in the middle of the north coast. Today 
it lies about thirty­nine kilometres from the pleasant airport of Faleolo, 
which lies in Mulifanua district at the western end of Upolu, along a 
road which follows the coastline and gives uninterrupted vistas of sea, 
reef and mountain. The well­surfaced road passes through innumerable 
villages with their neat oval houses, high roofs of thatch or corrugated 
iron supported by an open cluster of stout poles, with no walls and 
surrounded by hibiscus, frangipani and greenery of all kinds. The local 
church, perhaps paint peeling in the tropical sun, is a landmark in the 
village, along with the fale, the round house for ceremonial meetings.
Apia is a sudden departure from this colour and order. An old port 
town with dusty roads and patched weatherboard buildings, it fringes 
the shoreline along Beach Road. The harbour itself provides little 
inspiration to lift the setting. It is a reef harbour in an open bay, roughly 
semicircular, and about one and one­half kilometres across. It has no 
special virtues and can be quite dangerous in the hurricane season with 
winds from the north­west quarter, a feature which was demonstrated 
dramatically in 1889 when three German and three American warships 
were driven onto the shore in a hurricane, with the loss of 210 lives. To 
the west of the town lies the peninsula of M ulinu’u. For over a hundred 
years it has served as ceremonial seat of government and figured in all 
the major political disputes. Today the round, fale­inspired House of 
Assembly occupies a prominent position on the peninsula.
Presently there are over 100,000 citizens of Western Samoa, a 
threefold increase in the population which helped to glorify the German 
Empire before 1914.
The social structure of Samoa is founded on a number of ranked 
lineages, within which lesser chiefs and groups must defer to greater, 
on the basis of inherent societal rank .1 The descent groups consist of 
people born or adopted into localised households, as well as their 
descendants outside the village, all adult members having a network of 
relations throughout Samoa with whom they have frequent com ­
munication in a variety of ceremonial and social activities.
At the local level, the unit of social and political control is the village, 
consisting of several extended families joined together to deal with 
common problems. A chief, or matai, is at the head of each household, 
controlling the domestic tasks of its members and taking part in village 
organisation. Decisions affecting the latter are taken in the formal 
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voice in its proceedings and their authority and influence relate directly 
to their seniority of position within the village hierarchy. Decision­
making is not based on majority votes; the authority of one or of several 
high­ranking matai is the crucial factor. Family heads possess a 
quasi­consultative vote in discussing a problem prior to an assembly, 
but during council proceedings a heavy emphasis is placed on at least 
a public show of unanimity.
Above the village units there was no centralised political institution 
with control over all Samoans in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. The problem of maintaining order in the complex of 
cross­cutting associations fell to the village, which jealously guarded its 
independence, and acted vigorously against transgressors of its 
residence rules. Though villages were linked in loose, ascending grades 
of political association, and sub­districts did develop in former times, 
based on common village locality and lineage affiliation, these were 
generally less stable than the village system itself, and were always 
susceptible to factionalism and disintegration.
Villages were also loosely linked together in wider district organi­
sations. These were rarely distinct and permanent groupings, depending 
for their shape and definition upon allegiances to one or other ‘royal’ 
lineage and support for senior chiefly titles. The most important 
districts exhibiting this cohesion in the nineteenth century and thus 
enjoying relatively fixed boundaries were Atua, Tuamasaga and A’ana 
in Upolu; the combination of M anono, Apolima and Mulifanua; and 
Fa’asaleleaga in eastern Savai’i.
Districts were not administrative units but spheres of influence 
grounded in kinship, traditional history and policy. Their politics 
revolved around questions of family prestige, important marriage 
alliances and the pursuit of the highest chiefly titles, at the apex of which 
lay a claim to param ount chieftaincy, and with it nominal ascendancy 
throughout Samoa. Contention for the paramountcy was to Europeans 
the most disruptive feature of Samoan political life in the nineteenth 
century. To understand why, it is necessary to sketch in the structure 
of chiefly politics and examine the complexities of traditional group 
alliances in Samoa.
Chiefs with high titles are the elites in Samoa and they are divided 
into two categories, the ali’i and the tulafale. The tulafale or ‘orator 
chief’ was originally a kind of personal assistant to the ali’i, who 
possessed a particular sanctity in Samoan tradition and enjoyed 
exclusive privileges and the right to special deference. On public
6
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occasions it was the duty of the tulafale to proclaim the will of the ali’i, 
and to supervise the ceremonial exchange of food and other goods.
As ‘speaker’ and as skilful orator, the tulafale was in a position to 
involve himself in all sorts of political affairs, and to exercise influence 
in areas where he had no formal rights. A shrewd and energetic talking 
chief might thus arrogate virtually independent power to himself. His 
most influential role lay in the distribution of fine mats, an event which 
possessed special ceremonial and ritual value for Samoans and 
represented a means of payment. Such distributions took place on 
various family and public occasions, but the most important was the 
bestowal of titles on a chief, particularly the award of the Tafa 'ifa titles, 
the four highest in the land— Tui A tua, Tui A ’ana, Gatoaitele and 
Tamasoali'i. The candidate awarded all four titles was designated the 
param ount chief of the group. Control of these titles was vested in 
groups of orator chiefs representing confederations of districts; they 
were, in a very real sense, the ‘kingmakers’ of Samoa.
The first confederation was composed of Atua and A’ana, whose 
orators controlled the first two titles, together with the politically 
influential villages of Tuamasaga district in Upolu, which awarded the 
other two. The second confederation comprised the tulafale of six 
Savai’i districts, the island of M anono  and parts of Tuamasaga, which 
participated in the award of the titles. To the first configuration of 
districts the term Tum ua  was applied, while those based on the Savai’i 
districts were called Pule. To Pule was linked a subsidiary confederation 
called A'iga, which was based on M anono  and Apolima.
The historic battle for political supremacy in Samoa revolved, at one 
level, around the mutual opposition of these two power cartels. But it 
was complicated by a further level of alliances, those of different 
districts to two major ‘royal’ lines which were the focus of political 
intrigue for the paramountcy. These lines, actually patrilineal lineages, 
were the Tuia'ana or Sä Tupuä, and the Sä M alietoä, each of which 
traditionally looked to support from combinations of orator groups in 
various districts, A’ana and Atua on the side of Sä Tupuä , and 
Tuamasaga, Savai’i and M anono on the side of Sä M alietoä. It is little 
wonder that the representatives of various European Powers in Samoa 
have been consistently bewildered and exasperated by the intricacies 
of Samoan politics.
This was especially the case in the nineteenth century when the wars 
which inevitably resulted from the multi­layered intrigues never 
resolved the issues along lines that appealed to European conceptions
7
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of victory and authority. For victory by one or other of the major 
lineages never guaranteed a new level of stability in Samoa. The 
government of the victorious group {Malo) was only an alliance of 
convenience, with no commitment to principle or ‘party’ government. 
Its dissolution after a victory was usually rapid and complete since it 
interfered constantly in the local affairs of its members; moreover the 
practice of harassing the vanquished groups at every opportunity, 
demanding ever more goods and labour, soon led to new alliances and 
rebellion. Such was the prestige of the T afa’ifa titles that eventual peace 
only inaugurated fresh disputes and intrigues by chiefs competing to 
secure them for their various candidates.
Paradoxically, this structured chaos probably saved Samoa from the
8
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straitjacket of early annexation by a European Power. With a strong, 
continuous central government in Samoa, Europeans undoubtedly 
would have gained quicker and tighter control over Samoans by 
funnelling the political and economic forces at their disposal through 
the ‘head of s tate’ or the government. The Powers tried desperately to 
impose a centralised system of authority on Samoa in the late nineteenth 
century, but failed; the partition of the islands between Germany and 
America followed from that failure. Even then Samoans refused to 
surrender their freedom of action and their political creativity.
By contrast with Samoa, Ponapean social and political structure is 
more regular and authoritarian, though the political possibilities in 
some areas are more flexible than in Samoa. Ponape is the largest island 
of the Carolines group in Micronesia, an island world which is still a 
Trust Territory of the United States. Ponape lies roughly north­east of 
the Bismarck Archipelago at longitude 158° east and 6° north of the 
equator, and, like most of the islands of Micronesia, is isolated, her 
largest island neighbour being Kusaie, 494 kilometres away to the 
south­east. T ruk  is 708 kilometres to the west; to the north­west, 
Saipan is over 1600 kilometres, Manila 3803 kilometres. In the east 
only the Marshall Islands lie between Ponape and Hawaii. The distance 
to San Francisco is 7469 kilometres.
Ponape is a towering volcanic dome, roughly hexagonal in shape, 
about 23 kilometres from north to south and 26 kilometres from east 
to west. Mangrove swamps fringe the inner reef around the island and 
a narrow belt of alluvial land lies between them and the foothills. The 
interior is extremely mountainous, with eleven peaks rising above 610 
metres; overland travel is thus very difficult. M ost Ponapeans use 
shallow canoes for transport around the island, though low tide on the 
inner reef can restrict movement in many places. There are three main 
harbours: Langar in the north where the Spanish built the first 
European settlement, Kolonia; Madolenihmw in the east; and Ron Kiti 
in the south. The Japanese built a second large town on the eastern edge 
of Ponape, but during the Spanish and German periods Kolonia was 
the only centre of foreign occupation outside mission stations. To the 
west of Kolonia, across a narrow channel, lies the island of Sokehs with 
the most dominating feature of Ponape’s dominating landscape: the 
enormous Sokehs scarp, which falls away sheer from a height of 274 
metres to the sea at the island’s northern end. A modern causeway now 
replaces the rickety wooden bridge which connected Sokehs to the 
mainland in German times. The effect of the Sokehs scarp, together with
9
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the rugged interior, where the air lies thick and heavy, where dark 
clouds obscure the matted tops of mountains and thunder rolls uneasily 
across the valleys, is to give Ponape a sinister and brooding quality 
which contrasts markedly with that of the low, open and vulnerable 
atolls of Micronesia.
At the time of German rule, the native inhabitants of Ponape, like 
most of the Caroline Islanders, were divided into eighteen matrilineal 
clans which were further divided into sub­clans ranked by seniority. 2 
Political power at district level was based on these sub­clans and their 
senior individuals rather than oh the clans. The clans were distributed 
throughout the five districts or states into which Ponape was divided 
during German times: M adolenihmw, Uh, Kiti, Sokehs and Net. Each 
was territorially distinct from the others and acted independently in 
every aspect of social and economic life, yet it would be misleading to 
call them tribes since they all had a series of cross­cutting kinship ties 
with one another. Ponapean legends refer to a time when the whole 
island was united under a single ruler (the Saudeleurs), but that era 
ended with the conquest by the culture hero Isokelokel, when the 
separate districts of Ponape were founded.
The districts themselves were, in turn, subdivided into a number of 
geographical sections composed of several farmsteads. These were not 
villages in the ordinary sense of the word. Households belonging to each 
section were scattered along the shore and separated from one another 
by the land holdings of each farmstead. Sections were the units of local 
political control and were supervised by section chiefs, who were 
appointed by the principal chiefs of the district and required to keep 
an eye on the productivity of the various farmsteads as well as regulate 
tributary offerings to the High Chief.
O n e ’s position within a district and section was fixed originally by 
strict heredity and succession rules. Each district had a theoretically 
identical series of ranked titleholders in two chiefly lines. Below these 
were the commoners, bound to a particular section chief by ties of 
obedience, tributary labour and war service. There is an obvious, 
though rather loose, analogy here with the medieval European system 
of royalty, nobility and the common people. Within the district, the 
ultimate repository of power and authority was the High Chief, or 
Nahnm warki, who originally decided what was right and wrong 
without any distinction between civil and criminal law. Failure to 
observe proper etiquette, to respond to a call for service, or a deliberate 
disregard of one’s place in the scheme of things could be punished by
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the confiscation of land, by the removal of titles, or banishment. In 
theory, chiefs, especially highly­ranked chiefs, had an unconditional 
right to appropriate or confiscate the goods and property of 
commoners.
Land was the most valuable commodity vulnerable to confiscation. 
The common people did not possess a right to the land where they dwelt 
and farmed. Ultimately they held it at the will of the High Chief of the 
district. According to the first German Governor of Ponape, the land 
of a tenant farmer went back to the High Chief after his death, the Chief 
reissuing it as he pleased. 3 Recent findings by anthropologists however 
suggest that this is a statement of the ideal rather than what usually 
happened. Commoners were dispossessed in olden times, even during 
their period of tenancy, but only in a minority of cases did this occur 
and then for some unforgivable misdeed. Generally, matrilineal rules 
of inheritance operated and there was fairly automatic confirmation of 
the heirs to a plot of land. Ponapean land will play a large part in our 
story for it lay at the centre of the conflict between the Islanders and 
their Spanish and German rulers.
Like land inheritance, succession to chiefly titles was also automatic, 
according to matrilineal seniority in the sub­clan. But, again, this was 
the theory rather than the practice. In fact, the inheritance principle was 
modified by several considerations which made the structure of 
authority more flexible than its hierarchical nature would suggest. 
Personality, relative age, physical disability, martial exploits, industry 
and obedience to the Nahnmwarki could all produce differential rates 
of promotion, while institutionalised forms of tribute and respect to 
High Chiefs were exploited by aspirants to titles in a form of compet­
ition for prestige. The result was a degree of social and political mobility 
which was certainly greater than the more socially­conservative 
Samoan system.
Another comparison with Samoa can be made in the relationship 
between the Nahnmwarki and the N ahnken, the principal chief of the 
second line of titles in each district. The N ahnken has been likened to 
the talking chief or tulafale of Samoa because he enjoyed frequent, 
direct communication with the ordinary people of his district. Unlike 
his Samoan counterpart, however, the N ahnken played a much more 
consistent role in the administration of daily affairs, since the 
Nahnmwarki was regarded as holy and remote in a way that the 
Samoan ali’i never was. This did not mean that the Nahnken was the 
real autocrat of a Ponapean district. Traditionally there was a very close
11
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relationship between the N ahnm w arki and the Nahnken, and a state 
of delicate balance which seldom erupted into open discord. 
Throughout Ponape great social pressures operated in favour of 
political conformity, and in public affairs the N ahnmwarki and 
N ahnken presented one face to the world.
Ponapean political life centred round the pursuit of enhanced status, 
the capture of titles, and personal competition. The major cause of 
conflict was the inherent contradiction between theory and practice, in 
particular between the rules of matrilineal seniority and the effects of 
personal performance on the promotions system. Between districts, 
political vainglory played a large role in the frequent collisions. Each 
district guarded its independence and power fiercely and worked to 
have them acknowledged by other districts. A balance of power had 
gradually crystallised, so that by the time of German rule hostilities had 
been fixed for some years: the northern districts of Sokehs and Net 
against the rest. Clan members of different districts enjoyed much less 
contact than in Samoa. For a commoner, travel into another district was 
always dangerous unless a message had been sent ahead by the 
Nahnmwarki. High Chiefs themselves never travelled unless accom­
panied by displays of men and equipment sufficient to maintain the frail 
peace. It was this situation, fraught with instabilities and worsened by 
the Ponapean experience of Spanish colonisation, that Germany 
inherited in 1899.
As for New Guinea, it would be impossible here, as well as pointless, 
to describe fully the area’s physical and cultural characteristics. It will 
suffice, first, to establish the scale of the colonial enterprise in which 
New Guineans and Germans were involved and, second, to give a broad 
and superficial description of those social features which most influ­
enced relations between the two communities.
The protectorate of German New Guinea consisted of the north­east 
quadran t of the mainland of New Guinea together with about 600 
islands stretching east through the Bismarck Archipelago to the western 
fringes of Polynesia. With its most northerly point less than 80 
kilometres from the equator, the protectorate ran south to the border 
with Papua and the British Solomon Islands protectorate, and from the 
Dutch border in the west to N ukum anu in the Tasman Islands— 740 
kilometres from the northern extremes to the southern, and 1770 
kilometres from west to east.
The mainland is 181 299 square kilometres in area and extremely 
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torate. The Bismarck, Kratke and Finisterre ranges rise to over 3048 
metres, forming a massive cordillera covered with thick tropical jungle 
lying between the thin coastal belt and the western Highlands. Extensive 
plains on the coast are few, concentrated around the lower reaches of 
the Sepik and the Ramu rivers, on the Astrolabe/Maclay coasts and in 
the lower M arkham  River valley. As for rivers, only the Sepik and Ramu 
were navigable during German times. Nearly a quarter of the total 
population of the old protectorate lived in the Sepik area. The rest of 
the coast was populated only in patches. The Germans never reached 
the western Highlands where almost a million people dwelled.
Of the archipelago’s islands, New Britain is the largest, with an area 
of 33 670 square kilometres. Still­active volcanoes exist around Wil­ 
laumez Peninsula in the west and at Blanche Bay on the east coast of 
the Gazelle Peninsula, where over half of the island’s people live. The 
largest population group in the Peninsula are the Tolai, a comparatively 
light­skinned Melanesian people inhabiting the coasts and hinterland 
in the north and east. In the north­west lie the Baining M ountains where 
there dwells a racially distinct group of the same name, perhaps the 
original coastal dwellers who were driven into the mountains by the 
Melanesians who emigrated from New Ireland. During German times 
the Baining lived in small, dispersed hamlets in the mountains and 
practised a backward, shift­and­burn type of agriculture. The other 
large islands to which the Germans devoted their attention were New 
Ireland and Bougainville, but they will only briefly concern us in this 
work.
The social and political scale of population groups in German New 
Guinea was the most obvious difference from those in Micronesia and 
in Samoa. In New Guinea, the Germans rarely came into contact with 
corporate groups whose immediate range of authority was more than 
100 people. Local kinship­residential groups were common, and con­
sisted of a small village or a cluster of hamlets which were roughly equal 
in political terms and were tied to each other economically. Within 
these, New Guineans enjoyed a variety of political forms, including 
matrilineal and patrilineal descent groups, cognatic groups, m en’s 
clubhouses, secret societies, or a combination of these.
Social and political authority in these societies did not reside per­
manently or institutionally with one person or body. O n those societies 
with which the Germans had most dealings there is little ethnographic 
work that dates to the time of earliest contact; and German sources, 
both official and unofficial, are silent or unreliable about the authority
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structures that were in operation when the Germans first made contact 
with the New Guineans. Nonetheless, from the records of travellers, 
administrators, scholars and Papua­New Guineans themselves over a 
hundred years we can make a number of general observations about 
leadership which hold true for the range of groups with which the 
Germans came in contact. There did exist individuals in each group who 
were recognised as wielding greater powers of initiation and organi­
sation than others. They were men who, through martial renown and/or 
economic enterprise were able to attract a personal following, which 
they then manipulated to aggrandise power and resources for them­
selves and for their group. By paying bride price for younger men, by 
debt collecting, or by cultivating new land and dependants, such men 
were able to establish a coterie of followers and mobilise their p ro ­
ductiveness for prestige­building through public distribution of 
resources; they became the ‘big m en’ of their societies, though the social 
range of their influence remained limited. Their primary social roles 
seemed to be as the focal distributors of wealth, as initiators of 
large­scale economic activities, and as spokesmen in inter­village 
affairs.
Tolai leaders were perhaps the nearest thing to an indigenous elite 
with which the Germans came in contact . 4 Traditional leadership was 
based on the luaiua, the senior male member of a lineage or clan in a 
particular district, and successful Tolai leaders during German times 
tended to be natural products of the social system, controlling at least 
the landholdings of their lineage or clan. Yet sources of power other 
than seniority also operated. Personal initiative was important, perhaps 
through prowess as a warrior, and a dynamic personality or special 
entrepreneurial abilities were requisites for someone aspiring to be 
a ngala or a ‘big m an’. In the end, quality of performance determined 
one’s continued influence.
With the coming of the Europeans, individual ‘big m en’ were able to 
arrogate increased power to themselves, selling land on behalf of the 
descent group, cultivating support from one or other mission, and 
promoting inter­district solidarity through war alliances and m ono­
polies on white people’s goods. But this new, expanded position never 
became institutionalised, even after the Germans introduced a system 
of government appointees.
Leadership is one of the most rewarding areas of study in the story 
of Pacific Island adjustment to government by Germany. It will become 
plain that changes were rung on the character of Island leadership which
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are perhaps some of the more enduring results of Germ any’s thirty­year 
reign in the Pacific.
The Germans: Commerce, Colonies and Control 
The beginnings of European enterprise in the Pacific are obscure. 
Precious stones, metals and whales were the object of the earliest 
voyages. The harvesting of tropical products began relatively late; 
German participation in it even later. The H am burg firm of J. C. 
Godeffroy und Sohn had been trading in Latin America since the 1830s, 
and by the 1850s operated a network of commercial agencies around 
the rim of the Pacific: in Chile, California, South­East Asia and 
Australia. In 1855 the com pany’s agent in Valparaiso, August Unshelm, 
was sent out into the South Pacific to capture for Godeffroys a share 
in the rapidly­expanding coconut oil trade. Unshelm chose Apia in 
Samoa as the base for his operations, and, with the firm’s wide variety 
of ships plying the Pacific, Godeffroys very soon succeeded in seizing 
the bulk of the trade in the south­west. By the time of Unshelm’s death 
in 1864, forty­six stations had been established throughout the islands, 
as far north as the Marshall and the Caroline islands.
But the real expansion took place under Unshelm’s successor, 
Theodor Weber, merchant, innovator and empire­builder extra­ordi­ 
naire. Weber is credited with discovering that it was more efficient and 
profitable to export copra in sacks, and then to refine it in Europe, than 
to carry coconut oil in leaky barrels, and in 1865 he established the first 
large­scale plantations in Samoa. Under him the company tightened its 
grip on trade in the Marshalls and Carolines and moved into the New 
Guinea islands with a trading post at M atupit in 1874. Here they were 
joined by Robertson and Hernsheim, a small trading firm with its 
headquarters in the islands north of New Guinea.
I Such was the extent and strength of German trade by 1875 that 
[German warships were thereafter regularly dispatched to the Pacific to 
/p rovide official support for the growing commercial empire. Treaties 
Vof friendship and commerce were concluded between 1876 and 1879 
with various island groups—Tonga, the Gilbert, Ellice and Marshall 
islands, parts of the Society Islands, and Samoa. In 1878 the harbours 
of M akada and Mioko in New Britain were purchased on the initiative 
of a German warship captain, von Werner, in order to reinforce the 
claims of Germany’s traders in the area. By 1879 official sources 
claimed that German business houses were currently exporting over six 
million marks worth of products from the South Seas.5
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During these years, agitation was growing in Germany from econo­
mists and publicists in favour of overseas expansion for the Reich, and 
a number of associations were founded to promote the idea of colonies. 
Their hardest task was to win over the Iron Chancellor, Bismarck, who 
regarded colonies as a waste of time and a danger to the new nation’s 
resources. With strains on the economy from rapid industrialisation, 
Bismarck was keen to secure overseas markets, but his vision was of a 
free­trade empire, with no formal territorial attachments. That he 
reversed this ‘no colonies’ policy is now well­known and it is notV 
necessary to detail his reasons here: that is a continuing debate. Suffice 
it to say that, from 1884 on, Bismarck sponsored colonial annexations 
which expanded the Reich to Africa, the Pacific and the Far East, and 
that commercial interests in the Pacific provided a great deal of the 
pressure on the Chancellor to change his mind.
Despite the image of prosperity which German Pacific business 
conveyed in the late 1870s, there were a number of seeming threats to 
its position. Already in 1874 the Spanish had tried to obstruct German 
traders in the Philippines and the Carolines by demanding customs 
duties, and in the same year Germans in Fiji had most of their land 
confiscated when the British government annexed that group. The 
following year the United States obtained a privileged position over 
German commerce in the Hawaiian Islands, and in 1881 the French 
annexed the Society Islands where a subsidiary of Godeffroys, the 
Societe Commerciale de l’Oceanie, had been enjoying a large share of 
trade. Then, in 1879, Godeffroy’s European investments deteriorated 
and new capital could not be raised for a company to take over the 
Samoan interests. Bismarck, with an eye to the potential of the Pacific 
trade, came forward to support the idea of a guaranteed government 
dividend for a new firm, the Deutsche Handels-und Plantagen- 
Gesellschaft der Südsee Inseln zu Hamburg (DHPG), to replace the 
projected successor to Godeffroys. But, in a celebrated confrontation 
between the Government and its enemies in the Reichstag, the Samoan 
subsidy bill was defeated. The DHPG was rescued only when Berlin and 
Hamburg financiers agreed to reconstruct it with private capital.
As successor to Godeffroys, the DHPG dominated trade in Samoa. 
In spite of increased financial backing its difficulties did not disappear 
after 1880. Its plantations in Samoa suffered from constant civil wars 
over the paramountcy question, while increased competition added a 
new threat to its sources of Pacific Island labour. Furthermore, the 
Germans had to face strong agitation from New Zealand interests for
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annexation of the group, and the reigning chief, M alietoa Laupepa, 
made clear his preference for things EngTisli^
The DHPG faced the same situation in New Guinea, its m ain centre 
for labour recruitm ent and an increasingly im portan t trade and plan­
tation area. Here there was pressure on Britain, from the Australian 
colonies, to annex the entire eastern half of the island as a bulw ark for 
their defence. All these dangers led G erm an companies in the area, and 
imperial representatives in A ustralia and the islands, to inundate 
Bismarck with inform ation about the extent of G erm an enterprise and 
to urge annexation of Samoa, New Guinea and parts of M icronesia.
They had their reward. A promise of State p rotection for a C hartered 
Com pany to colonise north­east New Guinea was one of B ism arck’s 
first decisions in favour of colonial expansion. A nnexation of the 
m ainland and the offshore islands took place in N ovem ber 1884. In 
early 1885 the M arshall Islands were annexed. The Carolines group 
was to be next on the list, but Spain protested on the grounds that 
western M icronesia was already part of an overseas Spanish empire 
dating back to the sixteenth century. The question was subm itted, at 
Bismarck’s request, to Pope Leo XIII as international arbiter, and he 
ruled in favour of Spain’s claim.
As for Samoa, during the 1880s Bismarck entertained the hope that 
he could acquire the group by negotiations with Britain. But he was 
thw arted here too. C ontinual diplom atic gaucheries by his consuls in 
Apia turned opinion against the idea of G erm an sovereignty in Sam oa, 
and the United States adam antly resisted all attem pts to negotiate a 
partition  of interests.6 In the end Bismarck had to be satisfied w ith a 
co­protectorate over the group, in which all three Powers were involved. 
It was not until 1899, with the complete breakdow n of European 
control and the effects of a particularly ferocious civil w ar, that the three 
Powers were able to agree on a realistic solution to the im broglio: the 
western islands were then delivered into G erm an hands, the eastern into 
Am erica’s. W hen, the same year, Germ any purchased the C aroline, 
Palau and M ariana islands from Spain in the wake of the Spanish­ 
American war, the G erm an trade and plan tation  empire in the Pacific 
was complete.
Bismarck had not pursued an offensive Kolonialpolitik in the Pacific 
in the sense of staking out new spheres of influence for Germ any. The 
colonial empire was based on already­existing trade and p lan tation  
holdings in whose adm inistration Bismarck wished to engage the 
governm ent as little as possible. He looked to the H ansa cities to
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promote material and political development overseas, through Frei­
briefen or Charters for private enterprise on the model of the British 
N orth  Borneo Company, and he even tried, unsuccessfully, to enlist 
H am burg merchants as colonial directors in a new Imperial Bureau 
which would remove responsibility from the Foreign Office.
Bismarck’s hopes did become reality in the Pacific when the New 
Guinea Company, founded by Adolf von Hansemann in 1884, was 
awarded a far­reaching Charter on 17 May 1885 to administer the new 
protectorate of north­east New Guinea. On condition that it erect a 
governing apparatus at its own cost, the Company was given the 
exclusive right to regulate the internal administration of the colony, to 
levy taxes and duties, to take possession of all unowned land and to 
conclude contracts for land and labour with the local inhabitants. Only 
four years later the Company surrendered the reins of government to 
the Reich, though it continued to pay the costs of administration. It 
resumed control in September 1892, but was never able to overcome 
the conflict of interest between its public and private policies. Company 
expenditure increased steadily without any proportional return as a 
number of subsidiary companies rose and fell on the New Guinea 
mainland. In 1895­96 the New Guinea Company entered into nego­
tiations for the permanent transfer of control to the Reich, and this 
finally took place, after some domestic opposition to the terms of the 
treaty, in April 1899. Up to that time the Company had lost a total of 
nine million marks in New Guinea.7
In only one area of the Pacific was Bismarck’s model of Charter 
Government successful— the island sphere north of New Guinea. The 
DHPG and the firm of Robertson and Hernsheim, both of which 
controlled trade in the Marshalls (as well as in the Carolines under 
Spanish rule), founded a joint company in late 1887, the Jaluit 
Gesellschaft, which was given an Imperial Charter on 21 January 1888. 
The treaty gave the firm the right to take possession of all unowned land 
in the Marshall, Brown and Providence islands and to extract their 
guano deposits, while the actual administration remained in the hands 
of an Imperial Commissioner whose costs were borne by the Jaluit 
Gesellschaft. After the Carolines became part of the empire, the 
Company was granted a trading and plantation monopoly there also. 
The smallest of the privileged firms in G erm any’s colonies, the Jaluit 
Gesellschaft was also the longest lived and the most successful. In 1906, 
when the Company became a purely private business, it was already 
paying a dividend of twenty per cent. In that year the separate status
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of the Marshalls protectorate was abolished and it was united with the 
Carolines, Palau and M ariana islands, which had been administratively 
a part of the New Guinea protectorate since their incorporation into 
the empire.
As these events were occurring, changes were taking place in the 
machinery of colonial administration at home, changes that affected 
directly the policies adopted in the Pacific. In the early years, Bismarck’s 
open dislike of government involvement in the colonies meant that 
decisions about them were taken within the political section of the 
Foreign Office. Bismarck was determined that colonies would not 
become a new avenue of growth for the all­enveloping Imperial Civil 
Service; the activities of officials like the Samoan consuls only rein­
forced his conviction that inflated bureaucracies and petty despotism 
were the real fruits of overseas empire. But the concerns of the colonies 
grew rapidly after 1885, and, though he was disenchanted with the 
whole enterprise, Bismarck was forced in 1889 to ask for help in 
administering them.8 A year later, after he had already been replaced 
as Chancellor, a special Colonial Department was created within the 
Foreign Office.
Independence in policy making did not come with this arrangement. 
The new Department remained the responsibility of the Foreign Office 
and under the jurisdiction of the Chancellor. M ore importantly, the 
Department in its policy deliberations always had to reckon with 
articulate public discussion of colonial issues, and with pressure from 
the Reichstag. Unlike colonial organisation in most countries (Britain, 
for example, where the House of Commons had no direct authority 
over basic administration in the colonies), the German Reichstag was 
empowered to review each year the budget submitted by the Colonial 
Department. As an important weapon in its struggle to strengthen 
parliamentary control over Germany’s political life, the Reichstag 
guarded this right jealously, examining every aspect of colonial affairs 
rigorously, both in the House and in its Budget Commission. Because 
the various parties represented large­scale pressure groups, those 
interests with the most patronage in the colonies or in Berlin exerted 
a great deal of influence on colonial politics, especially after the 
so­called Hottentot elections of 1907.
Though criticism of the Colonial Department and its ways built up 
steadily after 1890, no major structural changes were made, except to 




treasury affairs into the system and set up a Colonial Council 
(K olonialrat) of ‘experts’ to advise on matters of trade, shipping, 
settlement, etc. Charges of excessive legalism and incompetence, of 
brutality and criminal misbehaviour by officers in the African colonies 
culminated in the Herero­Nama war of 1904 in South­West Africa and 
the Maji Maji rebellion in East Africa the following year. These 
produced a great crisis in G erm any’s domestic politics. In the elections 
of 1907 the parties of the Right— Conservatives, National Liberals and 
Freisinnige—gained power, and hence the interests of right­wing 
pressure groups, virtually identical with commercial interests in the 
colonies, commanded even greater authority in colonial policy making.
The reform of colonial administration in 1907 and the elevation of 
the Department to the status of a Ministerial Office did not diminish 
the influence of the Right. If anything, the trend was reinforced. 
Bernhard Dernburg, the new State Secretary for Colonies, was a Berlin 
banker, hand­picked by Chancellor Biilow to bring a new broom to the 
Wilhelmstrasse. In a matter of months, Dernburg rose from political 
obscurity to the centre of public attention. In the elections of 1907 he 
took upon himself the colonial cause and proved an untiring and 
inspiring advocate. He brought immense energy, imagination and 
decisiveness to his task of cleaning up the system, and the reforms he 
engineered were real and far­reaching. A purge of the ranks of Berlin 
officials was Dernburg’s first move. Then he turned to the tasks of 
arranging more coherent planning for the long­range development of 
Africa and the Pacific; of streamlining financial practices; of revising 
colonial law to incorporate local custom; of encouraging private 
investment.9
This last was the crux of the matter. Dernburg was at heart a 
mercantilist. His vision was a materialist one: the colonies were chiefly 
sources of raw materials and outlets for investment capital. True, he 
envisaged a reciprocal program in which Germany would bring civili­
sation and technology to the colonised peoples, and he attempted a 
number of liberal reforms aimed at improving relations between the 
colonies’ native peoples and their German masters, such as eliminating 
forced labour and the use of the whip. But his efforts were curtailed in 
extent and depth by the opposition of large, colonial, settler interests 
which would not accept radical interference with their commercial 
objectives and put pressure on Dernburg through the Reichstag. 
Dernburg initiated an economic take­off in Germany’s colonial empire, 
but the consequent material growth and the intensified pressures on the
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native populations posed enormous difficulties for those responsible for 
a humane native policy.10
These last were the men out in the field, the bureaucrats, civilians and 
soldiers who organised the day­to­day communication of German 
policy to Africans and Pacific Islanders.^n the Pacific, the isolation of 
island colonies one from another and from the mother country, their 
insignificance in the larger German empire, and the relatively moderate 
level of investment at stake all resulted in a minimum of supervision 
from home and more freedom of action for local administrators. Unlike 
the older British, Spanish and French empires, the Germans followed 
no ‘system’ of colonial rule in the Pacific in the sense of a standard 
pattern of administrative attitudes and actions based on abstract theory 
or predetermined by long experience. There is in the records a striking 
absence of instructions from the Colonial Department to the Governor 
of Samoa; the Governor of New Guinea, too, was generally left a free 
. hand to determine the way he would handle things, though the presence 
1 of powerful settler groups and large corporations meant that he had to 
{^.proceed more cautiously.
Within the colonies themselves, isolation threw decisive responsibi­
lities onto individual station officers, and often dictated the pattern of 
racial relationships. On mountainous, forested Ponape, small boats 
were the chief means of transport around the island. It took up to seven 
hours to reach the southern district of Kiti from the European settle­
ment on the northern shores. It could take five hours to sail from Upolu 
to Savai’i in Samoa: the isolation of Savai’i proved a major factor in the 
problems the Germans encountered in Samoa. In New Guinea, district 
stations such as Aitape, M orobe, the Admiralties and Kieta were often 
isolated from the main planting and trading communities, and com­
munication was dependent on desultory visits by the one government 
steamer or an occasional recruiting ship. District officers were thus left 
very much to their own devices. They were not required to seek 
approval from headquarters before opening up new country or taking 
action against local villages, and the tendency to one­man rule was 
reinforced by the absence of European subordinates, the personal 
loyalty of coloured police troops, and the New Guinean preference for 
social relationships of a personal and reciprocal nature.
These practices were to prove more arbitrary and militaristic in 
Africa, where soldiers seconded from the metropolitan army provided 
the bulk of field officers for the colonial service into the 1900s. The 
Pacific colonies were staffed mainly by civilian personnel, both at higher
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executive levels and ou t in the field. This did not mean tha t the relations 
between rulers and ruled in the Pacific were free of all violence, but the 
civilian tone of G erm an rule, particularly in Samoa and early Ponape, 
did m ake for m ore flexible responses in the face of island opposition.
Unlike Africa, too, the regimes in the Pacific were not supported by 
large m ilitary forces. N one of the colonies had a special colonial troop 
(Schutztruppe), and only New Guinea boasted a considerable police 
force, over 800 men by 1914, which was also used to open up new 
territory. Ponape got by with fifty Melanesian­and M alay police, Samoa 
with a mere thirty  young Samoans. Com pared with the size of the 
security forces in Africa, these numbers were trifling. G erm an East 
Africa, for exam ple, could call upon a troop of 230 white and 2500 
African soldiers; the C am eroons on 175 whites and 1550 Africans. The 
largest force of all was in South­W est Africa, where there was an 
all­white force of 2500, and 500 African police late in the G erm an 
period. D uring the H erero wars some 21 000 soldiers had been 
stationed in the colony.11 Only France am ong the Powers in Africa 
possessed a colonial arm y larger than tha t of the G erm an Reich.
Since, in an island empire the size of the Germ an Pacific, land­based 
security forces were too expensive and inefficient to m aintain, the 
Pacific adm inistrations leaned heavily on the G erm an navy for support. 
This created a special set of difficulties, for so jealously did each side 
guard its prerogatives of authority , that the exact function of the navy 
within the fram ew ork of colonial rule was the subject of frequent 
disagreem ent between adm inistrators and ships’ captains; the 
impotence of the navy in land exercises and the infrequency of naval 
visits added to these difficulties. Nonetheless, because of chronic lack 
of finance, and the extensive perimeters of the island colonies, the navy 
remained the m ost im portant sanction of the Pacific adm inistrations 
right up to 1914.
But the nub of the G erm an navy’s activities lay elsewhere. W hen, in 
1914, war was declared, none of the three colonies could count on naval 
protection against the invasion of enemy forces. In the event, Samoa 
and Ponape fell into Allied hands w ithout resistance; New Guinea fell 
after a token encounter between G erm an settlers and A ustralian troops. 
It was not just that the Reich’s two small Pacific cruisers, even with Graf 
Spee’s Far­East Cruiser Squadron, were hopelessly outnum bered by the 
range of battle craft which Britain and her dom inions could deploy. The 
reason was more that Berlin’s priorities lay closer to home. Well before 
1914, Admiral T irp itz’s strategy for a battlefleet to counteract the
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British in the north Atlantic demanded that the colonies be abandoned 
in the event of w ar . 12
Such were the instruments of imperial policy in the colonies. This 
book aims to add a further dimension to the story— that of the Pacific 
Islanders and their reception of German rule— and to show how the 
conflict between Berlin’s objectives, the local administrative possibili­






W hen the Im perial G erm an flag was raised in M ulinu’u on 15 M arch 
1900, Europeans and Samoans had been engaged for more than two 
decades in a constantly­fluctuating struggle over the right to control the 
Sam oan g roup’s political and econom ic destiny. Samoan affairs had 
dissipated a d isproportionate am ount of diplom atic energy in the 
capitals of the W estern Powers as the islands became a focus of imperial 
rivalry in the late nineteenth century.
European fam iliarity with Samoa dates back to 1722 when the 
D utchm an, Jacob Roggeween, first sighted the island. He described the 
inhabitants as ‘a harm less, good sort of people, and very brisk and 
likely, for they treated each other with visible m arks of civility and had 
nothing in their behaviour that was wild or savage . . .’ Subsequent 
visitors were to rue the words of Roggeween.
A series of sporadic and largely disastrous contacts took place over 
the years1 until 1830, when John Williams and Charles Barff of the 
; London M issionary Society arrived off Savai’i. M alietoa Vai’inupo had 
just trium phed decisively over a rival for the param ountcy, and this 
fortuitous circum stance, together with the practical and polytheistic 
leanings of the people, served the m issionaries well, for the Samoans 
readily took to the form al structure of religious observances and the 
new education.2 Already by 1860 over 5000 adherents were contri­
buting £1200 each year to the upkeep of the mission, and upwards of 
a thousand individuals had been influenced directly by the teaching 
seminary established at M alua in 1844. In following decades the 
Samoans voluntarily adopted com pulsory schooling, to the extent that, 
by 1905, twenty­five per cent of the population could claim an 
education from the London M issionary Society alone.3
The Christian revolution was, however, neither w holehearted nor 
complete. Samoans were not necessarily prepared to accept all the 
W estern religious sanctions which missionaries attem pted to super­
impose on indigenous life, and, in the absence of a m onopoly of foreign 
influence, the m issionaries were forced to acquiesce in what am ounted 
to an exchange of religious cultures as the Samoans institutionalised
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their own interpretations of Christian doctrine. W ithout recourse to 
W estern military power, the growing com m unity of beachcom bers and 
itinerant traders also had to accept traditional authority , for the 
Samoans refused to com prom ise either their standards of propriety 
regarding the behaviour of foreigners or the sanctions imposed for 
transgressions of the social and political code.
W ith the growth of Samoa as an entrepot and as a centre for 
plantations, the balance of physical pow er tended to swing in favour 
of the European com m unity. Expectations of W estern support and 
intervention accom panied the advent of consular representatives, and 
European navies now provided the means to intim idate the local 
populations. Island chiefs gradually found themselves com peting with 
the consuls and the navies for the loyalty of beach residents. It was only 
a short step to a situation where Europeans began treating the Samoans 
as a second­class race, a hindrance to the developm ent of commerce, 
and an exploitable com m odity.
European interests soon began to attem pt to dictate the outcom e of 
Samoan district rivalries in a way m ost favourable to themselves. In 
1869 the London M issionary Society and the foreign consuls interfered 
in the Tafa’ifa titles dispute between M alietoa Talavou and M alietoa 
Laupepa. Inter­district war followed inevitably until 1873, when, by 
mission entreaties and consular intervention, once again an uneasy 
peace was secured. But Sam oan allegiances were now deeply divided 
between the two Sä M alietoa parties. In quick succession there followed 
an abortive republican experim ent under an Am erican prem ier and, 
from 1876 to 1881, a new war between M alietoa Laupepa and M alietoa 
Talavou.
The exigencies of warfare led to the growth of a vigorous arms trade 
operated by the planters and land speculators now crowding into Apia. 
Ridiculously large am ounts of land were alienated from the Samoans 
for guns and am m unition, and fraudulent practices were the order of 
the day on both sides. By 1880 American and British interests laid claim 
to 185 000 hectares of land th roughout the group; Godeffroys, the old 
G erm an firm under Theodor W eber, claimed 61 500 hectares on Upolu 
alone. Only a quarter of this had been purchased with cash— largely 
with debased Chilean dollars— the rest was acquired in guns and kind 
at enorm ously inflated prices. W eber was no more scrupulous than his 
com petitors, but he was a far more m ethodical m an. Careful to 
reinforce title by effective occupation, he founded large copra and 
cotton p lantations in north­w estern U polu, and im ported native labour
\
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from  the G ilberts and M elanesia to work them since the Samoans could 
no t be induced to do p lantation  labour at an ‘econom ic’ wage rate.
By the 1880s, Germany was the power least trusted*by the Samoans, 
as G erm an m erchants were ruthless in seeking conditions favourable 
to the developm ent of their lands and business. Godeffroy’s strict 
occupation  of land, the use of G erm an gunboats to overcome resistance 
to occupation , the dependence of the Islanders on C om pany credit, a nd 
the im portation  of M elanesian labour were all objects of Samoan 
resentm ent. G erm any’s political capital was not improved when it 
appropriated  two harbours in 1879 in order to extract a ‘treaty of 
friendship and commerce’ from the Samoans. Britain had already 
secured a similar treaty voluntarily. There had always been a historical 
and perhaps tem peram ental preference for the English, and Apia was 
all bu t a British colony in appearance, com position and m anner. The 
G erm ans, despite their commercial preponderance, gave the impression 
of being outsiders. Very few considered Apia their hom e; m ost were 
employees of ‘the Firm ’ and intended to leave Samoa as soon as they 
had m ade some money.
Two distinct centres of power had by now crystallised in Samoa: the 
chiefs in their districts, and the M unicipality in Apia. The M unicipality 
\w a s  form ed in 1879 to protect the infrastructure of trade built up by 
(foreigners, and to regulate relations between the Samoans and the 
»Europeans. Interactions between these two groups were determined 
/  thereafter largely by the conflict of interests within each. Rivalries 
■ am ong the consuls who now assumed com m and in the M unicipality 
evenly m atched Samoan intrigues in the districts: the governing ability 
of this European oligarchy was regularly impeded by m utually 
incom patible instructions from Home Offices, and by the tendency of 
incum bents to take m atters into their own hands when any problems 
arose bearing in any way on national interests.4
The m ajor problem was, of course, the continual political distur­
bances am ong the Samoans themselves. T hroughout the 1880s, settlers 
and consuls threw their weight behind whichever Samoan party seemed 
m ost capable of creating a semblance of European­style order. Mis­ 
I construing the essentially delicate balance between the param ountcy 
J and the powers of chiefly groups in the various districts, the Europeans 
I contrived to establish a centralised m onarchical regime which would 
j be able to control all Samoans. To strengthen one of the parties 
sufficiently to hold the others in order, arms were constantly dispensed 
to the warring factions by different national interests. For their part, the
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Samoan district factions encouraged such European interference where 
it aided their candidates in the com petition for the Tafa’ifa titles. It is 
impossible to determ ine the exact num bers of firearms in the possession 
of Samoans during these years, bu t the DHPG adm itted in 1886 that 
it had supplied 467 rifles to the Islanders between January  and October, 
declaring that it could have been thousands m ore had the com pany not 
had the peace of the group at heart. The same year, non­G erm an firms 
were rum oured to have sold 700 rifles in full view of the M unicipality, 
while m any more were smuggled in through outlying harbours.5 None 
of the attem pts made in the 1880s and 1890s to regulate the flow of 
arms into Samoa worked because of the m utual suspicions of the three 
Powers.
In N ovem ber 1884, the G erm an Consul, Stuebel, forced upon 
M alietoa Laupepa a treaty designed to give Germ any overriding 
influence in the conduct of native affairs. W hen the chief ignored the 
treaty, as was Samoan custom with agreements which hedged their 
fundam ental political freedom s, Stuebel used it as a pretext to drive him 
from the seat of Samoan governm ent at M ulinu’u and raise the flag of 
the G erm an Empire. His coup, however, was repudiated by Bismarck 
who was hopeful of obtaining Samoa through negotiations with the 
other two Powers. A firm negative stand by America thw arted Bis­
m arck’s hope however, and, together with continuing damage to 
G erm an interests through Samoan fighting, this provoked Berlin into 
approving unilateral action by her local representatives. W ar was 
declared on M alietoa Laupepa and he was deported on a G erm an 
warship. In his place the Germ ans installed Tamesese T upua, who 
accepted alignm ent with G erm any as an effective means of checking the 
aspirations of a new contender for the Tafa’ifa titles, M a ta ’afa Josefo, 
also of the Sä Tupuä lineage.
Tamasese T u p u a’s regime, under the tutelage of a former employee 
of the D HPG, Eugen Brandeis, was very soon discredited in the eyes of 
Samoans and non­G erm an Europeans by the methods it used to 
eliminate political opposition and to impose the dem ands of a cen­
tralised governm ent on the decentralised Islanders. A revolt, with 
M a ta ’afa Josefo at its head, broke out in 1888, and the G erm an navy 
found itself hard pressed to cope. In an attem pt by G erm an marines in 
December 1888 to disarm  a party  of rebels near Vailele plantation , 
sixteen Germ ans were killed and over thirty wounded in a well­executed 
am bush by M a ta ’afa Josefo’s forces.
This event rather upset all the previous European assum ptions about
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Samoan powers of resistance. Bewildered Germ an officers and other 
eye­witnesses com m ented on the apparently ‘un­Sam oan’ action of 
firing on G erm ans. The ferocity of M a ta ’afa Josefo’s attack was 
rationalised by blam ing ‘a white Am erican’ at the head of the Samoan 
troops for firing the first shot and encouraging others to do likewise.6 
The German set­back contributed greatly to the growing movement 
towards resolution of the international conflict by negotiation. The final 
result was the Berlin Conference of 1889. A diplom atic rather than a 
realistic solution to the ethnic and political confusion in Samoa, this 
whole exercise simply converted the dangerous imperialist rivalries of 
the three Powers into a delicate balance of interests. The fiction of an 
autonom ous Sam oan kingship was preserved, and the tribunal of 
consuls was replaced by a tribunal of specially­created international 
officials. The arrangem ent was m eant to function as a tridom inium , but 
the retention of a m onarchical concept for which Samoa was not well 
suited only perpetuated the political confusion and provided the 
leverage by which the various Samoan factions continued to exploit 
European power in their own interests.
The sequence of Samoan initiative and European response continued 
when M ata’afa Josefo was deported in 1893 for rebellion against the 
established regime of M alietoa Laupepa. His adherents, the real 
‘kingm akers’, carried on the struggle in his name, skilfully m anipulating 
the shifts of power and alliance within the European com m unity, and 
growing stronger and more uncontrolled. W hile the navies of the 
Powers in conjunction probably prevented the disquiet from boiling 
over into a general conflagration, the measure of their control was 
strictly limited, extending little further than the range of their deck 
artillery. The Germ ans, in particular, acknowledged that if the Samoans 
withdrew to the bush, where they could live off the land and move with 
a facility that eluded European troops, the naval forces’ tenuous control 
would vanish com pletely.7
It was brought home vividly in 1898 when, after the death of 
M alietoa Laupepa, M alietoa Tanum afili I and the newly­returned 
M ata’afa Josefo contested the Tafa’ifa titles. The weight of Samoan 
preference clearly lay with M ata’afa Josefo, but, in a surprise move, the 
European Chief Justice of the tripartite  adm inistration declared his 
opponent ‘king’. At this point all European pretension to control of the 
situation broke down. M ata’afa Josefo’s huge body of supporters, 
which included the districts of Atua, A’ana and half of Savai’i, rose up 
against the party  of M alietoa Tanum afili I in a civil war of unequalled
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ferocity, for M a ta ’afa Josefo, spurned by the very powers that claimed 
to be preserving Samoan autonomy, was fighting for a decade of lost 
rights. His ability to marshal a large force behind him was due in great 
measure to the support of the leading orator chief of Safotulafai, and 
thus the virtual spokesman for Savai’i, Lauaki N am ulau’ulu M am oe.8 
Lauaki traditionally supported the Sä M alietoä  lineage, but he 
despaired at the indecisiveness of Britain in refusing, time and time 
again, to give a watertight guarantee to the Malietoa regimes despite 
their English sympathies. In 1898 he decided to give his allegiance to 
M a ta ’afa josefo as the only hope for uniting and stabilising Samoa in 
the face of foreign intervention. In so doing he demonstrated a power 
to mobilise sentiment and a political flexibility which, ten years later, 
made him the scourge of the German government.
The American navy led the operations on behalf of the legally­con­
stituted monarch, Malietoa Tanumafili I, while Germany, in a defensive 
bid to arrest the decline of her influence in the group, threw her weight 
behind M a ta ’afa Josefo. Open engagements with the Anglo­American 
forces were studiously avoided. However, when the Americans 
pounded M a ta ’afa Josefo’s villages with artillery fire, the rebels 
attacked the European lines in Apia itself and killed three sailors. In 
addition, they ambushed a party of troops which attempted to pursue 
them into the interior in April 1899, forcing the soldiers into a hasty 
and disorganised retreat and leaving three officers and several men 
killed and decapitated. It was an indication of what might be expected 
if the campaign deteriorated into guerrilla warfare. Mission societies 
provided a refuge for non­combatants and dispensed medical care to 
the wounded of both sides. Though both major missions, the London 
Missionary Society and the Marists, officially maintained a discreet 
neutrality, Samoan pastors of the London Missionary Society did 
appeal to Lauaki in early 1899 to use his considerable influence in the 
cause of peace. Lauaki refused. ‘We have not been a party to war with 
the Powers’, he responded. ‘We do not wish to resist. But we have the 
right to claim the privilege of free men and ask to be told plainly what 
is to be our future status.’9
A move in this direction was made when a Three­Power Commission 
was despatched to Samoa the same year. It brought about a temporary 
cease­fire, and both Malietoa Tanumafili I and M a ta ’afa Josefo were 
persuaded to renounce permanently future claims to the ‘kingship’, 
though their acquiescence was more a gesture of goodwill than a 
renunciation of traditional political ambitions. Meanwhile Britain and
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Germany were conducting negotiations concerned with tidying up loose 
ends of empire. Influenced by a recent naval assessment as to the greater 
strategic importance of Tonga, Britain agreed to waive her claims to 
Samoa in favour of Germany. Subsequently America agreed to the 
German annexation of Upolu, Savai’i and M anono, with Tutuila 
becoming an American dependency. The solution was greeted with 
great joy in the Reich, where Samoa had been elevated to the status of 
a test case of the new Weltpolitik: Samoa had come to be considered 
an indispensable jewel in the crown of German prestige.
The solution to the international destiny of Samoa did not exorcise the 
difficulties that Germany faced in Samoa itself. The Islanders had at first 
shown signs of resenting the partition of the islands. A High Chief of 
the Malietoa line sent a petition of protest to the Kaiser, and the chiefs 
of Safotulafai— significantly enough, Lauaki’s political base— refused 
to hold a fon o  to greet the news, in the mistaken belief that the United 
States was about to veto the agreement.10 By early 1900, however, these 
initial reservations had been overcome and the parties of both great 
lineages declared their acceptance of German dominion before the flag 
was raised.
On the part of M a ta ’afa Josefo and his adherents there was a great 
deal of sympathy for Germany in 1899­1900, but it was rooted in 
gratitude for support in the recent civil war rather than in an inherent 
predilection for German culture and hegemony. M a ta ’afa Josefo’s 
supporters reasoned that Germany’s capacity to help during the war 
had been restricted by the provisions of the Berlin Conference of 1889. 
Now that Samoa was German, there was nothing to stop her from 
recognising M a ta ’afa Josefo as Tupu Sili, or supreme chief, and his 
faithful band of chiefs and speakers as the M alo, the government of 
Samoa.
There was no doubt that M a ta ’afa Josefo was the Chosen One of the 
majority of Samoans. Since the late 1880s he had been the focus and 
inspiration of a purely Samoan movement in opposition to the candi­
dates favoured by the Powers. Despite his own renunciation of the 
‘monarchy’, his chiefs and speakers had never relinquished their right 
to choose, or more exactly to create, a ‘King of Samoa’ according to 
recent tradition, and to have their creation installed in M ulinu’u. 
Accordingly, before the German flag was raised, M a ta ’afa Josefo, under 
the tutelage of Lauaki, called an assembly of the Tanu people to effect 
a reconciliation, and a government was set up with M a ta ’afa Josefo and
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thirteen chiefs claiming widespread executive powers. Residing in 
M ulinu’u and styling themselves ‘the rulers of Samoa’, this band 
proceeded to collect taxes and issue regulations concerning Samoans 
and Europeans alike.
There was little Germany could do. In 1900 M a ta ’afa Josefo’s party 
still represented the strongest military force in the Samoan islands. It 
numbered some 2500 and was in a state of perpetual mobilisation, 
armed to the teeth with Western firearms. The Germans possessed one 
small cruiser which occasionally visited the islands, and two decades 
of erratic naval intervention had diminished.considerably any deterrent 
effect such a warship could hope to have on the local population; there 
were no colonial troops beyond a largely­decorative force of thirty 
Samoan police (FitaRta) designed to keep order within the Municipal­
ity. Drawn from the young men of the more important families, the 
FitaRta was employed to do mechanical tasks for the administration, 
such as sentry duty and dispatch­carrying. Later on, the corps came to 
be regarded as a symbol of the interdependent relationship between 
Samoa and Germany, but in 1900 it offered no guarantee of security 
against sectarian violence.
Half a century of European penetration had not cowed the Samoans, 
nor had the traditional culture and its reinforcing values undergone any 
radical dislocation. At village and district level, established power elites 
were still very much in control of social and political activities, and they 
were extremely jealous of their prerogatives. Germany was faced with 
the problem of establishing a colonial relationship with a people who 
had never really accepted the premise of subjection as Europeans 
conceived it. As Herr Meyer­Delius, local head of the DHPG advised, 
it was a situation requiring freedom for the Samoans in their own 
administration and a governor who was not only purposeful in his 
methods but experienced in handling the Islanders.11
The man whom the Colonial Department chose for the task was 
Wilhelm Solf, then head of the provisional government instituted by the 
three Powers in 1899. Solf was a distinct departure from the usual 
German colonial official. Better educated than the majority of his 
service colleagues, a man of the world familiar with British colonial 
policy from his experience in India, Solf felt altogether superior to the 
more middle­class, nationalistic, somewhat pettifogging German 
administrator. He brought to Samoa a natural respect for the intrinsic 
value of exotic cultures and a readiness to deal with the Samoans on 
their own terms. Above all, he renounced force as a means of
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im plem enting policy. ‘All radical measures are evil. Time and goodness 
and justice are the best means of governing in Sam oa’, was his firm 
conviction.12 Together with the qualities which Samoans associated 
with leadership— an imposing presence, paternal interest, and the 
power of rhetoric— Solf’s attitude was well suited to the social and 
political conceptions of the inhabitants.
Solf was convinced, as had been the International Commission before 
him , tha t nothing short of a m ajor transform ation of the traditional 
political system would guarantee peaceful developm ent. If the custo­
mary system of factional rivalries continued to operate independently 
of the G erm an governm ent, then a constant state of uneasy peace would 
degenerate into civil war at M ata’afa Josefo’s death, with disastrous 
results to p lan tation  agriculture and trade, which was already at a low 
ebb after two decades of unrest. Solf set himself three immediate 
objectives: to reconcile the opposing parties, to abolish the ‘kingship’, 
and to break the power of the chiefs and speakers presum ing to speak 
as the governm ent of Samoa. A longer­term aim was gradually to shift 
the concentration of indigenous political interest from national to local 
level and in this way undermine the durability of political parties. Solf 
possessed a conception of an ancient Sam oan ‘parish’ organisation and 
political system which he believed would elim inate the unstable influ­
ence of the Samoan districts. He envisaged a return  to a Golden Age 
which had no interest in national politics.13
In the early m onths of 1900, however, Solf was powerless to 
implement his plans in the face of the superior power and influence of 
M ata ’afa Josefo and his thirteen chiefs in M ulinu’u. In the weeks 
following the flag­raising, they badgered Solf with questions about the 
date and form ation of a new governm ent, and, led by Lauaki, pressed 
for a one­party adm inistration that acknowledged M ata ’afa Josefo’s 
sovereign position. M ata’afa Josefo himself warned Solf that a failure 
to recognise him as Tupu Sili would be construed by his followers as 
‘disregard of a long­established right’ and could endanger the peace.14 
It was clear that ‘the th irteen’ considered G erm any simply to be 
assuming the former functions of the tripartite  regime, and that the 
G overnor was obviously a High Chief sent out by the Kaiser to 
complete, together with M ata’afa Josefo and his chiefs, the governing 
power, M alo o Samoa.
Solf waited for instructions from Berlin, though he knew it was futile 
to expect his resources to be increased substantially. In the W ilhelm­
strasse, Samoa was regarded as a windfall colony: a ready­m ade,
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productive, going concern on the periphery of the overseas empire. 
Since the Director of the Colonial D epartm ent was responsible to a 
Reichstag which guarded jealously its right to examine the colonial 
budget, Berlin’s first concern was for economy of adm inistration in the 
colonies. There was a particular reluctance to underw rite expansion in 
the Pacific where the empire seemed so insignificant and potentially 
unrew arding in com parison with Africa and China. Consequently Solf, 
like his colleagues in New Guinea and M icronesia, had little but moral 
authority  on which to fall back in trying to sustain his regime. W hen 
instructions had not arrived by April, Solf took m atters into his own 
hands, in the m anner of the consuls before him. But, unlike them , he 
could act with com parative freedom  as the sole, legitimate, foreign 
authority  in western Samoa. Unlike m ost of them , too, Solf was capable 
of creating virtue ou t of political necessity and of organising a system 
which served his ends while seeming to serve those of the Samoan high 
chiefs.
Accordingly, on 11 April 1900 he announced the institution of a new 
Sam oan governm ent with the Kaiser as Tupu Sili, Solf as his principal 
delegate in Samoa and M a ta ’afa Josefo as A li’iSili, or param ount chief, 
‘the channel through which the wishes and orders of the governm ent 
are conveyed to the Sam oans’.15 As an auxiliary to this office, and to 
disarm  those chiefs who regarded themselves as the true Malo, a 
bipartisan council of advisers to M a ta ’afa Josefo was set up— the 
Faipule—which was to contain chiefs of both royal lineages together 
with district representatives. Finally, the existing Samoan judicial 
establishm ent was retained, and provision was made for indigenous 
adm inistrative officers ranking from district chiefs to village policemen. 
Lauaki N am ulau’ulu M am oe was prom inent am ong the appointees to 
the Faipule. Indeed the London M issionary Society complained tha t ‘all 
the old row dies’ had obtained high positions in the new governm ent.16
The position of A li’i Sili and a central governm ent in M ulinu’u were 
not part of Solf’s ideal plan for Sam oan politics; nor, for that m atter, 
was a local adm inistration based on the districts, the historic centres 
of m obilisation for political intrigue. Solf harboured plans to abolish 
all of these institutions when the time was right. He anticipated 
difficulties, especially from ‘th a t body of indolent intriguers’ as he called 
the Tumua and Pule chiefs who were constantly scheming over the 
Tafa’ifa titles issue,17 and they did not disappoint him as they became 
aware of his real political intentions. In the m eantim e, Solf was able to 
consolidate his adm inistration by capitalising on the first flush of
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co­operation th a t followed his apparen t subm ission to the desires of 
M a ta ’afa Josefo’s party , and on w idespread satisfaction tha t peace 
finally prevailed in the islands. In M ay 1900 the Colonial D epartm ent 
accorded him a great deal of freedom ‘to  determ ine the m anner in which 
the question of native adm inistration will be best solved while m ain­
taining peace and o rd e r’.18
The m ost urgent problem  was the disarm am ent of the population. 
N one of the attem pts made by the three Powers to control the num ber 
of arm s in the possession of the Sam oans had been successful until the 
International Com m ission in 1899 recom m ended the principle of 
financial com pensation, the cost to be m et by the Three Powers. The 
first experim ent took  place the same year and netted 3410 firearms. 
N o­one doubted th a t the Islanders still retained considerable quantities 
of guns and am m unition , nor that a com plete restructuring of the 
custom s system was necessary if shipm ents of arms were to be prevented 
from  reaching the Sam oans in the future. The prom ised com pensation 
m oney for 1899 (about US$41 000) finally arrived in 1900, but Solf 
delayed its d istribution  until December, by which time he had carried 
through the necessary reforms and had the arms trade under control. 
Shortly afterw ards, he announced tha t all further arms and am m unition 
were to be surrendered against paym ent by 31 January  1901. It was a 
discerning move, designed to exploit the m om entary euphoria of the 
Sam oans at receiving the promised cash after so long. By m id­February 
the people had delivered up m ost of the rem aining hoard , some 1500 
guns.19
A num ber of o ther elements of colonial control and developm ent 
were introduced w ithout resistance in the first two years of Germ an rule. 
In August 1900 Solf prom ulgated an ordinance directing every Samoan 
‘landow ner’ (the matai) to plant fifty coconuts annually on unused 
land, in order to offset the decline in production  over the preceding 
• years. Samoan ‘p lan ta tion  inspectors’ were appointed to supervise the 
process. Samoans were also obligated to m aintain public roads in their 
localities with tools supplied by the governm ent, and the custom ary 
I right of eviction of the defeated party  in a district by the victorious was 
outlawed.
The final link in the chain of regulations was a poll tax, levied from 
late January 1901. A dult males were required to pay four marks 
annually, later raised to twelve, then to twenty­four m arks for matai, 
and the tax yield rose each year: from 40 000 m arks in 1901 to 211 000 
m arks in 1912.20 The head tax was the only one of these early
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regulations to encounter some resistance, for Samoans openly dis­
trusted the whites where money was concerned. Solf was able to obtain 
the chiefs’ agreem ent only after conceding to their dem and that it be 
used solely for the upkeep of the Sam oan adm inistration and not for 
the white com m unity. Until 1905, at least, the Sam oan adm inistrative 
system was tied closely to the head tax revenue, and the size of official 
salaries was made dependent upon the am ount collected. Then, in 1908, 
resentm ent over the poll tax and the G overnor’s use of the revenue 
played a prom inent role in the great confrontation  between Solf and the 
old chiefs, which had been threatening from the early years of Germ an 
rule.
The political com plications which Solf predicted in 1900 did not take 
long to emerge. For a start, there were substantial practical difficulties 
in the operation  of his ‘self­governing’ local adm inistration. Despite the 
appointm ent of functionaries who already possessed local authority , 
and the protection of matai from pressures to support intrigues beyond 
their villages, the fact was tha t Samoan officials were expected to pursue 
European objectives which were governed by G erm an colonial policy 
and legal practice. They had to collect taxes, supervise road m ain­
tenance and coconut planting, and m aintain G erm an conceptions of 
law and order. These actions often clashed with Sam oan ideas of law 
and order, and with their habit of discussing and debating dem ands on 
\ com m unity resources. M oreover, in judging criminal acts, W estern law,
; unlike Sam oan custom , made no allowance for the respective social 
position of offender and offended, nor did it recognise the civil wrong 
suffered by the relatives of the victim. The contradictions with which 
individuals were faced were reflected in the high turnover of Samoan 
I officers between 1900 and 1905, either through dismissal or ro tation . 
Dismissals m ost often followed instances of dictatorial behaviour by 
I village ‘m ayors’ (pulenu'u) and district m agistrates (faam asino).
Threats to the new system came also from established chiefs in 
M ulinu’u and in individual districts, who assumed au thority  over 
newly­appointed officials on the grounds tha t they— the chiefs— were 
the true representatives of traditional custom , prestige and influence 
(fa ’a Samoa). From the beginning Solf had been forced to create the post 
of district chief ( Taitai Itu) to placate a num ber of dissatisfied elites. His 
final objective, however, was to abolish these positions, and several 
others, so as to have as few ‘middle m en’ as possible between himself 
and his European district officers.21
A more serious th reat to the G overnor’s entire juggling act occurred
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after 1900­01 as the chiefs of the M ulinu’u Malo  began to recognise 
the divergence between the form of political power conceded to them 
and the real intentions of the G erm an governm ent. Shortly after the new 
Sam oan adm inistration had been founded, a house of Taimua was 
created at M ulinu’u, consisting of the principal contenders for high 
Sam oan titles from both of the leading families. Seemingly it was m eant 
to encourage, in the minds of Samoans, the idea tha t com petition for 
the great titles of the land now had no m eaning, and that governm ent 
service should thenceforward be the highest aspiration of the prom inent 
families. This did not at all accord with the expectations of the M alo : 
the Taimua was a body quite foreign to Sam oan custom.
The M aid’s conviction that it was being stripped of its powers was 
strengthened by M ata ’afa Josefo’s obvious subjection to Solf. Though 
the G overnor was careful to protect M a ta ’afa Josefo’s dignity and 
always to use him as the official m outhpiece of the adm inistration, 
M a ta ’afa Josefo’s image was sullied more and more by his identification 
with measures which were new to the chiefs and contrary to custom. 
The m ost radical of these included the rem oval of Samoan responsi­
bility for the financial affairs of the Malo, and Solf’s division of several 
traditional districts into independent adm inistrative units, thus splitting 
the political support which ‘royal’ candidates could norm ally expect.22
D issatisfaction was aggravated by the presence within M ata ’afa 
Josefo’s party  of traditional, non­M ata’afan elements, especially Saf­ 
otulafai of Fa’asaleleaga in Savai’i. Safotulafai was the spiritual centre 
of Pule and usually pro­M alietoan. But in 1898, under Lauaki’s 
influence, and in order to increase the chances of Samoan unity, 
Safotulafai had opted for M ata ’afa Josefo. The chiefs of Safotulafai 
were well aware that the support of their district had given M ata’afa 
Josefo his overwhelming strength in 1898­99, and that they held a 
virtual balance of power in the new coalition of parties under Solf.
Lauaki was one of the first to read Solf’s design. O utw ardly he was 
a Samoan who manifested a confident acceptance of European civili­
sation. A devout adherent of the London M issionary Society and 
deacon of the local church, Lauaki moved easily am ong Europeans. He 
recognised and accepted the benefits of the E uropean economy; he even 
named his son Tivoli after a hotel in A pia.23 Internally, however, 
Lauaki’s life was guided by tradition. He had made and broken high 
chiefs in the era of the Three Powers, and skilfully exploited the la tte r’s 
rivalries to gain benefits for his party and candidate. M ore than any 
other tulafale, Lauaki embodied the highest values of Samoa in his
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knowledge of custom and his skill in politics, and he remained com­
mitted to the cause of Sä Malietoä and to the prerogatives of the Tumua 
and Pule chiefs.
M a ta ’afa Josefo’s alliance was therefore an uneasy one, with Lauaki 
and his district acting as power brokers. Increasingly, confrontations 
between the Malo and Solf became confrontations between Lauaki and 
Solf, though the ultim ate crisis was still some seven years away. But in 
1903 it was already whispered around th a t Lauaki had issued a warning 
against the G overnor and his subtle ways. He acknowledged th a t Solf 
was a good m an, but added tha t he was ‘too tricky’ for Samoans:
At first he cuts up all the different districts so as to weaken them, 
and takes away gradually the power from the Taitailtu, and lastly, 
he deprives the Sam oans of the high position of Faamasino Sili 
[Chief Samoan M agistrate]. After this the G overnor will even take 
away the position of Le A li’i Sili, so tha t no higher office remains 
for the Samoan people.24
At this stage Solf did not dare move against Lauaki because of the 
chief’s power and Solf’s own obvious lack of it. Fear of passive, if not 
active, resistance made the Germ ans very cautious in their early 
relations with the Malo, despite provocation. D uring Solf’s absence in 
1902, Lauaki and the Faipule organised a strike by Samoan road 
workers for better pay and food, with the apparen t purpose of intimi­
dating Solf’s deputy Heinrich Schnee into granting the Faipule a salary; 
they hoped thus to legitimise their occupation of M ulinu’u as imperial 
officials. Schnee stood his ground, knowing the G overnor’s desire to see 
the Malo dispersed, bu t he made no move to punish anyone for the 
disturbance, in fear of disaffecting the m ost powerful chiefs and 
speakers.25 It was no t until 1903 th a t Solf risked his first m ajor 
confrontation with the Malo, when he exiled two o ra to r chiefs to 
H erbertshöhe, one for preaching the hope of British annexation, the 
other for inciting his people to m urder. The th reat of deportation  had 
always been a powerful argum ent in tripartite  times, and G erm any had 
early established a reputation  for quick and determ ined action in such 
circumstances.
A new threat to Solf arose from a different quarter in 1902. In that 
year the white population  of Samoa increased dram atically as a num ber 
of im m igrants with very limited capital arrived from  G erm any to try 
their hand at p lan tation  agriculture, several retired m ilitary officers 
am ong them. They had been influenced directly by one R ichard Deeken, 
a young artillery officer in the G erm an Reserve, who visited Samoa
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briefly in 1901 and proceeded to write an extravagant and superficial 
account of the opportunities that awaited the small settler with 
moderate capital.26 The impact his fertile imagination had on people 
was reinforced by mounting propaganda in Germany in favour of 
occupying the colonies with small capital holdings. Deeken founded a 
p lantation company, the Deutsche Samoa Gesellschaft (DSG), to 
compete with the DHPG, and in August 1902 he returned to Samoa as 
its director.
The new settlers were quickly disillusioned. They had been led to 
expect abundant land ideal for growing cocoa. The reality was far less 
hopeful. At Solf’s invitation, an agricultural scientist, Dr F. Wohlt­ 
mann, came out to Samoa in 1902­03 to assess its proper agricultural 
potential. W ohltmann concluded that Samoan soil was already con­
siderably worked ou t and that only four per cent of it was suitable for 
cocoa cultivation, of which half was already being used by the Samoans 
for their own crops. A prospective settler would need at least 50 000 
marks, he estimated, and must still cope with high land prices and 
labour costs. In addition, settlers had to confront the formidable 
competition of the DHPG, which in 1900 already possessed 82 hectares 
of cocoa besides its lucrative thousands of hectares of mature coconut 
plants dating from the 1880s. The old firm’s most telling advantage lay 
in its privileged access to cheap Melanesian labour from the Bismarck 
Archipelago. As if this were not enough, the first settlers had to endure 
a drought in 1902, and try to acquire leasehold land from the Samoans 
who were withholding leases in the hope of inflated prices. It is little 
wonder that in 1903 W ohltmann found twenty­five of forty­six small 
planters urgently in need of government aid.27
They received scant sympathy from the Governor, who had done his 
best to correct the fanciful impressions of a colonial planting life in 
Samoa. As their early expectations were disappointed and their capital 
depleted, the small settlers became increasingly militant and chauvi­
nistic, and at last turned on the government. Deeken, who was also 
discovering that the land and labour monopoly of the DHPG was 
virtually impregnable, gathered the dissidents around him in a Planters’ 
Society (Pflanzerverein) which was founded in January 1903.
Deeken found a constant source of provocation in the intimate 
collaboration between Solf and the DHPG. ‘The Firm’ was the heir to 
the oldest German company in Samoa, Godeffroys, and had operated 
an extensive trade and plantation business throughout two decades of 
civil war. Its metropolitan directors were all old ‘Samoa hands’, familiar
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with the people, their customs, and their limits of tolerance. 3y 1900 
the major conflicts between the company’s exploitation of Sanoa and 
its social concern had been resolved, and a relationship quickly 
developed with Solf which was characterised by mutual respect and 
support. Solf was careful to uphold the firm’s monopoly of lane, labour 
and trade, not only against local enemies but also against the attacks 
of Governor Hahl in New Guinea, who was pressuring Berlin to curtail 
the D H PG ’s recruiting privileges in the Bismarck Archipelago. In 
return, Solf could count on the company’s support for his p ’Otective 
native policy, and there is no doubt that the pattern of his rule was 
strengthened by the friendship of men who had spent decades trying to 
establish orderly community relations in the Samoan islands.
In 1903­04 the Governor was in very real need of the DHPG’s 
influence in Berlin, for Deeken used his position as president of the 
Pflanzerverein to launch a campaign against Solf’s administration. 
Deeken was able to mobilise considerable influence in Germany 
through close contacts in the Catholic Centre Party (Zentrunspartei), 
and a press attack was orchestrated, alleging that Solf had done nothing 
for the small planters since the flag­raising, that he was pandering to 
the political whims of the Samoans, and that the administrstion was 
extravagant in its expenditure. There was even talk of a plai by Solf 
to deport twelve colonists and their families from Samoa. Deeken’s 
proposed solution was to replace Solf’s regime with a military cne which 
would be more attentive to the ‘demands’ of colonial development.28
It did not take long for the unrest in the white community to percolate 
through to the Samoans. In the Pflanzerverein Deeken had hspired a 
resolution that the Samoans be compelled to work for Europeans at 
least eight months of the year. In June 1903 the chiefs of he Alalo  
petitioned Solf to save them from its implications since it wa; Samoan 
custom ‘that no one on these islands should perform servile labour’.29
The Governor had no intention of dragooning Samoans into p lan­
tation labour for the likes of Deeken, knowing as he did that tne people 
were quite capable of effective counter­action: at the very best, copra 
cutting would cease, white traders would be boycotted, and tie people 
would revert to subsistence agriculture. Since the export/irrport eco­
nomy depended on Samoan production and consumption, the financial 
ruin of European business would inevitably follow. At ^vorst the 
Samoans might rise in armed rebellion.
Solf was fortunate in having the support of the DHPG on this 
question. With privileged access to the recruiting grounds of Melanesia,
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the com pany’s interest lay in the Samoans as trading partners, not as 
a labour force.30 Nevertheless, there was a definite increase in inter­ 
communal tensions, and Solf predicted that 1904 would bring further 
discontent in view of the projected poor copra harvest and sinking 
world prices. This would be grist to Deeken’s mill.
By now Solf was a bitter enemy of Deeken and his clique of small 
planters. His liberal, cosmopolitan paternalism and Deeken’s pan­ 
German philosophy of colonial exploitation were irreconcilable. 
Deeken conceived of colonies simply as economic appendages to the 
fatherland, and considered that colonial resources and manpower were 
meant to benefit industrious settlers. Solf, while he did not despise the 
economic ethic, hated its apotheosis. Colonial development was, to 
1 him, a process in which the economic prosperity of European settlers 
should be balanced by the preservation and encouragement of the local 
Islanders. Solf therefore refused to treat the Samoans as an exploitable 
commodity, considering their cultural achievements worthy of parti­
cular respect. There was a more practical reason too. A reading of 
Samoan history persuaded the Governor that the Islanders would not 
be bullied into subjection, and that foolishness, irresolution or excess 
on the part of the German regime would lead to passive resistance and 
general anti­white hostility. Before Deeken arrived, Solf had been 
working to convince the Colonial Department that he could guide the 
Samoans in the desired direction by a non­militant policy of close 
contact with them at village level.
Deeken presented a direct threat to the Governor’s image in Berlin, 
and to the patriarchal authority which he was assiduously building up 
with the Samoans. In late 1903, Solf warned the Colonial Department 
of the dangers which an opposition of ‘Catholics, pan­Germans, the 
disillusioned and the dissatisfied’ presented in the young colony, and 
in desperation pleaded with the Department to put pressure on the 
Deutsche Samoa Gesellschaft to have Deeken removed. He even 
declared himself prepared to resort to deportation if the occasion 
warranted.
But neither entreaties nor threats moved Berlin, which remained very 
cautious of Deeken’s influence in the Reichstag, and the Governor had 
to wait until early 1904 for a chance to rid himself of his bete noire. The 
chance came when Deeken was involved in suspicions of fraud con­
cerning his company’s first shipment of Chinese coolies to arrive in 
Samoa as plantation labour; Solf immediately revoked the company’s 
recruiting permission. Provoked, Deeken insinuated that the Governor
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had been inciting his workers against him, after several of the coolies 
complained of maltreatment. Solf responded with a libel action and in 
addition charged Deeken with brutality to his employees. There fol­
lowed a series of legal manoeuvres, smear attacks, calumnies and 
intimidations as Deeken attempted to wriggle out of the charge but he 
was finally brought to trial, and, in June 1904, convicted on two counts 
of assault and one of slander. The court sentenced him to two m onths’ 
imprisonment.
It was during this period that contacts between the settler opposition 
and certain sections of the Samoan community came to light. In June 
the British and American consuls reported several rumours: that the 
Samoans were demanding that M a ta ’afa Josefo should countersign all 
ordinances; that the M alo  be paid a monthly salary; and that it have 
the right to scrutinise quarterly balance sheets showing the details of 
government revenue. Both consuls were convinced that the demands 
could be inspired only by whites. The local newspaper even printed a 
rumour that the Islanders had refused to pay the head tax .31
Solf tried to calm everybody. He admitted the existence of a letter 
from the Faipule in M ulinu’u making imperious demands, and he 
agreed that it was inspired by whites, more specifically by Deeken who 
wished to discomfort the government. In a rare moment of discernment, 
Deeken replied that the Samoans ‘follow proceedings among the whites 
with the closest attention and use them for their own purposes’.32 For 
Solf had failed to consider the possibility that, as the local native 
bureaucracy consolidated its influence, the central government in 
M ulinu’u might seek to exploit dissatisfaction in the white community 
in an effort to offset its increasing loss of influence with the mass of 
Samoans. In this sense, the petition was an attempt to reassert the 
Faipule1 s position, and it is possible that the M ulinu’u chiefs encour­
aged the rumours of unrest in order to wring concessions from the 
administration.
Solf would not be bluffed. As far as he was concerned, only a few of 
the Faipule—Lauaki at their head—would dare to go so far; M a ta ’afa 
Josefo and the majority, he knew, had no heart for the matter. The 
Governor demanded an apology from the body or they would be 
dismissed. He got his apology.33 He was then able to dissuade the 
foreign consuls from reporting trouble to their governments, particu­
larly as it was obvious that the general populace had remained 
completely unaffected by the M aid’s conduct. The captain of a German
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cruiser visiting Samoa in September 1904 endorsed Solf’s view. ‘I gained 
the im pression anew ’, he wrote,
th a t loyalty, confidence in the governm ent, and attachm ent to the 
present representatives of the governm ent are deeply rooted in the 
hearts of the Samoans; that they are contented with their lot and 
tha t they will not hear of rebellion and disturbance unless they are 
misguided and led on.34
The Deeken saga was far from finished with his conviction, for he was 
released immediately on appeal and the old intrigues began again. His 
appeal may well have been upheld thanks to the good offices of Deputy 
T rim born, his uncle in the Reichstag, but, at the last m om ent, when it 
seemed th a t a full pardon might be granted, the Kaiser himself 
intervened on Solf’s behalf and refused to sanction one. Instead 
Deeken’s sentence was com m uted to two m onths’ confinement, and, at 
Solf’s insistence, he was made to serve it in Germ any, at the fortress 
above Koblenz­Ehrenbreitstein. The young reserve officer managed to 
alienate m ost of the fortress personnel during this stay there in 1905. 
In June 1907 he was back in Samoa to take up the reins of his com pany, 
and to continue his campaign to discredit the ‘Solf system’.
The O ioa M ovem ent
In the last m onths of 1904, it became evident that reports suggesting 
the Samoans were generally content with life under the Germans were 
prem ature. The activities of the settler opposition had significantly 
altered the equilibrium of relations between the two racial communities. 
New rum ours were already circulating in September that Solf was in 
disgrace and about to be recalled, while Deeken came to be regarded 
as a powerful figure because he continued to go free in spite of his 
calumnies.
On top of this came the deterioration of the Islanders’ economic 
prospects, as Solf had predicted in 1903. Copra produced by the 
Samoans was the backbone of the export trade, and through it the 
people were able to satisfy their demands for European consumer 
goods, as well as pay the adm inistration’s head tax. The Islanders 
produced well over half the 7614 tonnes of copra exported from the 
colony in 1903­04, but a slump in the world m arket price of copra in 
those years reduced their copra income from eight or nine pfennigs a 
pound to five pfennigs.35 The Samoan com m unity was disgruntled at 
the drop, and Solf only fanned the discontent when he rejected an
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application by the chiefs at M ulinu’u to stabilise the price of copra in 
Samoa at nine pfennigs a pound. Thus, with the chiefs in M ulinu’u 
mortified at the loss of their power, the stage was set for a major 
challenge to the white com m unity. This came when Pullack, a young 
half­caste son of a G erm an customs officer, m ooted the idea of a 
copra­m arketing com pany to be run by Samoans themselves, with its 
own shipping facilities and guaranteeing a high, stable price for copra . 36 
The M ulinu’u chiefs seized on the idea. They believed tha t not only 
would it solve the present copra crisis and help to update the industry, 
bu t also that it was an opportun ity  to acquire the econom ic power 
which, from their observations of European commercial enterprise and 
colonial practice, they perceived to be a prerequisite of political power. 
The Malo immediately began spreading propaganda in favour of the 
idea and ordered tha t every male Samoan was to contribute between 
four and eight m arks (Lafoga Oloa) to the project, which ran under the 
name of the Cumpani or Oloa. To mobilise the widest possible am ount 
of sentim ent, the Cumpani was launched as a patrio tic  venture which 
would em ancipate the Samoans from their ‘slavery’ to the white copra 
traders. Since manifold abuses and deceptions were practised on the 
Samoans by European traders, this approach was calculated to bring 
results. 37
The governm ent became fully aware of the significance of the scheme 
by about December when there was a drastic drop in copra cutting by 
the Samoans. For several reasons, Solf determ ined to pu t a stop to the 
Oloa. First, in com m on with m ost other Europeans in the colony, he 
was convinced that the Samoans did not possess the commercial 
' knowledge or expertise to m ake the scheme viable. Second, it was a 
f challenge to one of the platform s of colonisation— the white trader and 
the European m onopoly of commerce— to which the G overnor at heart 
was com m itted. Third, Solf recognised that it also was a bid by the chiefs 
and speakers in M ulinu’u to make a resolute stand against his projected 
native policy. They had never failed to assert tha t they were the 
‘kingm akers’ of Samoa, with a m andate to carry out the affairs of the 
Samoan adm inistration under the direction of M a ta ’afa Josefo. By 
institutionalising its power in the co­operative, the central governm ent 
m ight have succeeded in regaining influence over the activities of the 
Samoan districts and thus restoring the traditional system of politics 
to which Solf was adam antly opposed. From this perspective the Lafoga 
looked very much like a form of direct taxation , to be used as a lever 
against the G erm an adm inistration.
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Solf reacted quickly, and in early December he journeyed round the 
districts with his officials trying to persuade the people tha t the venture 
was hopelessly utopian. Pullack, who was suspected of preparing a 
m ajor swindle for his own benefit, was deported. However, the M alo  
rem ained defiant, and the district fonos revealed tha t the idea of a 
co­operative had a broad appeal to m ost Samoans, including M ata ’afa 
Josefo. Solf did no t dare to risk a frontal assault. He did strictly prohibit 
the paym ent of any Lafoga­, and he attem pted to break the united front 
of the M ulinu’u chiefs by forbidding all native officials of the adm in­
istration to participate in any way, under the th reat of dismissal. Lauaki 
was even pressured into a promise to ‘assist the governm ent in keeping 
peace and tranquillity ’ by using his influence to tu rn  the m ovem ent into 
more am enable channels.38 By the end of December 1904, these 
dividing tactics had succeeded in discouraging many officials and their 
localities and slowing the flow of funds to the m ovement. Solf, confident 
tha t the affair would soon become a laughing stock as district rivalries 
asserted themselves, em barked on a voyage to New Zealand.
His departure was the signal for the revival of the movement. The 
Oloa had not been forced out of existence at all, merely pushed out of 
sight of the Europeans. Suddenly Solf was in danger of becoming a 
laughing stock himself. Rum ours began circulating tha t Solf was 
involved in a conspiracy with the white traders against Samoan copra 
growers, and, in disgrace, had been recalled by the Kaiser. The pent­up 
frustration  of the M ulinu’u chiefs at Solf’s obstructionist tactics finally 
came into the open. Inspired by a recent petition of the Tutuila natives 
against the Am erican adm inistration, the chiefs addressed a petition to 
the Kaiser himself, complaining that Solf was discrim inating against a 
legal Samoan venture and reiterating their demands for recognition as 
the official organ of native governm ent.39 A new cam paign to solicit 
funds for the Cum pani was led by Lauaki’s brother N am ulau’ulu Pulali 
who claimed that the Governor and his deputy were in favour of the 
scheme. At a large fono  in Fa’asaleleaga on 5 January  1905, one of 
Solf’s appointed village m ayors, M alaeulu, went so far as to threaten 
that if Solf did not consent to the Oloa, the Samoans ‘must scrape his 
body with pipi shells’, and the decision was taken to restart the 
Cumpani.40
The situation looked desperate to Erich Schultz, the Imperial M ag­
istrate and Lands Commissioner who was Solf’s deputy in his absence. 
Aware that he could not risk forceful suppression of the m ovement 
because of the danger of Samoan resistance, he was equally afraid that,
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unless he made an exam ple of the ringleaders, the authority  of the 
Germ an adm inistration would effectively be subverted by the Malo. 
Schultz decided to arrest M alaeulu and N am ulau’ulu Pulali. O n 26 
January they were pu t in Vaimea prison on charges of disturbing the 
peace, spreading false reports and insulting the G overnor, charges 
which were, Schultz was careful to emphasise, fa ’a Samoa liable to 
punishm ent.
The Faipule in M ulinu’u presum ed that the two chiefs had been 
imprisoned for being m embers of the Oloa, and Schultz’s action was 
construed as an unfair belittlem ent of Pule, to which both chiefs 
belonged. Custom dem anded tha t the chiefs’ adherents come to their 
aid. M ata’afa Josefo sent a letter requesting the release of the two men 
since they were only doing the will of the Malo. ‘W hen a white m an has 
been sentenced for any violation of the law ’, he protested, ‘his sentence 
is not executed’41— an obvious reference to D eeken’s case. Before 
Schultz could reply, several chiefs broke into Vaimea prison on 31 
January and freed the prisoners, as a gesture of the independence of the 
Samoan governm ent and in an attem pt to reinforce a sense of 
solidarity.42
In actual fact the unity of the Oloa m ovem ent had been dissolving 
under internal stresses. The non­M ata’afan m embers am ong the Fai­
pule suspected that the adherents of M a ta ’afa Josefo were seeking to 
establish the superiority of their party  through the Cumpani, and they 
made it clear that any attem pt to raise taxes for it by force would be 
met with resistance. The Vaimea incident only had the effect of 
increasing the tensions between the two rival parties, and Schultz began 
to receive declarations of support from the non ­M ata’afans. M a ta ’afa 
Josefo and the m ajority of the chiefs immediately regretted their action, 
and, in a meeting with Schultz the day after, agreed to return M alaeulu 
and N am ulau’ulu Pulali to prison, which they prom ptly did. W ith the 
solidarity of the whole m ovem ent breaking down around them and the 
rum our of Solf’s recall proving untrue, the chiefs feared for the 
consequences of their actions and hoped, by their repentance, to 
appease Solf on his return. Pleading th a t ‘all is due to ignorance on our 
p a rt’, they pressed Schultz for a full pardon  for the two chiefs.43 Schultz 
refused, recognising from his knowledge of fa ’a Samoa, tha t from this 
entire debacle, Solf could extract the grounds he had been seeking to 
remove the M ulinu’u governm ent perm anently.
By the time Solf returned in m id­M arch, the Cumpani virtually had 
shipwrecked itself and the ‘patrio tism ’ of the m ovem ent was a dead
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issue. Solf set about trying to restore his own authority  and break 
perm anently  the influence of the chiefs and speakers in M ulinu’u. In this 
he was assisted by the eagerness of M a ta ’afa Josefo and the chiefs to 
salvage some of their prestige. First they prepared a lavish welcome 
festival for his return , and then they perform ed the traditional cere­
m onial act of atonem ent and self­humiliation (Ifoga) before his house: 
Solf ostentatiously rejected both. Accompanied by the captain and 
officers of SMS Condor, Solf then made a speech in Lufilufi, one of the 
two great political centres of Tum ua , in which he ridiculed the actions 
of the chiefs in fables transparent to every Samoan. He confronted 
M a ta ’afa Josefo with his ‘deceit’ in encouraging the events connected 
with Vaimea and styled the guilty chiefs ‘treacherous rebels’ who were 
fit only for deportation.
It was a shrewd strategy of intim idation entirely in accord with 
Sam oan custom in such circumstances. Ridicule and loss of face, 
particularly  before the public in a hallowed place like Lufilufi, were 
powerful sanctions am ong Samoan elites, so that in June, when Solf 
issued an order that M ulinu’u be vacated, the chiefs com plied; they had 
expected m uch worse.
Solf followed up with an assembly on 14 August in which he 
explained the necessity to dissolve the central governm ent of chiefs and 
speakers because ‘they had proceeded against the decrees of the regime 
whose allies they had been’.44 He also imposed a series of punishm ents 
for individual misdem eanours: M oefaauo and Lauaki, as chief 
representatives of the Tum ua  and Pule were to be deported, though 
Lauaki was later placed on probation  for fear of m aking him a m artyr 
to the Sam oan people; those responsible for the Vaimea incident were 
dismissed from their governm ent posts and fined 1000 m arks; 
M alaeulu lost his position as village mayor while N am ulau’ulu Pulali 
was im prisoned for two m onths. These individual penalties were 
accom panied by a purge of the Samoan judiciary and of certain native 
commissions.
Solf also took the opportunity  to make changes to the Samoan 
adm inistration, changes which would place it entirely in his hands. The 
house of Taimua was abolished and a new salaried council of Faipule 
established, consisting of twenty­seven deputies who were to reside in 
their districts and assemble in M ulinu’u twice a year. Only loyalists and 
those too influential to dismiss were considered for the appointm ents, 
but Solf was careful to select members of both m ajor parties and to 
establish a parity between Protestant and C atholic officials. By limiting
47
Pacific Islanders under German Rule
the number of orator chiefs in the new council to a maximum of seven, 
Solf was able to restrict their influence at the national level. By 
‘promoting’ district governors ( Taitai Itu) to deputies and making 
appointments to sub­districts which traditionally did not hold power, 
he was also able to achieve his original objective of reducing the 
institutional importance of the districts, as well as to create a nucleus 
of supporters dependent on him for their positions.
The new system destroyed completely the fiction of a Samoan ‘self 
administration’ which Solf had cultivated in 1900, using M a ta ’afa 
Josefo as mouthpiece. From now on all appointments emanated from 
the Governor himself and were to be terminated at his discretion, while 
the Faipule were now directly responsible for conveying his orders to 
the pulenu’u of the villages.
The seeds of a new Samoan reaction were sown in these changes of 
1905, for it was clear to the chiefs and speakers that they had lost all 
semblance of independence. Solf made it explicit when, in his speech 
announcing the alterations, he excluded the power cartel of Tumua  and 
Pule from any further say in Samoa’s official future:
. . . there is no room in that Government for Tum ua  and Pule. The 
old fa ’alupenga or formal traditional salutation of Samoa which 
was made use of by the former Council to arrogate power to 
themselves is no longer in existence, and I shall make a law 
forbidding use of that salutation in any meeting.45
But not all initiative had been removed from the chiefs. Solf’s one big 
error of judgment was to allow Lauaki to remain in the islands. Lauaki’s 
colleague, M oefaauo, on the eve of his deportation, had warned Solf 
to get rid of the Savai’i orator  while he could. He claimed vehemently 
that Lauaki was ‘the root of all evil’ in Samoa: ‘He has a sweet tongue 
and [is] a slippery man at tha t— the palagidon’t understand him as well 
as the Samoans d o ’.46 Solf would soon rue M oefaao’s words, for 
Lauaki’s presence was a pledge of continuing resistance to the 
Governor’s politics.
Lauaki had championed consistently the conservative cause against 
Solf. During the Oloa  movement he figured prominently, notably in 
restarting agitation after Solf’s departure and in joining the petition to 
the Kaiser. Some confusion exists about his role in the Vaimea incident, 
but since N am ulau’ulu Pulali was his brother, it is more than likely that 
Lauaki supported, if he did not directly encourage, the freeing of the 
prisoners.47 When retribution seemed near, with the return of the
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supposedly­disgraced Solf, Lauaki was very deft in retracing his steps 
and working against the co­operative idea, so successfully that he 
weaned his entire district away from it. It was undoubtedly Lauaki’s 
about­face which increased the confusion in the Samoan camp and 
contributed to the rapid disintegration of Oloa solidarity before Solf’s 
return. His final triumph was in convincing Solf and Richard Williams, 
district administrator on Savai’i, that his repentance was genuine, his 
loyalty unimpaired. Over the protests of M a ta ’afa Josefo, and with the 
unanimous disapproval of the other Faipule, this ‘crafty and perceptive 
m an’, as Solf described him , 48 was given a place on the new council.
Though M a ta ’afa Josefo was highly implicated in the train of events, 
Solf refused to sacrifice him to the reaction from the white community 
which followed the affair. Solf blamed Deeken for leading M a ta ’afa 
Josefo astray. He also blamed the settler clique for the original rumour 
of his disgrace, as well as for the M alo's petition to the Kaiser and the 
subsequent Vaimea incident. Nothing could be proven against Deeken, 
but there was ample evidence of contacts between his group and the 
leading chiefs in M ulinu’u. Direct contacts between Lauaki and Deeken 
could not be traced, but Schultz at least was convinced that Lauaki was 
clever enough to use the planter for his own purposes, which perhaps 
was corroborated by the fact that Deeken was regarded by the majority 
of the M alo  as prospective manager of the Cumpani in succession to 
Pullack. 49 This ploy was obviously both a business manoeuvre to 
exploit Deeken’s expertise, and a contingency measure against the 
future: if Deeken proved more powerful than Solf and the Governor 
really were disgraced, it obviously made sense to support Deeken and 
commit him to the future of the co­operative. At no time, however, did 
the Samoans openly engage themselves in Deeken’s cause. In fact, they 
had strenuously opposed from the start his campaign to force them onto 
the European plantations, and considered it an affront that he should 
retain his freedom in Samoa after his conviction.
Deeken’s group of disaffected small planters led the white reaction 
to the Vaimea incident. In a petition to the Chancellor, purporting to 
represent the majority of business opinion in Apia, the opposition 
presented the affair as evidence of the complete shipwreck of Solf’s 
control policy. They argued that the European population was now 
‘completely at the mercy of the Samoans’ and that it was essential to 
act with a mailed fist— to send naval cruisers, to deport chiefs and to 
establish a garrison of colonial troops . 50 The petition received short 
shrift from the Colonial Department which had no intention of
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increasing adm inistrative, let alone m ilitary involvement in the Pacific, 
in the face of the demands m ade by the recent H erero rebellion in 
South­W est Africa. Solf’s success, not only in m aintaining peace and 
security, but also in breaking the pow er of the corporation  of chiefs and 
speakers in M ulinu’u w ithout the use of force of any kind, was the 
strongest possible vindication of his policy. And in Samoa itself, 
Deeken’s panic patently was not shared by all. The DHPG newspaper, 
the Samoanische Zeitung, declared confidently, if predictably, in Solf’s 
favour. It concluded there were now better grounds ‘for anticipating a 
lasting peace for Samoa than have previously existed within the 
m em ory of living m en’ (26 August 1905).
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The three years 1905 to 1908 were a period of relatively peaceful 
development. T rade and agriculture took an upw ard turn, and in 1906 
Samoa achieved a favourable balance of trade for the first time. From 
1908 onw ards, the adm inistration was able to prepare its annual 
budgets w ithout relying on a Reich subsidy. For their part, the Samoans 
were enjoying an increase in purchasing power as copra prices began 
to rise once more in 1905. W ith the regulation of Samoan copra 
production  following the ordinance of 1900 and the adm inistration’s 
struggle to improve its quality through legislation and closer super­
vision, the Samoan com m unity was able to m aintain its high degree of 
participation  in the export economy: between 1905 and 1908 it 
produced on average two­thirds of all the copra exported from Samoa. 
M oreover, encouraged by the example of several new plantation  
companies in these years, Samoans had planted 1362 hectares of the 
new cash crop, cocoa, by 1906. They also continued to meet the fiscal 
demands made on them by the head tax, bu t were showing a greater 
interest in the way the taxes were being employed.
In the wake of the political changes of 1905, the Samoans were now 
being governed by an unrestrained, patriarchal regime founded 
squarely on Solf’s authority  and his conviction that ‘a tactful Governor 
can rule the natives w ithout laws’. U nderstanding better than m ost 
Europeans the limits to which Samoans would allow themselves to be 
pushed, Solf used only indirect m ethods to bring the Samoans within 
the colonial economy. The regular planting of young coconuts, which 
the G overnor enforced through plantation  inspectors, together with the 
head tax levy, helped to stim ulate use of village land and increase 
productivity; legislation against false weights and measures protected 
the Samoan grower against the unscrupulous copra buyer; while at the 
village level salaried Samoan officials were the levers of government. 
Solf interfered in this 'fa'a Samoa h in terland’1 only when a breakdow n 
in law and order was imminent, or when Sam oan economic aspirations 
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Solf was determined that his rule should provide a preferable 
alternative to the ‘para­administrative’ organisation which the various 
mission societies had come to represent to the Samoans through their 
long history of contact. The Governor had maintained consistently 
good relations with the missions since 1900. There had been a number 
of controversies— for instance, with the London Missionary Society 
over the extent of their annual district collections (Me) and the puritan 
regulation of Sunday activity, and over the M arists’ privileged influence 
with M a ta ’afa Josefo— but these had been only temporary irritations. 
Solf was realistic enough to concede that the Samoans could not be 
expected automatically to transfer their primary allegiance from the 
one form of Western discipline they had accepted for fifty years to a still 
largely unfamiliar secular regime.
With the conversion of the Samoans virtually complete by 1905, the 
missions were now concentrating on meeting the educational demands 
of the community. In 1906 the London Missionary Society could count 
24 808 Samoan adherents, or two­thirds of the population; 6022 
Samoans were Catholics while the remainder spread themselves among 
a number of smaller Christian societies. An elementary school func­
tioned in every one of the London Missionary Society’s villages, and 
there were a series of district high schools as well as the Malua seminary. 
In all, 299 schools of various denominations existed in Samoa in 1906, 
with 470 teachers and nearly 10 000 pupils. The government began its 
own public school in 1907.2
It was the Samoans’ avidity for education, as well as their economic 
activity, which moved Solf to respond to their appeals for a permanent 
prohibition on the further sale or leasing of Samoan land to whites. 
Samoans rarely seem to have been losers in the rush by Europeans for 
land holdings before 1900. There were more cases of Samoans 
defrauding Europeans in land deals during the 1880s than the reverse, 
and successful local wars had been financed from the profits. In 1889 
the Berlin Conference had established the principle of prohibiting the 
sale of Samoan land to foreigners and of restricting leaseholds, while 
the land commission set up by the three Powers in the following years 
confirmed only a small percentage of past European purchases.3 M ost 
claims were rejected on the grounds that the sale had not been made 
by the rightful owner, an ironic indication of Samoan accomplishments 
in land transactions.
But the advent of new plantation companies after 1900 brought 
widespread pressure to bear on the German government to reintroduce
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freehold sales or at least to permit long­term leases. Prominent Samoans 
countered with the argument that Europeans had long overestimated 
the area of cultivable land in the group, an argument supported by Dr 
W o h ltm ann’s analysis in 1902­03. W ohltmann found that only half of 
U polu’s land area was suitable for cultivation, and only one­fifth of the 
area of Savai’i. Whites had already alienated more land than was safe 
in the circumstances, and W ohltm ann advised that 50 000 hectares be 
reserved to the Samoans for their own needs.
Solf and the Faipule discussed the question at length in the August 
1907 meeting of the M ulinu’u council. The result was an ordinance of 
26 November, providing that land could be transferred by sale or lease 
only in the 'p lantation district’ around Apia. Outside this limit the 
government might lease land to foreigners provided that Samoan 
cultivable lands were not diminished to less than 1.29 hectares per head 
of population .4 It was a solution which patently favoured the DHPG, 
since it possessed the only considerable land holdings outside Apia 
already in the hands of Europeans.
Predictably, Solf had to withstand a new storm of criticism from small 
planters. Their opposition to the Governor was reinforced during these 
years by the return of Richard Deeken. Deeken arrived this time with 
instructions from his company to keep out of Solf’s way, but it was not 
long before the two men clashed openly over an attempt by Deeken to 
inveigle his way into the advisory council for settlers which Solf had set 
up early in his administration.
Solf’s critics in the colony and abroad did not waver in their 
opposition to his ‘system’. The G overnor’s self­conscious indepen­
dence, and his reliance on personal authority in dealing with the 
Samoan community were a continual affront to the Deeken faction. 
They wanted to see more direct mobilisation of Samoan manpower to 
ease the shortage of labour for small plantations, and advocated the use 
of ‘positive’ force should the Islanders resist. Solf reacted to all this 
badgering with occasional petulance and self­righteousness, but he 
stubbornly refused to abandon his Samoan policies: ‘I will not be the 
grave digger of the colony which I have helped to baptise’, was one of 
his favourite retorts.5
Wilhelm Solf (like his deputy Erich Schultz­Ewerth) was a man 
sensitive to the ethics and history of Samoan society, and outspokenly 
determined to preserve its integrity. His administrative strategy of 
defending Samoans, their land and their labour had its roots in a 
well­reasoned analysis of Germany’s role in Samoa, which he articu­
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lated in a series of reports to the Colonial Office in 1906 and 1907.6 
Sent in response to a general request for ideas about the future of 
G erm any’s colonies, Solf’s ‘program ’ was much more than a survey of 
past achievements and a list of developm ental priorities. .W ith his 
cosm opolitan background and outlook, and his small ‘1’ liberalism, Solf 
found it necessary to offer some form of ideological rationale for his 
involvement in G erm any’s Kolonialpolitik, w ith its blatantly economic 
ends and occasionally brutal consequences. The result was a conception 
which comes closer to a philosophy of colonialism than any other 
official collection of ideas in the G erm an Pacific.
The G overnor made it clear from the beginning tha t his plan for 
Samoa revolved prim arily around the Sam oan people: they would be 
the focus of his energies rather than  the small com m unity of German 
and English colonists. He argued tha t with the raising of the imperial 
flag in 1900, G erm any had accepted the legal and m oral obligation to 
create for the island people ‘better and more rational conditions of life 
than  they themselves in the narrow ness of their hearts and minds could 
create’. To do so required not force but patient and sensitive leadership. 
The Samoan people were only ‘wild, truculent, superstitious children’, 
susceptible to cajolery, and capable of reaching a higher ideal of 
civilisation if led by guides and m entors who, like Solf, were prepared 
to ground themselves in the em otions and thought processes of the 
island people. Solf’s ideal was developm ent with and through the 
Sam oans, not in spite of them.
To suggest that these ideas represent a liberal hum anism  years ahead 
of its time in G erm any would be an exaggeration. Solf may not have 
subscribed to the crude rhetoric of Social Darwinism , but his sym pathy 
for Samoans was based on a subtle variation of the same theme, namely, 
that Germ any, as the forem ost Kulturstaat, possessed the duty to 
civilise a society which had achieved as much as had Samoa in the 
pursuit of the W est’s educational values; in other words, tha t the 
Samoan people should continue to prosper as deserving servants of the 
colonising intelligence. It was also im practical politics to exploit the 
people ruthlessly, since, in his scheme of things, they were to provide 
the engines of Sam oa’s future developm ent w ithin the Reich. As Solf 
saw it, he was merely preparing a seedbed in Samoa for other genera­
tions of colonists. They would reap the benefits of his cultivation. 
Wilhelm Solf’s ideas thus occupy a place firmly within the intellectual 
traditions of W ilhelmine Germ any. If further evidence were needed, it 
m ight be seen in his approval of the English disdain for ‘over­fami­
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liarity’ with the coloured races of their colonies. Solf, in the final 
analysis, believed firmly that, to achieve anything in the colonies, 
G erm any m ust m aintain strict standards of racial pride and purity .7
Tow ards the end of 1908, the focus of attention  swung back dram at­
ically to indigenous politics. M ata ’afa Josefo, at seventy­six years of 
age, was fast becoming senile, and a series of illnesses he suffered in 
1908 raised in the minds of Samoans the question of succession to the 
param ount chieftaincy. There were four candidates for the posi­
tion— M alietoa T anu, Tamasese, Fa’alata and Tuim alealiifano (two 
from each of the royal lineages)— and efforts were being made by the 
influential chiefs to have M a ta ’afa Josefo prepare a political testam ent 
in which he would designate his successor.
Alongside this purely Samoan m ovem ent sprang up another in 
opposition to Solf’s governm ent. Solf was convinced the next challenge 
to his authority  would be the occasion of M a ta ’afa Josefo’s death, at 
which time he planned to abolish the post of A li’i Sili. But he reckoned 
w ithout the orato r chief from Savai’i. Lauaki, whose whole life had 
revolved around political activity, was not prepared to accept the role 
of spectator forced on him by Solf in 1905. The official suppression of 
Tum ua  and Pule, and the dispersal from the sacred seat of governm ent 
of those chiefs who came to power in 1899 had lifted the veil from the 
G overnor’s real intentions. Lauaki was already convinced of Solf’s 
deviousness; the recent events inevitably confirmed it, and, despite an 
outw ard show of conform ity, Lauaki resented Solf deeply.8
In addition he was, at heart, a Sä M alietoä  m an because of the 
traditional affiliations of Safotulafai district. His expedient support for 
M ata ’afa Josefo in 1898­99 did not, in Sam oan eyes, impose the 
obligation of unqualified loyalty, and Lauaki looked to the day when 
a M alietoan should succeed to the apex of Sam oan politics, with Lauaki 
at his side. M ata ’afa Josefo’s deteriorating condition, plus the fact that 
Solf went on leave in m id­1908, presented the chief with a perfect 
opportunity  to take up the fight for Tum ua  and Pule, as well as for a 
reconstructed central governm ent over which his candidate, M alietoa 
Tanu, would preside.
Lauaki, now over sixty years old, began a propaganda campaign in 
August 1908, after the close of the fono  of Faipule in M ulinu’u. 
Realising that he m ust create a united front am ongst Samoans if he was 
to have an efficient lever against Solf, he planned to organise a mass 
dem onstration of thousands to greet the G overnor on his return in
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November, and, after the welcoming ceremonies, to present Solf with 
a list of petitions. These were to urge four main reforms: that the upper 
house, Taimua, together with the Faipule, be reinstated permanently 
in M ulinu’u as salaried advisers to the government; that the four 
contending ‘princes’ be appointed as salaried officials at M ulinu’u; that 
the Samoans be furnished with records of administrative revenue and 
expenditure; and that the head tax be eased.9
The first demand was designed to achieve the restoration of a 
‘national’ political structure which Solf had toiled so hard to dismantle, 
even though the Taimua and Faipule would not represent a traditional 
Malo. The second would safeguard the principle of continuity to the 
paramountcy by the presence of the ‘royal’ candidates at the seat of 
government. By ostensibly supporting everybody’s candidate for the 
succession, Lauaki was able to recruit chiefly support throughout Upolu 
districts as well as in Savai’i; no doubt he was assisted by some general 
resentment at Solf’s high­handed action of dispersing the Malo  in 1905. 
There can be also little doubt about the orator chief’s real objective: to 
prevent M a ta ’afa Josefo from declaring unilaterally whom his succes­
sor should be until Lauaki had secured Malietoa T an u ’s prospects; then 
the question of the re­establishment of the role of Tumua and Pule 
would be introduced. The remaining petitions were calculated to strike 
a responsive chord among the people, for they played on the prevailing 
Samoan suspicion of money matters where Europeans were concerned. 
In particular it was suggested that the head tax made Samoans into 
slaves of the whites.
The parallels with the Oloa movement are obvious. In fact, in its 
conservative aspects, Lauaki’s campaign was simply an extension of the 
Oloa: a rearguard action by a minority which longed for the days when 
it was the strongest power in the land and could manipulate Sam oa’s 
political fortunes at will. This time it was ‘diplomacy by intimidation’,10 
a ploy which had a respectable antiquity dating back to the period of 
Three­Power rule. As to what would happen after the Apia dem on­
stration, Lauaki was probably unclear. The visit in August 1908 of 
sixteen ships of the United States battlefleet may have induced him to 
believe that the Powers would once more come to the Samoans’ aid.
It was not until November, on the eve of Solf’s return, that Deputy 
Governor Schultz learned of the movement. By that time Lauaki had 
managed to mobilise the most important political districts of Samoa by 
capitalising on the traditional elite status of chiefs and orators as 
‘kingmakers’, and on his own standing as high priest of the political
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citadel. Saleaula and Safotulafai in Savai’i, along with Leulumoega and 
Lufilufi in Upolu, accepted Lauaki’s appeal to the old ways and 
corporate political issues. Their support, representing the power of 
Tum ua  and Pule, theoretically put him in a formidable position.
Schultz could not afford to let the demonstration take place. He 
realised at once the meaning of the petitions, and knew that Solf’s 
response must be negative. N ot only might the presence of so many 
Samoans create difficulties for the government, but a refusal could 
provoke the spread of passive resistance to subsequent administrative 
demands. Schultz immediately sent letters round the Upolu and Savai’i 
districts forbidding all but those officially connected with the welcome 
for Solf to congregate in Apia, while the administration’s most trusted 
local officials journeyed round the islands to argue against the Apia 
demonstration. Lauaki, however, maintained his determined stance 
and, with twenty­two boats of Savai’i supporters, he moved to M anono 
and the district of A’ana in Upolu, seeking some excuse to go to Apia 
‘to bring forward their opinions’.11
At this point M a ta ’afa Josefo, who originally had been brought on 
side by the promise of suitable honours for his high position, left the 
movement. He was not prepared to risk a confrontation with the 
government, and instead began to apply his considerable weight as A li’i 
Sili in support of Schultz’s efforts to keep the people in their districts. 
In the face of this pressure Lauaki finally submitted to Schultz’s 
injunction and remained absent from Apia on 19 November, when Solf 
arrived with his newly­wedded wife. The demonstration failed to take 
place.
Solf now took the reins in his own hands and embarked on a tour of 
Upolu and Savai’i to remind the chiefs of their duties and warn them 
against disloyalty. Lauaki he confronted in Safotulafai, but in the 
presence of so many followers of the orator chief Solf was powerless to 
do more than warn Lauaki of ‘the vengeance of the German eagle’. 
Lauaki retorted that there was no rebellious intent among the chiefs of 
the Pule and, declaring that he was appointed by the people to guard 
‘the sons of old Samoan Kings and the darlings of the N ation’, he 
beseeched Solf to allow again the ‘Faipule Kaiserlike’ to assemble in 
M ulinu’u .12
Despite the fact that, as a result of Solf’s tour, the local press was 
prepared to consign the rumours of unrest to the realm of fable, it was 
just at this stage, in late December, that the movement got under way 
with renewed vigour and began to take on rebellious overtones.
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Schultz’s original refusal had had serious repercussions for Lauaki In 
the failure of his demonstration he had lost face fa  ’a Samoa  and exposed 
himself to Samoan ridicule. He would not see his plans so easily 
thwarted. After Solf’s departure from Savai’i, the rumour spread taat 
Lauaki had humbled the Governor in their encounter. Then Lauiki 
took an action which effectively cut him off from any hope of clemency 
by the German government: he sent his aide, the chief Liga Pisa, to seek 
the support of the United States regime in Tutuila in case Lauaki found 
himself in difficulties. Clearly Lauaki was directing the movement, 
which now acquired the names mau e pule (opposition movement of 
Savai’i) or o le m au , against the German grip on Samoan powers of 
decision­making. Pule was ‘on the m arch’ again, as one of Solf’s more 
trusted Faipule put it.13 The Faipule of the G overnor’s council were 
themselves caught up in the movement. Some chose to wait and see if 
Lauaki would be successful. Others, as well as many ordinary Samoans, 
followed Lauaki because of his authority as a traditional leader and 
because of his oratorical powers, though the evidence suggests tiey 
were unsure of his ends.
Solf was in an unenviable position, faced with a developing opposi­
tion front of Tum ua  and Pule, with the masses at their heels, while he 
lacked any sort of military support with which to assert his authority. 
As in the early stages of the Oloa, Solf could not simply break the 
movement by imprisoning its leader. Lauaki had been carefu to 
organise o le mau  along the lines of a legitimate, fa ’a Samoa form of 
protest and opposition. Direct suppression would have been construed 
by the majority of Samoans as tyranny and injustice.
However, cracks were already appearing in the alliance which Lauaki 
had constructed. Upolu chiefs were always suspicious of political 
initiatives which did not originate in their own districts, and the 
relationship between Tum ua  and Pule was often attended by covert 
distrust. Lauaki found that even his base of support in Savai’i was not 
firm: some of the Fa’asaleleaga villages would not join him, while one 
of the most powerful chiefs of Safotulafai was his commuted 
opponent.14 Perhaps most importantly, Lauaki found that among 
ordinary Samoans he could not count on any general movement 
aspiring to change the state of society. Since 1900 village Samoans had 
experienced a minimum of deprivation under Solf’s low­key adm nis­ 
trative policies. German rule had brought a peace the Samoans had not 
known for decades: their lands were secure and they were prote.'ted 
from the labour demands of planters; regulated copra production
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ensured a steadily rising standard of living; and they were governed by 
local officials who were also familiar village chiefs. None of this had 
been changed by the abolition of the M alo  in 1905; indeed there had 
followed three years of peace. Under these conditions, the intrigues of 
o ra to r  chiefs did not have the appeal they once had.
Solf’s close rapport with fa ’a Samoa , developed sensitively over the 
years through study, through consulting, through touring and feasting 
from village to village, enabled him to recognise the signs of instability 
in Lauaki’s relationships. He decided to play Lauaki at his own 
game— in the circumstances his only recourse. At a fo n o o i  Upolu chiefs 
and speakers in mid­January, the Governor baited his audience, 
carefully and sarcastically painting a picture of Lauaki installing 
himself in M ulinu’u with his Savai’i adherents at the cost of Lufilufi and 
Leulumoega, the districts which represented the majority of Tumua. 
‘Your glory is gone’, he taunted them,
for Lauaki is the maker of kings. He confers the high honours, not 
you. He anointed M a ta ’afa. He will anoint himself— as Tafa’ifa 
he will go with his queen Sialata’ua to M ulinu’u and will be lord 
over you fools.15
So successful was he in persuading the chiefs that Lauaki’s plans did 
not include them in the final victory (which was not altogether devoid 
of truth), that most of A’ana and Atua deserted the alliance immediately 
and, with parts of Tuamasaga, began making preparations for war 
against Lauaki and his district Fa’asaleleaga.
Solf summoned Lauaki to Apia for a private interview on 16 January. 
When Lauaki landed in Upolu and became aware of Tumua's attitude, 
he instructed his Savai’i followers to accompany him, and, as he made 
his way to Apia, a thousand of his men lodged themselves in Vaiusu and 
in sympathetic parts of Tuamasaga district. Solf now refused to 
negotiate with Lauaki until his ‘arm y’ had dispersed. The chief 
answered that they were simply supporters who wished to farewell him 
in case he was apprehended and hanged.16 A few boatloads of Lauaki’s 
supporters left Vaiusu in the next few days, but they went only as far 
as M anono on the pretext of bad weather. Lauaki himself remained in 
Vaiusu.
Throughout the different confederations of districts preparations 
were now being made for a full­scale war, a prospect which in no way 
consoled Solf. A Samoan war meant not only the plunder of Apia and 
the German plantations, and the possible ruin of the cash­cropping
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industry, but also probably acts of violence against Europeans. It would 
signify a return to the confusion and bitterness of the last century and 
make illusory any gains which the administration had made since 1900. 
To forestall an outbreak Solf sent his most trusted and influential 
Samoan officials, the secretary Saga and the chief Taumei, to dissuade 
Tum ua  from taking up arms.
Meanwhile, on 18 January, two letters arrived in Solf’s office. One 
was what Solf termed ‘an open declaration of w ar’ from Lauaki, in 
which the chief declared that if he were forced to take a ‘holiday’ to 
Tonga and Fiji as the Governor had requested in their recent interview, 
‘on that day when I set foot upon the steamer, the Samoans will fight’. 
It confirmed what he had already told the chief Taumei: ‘I fight for the 
liberty of Fa’asaleleaga and for Pule. Whether I die or be banished is 
the same to me’.17 The other letter came from the corporation of chiefs 
representing Savai’i and M anono, Pule and A ’iga, and reiterated the 
demand that Samoans be given responsibility for their own monies. 
Other information reaching Solf from loyal chiefs warned that Lauaki 
had assembled his forces in Vaiusu. From the DHPG in Vaitele came 
a report that Samoans, painted for war and armed, were headed for 
Apia. The situation looked more and more desperate, and, after a hasty 
consultation with his deputies, Solf decided that he must confront 
Lauaki in Vaiusu and try to dissuade him from violence.
The Vaiusu meeting stayed vividly in Solf’s memory, and he later 
admitted to being genuinely afraid at the size and temper of Lauaki’s 
gathering. He had chosen not to take an armed escort for fear of 
provoking Lauaki’s supporters, and it was well that he had, for crowds 
of blackened warriors, well­armed and chanting for war, surrounded 
the meeting house. The scene had about it the air of a confrontation 
between the leading warriors of opposing sides — which traditionally 
took place in Samoan wars before the commencement of hostilities. 
Both the Governor and his European aide were convinced that they 
stood on the knife­edge of a rebellion similar to that of the South­West 
African Herero in 1904.18
In reality, it was an object lesson in the political skills which had 
preserved Lauaki throughout his long career. After Solf refused to give 
Lauaki his hand, the ‘silver­tongued’ orator chief launched into an 
impassioned speech which lasted more than an hour, begging the 
Governor’s pardon for his obstinate conduct and swearing on the Bible 
that the ‘evil genius’ behind all the Samoan disturbances since 1904 was 
really M a ta ’afa Josefo. The speech transferred the moral onus squarely
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to Solf’s shoulders. By accusing Mata’afa Josefo, Lauaki had answered 
the accusations of conspiracy upon which the governor had built the 
basis of inquiry against him. Since Mata’afa Josefo in his reply to the 
speech, made no attempt to repudiate Lauaki’s allegations, Solf was 
faced with the possibility that there were now two guilty chiefs. To 
punish one and free the other would not have accorded with the Samoan 
concept of justice; to raise the question of Mata’afa Josefo’s disloyalty 
at the time might only have hastened the prospect of civil war. At the 
same time it was clearly impossible to take Lauaki from his followers 
and examine him in court. Solf’s only alternative was to grant Lauaki 
the pardon which he had requested. But he did so reluctantly, and it was 
only a conditional pardon. He insisted that Lauaki retire immediately 
with his supporters to Savai’i and cease all agitation. He also made it 
clear to Lauaki that the pardon would not apply if Lauaki was found 
to be guilty of treason by sending political ambassadors to Tutuila for 
American aid.
The next day, 19 January, found Lauaki on Manono where, again 
using the weather as a pretext, he remained. The conflict was obviously 
unresolved, particularly so when Solf’s investigation revealed that 
attempts had been made to draw the United States in to aid the 
dissidents. Tension between the Samoan parties and between the 
Samoans and the European community increased steadily. The first 
reports of unrest since late December now appeared in the local press; 
rumours of war and general animosity to German rule flooded in and 
out of Apia; Solf was continually beseeched by Tumua chiefs to supply 
them with weapons to capture Lauaki and defeat his followers. At a 
fono of Faipule at the end of January there was strong pressure on Solf 
to begin military action against Lauaki, and only four chiefs spoke 
against dismissing Lauaki from the assembly and deporting him from 
the islands.19
Solf managed to withstand the pressure of the Upolu chiefs while he 
worked to prevent a panic among the whites. While the government’s 
more loyal collaborators, the chiefs Saga, Taumei and a few of their 
colleagues canvassed the districts, testing the attitudes of their people 
and arguing in the councils against taking up arms, Solf hid the colony’s 
explosives, and immobilised the weapons in the magazine. He gave 
strict instructions to the Europeans not to resist any attempt by Tumua 
forces to seize the weapons lest this provoke them to an attack on the 
European quarter. ‘In all cases we must try to keep the peace’, he urged, 
‘even on the condition that Lauaki restores peace in Savai’i’.20
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It was a hollow hope: Lauaki seemed to have no intention of restoring 
the peace anywhere in the islands. Though by this time he had returned 
to Savai’i, his agitation continued unabated. A new crop of rum ours 
m aintained that Solf had sworn on the Bible against Lauaki’s depor­
tation and that the G overnor had agreed in principle to all the o ra to r’s 
original demands. From L auaki’s allies in M anono came the particu­
larly om inous threat tha t every G erm an in Samoa would be killed if 
Lauaki were deported .21 In the face of these m ounting events, Solf 
finally lost hope that he alone could stabilise the situation. Reluctantly, 
with a sense of defeat of his hard­w on policies, he telegraphed Berlin 
on 5 February 1909 for the urgent dispatch of m ilitary support.
Six weeks of anxious w aiting followed, during which Solf was 
reduced to inaction against Lauaki. His energies were concentrated on 
restraining the Upolu chiefs from taking action on their own initiative 
and on calming the Europeans. O n 18 M arch a G erm an cruiser, SMS 
Leipzig, arrived from the East Asian Squadron in K iautschou, under the 
com m and of Rear Admiral Coerper. By 26 M arch it had been joined 
by a further two cruisers and a supply ship, bringing some 680 sailors 
and marines to Sam oa’s undefended shores.22
Solf now dropped his pretence and returned to the initiative. His plan 
was still to avoid military action at all costs and to rely on the mere 
presence of the largest G erm an naval detachm ent Samoa had seen since 
the civil war of 1898­99. Resort to physical force would provoke Lauaki 
to take to the bush where, as history had shown, European forces were 
at a serious disadvantage; only a long, bloody and costly guerrilla war 
would then dislodge the rebels. There was the added danger that 
eventually the loyal Samoans would make com m on cause with Lauaki 
and his supporters in a liberation crusade against colonial rule. Solf 
found a staunch ally for his caution in Coerper, who deferred com ­
pletely to the G overnor’s discretion.
O n 22 M arch Solf sent an ultim atum  to Savai’i ordering Lauaki to 
report for deportation  by 29 M arch along with eight o ther ringleaders: 
Letasi Tuilagi, N am ulau’ulu Pulali, M alaeulu, Tagaloa, Tevaga M at­ 
afa, Asiata Taetoloa, Asiata M a’agaolo and Liga Pisa. It was accom ­
panied by a letter from M ata ’afa Josefo urging obedience for the sake 
of peace. W hen these messages reached Lauaki the confrontation 
entered its m ost critical phase. Lauaki and his two deputies, Letasi 
Tuilagi and N am ulau’ulu Pulali, replied the following day, protesting 
that Pule and A ’iga had been pardoned and declaring tha t they would 
rather fight and die than  be deported .23 As Lauaki’s supporters on
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Savai’i began conveying their goods into the bush and stockpiling 
provisions, the navy moved in to blockade the island and confine any 
revolt to Savai’i alone. Rum ours th a t the M elanesian police­soldiers 
accom panying the vessels were to be released ‘like dogs’ on the Samoans 
and th a t the ‘rebels’ were to be hanged from the yard­arm s, only 
hardened resistance in Lauaki’s villages and made loyal Samoans 
uneasy. C oerper immediately repudiated all these stories, and at a fono  
on 27 M arch he made a personal appeal to the m ovem ent’s leaders to 
surrender, prom ising tha t no force would be used if Solf’s directions 
were obeyed. There was no response. At this juncture, Reverend John 
Newell of the London M issionary Society, partly m otivated by accu­
sations from the settler com m unity th a t he had been sending letters of 
encouragem ent to the disaffected districts, offered his services to try and 
persuade Lauaki to surrender w ithout violence. W hen Newell reached 
Savai’i on 27 M arch, he found tha t the whole west of Savai’i, as well 
as Palauli, Sapapalii, Saleaula and M atau tu  were in fact opposed to 
Lauaki, and he was greeted as the harbinger of peace.24 However, 
feelings of defiant solidarity were still strong in Lauaki’s own villages, 
and, in a last­ditch effort to retrieve the situation, Lauaki appealed to 
the British Vice­Consul in Apia, Thom as T rood, to call in the Three 
Powers to the protection  of Samoa. O n 28 M arch T rood replied shortly 
tha t Samoa was now under G erm an rule and there could be no redress 
from the other G reat Powers.25
The first break in Lauaki’s immediate circle of support came when 
Reverend E. G. Neil, of the M ethodist M ission, persuaded one of the 
ringleaders, Asiata Taetoloa of Satupaitea, to surrender.26 This virtu­
ally defused the rebellious situation from Satupaitea to the west coast, 
and left Fa’asaleleaga isolated in the east. O ther chiefs followed Asiata 
T aetoloa’s exam ple when they realised that the Germ ans were not 
extracting a brutal revenge from their colleague. In a public meeting in 
Safotulafai, presided over by Newell, L auaki’s brother, N am ulau’ulu 
Pulali, declared tha t he was prepared to surrender if it m eant avoiding 
war for Sam oa.27 A further round of discussions finally led Lauaki to 
send Newell a message on 29 M arch, prom ising that he and the 
Safotulafai chiefs would give themselves up on 1 April. In response, 
Coerper and Solf agreed to extend the deadline of the ultim atum . 
Lauaki and his men arranged their affairs and took leave of their 
friends. As the ships Leipzig and Arcona steamed tow ards Savai’i to take 
up positions for a m ilitary assault, they received a message that Lauaki 
and five chiefs had presented themselves punctually on board SMS
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Jaguar. O n  the same day the chiefs, numbering nine in all, together with 
their families, left Apia on board  the Jaguar, bound for Saipan in the 
M ariana Islands where they were to live in exile.
Solf later remarked privately that there had been a moral onus on  
Lauaki to accept his fate ever since the first chiefs had surrendered, for 
the respectful treatment accorded them by the Germans had done a 
great deal to legitimise Germ an authority in the eyes of ordinary 
Samoans. 28 Imponderabilia like the people’s ethical expectations and 
notions of duty and reciprocity no doubt played a part in Lauaki’s 
decision. However, as a devout Christian and deacon of the local 
church, Lauaki had been convinced finally by Newell’s arguments tha t 
rebellion would only lead to Samoan fighting Samoan and to ‘the 
opening of the flood gates of misery that might last for years and years’.
His surrender was no doubt also made easier by the fact that Solf, 
too, with the Admiral’s support, was anxious to avoid bloodshed. N o  
actual charges were laid against Lauaki in a court of law. If the German 
code had been employed, the m ovement’s leaders would have been 
guilty of rebellion and treason, which presumably would have led to 
their execution. Deportation was, in the circumstances, a restrained 
course of action. Solf continued to act temperately in punishing the 
errant districts, studiously avoiding any impression of a witch­hunt or 
a wholesale purge of Samoan officials. The Lauaki affair had shown that 
fears of the Samoans taking to the bush if pushed too far were well 
founded, and there seemed even greater need now for adhering to the 
existing lines of Solf’s native policy. The Governor dismissed for twelve 
months all officials in the districts of M anono, Fa’asaleleaga, Saleaula 
and Satupaitea; land was confiscated at Tuasivi in Fa’asaleleaga for 
government purposes; in the guilty districts every mataiwas fined thirty 
marks and all shotguns on issue for hunting purposes were with­
drawn . 29
For the rest, Solf vented his righteous anger on Richard Deeken’s 
planter clique, which, he tried to convince himself, had stirred up the 
entire hornets’ nest. Rumours were rife during the critical period that, 
once again, Europeans were mixed up in the movement and the local 
press argued that the Samoan petitions relating to public money could 
only have been inspired by whites.
In fact, the settler opposition had been guilty only of spreading false 
rumours abou t the Governor, in particular that he had sworn on the 
Bible in Vaiusu to pardon Lauaki and meet all his demands. The 
American planter and trader, H. J. M oors, was known to be
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sym pathetic to the chief’s claims, and he had leaked news of unrest and 
rebellion to the New Zealand press long before m ost Europeans in Apia 
were aware of w hat was going on. But he was acquitted in court of any 
a ttem pt to assist Lauaki in his cause, or of encouraging the use of force. 
N o concrete evidence existed to suggest tha t Deeken and his friends 
were deliberately inciting Lauaki. The tru th  was, as Deeken had 
suggested at the time of the Oloa m ovem ent and as Reverend Newell 
now perceptively agreed, tha t the Samoans were quite capable of 
twisting anything the whites said or did independently to buttress their 
own dem ands.30
The Lauaki affair inspired the Pflanzerverein to rear its head in a new 
attack  on Solf’s policies. It was linked closely to the governm ent’s 
failure to settle the still­pressing labour question, for the Chinese 
governm ent was m aking difficulties over the conditions for further 
shipm ents of coolies to Samoa. The small planters blamed Solf’s native 
policy for these difficulties, and they regarded his forbearance of the 
Samoans as a direct encouragem ent to the Chinese to be obdurate and 
unreasonable in their dem ands about conditions of em ploym ent.31
Yet another cam paign was initiated in Germ any to prove the 
inadequacy of Solf’s adm inistration. This time Solf was accused of 
moving too fast to destroy indigenous organs of governm ent and strip 
old and experienced chiefs of their powers. In a petition in June 1909 
addressed to the Kaiser, Deeken argued that the establishm ent of a 
garrison of colonial troops, after the Oloa movem ent in 1904­05 would 
have forestalled the recent unrest, and he subm itted tha t the only 
guarantee of peace for Samoa was ‘a consistent policy to some extent 
based on the customs and traditions of the Samoans, but with force at 
hand’. His uncle in the Reichstag, Deputy T rim born, was influenced to 
urge the Colonial Office for a perm anent military presence in Samoa, 
while the Deutsche Samoa Gesellschaft harassed it with petition after 
petition in 1909 and early 1910 dem anding that, together with a 
garrison of M elanesian troops, a naval vessel be stationed constantly 
in Samoa.
The Colonial Office rem ained unim pressed, and made no secret of 
its disinclination to alter the existing line of policy on Samoa or to put 
restrictions on Solf’s security decisions. An article in the semi­official 
Norddeutsche Allgemeine in m id­1909 dismissed the question of 
m ilitarisation as far too expensive and dangerous. N o t only was Samoa 
not worth the two million m arks which would be needed to m aintain 
a battalion in the islands, it claimed, but a garrison would also be a
65
Pacific Islanders under German Rule
constant source of disturbance for whites and the native people. 
Pressure for a military establishment came from whites who had little 
knowledge of the Samoans themselves, it argued, and from whites who 
saw themselves as absolute masters and saw ‘natives’ as subjects 
without rights. The piece concluded:
Such a people (as the Samoans) can not be ruled with the mailed 
fist, but only with benevolence, justice and considerable attention 
to their laws and customs.32
The argument could only have come from an old Samoa hand, 
probably Heinrich Schnee, who believed, like most Europeans in 
Samoa, that military mobilisation would only incite the Islanders. As 
early as 1899, the wider European community in Samoa had rejected 
the proposal of the German Consul and naval representative that a 
volunteer European corps be established to protect the settlers, for it 
was convinced that the best guarantee of security lay in the fact that the 
European residents were not armed for war.33 Fear of the Samoans as 
formidable enemies if provoked, was, in the following years, a central 
leit­motiv running through Berlin’s decision to maintain a non­militant 
posture in the islands. Despite the constant battle by the pan­German 
settler clique to have the Samoan Fitafita replaced by a more effectual 
garrison of Melanesian troops, Berlin refused to capitulate. Staffed with 
men of Samoan experience for much of the period, the Colonial Office 
shared Solf’s opinion that to substitute Melanesians for the Fitafita 
would be considered an unforgivable affront by the Samoan community 
because of the special tie between Germany and Samoa which the 
Fitafita symbolised. The resentment which followed the rumour that the 
Melanesians were to be released ‘like dogs’ on Lauaki and his followers 
tended to corroborate their view.
So, in 1909, Colonial Secretary Dernburg himself took up the cudgel 
in Samoa’s defence to tell Deputy Trimborn that the Reich must ‘come 
to terms’ with the Samoans since only at great expense could they ever 
be tamed by colonial troops. And at the same time the Deutsche Samoa 
Gesellschaft was informed flatly that troops were not ‘absolutely 
necessary’ since a second cruiser had just been approved for the Pacific 
station.34
In Samoa itself the majority of the European community gave Solf 
its vote of confidence. One of its oldest and most eminent residents, the 
former British Vice­Consul, Thomas Trood, paid the Governor his 
highest compliment when he remarked that even England could never
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have guaranteed nine years of peace in the group without the 
employment of ‘humane repression’. And Lauaki’s chiefly enemies had 
already celebrated Solf in biblical terms, likening him to Moses who had 
freed his people from bondage to the old ways.35
So, in the end, the Lauaki affair proved not a defeat but a victory for 
the G overnor’s non­military style of administration. In August 1909 
Solf was able to affirm that he would continue to govern the Samoans 
‘with love and peace and no tyranny will be exercised’.
There was one political issue, however, which still faced Solf, the issue 
which originally inspired Lauaki’s movement and which, until solved, 
would continue to thwart the German Governor’s control policy: the 
position of param ount chief and the question of succession after 
M a ta ’afa Josefo’s death.
It took Solf the next eighteen months to devise a formula which would 
complete this control over the Samoan political structure. ‘If . . . the 
German Government [showed] power, together with goodwill in 
respecting the holy traditions of the Samoans’— proven ingredients in 
Solf’s Samoa— then the Governor guaranteed to preserve peace among 
the Islanders.36 His idea was for a proclamation from the Kaiser as Tupu 
Sili, declaring his will that no more A li’i Sili be appointed after M a ta ’afa 
Josefo’s death because of the implied slight to the just claims of both 
‘royal’ families. Instead, Solf suggested the naming of two advisers to 
the Governor (Fautua), one from each ‘royal’ lineage.
Paradoxically, Solf’s solution, and the Colonial Office’s acceptance 
of it, was a considerable achievement for the Samoan people. It reveals 
the extent to which the Samoans and their actions had purchased 
respect in the formulation of colonial policy. Berlin acknowledged this 
respect by allocating some 40 000 marks to be used by the Governor 
as compensation for Samoan leaders who showed themselves dissatis­
fied with the solution.37
In the end the Samoans denied Solf any final, personal triumph over 
the islands’ politics. For M a ta ’afa Josefo was still very much alive late 
in 1910, when the Governor departed for Berlin the last time. His old 
enemy, Richard Deeken, had already gone in February.
The Governor’s final directive to his officials was entirely in keeping 
with his concerns of the past ten years as chief executive:
While not losing sight of the natural desire of our Government to 
have some advantage from its colonies, never forget that they are 
the homelands of human people who have been promised our 
protection and for whom we must provide. Remember too that one
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does not achieve success merely from the legal relationships 
between people, and that even a Christian attitude towards life is 
not enough. Unless one has lived for years among a people and 
shares their joys and sorrows, unless one’s heart beats with theirs, 
unless one feels Christian charity for these people of different 
thoughts and feelings, one will never understand the delight and 
enthusiasm with which the inspired coloniser and missionary 
attack their work.38
This was no mere statement of an unattainable ideal nor a simple 
admonition to fair­mindedness. It was a plea for cultural sensitivity and 
for a breadth of vision which saw beyond national goals. Tinged though 
he may have been with the conviction of Germany’s world mission, Solf 
had shown that his vision could work. He had made a covenant with 
the Samoan people that they should not be destroyed by colonial rule, 
but prosper. They, with few exceptions, remained loyal, if not to the 
German eagle then to Solf himself.
And they continued to remain loyal, though Solf never returned to 
Samoa. In December 1911 Solf became State Secretary for Colonies in 
succession to Friedrich von Lindequist, who had resigned suddenly in 
protest at a treaty which, without consultation, the Foreign Office 
negotiated with France over the Cameroons. The period after the First 
World W ar brought Solf to Japan as German Ambassador. There, in 
September 1923, in the aftermath of the earthquake which destroyed 
Tokyo and Yokohama, Solf received a telegram from ‘the Samoan 
people’, asking him to return as Governor once more.39
His successor in Samoa had been the man who had held the posts of 
Native Secretary, Chief Judge and Deputy Governor successively since 
1902, Erich Schultz­Ewerth. Schultz was an ardent supporter of Solf’s 
way of government, and he openly sympathised with the problems 
Samoans had to face in conditions of intensifying contact with Western 
civilisation. By a meticulous observance of their ethical and ceremonial 
values, he had already achieved understanding with the Islanders, and 
they accepted easily the mantle of patriarchal authority which Solf 
bequeathed to Schultz.
It was Schultz who was left to deal with the contentious issue of 
M a ta ’afa Josefo’s death and succession. As the old chief became ever 
more bed­ridden, Schultz had to contend with increasing pressure from 
a variety of Samoan groups all seeking a definitive expression of 
M a ta ’afa Josefo’s political testament. Schultz resisted them all, gently 
insisting on the prerogatives of the Tupu Sili in Berlin, and attending
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the ailing High Chief regularly. His harshest act was to banish, 
reluctantly, two chiefs from Falefa who had aroused public excitement 
by extracting from M ata ’afa Josefo a declaration in favour of Tui­ 
m alealiifano. M ata’afa Josefo, for his part, approached death stoically, 
know ing he was the last of his kind. Practically his last thoughts were 
for the exiles in Saipan, for whose forgiveness and return he petitioned 
the Kaiser.40 Finally, on 6 February 1912, the High Chief died, amid 
great dem onstrations of grief from the people whose political fortune 
he had embodied for more than  two decades.
Schultz’s low­key approach and his deterrence of political agitation 
seemed to have had the desired effect. He encountered no excited 
indignation when he proclaim ed at M ata ’afa Josefo’s funeral: ‘the 
clouds have burst asunder, the titles have fallen to pieces’.41 In fact, 
explicit assurances were received from some of the chiefs that, in order 
to observe the G overnm ent’s wishes, they would not carry through the 
custom ary practices associated with a great chief’s death. There would 
be no fono, no funeral feasts, no fine mats or gift offerings (mea alofa); 
the bereaved family would be left in peace. This boosted Schultz’s 
optim ism , and he made no move against the office of A li’i Sili during 
the time of m ourning. So confident was he of the security of Samoa that 
he risked a trip to Germany at the end of 1912 to w ork out with colonial 
officials the final details for a public abolition of the param ountcy. The 
event took place on 12 June 1913, at a fono  in honour of the Kaiser’s 
twenty­fifth anniversary as Head of State. M alietoa Tanu and Tamasese 
were appointed as the Fautua and, in the shadow of SMS Cormoran , 
the occasion passed off in harm ony. The navy had been unable to send 
the East Asian Cruiser Squadron for the occasion, but a visit was 
planned for August, to drive home the appropriate impression.
Schultz dared to look to the future with cautious hope. The new 
political system had still to be tested: although the term Fautua carefully 
avoided any connotation of independent powers of decision, no­one 
could say how the new advisory positions would develop. But the 
G overnor had no doubt about the ‘undeniable adm inistrative gifts’ of 
the Samoans, and he pu t great faith in the people’s essential vitality 
(Lebenskraft), which, he felt, would enable them to make a significant 
contribution  to the future prosperity of the colony.42
In economic terms the Samoans were already showing the way. The 
Islanders returned quickly to copra and cocoa production after the 
Lauaki episode, and throughout the last five years of G erm an rule they 
still supplied the overwhelming proportion  (three­fifths) of export
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copra for the colony. In 1909­10 experts pu t the num ber of coconut 
palms belonging to Samoans at 800 000, with an annual rate of increase 
of 25 000­30 000 trees; Sam oan stands of coconuts covered three times 
the area of European copra plantations. M oreover, because of the 
labour shortage, Samoans were able to earn the very high wage of three 
m arks a day plus food w orking casually on European plantations.
European industry also prospered, though not uniformly. N one of 
the small Germ an plantations was a success. D eeken’s own firm lost 
253 000 marks on cocoa in 1913 alone, and never paid a dividend. The 
DHPG remained pre­em inent, protected by its land and labour 
m onopoly. It acquired forty­nine per cent of all copra produced by 
Samoans between 1902 and 1913, and its annual turnover in copra 
alone am ounted to two million m arks. Furtherm ore, the com pany’s 
extensive plantations enabled it to m aintain consistently higher profits 
over smaller firms which relied on trade copra. The general base of 
European industry expanded with the developm ent of cocoa and rubber 
p lantations, and by 1914 these represented forty­five per cent of all 
cultivated European­ow ned land. G erm an exports quadrupled between 
1900 and 1912, though copra rem ained the staple. There was even a 
pineapple canning industry by 1914.43
Samoa was, on the surface, a prosperous and peaceful corner of the 
empire. But the prosperity was brittle and the peace hollow. It is easy 
to say with h istory’s hindsight that Samoa would never have been the 
same for the Germ ans had they returned in 1918, for G erm any’s reign 
since 1900 had been Wilhelm Solf’s reign and there could have been no 
guarantee of continued peace and stability once he and Schultz had left. 
Pressure from white settlers to acquire greater autonom y and a more 
influential role in the running of the com m unity was m ounting in all 
the colonies in 1914, and there were signs tha t Berlin would have 
granted these wishes if the war had not intervened.44 M oreover, by 
1918 Germ any would have inherited a colonial world in which tropical 
produce was at a discount and econom ic depression ram pant. Such 
developments, coupled with the first faint stirrings of colonial nation­
alism, would have been bound to affect adversely relations between 
Samoans and Germ ans, as they did between Sam oans and New 
Zealanders.
But, in 1914, there were also more im m ediate signs of coming 
trouble, which tarnished Sam oa’s external image of well­being. 
Socially, the colonial relationship was undergoing subtle but con­
siderable change in the final years of G erm an rule. Exile and old age
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had removed the stronger elements of traditional leadership by 1912, 
which partly  explains the people’s acquiescence in the abolition of the 
A li’i Sili title. A new, more literate and W esternised generation of 
Samoans was coming of age and causing distortion to the indigenous 
authority  structure; chiefs were com plaining tha t they were finding it 
increasingly difficult to assert their authority  over young Samoans. For 
his part, Schultz was worried th a t ‘advancing dem ocratisation’ would 
underm ine the social structure and increase the rate of social change, 
thereby loosening G erm any’s hold over the Islanders.45
The changes to the Sam oan com m unity were m atched by a 
deterioration of racial attitudes am ong G erm an adm inistrative staff. In 
one of his last private letters to Solf before the outbreak of w ar,46 
Schultz rem arked tha t his higher officials were now mostly old Africa 
men, distinguished by their ‘m ental laziness, complacency and a 
defective capacity for com prehension and adjustm ent’. He complained 
of getting bare support for his accom m odative native policy because 
of the ‘m aster race’ attitude which these men adopted tow ards the 
Samoans. Such an attitude was particularly dangerous. The Samoans 
laid great stress on outer form s, honour and m utual respect in inter­ 
com m unal relationships. W ithout them , Schultz argued, an isolated 
disturbance m ight easily become a mass riot; Schultz’s period of office 
had already been m arred by several ugly racial incidents. It was a sour 
note on which to end fourteen years of Germ an rule, and it foreshad­
owed the com m unal collisions tha t would occur in the 1920s during 
New Z ealand’s adm inistration.
Epilogue
Lauaki and his fellow exiles in Saipan were provided with land, seed, 
livestock, fishing gear and household utensils, and expected to procure 
their own living, as well as to participate in the labour corvee organised 
by the local G erm an adm inistration. They were given no idea of the 
length of their exile, though there seems to have been some expectation 
tha t it would last no longer than  two years. Solf rem ained firmly 
opposed to the return of the chiefs until Lauaki’s death, bu t in the end 
he left the decision to Schultz. N am ulau ’ulu Pulali died w ithin the first 
year of banishm ent. The others were finally picked up on the orders of 
the New Zealand adm inistration in Samoa in late 1915 and arrived 
back in Apia on 18 December. Lauaki was not am ong them: he had 
caught dysentery while on the voyage home and was landed at Taraw a, 
in the G ilbert Islands, where he died four days later. His body was later
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removed to Samoa and buried at Fogapoa, Savai’i. By 1919 none of the 
originally­exiled chiefs was alive. Some died shortly after their return, 
others in the influenza epidemic of 1918. Lauaki’s grave still exists, and 
occasionally washing is spread out to dry upon the basalt and coral 
m ound. This is not an irreverent habit: the memory of Savai’i’s m ost 




The Pattern of S p an ish  an d  G erm an Rule
European knowledge of Ponape dates back to the sixteenth century. It 
has been suggested that the first contact was as early as 1526, when 
Loaisa y de Saavedra voyaged through the area, but no report of this 
exists.1 The earliest docum ented sighting was by Ferdinand de Quiros 
in 1595. Irregular contacts were made by Spanish galleons and 
American whalers during the next three hundred years. By the year 
1850, contacts had multiplied so quickly tha t an average of twenty­nine 
ships were putting  in at Ponape annually, m ost of them whalers from 
the northern Pacific, seeking fresh provisions and recreation.
W hen the American Board of Com m issioners for Foreign Missions 
(or Boston M issionary Society) founded its first station on the island, 
in the district of Kiti, in 1852, the Ponapeans were already well 
accustomed to Europeans and the trappings of their civilisation. Luxury 
goods had replaced iron as the m ost sought­after item of trade, and a 
fair­sized com m unity of beach residents existed, consisting of ships’ 
deserters, mutineers and escaped convicts. Andrew Cheyne mentions 
a white population  of sixty in this ‘rogues’ paradise’ when he arrived 
as a trader in 1842, and they com bined to frustrate his attem pts to 
found a trading empire on Ponape based on tortoise­shell, beche de mer 
and various tropical plants.2 W hile the beachcom bing com m unity 
formed a considerable acculturative influence on the Islanders, it never 
possessed the productivity or the power to challenge successfully the 
dom ination by the district chiefs. Commerce on the island generally 
remained in chiefly hands, and Europeans were required to function as 
trading agents or resident artisans and perhaps buy protection with a 
proportion  of their earnings. It was probably from this situation that 
the Ponapeans acquired an early reputation  for stubborn independence 
mixed with ferocity and duplicity. Ponape was never the home of the 
legendary happy savage who peoples the tales of early European 
travellers in the Pacific.
Initially, the Islanders were cordial to the Boston M ission, and the 
mission settlem ent was welcomed, despite the protests of the beach 
com munity, because the chiefs saw in it prospects of more frequent
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trade with European ships. But relations deteriorated quickly when the 
missionaries began evangelising. The Boston M ission had behind it 
thirty years of evangelical experience in Polynesia, and, with their strict 
Puritan traditions, its members viewed the indigenous cosmology and 
cults as diametrically opposed to Christianity, a system of evil which 
had to be met head on and elim inated. Sakau  drinking, polygyny, and 
the absolute nature of chiefly au thority  were subjected to virulent 
attack, with the result tha t the m ission encountered stubborn  resistance 
in Kiti and in Sokehs.
The mission persisted, however, despite blockades and the burning 
of the Kiti station in 1865. D uring a sm allpox epidemic in 1854, which 
carried off three­fifths of the population , the m ission’s inoculations and 
nursing work won it m any apparen t supporters, and its unrelenting 
campaign against the High Chiefs’ powers gradually persuaded several 
powerful district chiefs to throw  in their lot. By the 1880s, the Boston 
M ission was well entrenched in M adolenihm w  and Kiti, ruling its 
adherents as a theocracy, controlling its own law enforcem ent agency, 
operating a kind of legislature and prom oting private ownership of 
hom esteads.3
By the 1880s also there was already a considerable G erm an presence 
in the Carolines. In 1866 Alfred Tetens established an agency for 
Godeffroys in Yap, in the western Carolines, and this was followed by 
stations on Kusaie and on Ponape. By 1885 eighty per cent of the 
C arolines’ trade, and indeed m ost of the commerce of the entire island 
sphere north of New Guinea, was in G erm an hands.
It was natural, then, tha t this area should be a target for annexation 
when Bismarck’s new pro­colonial policy began to operate after 1884. 
The flag was indeed raised th roughou t M icronesia, but Spain suddenly 
m ounted vigorous protests, claim ing th a t the Caroline and M ariana 
groups, though no official regime was installed there, had been part of 
the Spanish Pacific empire for centuries. Bismarck was at the time 
wrestling with the problem  of his K ulturkam pf against Catholicism and 
how to resolve it. The M icronesian issue offered him the perfect means 
by which he m ight make his peace with the V atican. The dispute was 
therefore referred to Pope Leo XIII for his arb itration . In O ctober 1885 
the Pope decided in favour of Spain. It was not until eighteen m onths 
later, in M arch 1887, tha t a G overnor of the eastern Carolines, C aptain 
Posadillo, arrived in Ponape with fifty soldiers, twenty­five convicts and 
five Capuchin m onks, to actualise the imperial presence.4
The Spanish were blissfully ignorant of their Pacific ‘em pire’, and of
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the nature of the people with whom they were dealing. They came into 
im m ediate conflict with the Boston M ission over the site of their colony 
(M esenieng), which the missionary Edward T. Doane claimed by right 
of prior sale. But the chiefs involved, Lepen N et and Souwenim M etipw, 
denied the sale, and Doane was sent to M anila under arrest for allegedly 
inciting the Islanders against Spanish rule.5 The tru th  is difficult to 
isolate in this incident, but D oane’s personal animosity to the Spaniards 
is well authenticated. To a m issionary fired with ideals of the American 
Republic, Spain’s Catholic State apparatus seemed the epitom e of 
feudal decadence. Under such a regime the mission had a great deal to 
lose.
M eanwhile the Spanish were enjoying a short honeym oon with the 
Ponapeans, whom they called upon to provide w orking parties to assist 
in the construction of the colony. At first the Islanders complied 
willingly, bu t as time went on and they were repeatedly embezzled out 
of their wages by three unscrupulous European interpreters, resentm ent 
against the regime grew. Then, in July 1887, the W asai Sokehs (High 
Chief of Sokehs) refused point blank to send any more working parties 
to the colony. The incident tha t occurred next is surrounded by 
conflicting evidence, but when the G overnor sent a m ilitary detachm ent 
to the island it appears that the W asai and his deputies refused to leave 
their assembly house. The Spaniards then fired into the air in an effort 
to persuade them otherwise. This was the signal for general conster­
nation. Sokehs warriors grabbed the Spaniards’ firearms and shot them 
down. Excited to fever pitch, the w arriors followed up with a concerted 
attack on the new colony in which G overnor Posadillo and a further 
eighty soldiers were killed.6
A new G overnor, Don Luis Cardaso, arrived at the end of O ctober 
with three cruisers and 700 soldiers, but the only action he took was 
to dispatch three of the suspected killers to M anila for trial. To the rest 
of the Sokehs people the G overnor offered an amnesty, and by the 
beginning of 1888 relations were on an even keel once m ore, at least 
on the surface.
Com parative peace reigned until 1890. The N ahnm w arki of Kiti had 
already shown himself willing to accept a C atholic m issionary in the 
district, probably to offset the growing influence of one of his chiefs, 
Henry N anpei, who was the d istrict’s leading businessman and had 
become principal benefactor of the Protestant M ission. The first 
Catholic station was founded at Aleniang in June 1889. There was, 
however, a great deal of general coolness when Don Luis announced
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a plan to lay roads to the Catholic mission centres and establish military 
outposts in close proximity to them, so as to extend gradually an 
integrated network of Spanish control over the districts. The Capuchin 
Fathers were understandably alarmed at the likelihood of their work 
being identified with military rule and, when a road was cut from 
Aleniang into the stronghold of Protestantism at Oa in Madolenihmw 
in May 1890, they warned the Governor that the people would not 
stand for this two­fold infringement of their independence and their 
religious affiliation.7 On 25 June, as a party of forty soldiers arrived to 
occupy the site for the garrison, they were attacked by the Madole­
nihmw people and cut down to a man. A further forty sent the same day 
met the same fate. In the following months the rebellion grew, and the 
Spanish mounted a series of punitive expeditions involving several 
gunboats and hundreds of soldiers imported from the Philippines. 
These, however, only led to more serious reverses and heavy loss of 
Spanish life before Oa was taken and the rebellion broken.
The people of the northern districts of Net and Sokehs had had much 
more contact with the Spanish regime than the people of the south, to 
whom they were traditionally hostile. Since 1887 the Catholic Mission 
had been able to make several converts in Net and Sokehs. The revolt 
in Madolenihmw, and the barely­disguised distaste of Kiti and the other 
southern districts for the Spanish, caused anxiety among the northern 
people and forced them to consider an alliance of convenience with the 
administration and the mission. In consequence, indigenous feuds more 
and more took on the outward appearance of a confessional war 
between the Catholic north and the Protestant south. This occurred 
despite the deterioration of the Boston Mission’s position after the 1887 
trouble and its final expulsion by Cardaso in 1890.
Throughout the next decade the Islanders continued to defy the 
Spanish, especially in the south. Intermittent skirmishes and assassi­
nations took place as successive Spanish governors tried in vain to 
reassert the imperial presence by road­building projects or schemes to 
disarm the population. On occasions the regime did gain the upper 
hand in military engagements, only to lose it immediately by a policy 
of appeasement, which was invariably interpreted as weakness. Reports 
from German naval vessels visiting the island in these years indicate that 
the colony lived in a state of constant siege. A buttressed wall with 
artillery emplacements encircled the entire European settlement at 
Mesenieng, while the land beyond was cleared to a depth of 500 metres 
so as to provide a clear line of fire. None of the 300­strong garrison
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dared to venture outside this fortress for fear of being shot down, and 
the soldiers spent m ost of their time drinking in the taverns. The 
adm inistration  also paid a salary or ‘tribu te’ of about 100 m arks a 
m onth to the various High Chiefs, to keep the peace; the leader of the 
Protestant faction in the south, Henry N anpei, reportedly received 
3000 m arks a year.8
N one of these measures altered things in favour of the Spanish. The 
Ponapeans m aintained their m ilitary weight and effectiveness by means 
of the arm s continually smuggled into the island by American whalers. 
Indeed, so low had the Spanish authorities sunk in the Islanders’ 
estim ation tha t this trade was carried on under the very nose of Spanish 
gunboats, which were under strict instructions to avoid provoking 
Americans because of the international differences between the two 
countries.
The Spanish­American war of 1898­99 in fact proved to be the nadir 
of Spain’s abortive regime in the Carolines. A dispute between the 
C atholic sub­district of Awak in the north  and the P rotestant districts 
exploded into a general Protestant uprising in 1898, after the Spanish 
courts acquitted an Awak chief charged with m urdering a Protestant. 
Politics and religion were inextricably linked in the affair. The Protes­
tants in the south were determ ined to vanquish the northern  districts 
and thrust the Spaniards from the island as a prelude to American 
occupation; the northern  chiefs bore a particular antipathy tow ards the 
leader of the Protestants, Henry N anpei, whom they suspected of 
am bitions to make himself the first ‘King of Ponape’.
N anpei was the m ost exceptional Ponapean of his generation. He had 
acquired the largest landed fortune on the island through an inheritance 
which was contrary to the Ponapean tradition  of matrilineal succession. 
The inheritance was from his father, N ahnku , the form er N ahnken of 
Kiti district. N ahnku had established a reputation  for hospitality and 
assistance to visiting Europeans, and, in return, the father of N ahnku’s 
wife, an Englishman by the name of James Headley, in 1863 left a 
testam ent ceding the full rights over a large area of land in Kiti, 
including several offshore atolls, to the N ahnken and his direct heirs. 
This docum ent to private landed title, unconventional though it was, 
had been honoured by the Spanish regime, and was to be again by the 
Germans. Henry N anpei continued his fa ther’s tradition  of generous 
disbursem ent, and developed his estates considerably through trading 
and planting. He founded the first Ponapean­owned store, purchased 
more land, and planted it with coconuts and ivory nuts. In the late
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1890s an Englishman visiting Kiti rem arked with surprise on the 
substantial wharf, boathouse and storing facilities which N anpei had 
built at the m outh of the Ronkiti River, and he described ‘countless’ 
planted coconuts flourishing in the river valley.9 By the turn of the 
century N anpei laid claim to 300 hectares in Kiti and to the Ant Islands 
offshore.
N anpei had received an education from the Boston missionaries. 
Under their auspices, he had travelled to Hawaii and California, 
returning to Ponape with a rough collection of Republican ideas and 
quite W esternised personal habits. N anpei was nothing if no t adap t­
able. W hen the Spanish arrived he was no t unfriendly at first, helping 
to m ediate peace between the parties in the early conflicts, and even 
rescuing the Capuchin m onks from attack  during the 1890 war. For his 
services he was twice decorated with imperial insignia and he received 
a substantial stipend from the regime, reputedly the largest stipend paid 
to any of the island chiefs.
But H enry N anpei was not prepared to com m it himself uncondi­
tionally to the dem ands of his new m asters. Always he was looking to 
the m axim um  political advantage, mindful of the uncertain basis of his 
estates in Kiti. He had made enemies am ong the Ponapeans because of 
his unconventional initiatives and his non­conform ity to the rules of 
inheritance, and the struggle which absorbed him m ost was political, 
not religious. N anpei recognised th a t the Spanish governm ent was a 
poor guarantee of his position in Kiti, and of his growing power. In the 
end his sym pathy with the United States made him an enemy of Spain. 
Exploiting his position as protector of the Protestant faction after the 
mission left in 1890, N anpei used the mission schools to preach the 
virtues of American rule. He im ported arms and am m unition into Kiti 
from Japanese trading schooners and allegedly used them as paym ent 
for the labourers on his land .10 In 1898 N anpei was the inspiration of 
the Protestant revolt, though typically he rem ained carefully in the 
background, in case the Spanish proved victorious.
In fact the Spanish forces, with the aid of Sokehs and N et, did manage 
to beat back the first attack on Awak by southern w arriors in M arch 
1898, but fighting broke out again a m onth later. N anpei was arrested 
as the instigator of the disturbances, but the process against him faltered 
in the confusion surrounding the progress of the war between Spain and 
America. It was a time of uncertainty for the adm inistration, which was 
besieged on all sides and expecting every day the arrival of an American 
naval force. The conflict with the Islanders dragged on into 1899, while
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Spanish rule became ever more discredited. At last, in September 1899, 
a w arship arrived with the news that Ponape (in fact the entire Caroline 
and M ariana groups) were to be sold to Germany.
G erm any had never relinquished her interest in the Carolines. 
B ism arck’s unsuccessful annexation bid had not impeded the activities 
of G erm an traders in M icronesia during the Spanish period. Indeed, the 
agreem ent signed with the Spanish governm ent in 1885 had specifically 
guaranteed freedom  of trade and equality for G erm an m erchants in the 
area. Since G erm an companies, the m ost prom inent am ong them being 
the Jalu it Gesellschaft, had already built up extensive trading links by 
this date, it m eant in effect tha t the status quo was shifted in their favour. 
The single Spanish firm, Factoria Espanola, did not develop to any 
extent during Spanish rule, and though there were other small traders 
on Ponape, and larger American and Japanese concerns in the western 
Carolines, they had not underm ined G erm an dom inance of the m ar­
kets. In 1899 the Jaluit Gesellschaft was exporting three­quarters of the 
1500 tonnes of copra produced in the Carolines and it was urging the 
Foreign Office to acquire the group as a going concern before the 
Americans could do so .11 In a fit of exhaustion, with the Pacific empire 
breaking dow n around it, the Spanish home governm ent was yet 
determ ined to deny its island chains to the trium phant Americans. The 
equivalent of five million m arks had been spent trying to subdue the 
Carolinians. To recoup that, the Carolines and M arianas were sold to 
G erm any in June 1899 for a grand total of 17 250 000 marks. O n 2 
O ctober a G erm an expedition from New Guinea took form al posses­
sion of the Caroline Islands and brought the period of Spanish rule to 
an end.
The new G erm an adm inistration was forced to take up where its 
predecessors left off. The Spanish retreat left the Germ ans facing a 
thousand practised warriors in the five districts, and the problem  of 
coping with large caches of m odern arms and am m unition. It was a 
crude frontier predicam ent, which had prevailed w ithout interruption 
for nearly two decades.
Official policy towards Ponape in the next seven years was influenced 
decisively by Berlin’s consciousness of the island’s past. W ith the 
Spaniards’ experience in mind, officials of the Colonial D epartm ent 
were concerned lest any false moves or indiscreet demands by the local 
regime should lead to a general rebellion which only a full­scale land 
and sea operation  could hope to suppress.
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Of equal im port were the econom ic considerations. Ponape was just 
not worth many risks. It was an insignificant, undeveloped corner of 
the colonial empire, with very m odest potential as an economic or 
strategic asset. Though by far the largest island of the Carolines, it 
contained only eight per cent of the total population of the group 
(40 000), while the European population  never rose above fifty during 
the Germ an period. Ponape’s high volcanic nature diminished its 
p lantation  potential, for there was only a narrow  belt of level land 
between the m angrove­fringed reefs and the m ountains, with a thin 
layer of topsoil lacking a coral base. This retarded the rapid growth of 
coconuts in particular. The constant, heavy rainfall ham pered copra 
production, and the m ountainous terrain of the interior made clearing 
and planting arduous and expensive. In addition, m arkets were a long 
way off and freights costly, and there was the ubiquitous problem of 
labour: because of the dem ands of yam cultivation associated with the 
com petition for prestige in Ponapean society, the Islanders had little 
inclination to work for Europeans as wage labourers.
There were no large plantations on Ponape when the Germans 
arrived. Henry N anpei, and a Portugese settler by the name of Dominic 
Etscheit, owned patches of irregularly­planted coconuts, but they were 
not geared to intensive production for e x p o rt.12 A few new plantations 
were established by Europeans in subsequent years, but their rate of 
developm ent was slow; by 1904, six European plantations in the 
eastern Carolines employed only seventy­eight labourers.13 The entire 
Carolines group in fact exported much less copra than did the neigh­
bouring group of atolls in the east, the M arshalls. The Jaluit 
Gesellschaft had begun its trading in the M arshalls and had built up 
quite a sophisticated industry there. W ith G erm an rule established in 
the west of M icronesia, the Jaluit Gesellschaft was given a concession 
in 1901 to develop the coral atolls of the eastern Carolines and the high 
islands of Truk. But Ponape was excluded from the agreem ent in 
recognition of its limited prospects and its fragile security.
W ith such a questionable asset, and for the sake of inter­com m unal 
peace, Berlin was at pains to avoid any policy which might cause unrest 
or provoke a hostile response from the Ponapeans, even to the point 
of sacrificing close adm inistrative control and the economic m obilisa­
tion of the Islanders. The m an whom they chose to lead the adm inis­
tration  in the Carolines did not stray from this conception. He was 
Albert H ahl, Imperial Judge in the p ro tectorate of New G uinea since 
1896, and appointed Deputy G overnor of the island sphere in July
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1899. H ahl was well aware of the difficulties facing him on arrival in 
Ponape: ‘We arrive in the protectorate with naked cheeks’ he wrote to 
a colleague in 1899,
and are supposed immediately to build houses [and] drill people 
whom  we d o n ’t understand and who d o n ’t understand us . . . From 
the Spanish we’ll learn nothing and will have nothing to take over; 
the ground is indeed chosen, but no t sowed; at best with b lood .14
In the light of Berlin’s apprehensions, H ah l’s strategy was to let the 
ground lie fallow awhile. From the start, his adm inistration adopted a 
relaxed posture. H ahl arrived in Ponape with w hat the departing 
Spaniards considered a skeleton staff— a doctor, a harbour m aster, a 
police official and a mixed force of forty­six M elanesians and 
M alays— which prom pted the Spanish G overnor to urge Hahl to leave 
with him im m ediately, lest his puny group be massacred within a 
w eek.15 Though the Ponapeans treated his small band of ‘niggers’ with 
open derision, H ahl was unconcerned, for he reasoned that any larger 
m ilitary display would only be cause for provocation. The Deputy 
G overnor also took walking tours around the districts, deliberately 
w ithout any m ilitary escort, in order to convey his peaceful intentions; 
and he announced th a t there would be no prosecution of any offences 
com m itted during the Spanish period, backing up his promise by 
negotiating a fragile peace between Awak and the w arring Protestant 
faction.
H ah l’s low­key approach succeeded in gaining a respite from con­
flicts for the first five years of G erm an rule. It would be unfair to suggest 
that no substantial adm inistrative priorities existed during this time. 
Hahl had draw n up a list of objectives, centring on the curtailm ent of 
the powers of the High Chiefs, on balancing the interests of clans and 
on completely restructuring indigenous land rights. According to 
H ah l’s in terpretation , the roo t of m ost social conflict in Ponape was the 
land tenure system, with its emphasis on m atrilineal succession and the 
theoretical right of the High Chief to dispose of all land in his district. 
G radual changes to land tenure concepts were taking place on Ponape, 
hastened by contact with the outside world, and Hahl recognised this 
development. He envisaged that in four or five years, when rum ours of 
war had subsided and the Islanders were disarm ed, Germ any might lend 
her weight to the process and break the bonds of the feudal system. But 
the D eputy G overnor was not sanguine about early changes. The 
Ponapeans he regarded in 1900 as ‘distrustful, treacherous and
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apathetic’, and the political situation as too delicate for ideas of 
economic and social reform .16
Where he was able to, w ithout stirring passions, H ahl did sow seeds 
for the future. In continual discussions with the High Chiefs, which 
initially took place under armed guard because of their m utual suspi­
cions, Hahl elicited a tenuous acceptance of a few vague principles of 
adm inistration, like freedom of religious practice, preservation of the 
Ponapean ‘constitu tion’, and protection  of individuals’ p roperty .17 
Significantly, the first signature sought by the Germ ans for the 
accom panying protocol was tha t of H enry N anpei, no t tha t of the High 
Chiefs. The High Chiefs were delegated local judicial powers in m inor 
civil and criminal m atters, while im portan t cases affecting the districts 
were left to the D eputy G overnor in concert with the chiefs. From the 
outside the ‘package’ seems a crude form  of indirect G erm an rule; in 
reality it had more to do with the policy of treading softly in uncertain 
places, and it left m any disputes which otherwise would have reached 
Germ an courts to be dealt with according to traditional sanctions and 
patterns of authority. Policing such an agreement was obviously ou t of 
the question.
Albert H ahl left Ponape at the end of 1901 to resume duty in New 
Guinea, this time as G overnor— a post he retained until 1914. Although 
this gave him a continuing relationship with the island sphere (as its 
chief executive), his energies were concentrated alm ost entirely, and 
naturally, on New Guinea itself. His two­year acquaintance with 
Ponape m ust be seen therefore as a mere interlude in a long New Guinea 
adm inistration. T hat does not diminish the value of his observations 
on Ponape, nor his conception of its problem s, for H ahl was a m an of 
astute perception and practical vision. But it did m ean that Hahl was 
later to make decisions about Ponape based on a rather short, and 
difficult, tour of duty. His opinion of the people was no more flattering 
to them at the end of his stay than at the beginning. He left Ponape a 
disappointed m an, after doing all in his power to win their trust and 
make them loyal subjects, w ithout apparen t success.18
His successor was Victor Berg, a forty­year­old colonial civil servant 
with some experience of Germ an East Africa. Initially he shared H ah l’s 
distaste for the Ponapeans, characterising them on one occasion as 
‘incorrigible layabouts and ill­civilised Yankee apes’.19 Berg arrived 
with definite preconceptions about the job, and he earned a severe 
censure from the Colonial D epartm ent within his first two m onths, after 
a rashly­worded dispatch announcing his determ ination to assert
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imperial authority  ‘forcefully’ and to meet local resistance with 
‘relentless’ reprisals. He learned his lesson very quickly, however, after 
his superiors warned that any unrest during his appointm ent would lead 
to an immediate recall.20 His adm inistration thereafter was m arked by 
a singular restraint and sobriety, and in both report and action he 
rem ained faithful to the official conception of his duties— to follow the 
lines of policy laid down by Hahl.
Only three events stand out in Berg’s five­year tenure of office: a 
partially successful disarm am ent of the Carolinians, the beginnings of 
a long and wearisome dispute with the C atholic mission, and the 
m anner of his death.
Despite H ah l’s surveillance of whaling ships in 1900­01, an illegal 
whaler trade in consum er goods and arms did continue in Ponapean 
harbours into 1902 and 1903. After the farcical attem pts by the Spanish 
to stop the arms trade, American whalers had acquired a nimbus of 
superiority over warships. N o t even H ah l’s threats of prison for those 
found trafficking with the whalers were sufficient to deter the Islanders. 
Lacking m anpow er and restricted by poor com m unications (it took six 
to eight hours for a report to reach the colony by boat from the southern 
harbours), the adm inistration could rely only on occasional patrols by 
visiting naval vessels.
Therefore, the long­projected operation  to remove as m any of the 
C arolinians’ firearms as possible was begun, n o tin  Ponape, but in T ruk, 
where the density of population was much higher (12 000 inhabitants 
occupied an area one­third the size of Ponape). Using the Samoan 
precedent of financial com pensation, in late 1904 Berg, supported by 
the presence of SMS Condor, collected over 400 guns and a large 
am ount of am m unition in less than  three m onths.
Berg’s idea was to use the T ruk disarm am ent in turn as a precedent 
for a similar cam paign in Ponape, not immediately, but in a few years 
when the Ponapeans were ready to trust the Germans. But Berg was 
presented with his opportunity  after a very few m onths. O n M aundy 
Thursday, April 1905, a typhoon broke over Ponape and left a trail of 
destruction in its wake: forty­six Islanders were killed in the eastern 
Carolines, over 300 were injured, and dam age am ounting to four 
million m arks was inflicted on property and crops. O n Ponape itself, 
all the breadfruit and bananas, and three­quarters of all coconut palms 
were destroyed; the adm inistration’s two­day­oid m otor schooner was 
thrown onto the reef and buildings suffered damage w orth 150 000 
marks; while the mission societies fared even w orse.21 At one stroke the
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economic potential of the area was set back years, and, although the 
ensuing threat of famine was averted, there was for a time an alarming 
scarcity of all but basic foodstuffs.
Berg decided to combine the task of reconstruction with a calculated 
offensive against the armament problem. His most powerful potential 
opponent, Henry Nanpei, was conveniently out of the way on a trip to 
Germany, and this increased Berg’s leverage over the community. This 
time Berg offered thirty­five marks per weapon, ten marks more than 
in Truk, or rice and tinned meat at even higher values. Hand­in­hand 
with the arms purchase went the distribution of free coconut seeds and 
a campaign of planting and house reconstruction.
The results genuinely surprised the Germans. From M ay 1905 to 
M ay 1906, some 545 guns and thousands of rounds of ammunition 
were handed in, most for cash rather than goods. Ponape was revealed 
to be quite an armed camp, for the proportion  of one gun to fewer than 
six Ponapeans was by far the highest in the Carolines and exceeded even 
that in Samoa.22 Only one incident soured the operation, and that was 
the unscheduled arrival of a German warship, which led to rumours in 
the more suspicious areas, Sokehs in particular, that the Germans were 
planning to fall upon the now­defenceless districts. The surrender of 
arms dropped dramatically from that time, leaving a substantial 
number in the hands of Sokehs warriors, though several years were to 
elapse before the Germans discovered the fact.
Berg, however, considered the disarmament a success, and he was 
never to know otherwise, for on 30 April 1907, still in office, he died. 
Officially he died of sunstroke while ou t surveying— an unusual death 
for a man who had spent some nine years in the tropics. The Ponapeans 
themselves believe differently. Their oral traditions tell of Berg’s digging 
in the ruins of N an  M adol and disturbing the tombs of the ancestral 
kings. He died a few days later, without any prior signs of illness, 
pursued to the end by the sound of ghostly shell trumpets echoing 
through the mountains.23 It is a tale of retribution entirely in keeping 
with the brooding atmosphere of Ponape and its people.
The final years of Berg’s administration had not been free of all 
recrimination. For the first time since the Boston Mission had left the 
island in 1890, the government in 1905 encountered a challenge from 
missionary zeal. A measure of confessional balance had been regained 
in 1899 when the Boston Mission returned to Ponape, but the centres 
of its operations now remained in Kusaie and Truk and only one or two 
missionaries were stationed in Ponape. In 1907 its work in the Carolines
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was taken over by the Liebenzeller Mission, an arm of the German 
evangelical Jugendbund für entscheidendes Christentum. In like m an­
ner, the mandate of the Spanish Capuchins was transferred to the 
Rhein­Westfalen Province of the Capuchin Order, and after 1903 
German monks gradually replaced the Spanish.
Relations between the Catholic Mission and the administration were 
at their most cordial while the Spanish Capuchins were still on the 
island. Both Hahl and Berg were on very friendly terms with the Fathers, 
and their friendship was reciprocated; Hahl in particular was regarded 
by the Spanish Fathers as ‘a sensitive and noble m an’.24 Ironically, with 
the arrival of the German Capuchins a less fraternal atmosphere 
prevailed, over an issue which had been evaded hitherto: the question 
of competitive proselytism.
The first collision occurred early in 1905, when the Capuchins sought 
approval to expand into Takaiu, an island section in the lagoon of Uh, 
where the mostly pagan and Protestant inhabitants had declared 
themselves ready to accept a Catholic station. Predictably, the 
evangelical missionary, M r Gray, protested that Takaiu had always 
been a traditional Protestant preserve.
The dispute which Berg was now forced to adjudicate had ramifica­
tions beyond mere sectarian jealousy. Though it claimed over 1000 
adherents, evangelical Protestantism in Ponape in the early 1900s was 
a hollow institution; even the Boston Mission on its return in 1899 
acknowledged that the spiritual life of the people was ‘all but zero’.25 
But religion had become over the years a powerful reinforcement of the 
political divisions of the districts. The complexion of one’s faith was 
now a badge of political allegiance: the Catholic north against the 
Protestant south. To disturb that by insisting on the principle of 
religious freedom would create dangerous tensions in Ponape. It was 
a problem that Hahl never had to face even though he had succeeded 
in gaining the High Chiefs’ assent to the principle in 1900. It was left 
to Berg, and he was only too aware of the Colonial Departm ent’s 
anxiety to maintain the status quo. He also recognised in Henry Nanpei 
a man who was the Church in Kiti, to whom the power was more 
important than the calling. N anpei’s support was vital to the admin­
istration. Under the circumstances, Berg would not sanction the 
Catholic Mission’s plan without Protestant approval.
A confrontation with the mission was inevitable, especially after the 
Deputy Superior retorted that war was immaterial to the mission where 
converts were to be made. When Berg went on in 1906 to accept the
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action of the High Chiefs of Kiti and Madolenihmw, who stripped two 
of their chiefs of land and titles for favouring the Catholic Mission, the 
Capuchins were thoroughly outraged. Relations thereafter were 
steadily more strained.
The missionaries’ stand is an important part of the Ponape story, for 
they were the real representatives of European rule at district and 
section level until 1907. The administration gained some knowledge of 
district relations through its consultations with important chiefs, but 
by and large until 1907 Hahl and Berg had been confined to rather 
negative policies: trying to reduce sources of inter­communal conflict, 
curbing gun­running operations and partially disarming the Islanders. 
Berg’s death marked the end of this phase, for it coincided with the 
creation of the Colonial Office as a separate ministry, and with the new 
priorities of Secretary Dernburg: colonial self­sufficiency and co­ordi­
nated economic and social development. After 1907 these pressures 
made themselves felt on Albert Hahl as chief executive of the island 
sphere, with portentous results for Ponape.
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The arbitrary  nature of ‘feudal’ rule in Ponape, with its expulsion of 
tenants, banishm ent of dissidents and disputes over tenure, tribute and 
advancem ent, was an inexhaustible source of conflict which the Ger­
m ans found difficult to control before 1907 because of the widely 
scattered nature of Ponapean settlem ent, the lack of roads and the 
dependence on slow boats for transport. The new Colonial Office 
initiatives gave H ahl in New Guinea the inducem ent to consider 
im plem enting the changes he had projected in 1900. N o t just security, 
bu t also the need to stim ulate indigenous production  and raise Ponape’s 
econom ic ou tpu t— indeed the ou tpu t of the whole island sphere— dic­
tated positive action. In 1907 H ahl was sure he could introduce a new 
system of land tenure into Kiti district at least, because population  
pressure there was straining the available land, and because in Kiti lived 
Henry N anpei, whom Hah! saw as a certain supporter of the Germ an 
m oves.1
The G overnor undertook a tour to Ponape in September 1907 while 
the island was still w ithout a new district officer. O n 23 September, he 
announced to an assembly of chiefs the Reich’s intention of converting 
the present land system into freehold ownership by farm stead tenants, 
and he managed to extract from the High Chiefs a written agreem ent 
tha t they would refrain meanwhile from dispossessing their present 
tenants of cultivated land .2 W ithout offering any further inform ation 
H ahl then departed, leaving behind him general confusion. Some 
sections of the population  saw the agreem ent as a total abolition of 
chiefly powers; the High Chiefs feared that the agreem ent m eant their 
position and prerogatives had been swept away by mere fiat.
W hen the new district adm inistrator, Georg Fritz, arrived m any 
m onths later, in April 1908, he found a highly unstable situation. In the 
absence of a strong hand, the leading chiefs had been spreading 
rum ours that the Germ ans were planning to introduce new taxes and 
customs duties, and even forced labour cam ps.3
Fritz was a young, am bitious m an, sensitive about professional status 
and esteem, who had just completed a successful tour of duty as
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adm inistrator of the M ariana Islands. There, am ong the peaceful, 
passive race of C ham orros and M icronesians, he had with little 
difficulty set up a poll tax  system, regulated the planting activities of 
the inhabitants, and introduced com pulsory labour for the adm inis­
tration. Fritz was an official in the true colonial m ould. He was eager 
to bring the ‘realities of civilisation’ to the Naturvölker, namely, the will 
to work for its own sake, joy in private property, and love of family, 
preferably the nuclear family. A patronising m an, filled with the need 
to uphold the honour and prestige of the Reich am ong ‘native races’, 
Fritz was yet anxious to be, and to appear to be, fair, im partial and 
understanding.
Because the M arianas had been such a congenial area for his talents, 
Fritz came to Ponape unwillingly at first. His instructions from Hahl 
were to address himself to the land issue. H ahl wanted a survey of every 
farm stead and com m on on the island so tha t the needs of the people 
and of the adm inistration could be gauged before effecting any changes. 
Fritz was in agreem ent with the G overnor th a t things could be allowed 
to drift no longer, and tha t the seat of adm inistration might just as well 
be shifted to another, more prosperous centre in the Carolines unless 
economic developm ent were accomplished in Ponape along the lines 
desired by the Colonial Office.
Fritz himself foresaw the extension of his M arianas work to Ponape, 
including the levying of personal taxes and the im position of corvee 
labour, but felt that it should be discreetly organised so as to overcome 
the resistance of the Islanders. He did not take kindly to H ah l’s m ethod 
of procedure, regarding the G overnor’s reform project of September as 
‘im m ature and unjust’ and its disclosure in Ponape prem ature.4 In 
February 1908 he had already informed H ahl of a scheme of his own 
which would transform  the social system, and involve the Islanders 
th roughout the Carolines in the tasks of developm ent.5 In areas where 
the chief and his tenants agreed, the absolute right of the chief over the 
com m oner’s land was to be abolished, as well as the constant obliga­
tions of tribute in produce and labour. In return, the main chiefs were 
to be com pensated financially through a system of com pulsory w ork 
which the governm ent would organise for the em ancipated tenants. The 
tenants would gain the freehold possession of their land, to be handed 
down in perpetuity to their heirs, but would be obligated to work on 
governm ent projects for fifteen days each year at a wage rate of one 
m ark per day. Half this wage would then be distributed to the chiefs 
as recompense for their lost income and privileges; the rest would fall
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to the governm ent treasury. Fritz anticipated that, as the traditional 
leaders were incorporated into the adm inistrative apparatus as officials 
and overseers of the public w orks, their ‘pension’ would be phased out 
and the tax  of fifteen work­days on each Islander would accrue to the 
adm inistration. It was a subtly­disguised system of mass taxation  and 
corvee labour, designed, at one stroke, to reduce the independence of 
the chiefs and involve them more closely in adm inistrative control, to 
accustom the people to ordered w ork, and to open up the island at 
minimal cost. Fritz later estim ated tha t, with the extension of the 
scheme to the rest of the Carolines group, and with the added inno­
vation of a direct cash or copra tax  on the low copra­yielding atolls, the 
island sphere might generate 100 000 m arks in cash annually.6
H ahl and Fritz had just managed to convince the Colonial Office in 
June 1908 that the reforms were essential to productivity, and to law 
and order, when suddenly the entire scheme was throw n into doubt by 
growing unrest over the reforms themselves. N o t only had the latent 
dissatisfaction touched off by H ah l’s visit spread throughout the native 
com m unity, but Fritz was also becoming unavoidably embroiled in a 
m ajor dispute between two Kiti chiefs, H enry N anpei and Sou Kiti.7
N anpei’s legacy of land, his acquisition of the Protestant leadership, 
and his business ability had earned him a power base in his section, 
Ronkiti, which rivalled that even of the N ahnm w arki. In so doing he 
created enemies in the ‘royal’ line of chiefs. Among them was the section 
chief of Enipein in Kiti, Sou Kiti, descendant of a famous Enipein 
w arrior of the same clan, who had conquered the Ant Islands off Kiti 
in a m ajor district war of the eighteenth century. This connection, along 
with the titular headship of the goddess N aluk cult gave Sou Kiti 
significant historical rights to the Ant Islands, which N anpei also 
claimed through his father’s testam ent of 1863. Over the years, Nanpei 
had developed the islands, which were rich in coconuts and marine 
products, as the m ajor base of his business operations, and he regarded 
Sou Kiti’s claim with hostility.
The issue was revived in 1907­08 with H ah l’s announcem ent of the 
proposed land changes. Though the Spanish regime in 1896 and Hahl 
in 1899 had recognised N anpei’s inheritance, his claims, particularly 
to Ant, strictly contradicted the traditional system of inheritance, and 
there were those from within Kiti itself who would gladly seek any 
charge to circumscribe N anpei’s power and wealth. N anpei was p ar­
ticularly apprehensive of Sou Kiti as a political rival, for Sou Kiti was 
equally a m an of reputation in Kiti. He was resolute, brave, loyal and
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clever; a w arrior who had taken the Sou Kiti title after aiding Sokehs 
and N et in the Spanish wars and a leader who could mobilise many 
people in Kiti in his support. Because of this Henry N anpei had a vested 
interest in seeing the G erm an land reforms introduced, rtis  chances of 
confirming his claims to the Ant Islands and their wealth were far 
greater if he supported the G erm an plans than if he took recourse to 
traditional custom in Kiti.
At the same time, a new element com plicated the dispute and 
aggravated N anpei’s dilemma. Sou Kiti was not a C atholic but he 
possessed clan relatives in the Catholic districts and was sym pathetic 
to the Capuchin missionaries. They appear to have courted Sou Kiti to 
provide land in his section for a school and church.8
To H enry N anpei this represented a serious threat: no t only could 
Sou Kiti count on the Capuchins for active support in any campaign 
against N anpei’s estates, bu t a Catholic intrusion into Kiti would 
underm ine N anpei’s position and considerable influence as Protestant 
head. It would also imply a certain trium ph for the northern  districts 
who identified themselves with the C atholic cause and treated Sou Kiti 
as an ally.
The district chiefs of Sokehs and N et were particularly  wary of 
N anpei. They continually suspected him of deliberately augm enting his 
landed estates and his prestige so that he would be in a position to 
dem and recognition as the m ost powerful m an in Ponape, strengthening 
the southern districts against the northern in the process. The G erm an 
adm inistration repeatedly seemed to these chiefs to be favouring 
N anpei by seeking his com pany and advice and taking him as inter­
preter or m ediator on tours around the Carolines.
Their suspicions hardened when, after H ah l’s visit in September 
1907, N anpei reconstructed a group of his supporters which had grown 
up in the Spanish period as a direct result of the Boston M ission’s 
attem pts to introduce American ideas of party  governm ent and private 
property. This body of Protestant­trained chiefs in M adolenihm w , Kiti 
and Uh had acted, not always consciously nor w ithout violence and 
coercion, as a vanguard of American ideas. O n Georg Fritz’s arrival, 
the group paraded itself as a new dem ocratic m ovem ent which had 
formed ostensibly in response to social reform s. Its plan was to elect 
three chiefly representatives from each of the five districts, with N anpei 
as ‘chairm an’, to act as an ‘advisory council’ (puin en lolokon) to the 
adm inistration in ‘native affairs’.9
O n one level the plan m ight be seen as a progressive initiative to have
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power shared in a colonial situation: but it is also necessary to recognise 
in it the operation of plain political self­interest: Henry Nanpei’s 
primary aim was to capture a position and influence commensurate 
with his standing as Ponape’s foremost land baron and entrepreneur.
N anpei’s uneasiness with traditional custom did not stem simply 
from the Ant Islands affair; he laid claim to parcels of land all over Kiti 
and in other districts as well. In fact Nanpei’s status in Ponape was 
exceptional in every way. He was the son of a celebrated Nahnken, and 
enjoyed the title Ipwin pohn warawar (Born Upon the Ditch), which 
gave him considerable prestige;10 he held the Nanpei title in three 
districts, Kiti, Madolenihmw and Uh; he was head of the Protestant 
faction in those three districts; and he possessed eminent kin connec­
tions in both Madolenihmw and Uh, who enjoyed the ear of their 
Nahnmwarkis.
For all his high birth, innate ability and the power and influence of 
his own making, Henry Nanpei remained a prisoner of custom. He had 
nowhere to go in the title system. N ot being of the appropriate clan, he 
would never progress either to Nahnmwarki or Nahnken. As owner of 
a great deal of unconventionally­inherited land, he was always, in 
theory at least, vulnerable to sequestration by the Nahnmwarki of Kiti. 
It was logical, therefore, that Nanpei should initiate moves to counter 
and neutralise, if not abolish, the power of the High Chiefs, and secure 
for himself the maximum freedom of action. His proposed advisory 
council would achieve just those ends. With his followers from the three 
southern districts and their influence on the Nahnmwarkis, Nanpei 
would be in a position to manipulate both the traditional system and 
the German regime. The northern districts at least were in no doubt that 
Nanpei was out to destroy the Nahnmwarkis and entrench himself as 
an ally and protector of the foreign regime. From their vantage point 
in the north, the Capuchin Fathers agreed; indeed their Superior 
believed that Nanpei was out to create a new ruling line through which 
he and his descendants would become in effect hereditary Deputy 
Governors of Ponape.11
By July 1908 there was once more open animosity between the 
southern and northern districts, with the inexperienced Fritz totally 
confused by the complexities of the dispute. The isolation of Mese­ 
nieng, or Kolonia as it was now called, on the northern shores of Ponape 
added to Fritz’s difficulties, for it effectively prevented him from 
discovering what exactly was going on in the south.
To counter this, Fritz began in May to construct a road from the
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colony to Kiti with paid out­islander labour. It had not gone more than 
1000 metres, when, on 17 July, the road workers were thrown into 
consternation by a warning to stop work on the project or risk being 
attacked by Ponapean warriors. Five days earlier, people from Pweipwei 
and Paliapailong in Kiti had raided Sou Kiti’s land inTomworoahlong, 
destroying coconut and breadfruit plants and damaging some canoes 
and a house. Fritz was in Kiti investigating this incident when he heard 
of the furore at the roadworks. O n top of this report came one from 
Nanpei: that the Catholic areas of Sokehs, Net and Awak were furious 
at the rumours of enforced land changes and new taxes, and were 
planning an assault not only on the European colony but on friends of 
the regime like Nanpei as well.
By now totally flustered and believing Ponape on the brink of 
rebellion, Fritz retreated to N anpei’s base in Ronkiti. At the same time 
he dispatched a message to the colony to prepare its defences and one 
to the Capuchin Fathers asking them to use their good offices to pacify 
the northerners.
The northerners, for their part, were genuinely nonplussed at the 
whole affair and then highly indignant at what they saw as a plot by 
Nanpei to discredit them. Two days after the unrest on the road project, 
the chiefs of Sokehs and Net gathered before Fritz in a demonstration 
of loyalty and obedience organised by the Catholic mission and Fritz 
promised that no changes to land tenure would be made until the chiefs 
approved.
None of these measures really solved the crisis or reduced the tension. 
When letters continued to arrive in Kolonia warning against a northern 
attack, Fritz contemplated calling in military support, but decided 
instead to tackle the island chiefs in a general assembly.
The assembly, on 4 August 1908, revealed how close to the edge of 
war Ponape had slid since the issue of land reform was raised twelve 
months before. The delegates from M adolenihmw came bearing rifles, 
the Uh people arrived in forty­two strongly­manned canoes, and 
rumour was rife that Nanpei and the Kiti district were waiting to fall 
on Sokehs. And Fritz did not help his cause by determinedly ignoring 
the recent incidents on which the northern chiefs in particular expected 
judgment. Instead, he simply welcomed the chiefs’ queries about 
government policies and accepted the principle of N anpei’s advisory 
council, to comprise the five High Chiefs, section heads and one or two 
other representatives from the districts, who would all assist in the tasks 
of native administration.12
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This proposal was greeted with stony silence, for the northern chiefs 
saw in it the triumph of a campaign carefully orchestrated by Nanpei. 
Both mission societies and Fritz, indeed most of Ponape, agreed that 
Nanpei was behind the series of false alarms in the previous few days. 
Nanpei appears to have paid the Pweipwei people, a group who could 
be bought at any price, to damage Sou Kiti’s land in a traditional gesture 
of displeasure, with the hope that Sou Kiti would retaliate. Nanpei 
could then denounce his rival as a troublemaker and so destroy his 
claim to the Ant Islands.
Likewise, the incident at the roadworks in mid­July was N anpei’s 
work. His purposes in this case were labyrinthine. First, Nanpei did not 
want a road into Kiti, for that would compromise his freedom of action 
and enterprise; the warning of attack on the road workers was meant 
to be a deterrent. Second, Nanpei implicated the northern districts in 
the unrest hoping that Fritz would take action against them and the 
Catholic Mission. In drawing the disconcerted administrator to him in 
Kiti, it is possible Nanpei hoped to provoke a dispute between the 
Capuchin Mission and Fritz by convincing the former that Fritz was 
favouring Nanpei and his Protestant supporters. But, third, Nanpei had 
a genuine reason for seeking Fritz’s protection, for Nanpei had enemies 
within Kiti itself who were accusing him of plotting with the adminis­
tration to introduce taxes and change the land system in his own favour.
Nanpei was under siege from all sides, and through his manoeuvres 
he was attempting to manipulate circumstances to his advantage: the 
threat from Sou Kiti would be removed; Catholic pretensions in Kiti 
would be thwarted; and German support would be won for N anpei’s 
claims and his position in Kiti. Fritz’s August assembly seemed to his 
opponents to confirm his success. .
A few days later a new occurrence dashed all Fritz’s hopes of 
regaining peace and stability by negotiation. It was imperative that Sou 
Kiti receive compensation for the destruction on his land if he were not 
to lose face to Nanpei. Traditionally the victim extracted justice by 
reciprocal force or intimidation. Fearing a major district collision, 
perhaps civil war, if Sou Kiti took matters into his own hands, the 
Capuchin Mission pressed the administrator to come to Sou Kiti’s aid. 
In a secret meeting Fritz promised Sou Kiti that the government would 
compensate him financially and Sou Kiti expressed himself satisfied.
At this point, when the situation seemed most under control and the 
ways of the Ponapeans no longer a mystery, the frailty of German 
understanding was revealed. The mission’s sources suddenly reported
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that Sou Kiti was disappointed with Fritz’s offer and wanted a written 
assurance of support from the Government. Fritz baulked at the new 
demand. From his experience in the M arianas, Fritz had acquired a 
deep suspicion of Catholic priests, after observing the destruction of the 
Chamorro civilisation which the militantly­Catholic Spanish regime 
had wrought over the centuries. Fritz’s reading of Ponape’s past 
convinced him that the rivalry between the two Christian confessions 
lay at the heart of the district disputes, and he was almost frantic that 
the German regime should not take sides as had the Spanish. Any 
written agreement given to a Catholic sympathiser would, he was 
afraid, be used by the Catholic districts to incite the Protestants, and 
he minced no words in telling the Capuchins so.
There followed an acrimonious correspondence, the mission dis­
claiming all responsibility for the future behaviour of its adherents and 
Fritz accusing the Fathers of trying to enlist the administration in a 
religious war against Protestantism.13 The estrangement became more 
complete when two letters, inspired by Nanpei, arrived from the 
Protestant High Chiefs in the south, begging Fritz to curb the activities 
of the Catholics and restrict them to the northern districts. By mid­ 
August relations between the Government and the mission were 
virtually broken off and passions were so inflamed that Fritz felt it 
necessary to send for a warship and extra police to forestall the 
outbreak of fighting.
The cruiser SMS Condor sailed in, cleared for action, on 2 September, 
and 100 Melanesian police­soldiers from New Guinea landed. Fritz had 
already warned the Ponapeans of their impending visit, and had played 
up their reputation as ‘black cannibals’ to salutary effect. When 
Governor Hahl arrived in mid­September to assess the situation, a 
sullen peace prevailed, and he grasped immediately that the passive 
population he had known was now uneasy about German rule. In early 
October he telegraphed for a second cruiser and requested a further 100 
soldiers, with the object of maintaining a garrison on the island until 
the tension had eased.14 Some weeks later the gunboat SMS Jaguar 
arrived from Kiautschou.
Partly with Melanesian labour, partly with local volunteers, Fritz was 
able to resume work on the road to the south, an urgent project now 
in view of the unrest, and in six months a twenty­four kilometre road 
was cut through the island over the mountains into Kiti. A road ten 
kilometres long now also linked the colony with Sokehs. At the 
beginning of March 1909, the landing corps of the Condor and a
94
Reform, Rebellion and the Sunset of German Rule
detachm ent of the M elanesians m arched ceremoniously from the 
colony to  Kiti district to dem onstrate the adm inistration’s new­found 
capacity for m obility; the journey took six hours! The Germans 
followed up with displays of firepower and close­quarter fighting by the 
w arships. Arrangem ents were made to remove to the M arianas over 
600 out­islanders stranded on Ponape since a typhoon in 1907 had 
destroyed their atolls, and who were in danger of being used as 
m ercenaries in the district conflicts.
These measures restored at least some external respect for the power 
of the G erm an regime, but they also heralded a new phase in its relations 
with the Islanders. The era of tem porisation was over. The adm inis­
tra tion  was now com m itted to a policy of economic and social 
developm ent and to a more rigorous control over the political activities 
of the Ponapean districts. It was clear tha t for seven years Ponapeans 
had merely tolerated the Germans. H undreds of firearms were still 
being hoarded in various parts of Ponape and there was a general feeling 
tha t serious disorder could occur at any time. Fritz felt obliged to 
institute arm ed patro ls for men working on governm ent projects, and 
the defence forces of the European colony were kept constantly 
mobilised in case of trouble. The G erm ans were approaching the state 
of siege which had prevailed under the Spanish two decades before.
Fritz and H ahl were of one mind tha t there was no going back from 
this position. The honour and reputation  of G erm any, not to m ention 
that of her local officials, depended on the successful com pletion of the 
new social and econom ic tasks. Both men therefore pressed the Colonial 
Office for funds to establish a proper peace­keeping force in the 
Carolines which would ensure that all the reforms were carried through. 
A naval vessel stationed in Ponape waters, 200 soldiers, and a network 
of roads were the prerequisites they envisaged. Fritz also asked for an 
extra fiscal g ran t of 40 000 m arks over two years to offset the cost of 
constructing the roads with voluntary labour, since the planned public 
corvee was m om entarily out of the question .15
However, the recent disturbances had begun to raise doubts in Berlin 
about the wisdom of an aggressive forw ard policy on an island which 
possessed so little value for the Reich. In the circumstances, the State 
Secretary for Colonies, Bernhard D ernburg, considered cutting Ger­
m any’s losses and w ithdrawing the governm ent apparatus from Ponape 
altogether. The real ‘epicentre’ of the Caroline Islands, the focal point 
for traffic from the smaller islands, was T ruk , the archipelago of high 
islands 616 kilometres to the west of Ponape, with a population of
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20 000. Truk was, as Victor Berg had once described it, the ‘Paris’ of 
the island sphere, or what Zanzibar was to the negroes of the East 
African coast.16 Its islands held half the population of the whole area; 
it had far better harbours and far richer economic prospects than 
Ponape, producing five times as much copra; and it was much closer 
to the more populous western half of G erm any’s island sphere. It is not 
clear why the Spaniards chose Ponape as a base in 1887, though its 
individual size, the difficulty of consistent water supplies in Truk and 
the fearsome reputation of T ru k ’s inhabitants all played some part in 
their decision. The question of transferring the seat of German ad­
ministration there had already been raised as early as 1902, but the 
same difficulties applied. By 1908, Hahl was using the insecurity of 
Ponape as the strongest argument against withdrawal. Hahl believed 
that unless Ponape was pacified there was a real likelihood of distur­
bances spreading to other islands in the group, like Truk. Germany had 
no choice: she was trapped on Ponape.
Dernburg accepted H ah l’s argument and compromised. Germany 
would stay. But he refused Fritz’s request for special finance, ordered 
the withdrawal of the extra troops, and in September 1908 instructed 
Fritz to follow H ah l’s original policy and ‘hold the ring’, leaving 
development to the Ponapeans themselves. The naval authorities had 
already advised that a second cruiser was due to be appointed to the 
Pacific in 1909­10, which should ease the patrolling strain on SMS 
Condor.11
During the next nine months, the island colony stagnated as Ger­
many resumed her defensive posture. In February and March 1909, 
Fritz was able to obtain the grudging consent of Kiti, M adolenihmw and 
then Uh to his reform scheme. The money argument was definitely 
influential in winning over the leading chiefs. In Kiti, for example, with 
over 200 men of working age, the N ahnm w arki would receive 1000 
marks from the tax labour, with a further 700 marks divided among 
the Nahnken and his prominent colleagues. Since many chiefs were in 
debt, a guaranteed income from the Germans was an attractive p ro ­
position. Nanpei certainly used his influence to campaign for accep­
tance, an important factor since several chiefs were in debt to him. And 
the temporary presence of SMS Jaguar, as well as the belief that the 
districts could withdraw from the agreement if dissatisfied, seemed to 
have assisted Fritz in gaining the chiefs’ assent.
Fritz got as far as beginning the registration of land holdings and 
organising the first work periods. But though the three southern
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districts completed their obligation for 1909, along with N et, which 
accepted the reforms hesitantly later in the year, the results were not 
encouraging. Anxious not to provoke the people, or the w rath of the 
Colonial Office, Fritz let the w ork proceed in haphazard  fashion, with 
no European supervision and workers coming and going as they liked. 
As a result the project lacked any serious co­ordination or direction, 
and after the 1909 series was finished Fritz made hardly any headway.
M ost people of the northern  district Sokehs were not unsym pathetic 
to the G erm an innovations, bu t a small body of chiefs pu t up a stolid 
resistance and refused to accept them , at least for 1909. The dissidents 
were led by the leading trader and w arrior of the district, Soum adau en 
Sokehs, section chief of M w alok where the Sokehs ceremonial house 
was located.
Soum adau was no t of the ruling clan, Soun Kawad, but his father had 
been a high ranking m em ber of it, which gave Soum adau substantial 
prestige. Indeed, his prestige, energy and influence so eclipsed that of 
the weak and vacillating High Chief (W asai Sokehs), tha t Soum adau 
was, in effect, the chief executive of the district. Soum adau was the 
em bodim ent of Sokehs’ fiercely independent reputation. He had fought 
on the side of Awak in the war with the Protestants in 1898, and had 
led fam ous charges against the Spanish fortress. Sokehs district had 
long considered itself forem ost am ong the five of the island. It had been 
the scene of the first uprising against the Spanish in 1887, and, though 
later forced onto Spain’s side in distrust of the south, Sokehs continued 
to retain a sense of superiority over Europeans, jealously guarding its 
isolation on the small island which lay to the west of Kolonia. It was 
Sokehs which resisted Berg’s disarm am ent in 1905; and Soum adau en 
Sokehs was even supposed to have been behind a plot to kill an acting 
adm inistrator, S tückhardt, in early 1908 .18
Soum adau was intent on safeguarding the integrity of the district 
against the southerners, and on this account he opposed the G erm an 
reforms. There is also evidence to suggest tha t Soum adau was a 
com m itted traditionalist, and that in particular he was against the loss 
of traditional chiefly privileges and the possible destruction of clan 
control of land. This was despite the fact tha t he owned a western­style 
store in M w alok and wore only European clo thes.19
M any of the northern  chiefs were suspicious of the Germ an changes 
because they imagined them to be the inspiration of Henry N anpei, 
whom they saw as benefiting from the new land distribution. W ith these 
misgivings in Sokehs, Fritz was unable to move them to accept the
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Germ an plans for 1909. And he was in no position to force them since 
not only had he prom ised tha t the reform s would be subject to district 
approval, but also he was now w ithout m ilitary support again. 
However, after the m ediation of the C atholic M ission, which assured 
the Sokehs chiefs tha t the reform s were ‘a governm ent affair’ and 
nothing to do with N anpei, they were finally persuaded to consider a 
work period for 1910 and let the survey of their land holdings go 
ahead.20
All in all, the Ponapeans still retained the initiative in 1909. Fritz’s 
incipient system of close imperial control seemed to have been dealt a 
dam aging blow, and the success of his innovations was very doubtful. 
M oreover, he was still tied by his agreem ent to the principle of a Puin 
en lolokon, N anpei’s advisory council.
Suddenly, in O ctober 1909, Georg Fritz was transferred to Yap, to 
take over the governm ent of the western Carolines. The reasons for the 
move are not known, though the C apuchin O rder in Germ any had 
considerable influence with the Centre Party and it is more than  likely 
tha t the O rder had been putting  pressure on Berlin for his removal. 
There is little doubt th a t Fritz had come to Ponape predisposed against 
the Catholic M ission, and had allowed himself to be distracted from 
the real causes of conflict in Ponape by his involvement in religious 
sectarianism. Because of this his reputation  suffered, and his later 
polemics against the priests did not help to redeem him.
But Fritz was nonetheless a com petent and careful adm inistrator, one 
who worked to gain a consensus of agreem ent about his reforms. 
W ithout tha t consensus he would not proceed, partly  because he 
considered the Ponapeans a m ercurial and unpacified people, torn by 
class conflict, inter­district envy and religious strife over which one 
could not ride roughshod. But Fritz’s instincts were also fundam entally 
non­aggressive and conciliatory, and he disliked having to resort to 
military solutions: hence his agreem ent to im plem ent his ideas not at 
his own, but at the Ponapeans’ pace. If he did call for arm ed forces in 
the end, it was as a m oral support ra ther than  as a punitive instrum ent. 
Ponapean tradition  is relatively to leran t of Georg Fritz. He grew with 
his job, though not to the extent tha t he was a m atch for H enry N anpei, 
the island’s eminence grise.
Ponape now received its fifth adm inistrator in ten years. The new man 
was Carl Boeder, and he came directly from Dar­es­Salam in East 
Africa, where he had been involved in G erm any’s struggle against the 
M aji M aji uprising of 1905­06.
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W hen he arrived in Ponape on 14 December 1909 a cloud of lethargy 
hung over the island. The absence of real rapport between Islanders and 
governm ent, a chronic lack of finance, and continual changes inofficial 
personnel had brought m ost adm inistrative activity to a virtual halt.
Boeder was in a difficult position, inhibited by the negative attitude 
of the Colonial Office, yet saddled with the reform  initiative taken by 
Hahl and Fritz. His personality  was ill­suited to the m onotonous life 
of a sm all, close­knit island com m unity isolated from the rest of the 
w orld; his experience in Africa was certainly no guarantee of success 
in dealing with Pacific Islanders. A correct and rather d istant m an, 
Boeder tended to assume th a t his personality and authority  would 
ensure peaceful solutions to any problem s which might arise between 
the two cultural com m unities. To the job of dealing with other races 
he brought goodwill, bu t he was au thoritarian  and dem anding, and he 
carried with him from  Africa the conviction tha t the rod was a 
legitimate and effective m ethod of instilling ‘colonial discipline’ into 
fundam entally prim itive peoples; in fact, rum ours later circulated in 
Ponape tha t he had been in trouble in Africa because of his severity. 
W ith these attitudes, and despite the warnings of his predecessor, 
Boeder set out to re­invigorate the G erm an presence on Ponape.
The new adm inistrator was rather contem ptuous of w hat he con­
ceived as Fritz’s weakness in dealing with Sokehs and the other districts 
over the compulsory labour question, and his first objective was to 
renegotiate the issue of Sokehs’ approval of the reforms. T hroughout 
February 1910 Boeder pu t pressure on the chiefs of Sokehs, mainly 
through the irresolute W asai, to begin their work period at once, 
arguing tha t the Ponapeans could only enjoy increasing prosperity if 
they all worked hard and obeyed the governm ent’s orders. At an 
assembly on 16 M arch 1910 the reforms were publicly accepted, albeit 
under duress.21
The com pulsory labour periods for all the districts got under way in 
April with rem aking the old roads to Kiti and Sokehs. Of Fritz’s road 
through the island to the south coast barely one and one­half kilometres 
was still passable, the rest was overgrown and fallen into disrepair. 
Boeder at least recognised tha t the road was economically and militarily 
of little use to the regime since the south could be reached alm ost as 
quickly by boat. But he planned to recut it nevertheless, since in his eyes 
inconsistency was the gravest sin which a regime could com m it against 
its subjects. W hat Boeder really wanted was a new road around the
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coast, touching most of the sections, and then one along the foreshores 
of Sokehs Island, to give easier access to its interior.
The Ponapeans suddenly found themselves subjected to a new and 
distasteful regimen. For a start, their work was closely supervised by 
a European, Otto Hollborn, a former employee of the Jaluit Gesell­
schaft who had recently joined the administration. Sokehs in particular 
resented this: perhaps it awakened memories of the Spanish period. To 
quieten them, Boeder appointed Soumadau en Sokehs as a second 
overseer, to work in conjunction with Hollborn, at the rate of two 
marks a day. The results were only temporary. At the end of April 1910 
the German administration demanded that Sokehs work a second 
period of fifteen days in 1910 to make up for the one that they had 
refused to perform under Fritz the year before. Despite the bitter 
protests of Soumadau, Wasai Sokehs and the N ahnken, Boeder and 
Hollborn insisted that the double obligation was all part of the package 
to which the Sokehs chiefs had agreed in February.22
The whole of Ponape was now greatly apprehensive about Boeder 
and the methods he used. Chiefs everywhere began to resent the fact, 
made clear to them for the first time, that the implementation of the new 
order meant that they must forfeit tribute from the people permanently. 
Tributary labour and the first fruits from tenants’ harvests were the only 
sources of income for some chiefs, and consequently the money to be 
divided among the leading few chiefs after the work periods were over 
was small compensation for the majority. Boeder began to encounter 
resistance to the scheme, not only from the chiefs but from the common 
people also, who supported the chiefs’ appeal to halve the am ount of 
compensation and allow tribute to go on being paid. Boeder refused, 
and in addition he made it clear that voluntary acceptance of the 
reforms did not mean that the Islanders could withdraw at will.23 
Boeder’s vision of a quickly­constructed network of roads for Ponape 
began to fade as people refused to work outside their districts and the 
organisation of work faltered in consequence.
The most persistent resistance came from Sokehs, which took great 
offence at the exaction of a second labour period. Boeder had ignored 
the fact that his predecessor, Fritz, had waived the fulfilment of the 1909 
obligation for Sokehs, and he seemed deliberately to be provoking the 
district by ordering that this work period be used to build the projected 
road around the island, thereby compelling the people to destroy their 
coveted isolation and expose Sokehs to unwanted influences from the 
mainland. Throughout May protests and complaints about the ad­
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ministration’s injustice continued to be made by Soumadau and Wasai 
Sokehs, and the smouldering unrest was manifest on the roadworks, 
where Sokehs labourers carried long knives and Hollborn had difficulty 
in extracting obedience. The Sokehs people, led by Soumadau, com­
pleted their first fifteen days ill­humouredly and demanded a m onth’s 
interval to attend to their crops before beginning the second period. The 
administration could only get voluntary day­labourers to maintain the 
works when Soum adau’s wage was raised to four marks a day. By the 
end of M ay there was a definite groundswell of opinion against Boeder 
and his subordinates.
Boeder was aware that something was afoot in Sokehs but discounted 
its importance, feeling secure enough to embark on an official tour of 
the Carolines at the end of M ay with half of the fifty Melanesian soldiers 
attached to the colony. N o sooner had he left than the Superior of the 
Capuchin Mission hastened to Boeder’s young deputy, the Secretary 
Brauckmann, with news that the Net people had warned of a plot by 
Soumadau to attack the colony on 31 May; simultaneously the people 
of Awak arrived to defend the colony. In the days that followed, 
Ponapeans began lurking around the perimeter of Kolonia or appearing 
in the settlement with their long knives, while Uh people, fearful of a 
revolt, came to remove their relatives from the government hospital.
Brauckmann initially gave little credence to the priests’ report: 
relations between administration and mission had never fully recovered 
since the collision over the Sou Kiti affair. However Brauckmann was 
also inexperienced at deputising as chief official and seems to have 
willed any plots to be figments of the imagination. When he visited 
Sokehs and found nothing, he reported to the priests with some relief 
that he felt the matter was all ‘idle ta lk’.24 Those found in the colony 
with knives he arrested and then released immediately, though evidence 
he had received since his visit to Sokehs confirmed the likelihood of a 
conspiracy. There had, indeed, been a conspiracy, and it had failed only 
because Wasai Sokehs and the N ahnken were hesitant, and the Net 
people, traditional allies, refused to help.
Boeder’s return on 24 June changed nothing. He, too, refused to take 
the matter seriously, declaring complacently that the unrest was simply 
‘the empty talk and bragging of some hotspurs’ who were discontented 
with roadwork.25 Rather than act against the ‘hotspurs’ in Sokehs, 
Boeder thought it ‘politically more astute’ to threaten them with naval 
intervention, knowing that a visit by the East Asian Cruiser Squadron 
was already scheduled for early July. The squadron arrived promptly
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on 2 July, but, contrary to the expectations of Boeder’s staff and the 
rest of the European community, the administrator made no effort to 
punish those responsible for the growing agitation. Instead Boeder 
invoked the ‘moral impression’ which the collection of vessels was 
supposed to have, encouraging the Ponapeans to visit the ships and 
arranging for parades by the 400 members of the squadron’s landing 
corps. That the mere external display of size and power was already an 
outdated sanction in the conditions of Ponape, Boeder does not seem 
to have considered, nor that his self­conceived tolerance might be taken 
as proof of weakness. Soumadau, for one, compared the Germans 
unfavourably with the Spanish who, though fearful, proved their 
bravery by fighting, while the Germans always talked about their 
soldiers, their ships, their glorious Kaiser, but did nothing.26 Never­
theless, at the end of the banquets, the manoeuvres and the parades, 
Boeder once more felt master of the situation. He believed there was 
nothing to fear from the ‘natives’ in the foreseeable future, and to prove 
his point he decided not to go ahead with reinforcing the island’s police 
troop as he had been planning.
Unfortunately for Boeder’s optimism, the difficulties with Sokehs 
began all over again when the district was told it must now complete 
its second work period. Soumadau and the leading chiefs kept up their 
complaints and queries, while the road labourers continued to disobey 
Hollborn. In August, at a time when there was not a ship of any kind 
in Ponape and the island was effectively cut off from the outside world, 
the Wasai Sokehs demanded from Boeder an increase in the day wage 
of the road labourers. Boeder refused, threatened the High Chief with 
deportation and threw him bodily out of his office,27 an action which 
was provocative in the extreme.
Worse was to come. After July 1910 Boeder introduced corporal 
punishment as a punitive sanction against anyone found guilty of lying, 
insubordination or ‘shameless behaviour’ towards whites. Despite the 
fact that, from this point on, clear warnings abounded that beatings 
would cause the Islanders to rise up against the Germans, Boeder made 
no concessions to indigenous sensibilities. He began to acquire a 
reputation for cruelty and contempt. A special convict uniform was 
introduced, and prisoners now had their heads shaved, a gross and 
calculating insult to the Ponapeans. A tradition exists that Boeder 
would use a drawn revolver to interrogate Islanders during a trial, 
occasionally shooting it off in their faces to frighten them; and that if
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he stumbled on a stone or a coconut while on an expedition he would 
fly into a rage and threaten to beat his guides and bearers.28
Then, in September, Boeder had the first thrashing administered, to 
Eliu Santos of Kiti, who lied to the authorities about a theft of money 
from Henry Nanpei. The ethnologist, Paul Hambruch, at that time 
travelling round Ponape, reported to Boeder that a secret society was 
now mobilising in all districts, with Soumadau as its leader, to plan the 
overthrow of white rule.29 Boeder seemed oblivious of any danger, and 
disregarded persistent warnings by the Catholic Mission that Souma­
dau was the main troublemaker and should be deported. The cruiser 
SMS Cormoran  came and went in September without any action being 
taken.
Ponapeans say that Boeder counted Soumadau as a friend, and, if so, 
it is more than likely that Boeder felt he could control the Sokehs chief; 
after all, he had given him a well­paid job on the roadworks. But Boeder 
betrayed no understanding of the difficult position in which Soumadau 
now found himself. Soumadau en Sokehs was losing face. As overseer 
and virtual Chief of the district, he was supposed to protect Sokehs. But 
as Boeder’s abuses mounted and he paid no heed to protests, Souma­ 
dau ’s collaboration began to look shabby. This was not improved by 
the fact that he was getting paid handsomely for his supervision. To 
allow the fiction of his co­operation with the Germans to continue 
would only destroy Soumadau’s credibility with Sokehs: he would lose 
his prestige, his influence, his ability to move Sokehs at all. Pressure was 
mounting for Soumadau to demonstrate his leadership more forcefully.
The pressure finally became intolerable on 17 October 1910. On that 
day, one of the Sokehs labourers, Lahdeleng, was sent by Hollborn to 
the administrator with a piece of paper alleging insubordination; 
Boeder had no hesitation in ordering ten strokes with a wire­lined 
rubber hose. The beating was administered by a Melanesian, and 
Lahdeleng was helped back to Sokehs, barely able to walk. On the 
island that night an emotional meeting took place, at which the marks 
of the beating were exhibited to all. Soumadau now had no choice but 
to prove he was a warrior chief, that he would not recoil in the face of 
so serious a challenge. He called for war to make away with the 
Germans as Sokehs had done with the Spaniards. There was some 
resistance from a party led by the Nahnken, who advocated compro­
mise and co­operation with the regime. But the party of Soumadau and 
his brother, Lepen Ririn, had great influence over Wasai Sokehs, and 
it proved the stronger.30 Lahdeleng, after all, was a member of the Soun
103
Pacific Islanders under German Rule
Kawad clan, the W asai’s own, and the imperative of retaliation was too 
strong to deny. Boeder had treated Lahdeleng like an animal in a culture 
where dignity and strength, courage and patience were the touchstones 
of manhood.
The entire district was caught up by the desire for vengeance, not 
simply in the passion of the moment, but because of regional loyalties 
and a peculiarly Ponapean feeling that fate dictated the destruction of 
Sokehs. There were no illusions about who would win in a head­on 
confrontation with the Germans. About a month before Lahdeleng’s 
beating, a corner of Pan Kadara, the most sacred location in the stone 
city of N an  Madol, had crumbled. The corners of Pan Kadara were 
revered on Ponape as symbols of the various districts, and if any were 
to crumble it signified the impending destruction of that area. In this 
case it had been the Sokehs corner. Thus the Sokehs people knew and 
accepted that Sokehs must die, but, if so, they desired to die fighting, 
as m en . 31 Their decision was probably strengthened by the belief that 
they could expect assistance from other districts because of cross­dis­
trict clan relationships; Soum adau’s own clan, Dipwenpahnmei, was 
the ruling clan of M adolenihmw and Net was ruled by Soun Kawad.
Early the next morning when Hollborn and the recently­arrived road 
engineer, Hafner, came to Denpei on Sokehs to begin work, they found 
Soumadau and his followers in war garb, their bodies oiled, wearing 
new grass skirts and carrying knives and rifles. The warriors began to 
converge on the two men, who immediately took refuge in the nearby 
Catholic Mission. While the angry Sokehs people surrounded the 
building shouting for H ollborn’s blood, messengers were dispatched to 
the colony to raise the alarm. The first party was turned back and it was 
not until three o ’clock in the afternoon that three mission helpers were 
able to get through. Boeder immediately rowed over to Sokehs with 
Brauckmann and five M ortlock Islanders. Thinking perhaps that a 
military display would only further provoke the Sokehs, or that they 
would immediately recognise his authority and submit to talking, 
Boeder brusquely refused his police master’s plea that a troop of 
Melanesian police be allowed to accompany him . 32
Boeder arrived at Denpei about four o ’clock, where he was met by 
Hollborn, Häfner and the mission Fathers who had managed to slip out 
of the house. They were amazed that he was without military escort and 
tried to persuade him of the danger. Waving them away, Boeder went 
south towards M walok to confront Wasai Sokehs. He had gone only 
seventy yards when Lepen Ririn, Soum adau’s brother, fell in beside
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him. Suddenly Lepen Ririn drew a gun and shot the adm inistrator in 
the stom ach. M ortally  w ounded, Boeder is reported to have appealed 
to Soum adau, who stood now  above him: ‘Ponape is good, Soumadau. 
Ponape is good’, he said. Soum adau then replied, ‘Ponape is good’, and 
is alleged to have shot Boeder in the head.33
A frenzied crowd now rushed on the other whites. Brauckm ann, 
H ollborn  and H afner were hacked down with knives or shot as they 
attem pted to escape in Boeder’s boat, and four of the five M ortlock 
Islanders were also killed. O nly the two priests, Fathers G ebhardt and 
Venantius, managed to escape when they took refuge in the church and 
a group of loyal Sokehs wom en shielded them from attack  with their 
bodies. After the killings, Boeder’s body was m utilated by the people 
in a Ponapean gesture of contem pt for a hated enemy. His hand was 
cut off and the body was throw n into the sea along with those of the 
others.
The Sokehs insurrection should have been the least likely such 
occurrence in any of G erm any’s Pacific territories. From the beginning, 
the Berlin authorities had insisted on a policy which would not provoke 
the Islanders, and their feelings on the subject were clearly expressed 
in the censure of Berg in 1902. The great reform scheme itself had not 
precipitated violence even though it represented a radical structural 
change in Ponapean society, by rem oving land possession from direct 
dependence on the hierarchy of power, and by implicitly subverting 
traditional authority. The changes initially were unpopular in all 
districts, though they were accepted in the end by the southerners. Even 
the resistance of the Sokehs leaders had been blunted by the time of 
Fritz’s departure, and they had conceded tha t the changes might be 
instituted by negotiation at a later date. But then came Boeder and his 
methods. Initially Sokehs m ade the best of it, but Boeder’s brutality and 
his injustice in foisting upon them a second work period in the same year 
aroused resentm ent beyond toleration. N o t the reforms themselves, but 
the timing and m anner of their enforcem ent brought about ultimate 
violence.
In the end, the uprising shows that, despite the dictates of official 
policy, the initiative for handling the colonised Ponapeans lay squarely 
with the individual officer in Ponape, in the same way tha t it did in 
Samoa and New Guinea. In Ponape, Boeder incorporated all the 
functions of colonial rule: legislative, executive and judicial. M easures 
like disarm am ent and the reform s of 1907­08 originated in the colony, 
not in Berlin. M ost im portantly , Boeder had been able to act for nine
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m onths virtually in contravention of guidelines laid down by Berlin, 
Hahl and Fritz.
There is no doubt he brought Sokehs’ revenge upon himself. Boeder 
was an aggressive and am bitious adm inistrator, yet he lacked the 
creative touch of a H ahl, or a Solf in Sam oa; he had quickened the 
tempo of change w ithout appreciating the consequences of the resulting 
unrest; he had been highly inconsistent in his behaviour tow ards the 
Ponapeans. In refusing to m ake concessions to a colonised people, in 
denigrating their sense of self­respect, and in dishonouring his 
predecessor’s agreement, Boeder overstepped the bounds of m odera­
tion. T hat he could do so w ithout censure from Berlin dem onstrates 
that, in the final analysis, Ponape was too far from New Guinea, let 
alone Europe, for the actions of its executives to be supervised in detail.
For all the provocation, the insurrection had been alm ost spon­
taneous in execution, and the m ain objects of their hatred rem oved, the 
passions of the Sokehs people quickly subsided. This spontaneity, along 
with the feeling that the crimes against the district had been expiated, 
probably saved the colony. M ax G irschner, the local doctor, was the 
m ost senior Germ an official rem aining, and he set ou t by boat for 
Sokehs as soon as the first confused reports reached him. Halfway there, 
he encountered the two priests who had been allowed finally to depart 
in a canoe. They advised him that the people were in ‘a raging fury’ and 
tha t there was nothing he could do, so G irschner returned to the colony 
to organise its defences.34 N o attem pt was made by the rebels to shoot 
the doctor in his boat, though it would have been an easy m atter, and 
would have left the colony at their mercy.
The Europeans were in a critical plight. There were less than fifty of 
them protected by another fifty police­soldiers, in a settlem ent with a 
tw o­kilom etre perim eter and no walls. The rebels num bered at least 250 
and it was soon evident tha t they were well arm ed. Some ninety rifles 
and new am m unition appeared from nowhere, as well as an old cannon 
and a case of dynam ite stolen from the roadw orks. Furtherm ore, the 
other districts on the island were as yet an unknow n quantity , and no 
ship was scheduled to arrive in Ponape for at least six weeks.
The future of the little colony was firmly in the hands of M ax 
Girschner, a m an, ironically, whom H ahl had once judged as too ‘soft, 
irresolute and vague’ to handle the business of adm inistra tion .35 But 
G irschner had lived on Ponape for ten years and in that time he had 
earned the respect and affection of the inhabitants by his sym pathetic 
attitude and his attention to their medical care. In the circum stances,
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G irschner chose the only course he saw open to him: he gambled that 
the rem aining districts were not party  to the revolt and would respond 
to  his call for assistance. W ithin tw enty­four hours, some hundreds of 
w arriors from M adolenihm w  and Uh, as well as N et and Awak, allies 
of Sokehs, were encam ped in and around Kolonia. Stone walls were 
bu ilt, barbed wire erected, the ground cleared, and sentries posted; 
G irschner even distributed 100 rifles to sentry parties. His measures did 
no t meet with the unanim ous approval of the rem aining Europeans, 
som e of whom w arned tha t the ‘loyalists’ would take the earliest 
possible opportunity  to make com m on cause against the whites.
It is difficult to penetrate to the tru th  of where m ost Ponapeans stood. 
There was no general support for the Sokehs in the afterm ath of their 
act, not even from Soun Kawad members; only a few clan members 
from  Kiti and one from  M adolenihm w  joined the rebels.36 T hat 
traditional friends like N et and Awak hastened to the side of the 
Europeans was the result of fear: they understood, as indeed did the 
Sokehs themselves, the consequences of a collision with the G erm ans; 
and the influence of the C atholic M ission was also im portant in keeping 
the northern  districts loyal to the Germ ans. As for the south, 
G irschner’s call capitalised on the enmity which was now fixed between 
Sokehs and the southern districts, and, by offering an opportunity  to 
take up arms against Sokehs, G irschner probably localised the revolt 
to the one district, at least for the time being.
But there were o ther, less visible signs th a t the other districts 
respected Sokehs for the action it had taken in defence of Ponapean 
virtues. Kiti, for instance, waited three days before sending any warriors 
to guard the colony, and it is the inscrutable H enry N anpei who was 
credited with holding them back.37 N anpei is also widely regarded as 
having clandestinely supported the rebels with food and equipm ent 
from his stores th roughout the ensuing cam paign. Those guarding the 
colony m ade no attem pt to counter­attack  or even challenge the Sokehs. 
Indeed, the European camp was full of rum ours tha t the ‘loyalists’ were 
actually succouring the rebels with food and weapons.
In the days and weeks that followed the uprising, the rebels them ­
selves made no concerted assault on Kolonia, bu t confined themselves 
to nocturnal sniping and foraging raids. They even allowed a party  of 
out­islander labourers and their Spanish overseer who were based on 
the Sokehs roadw orks to return to the colony unscathed, and Souma­ 
dau made only a half­hearted dem and for the surrender of the colony’s 
weapons. These were all indications that the heat of the insurrection had
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been fanned and m aintained by a relative few in Sokehs, and tha t it was 
more an explosion of frustra tion  than  a wholehearted rejection of 
foreign hegemony.
But the conviction of their inexorable destiny was too strong to 
perm it the Sokehs to capitulate there and then. In the only attem pt made 
by any of the Germans to talk w ith the rebels, Girschner on his own 
initiative sent a letter enjoining them  to disarm , and pleading with those 
who had not participated in the m urder to surrender. The reply was 
gracious but resigned: ‘T hank you for your goodness, but we cannot 
come. We fear that we have com m itted too great a sin’.38 W asai Sokehs 
wrote explaining why they had been forced to act. Prison or exile they 
may have tolerated, bu t they would rather die than let themselves be 
treated ‘like pigs’.39 The Sokehs proceeded to dig themselves in on the 
inaccessible twin peaks of the island. They cleared a line of fire, erected 
fortifications, and waited for the invasion they knew m ust come.
They had to wait a long time. N o t until the end of N ovem ber, six 
weeks after Boeder’s m urder, did the post vessel, Germania, touch at 
Ponape and carry the news to New G uinea. It was a further m onth 
before Berlin heard. M eanwhile, Deputy G overnor Oswald, who was 
adm inistering New Guinea in H ah l’s absence, sent 172 M elanesian 
police to relieve the beleagured colony. He also requested of Berlin a 
fleet of cruisers from the East Asian Squadron, and a new district 
adm inistrator to take Boeder’s place and to direct operations.
Berlin granted these requests immediately. Following the experience 
of the Spanish, the G erm an authorities had assumed from the beginning 
that only a large­scale m ilitary operation  would have any hope of 
restoring European authority  if the Ponapeans were to rise again. They 
not only expected the m ost bitter resistance from  the Sokehs people, 
but also concluded tha t any attem pt to appease or accom m odate them 
would simply add fuel to the fire. This cam paign was to be m ore than 
a punitive expedition: it was an opportun ity  to pacify Ponape com ­
pletely, and to establish once and for all G erm any’s hold over all of 
M icronesia. It was therefore agreed that the leaders of the Sokehs would 
be executed when caught, and the entire district banished from  the 
Carolines.40
By 10 January 1911 the cruisers Emden, Nürnberg, Leipzig and 
Cormoran, together with SMS Planet from New Guinea and the armed 
schooner Orion, were all anchored in Ponape’s north­w estern harbour 
of Langar, with over 300 inexperienced bu t enthusiastic Germ an 
marines on board. In the following days no attem pt was made to
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negotiate with the rebels. Instead, the ships proceeded to shell the 
heights of Sokehs, while Captain Vollerthun of SMS Em den  worked out 
the plan of operations with the newly­arrived administrator, Dr 
Heinrich Kersting.
O n  13 January, the marines made a completely unopposed landing 
on the northern foreshores of Sokehs Island, and prepared themselves 
for a struggle of several days to drive the Sokehs from the fortified 
heights. Then, on the same afternoon, Kersting arrived in the front lines 
and prevailed upon the senior officer to make an immediate attack on 
the enemy’s main position, the Apalberg, arguing that surprise was the 
best way to overcome the stolid resistance of the Islanders. Before the 
main contingent of troops had been landed, and with the help of the 
Melanesian police who had to be prodded upwards step by step, the 
Apalberg was stormed and taken under heavy fire. The other peak of 
the island was captured soon after.41
The speed with which this initial victory was achieved surprised the 
Germans, but they were no less convinced about the difficulty of their 
task. Only two of the Sokehs defenders had been killed in the encounter 
and none were captured. More urgently, if the rebels managed to reach 
the mainland, they would be in a position to wage an almost endless 
jungle war with the German troops.
To forestall this possibility, a land and sea blockade of the little island 
had been set up at the beginning, consisting of the police troops, half 
the marines and the ships N ürnberg  and Planet. This was all to no avail, 
for in the week following the conquest of the peaks, Soumadau and 
most of his band slipped through the cordon at night. Search parties 
combed the island for a week, seeking out probable hiding places. They 
caught thirty men and eighty­four women and children, but none had 
played a significant role in the revolt.42
Meanwhile the administration, under Kersting, proceeded to 
organise logistical support for the operations. Kersting’s first task was 
to ensure that the unrebellious districts remained firmly in his control 
and were given no opportunity to consider throwing in their lot with 
Sokehs. If the stories of their collusion with the rebels while guarding 
the colony are true, then this was at least a possibility. The conduct of 
the ‘loyalists’ during that time had certainly not been without blemish. 
Several Islanders were guilty of robberies and pillage, and quarrels had 
broken out between the districts. When the first Melanesian rein­
forcements arrived and the Ponapeans were sent back to their farm­
steads, the European community had heaved a collective sigh of relief.
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By m id­January, the rem aining districts were properly impressed by 
the size and earnestness of the G erm an response. Kersting was anxious 
to drive home the im pression th a t G erm any would no longer be trifled 
with. He therefore w arned the district chiefs tha t their only hope of 
preventing the war from ravaging their farms and possessions lay in 
co­operating with the governm ent. They were to supply food for the 
troops, and guides and interpreters for the operations; they were to 
report rebel movements and to deliver any rebels they caught to the 
governm ent.43 In this way Kersting managed to set up, if by fear, a 
workable intelligence service on which the m anoeuvres of the Germ an 
troops were based. N ear the colony, he also constructed camps where 
captured Sokehs could be detained, and arranged medical and general 
welfare services for them through the missions. For the later stages of 
the cam paign, Kersting, largely on his own initiative, form ulated a 
strategy whereby small detachm ents of troops would be stationed in 
various parts of Ponape and billeted on the ‘loyalists’, to search for and 
constantly harass the enemy. K ersting’s experience in African bush wars 
in Togo had taught him that the only way to success in such wars was 
to take guerrilla tactics to his opponents.
In the last two weeks of January , the sorties on Sokehs Island were 
extended to the m ainland, and the G erm ans occupied the sub­district 
Palikir, which had pledged its support to Sokehs. By 25 January  there 
were 250 Sokehs men, wom en and children in Germ an hands, am ong 
them five men directly involved in Boeder’s m urder. On 26 January  this 
group of prisoners was transported  to Yap. Palikir and its neighbour 
Tom ara were then shelled by the w aiting cruisers and the farms razed 
so as to deny the enemy any secure base for its activities.
Suddenly, on 25 January , the Superior of the C apuchin M ission 
received inform ation that Soum adau and his rem aining followers had 
entrenched themselves in the interior at N ankiop , where an old Spanish 
fortress was built on the side of a cliff. N ankiop was the symbolic centre 
of the Soun Kawad clan: its legendary place of origin. It was also an 
exceptionally difficult position to attack, with a tower and stone walls 
from which to fire, a high cliff at its back, and protected by alm ost sheer 
drops on three sides. It seemed that the Sokehs were m aking ready for 
a final, organised stand.
N ext day, two companies of m arines and M elanesians were sent to 
make a frontal assault on the fortress, while the landing corps of SMS 
Em den  worked its way round by a secret path  to attack the rebels on 
their m ost unexpected flank. ‘Loyalists’ sym pathetic to Sokehs were
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able here to lend their assistance by leading the Emden corps along the 
most difficult and circuitous routes, so that it was three hours late when 
it arrived at Nankiop. By that time, the main force had suffered heavily 
from accurate Ponapean fire. At 5 p.m., as darkness was falling, the 
fortress was finally stormed, but, at the decisive moment, Soumadau 
and his men retreated up the cliff behind them, leaving three of the 
German forces dead and eight wounded, and without a single casualty 
themselves.44 It was a pyrrhic victory, which worried Kersting and 
Vollerthun: if Soumadau were to repeat these tactics at every encounter, 
he could take a heavy toll of German life and remain virtually 
untouched. They did not yet know that the Nankiop encounter had 
virtually demoralised the Sokehs, and that their cohesiveness as a 
fighting force had been destroyed. From now on, the Sokehs were split 
into small groups which wandered aimlessly about seeking food and 
shelter, and trying desperately to avoid the German troops.
Kersting’s harassment strategy had been put into operation by this 
time, and detachments of sixty men each were placed in Kiti, Tomara, 
Palikir and Nankiop. In addition, Kersting had the Ponapeans harvest 
all crops in the areas of fighting so as to starve the rebels gradually into 
submission. These procedures hastened the dissolution of the smaller 
and smaller bands of Sokehs, and, as hunger, sickness and the denial 
of solace from the other districts took their effect, surrenders became 
more frequent. By 8 February, another 137 persons, including Wasai 
Sokehs, had been delivered to the administration, leaving a core of 
about thirty or forty young and committed supporters of Soumadau.45
The group was reduced more and more to a nomadic existence as the 
German detachments carried out regular patrols. The ease with which 
the rebels had eluded the combined forces of Germany since the 
storming of Sokehs was proof that Soumadau possessed the potential 
to fight a long and effective guerrilla war, but it soon became evident 
that most of his followers lacked the tenacity and endurance, let alone 
the commitment, to suffer the constant hardships such a life involved. 
Some threw themselves upon the mercy of the Germans, which Kersting 
felt was due to the debilitating effects on ‘Ponapean character’ of 
prolonged contact with Western civilisation.46 But he completely 
missed the point, for the hearts of the Sokehs were just not in the 
struggle. From the start they had accepted their lot: to be dispersed and 
destroyed by the sheer weight of Germany’s might. It only remained to 
hasten the result.
The Germans never expected Soumadau and his close accomplices
111
Pacific Islanders under German Rule
to surrender, since the rebels knew they could expect no mercy. 
Consequently, the administration was genuinely surprised when Sou­ 
madau and five of the ringleaders succumbed to their fate on 13 
February 1911, and gave themselves up to the chief Nos en Net; the rest 
followed suit within a few days. By 22 February the last of the Sokehs 
warriors was in German hands.
The denouement was swift. A court­martial was convened on 23 
February, the day after military operations were declared at an end. 
Representatives from the two missions and the trading community 
joined with Kersting, Girschner and a naval officer to try summarily 
those accused of the murder of Boeder and his companions. Though 
each of the leading Sokehs figures was given a full opportunity  to defend 
himself, the tribunal was interested less in the justice of the result, which 
was already a foregone conclusion as far as the judges were concerned, 
than in the necessity to make an example which would deter malcon­
tents in the future. The bulk of the evidence revealed that resentment 
of Boeder’s actions had run deep and wide, and there were no regrets 
that he was dead. It also became clear that there had been a lingering, 
almost desperate belief that the Germans might be driven out as had 
been the Spaniards. After all, until Boeder’s arrival, none of the districts 
had really experienced the strong hand of Germany. Deputy Governor 
Oswald had concluded when he first heard of the uprising:
In the final analysis they didn’t fear us and d idn’t believe we were 
earnest in our threats . . . We suffered from the mistakes of the 
Spanish. Perhaps if we had begun energetically this would have 
been avoided.4’
But the court­martial tribunal was not interested in why the revolt 
occurred, only that it had and must therefore be punished. The trial 
lasted only a day and the court agreed that seventeen Sokehs should be 
executed, several others sent to prison with hard labour at the Angaur 
phosphate works, and the remainder of the district banished en masse 
to the Palau group. Ironically, the only call for clemency towards those 
to be executed came from the navy’s representative. Though Kersting 
himself acknowledged that Sokehs had suffered under Boeder, his 
concern for ‘consistency’ of punishment, together with the ‘deterrence’ 
arguments of the missionaries and traders easily won the day.48
The very next day, 24 February, fifteen of the condemned prisoners, 
handcuffed together and escorted by Melanesian police, were marched 
down to Kumunlai, an old cemetery and cult place outside the colony.
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Plate XII Right: To Bobo (on left)
(from the Fellmann Collection, Mitchell
Library)
Plate XIII Below: A New Ireland war party 
(from A. B. Meyer and  
R. Parkinson, Album von Papua-Typen, 
Stengel and Markert, Dresden, 1894)
Plate XIV Above: A leader of the Baining massacre, 1904, possibly the adoptive father of 
To Marias (from the United Church Archives, UPNG)
Plate XV Below: The execution of one of the leaders of the Baining massacre, 1904 
(from the United Church Archives, UPNG)
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There they were lined up against a makeshift fence strung between 
coconut trees and tied with their arms outstretched, ‘as Christ 
crucified’ . 49 The M elanesian soldiers (for the tribunal had decided that 
G erm an soldiers should not be subjected to this undignified ritual) 
ranged themselves in two lines, one standing, one kneeling. Soum adau 
was refused permission to speak to the expectant crowd, but in a quiet 
voice he greeted the people and urged them not to follow the Sokehs 
example. Before he could finish, the first volley of shots rang out; the 
soldiers kept firing until all were dead. Then the bodies were throw n into 
a com m on grave and the crowd, now hushed, was told to return to their 
districts.
W ith the ending of the Sokehs uprising, G erm any’s occupation of 
Ponape had a little over three years to run. It was a period of rem arkable 
tranquillity on the part of the Ponapeans, considering all that had gone 
before. The key to their docility lay in the retribution suffered by 
Sokehs; in that sense German policy had succeeded. N o t just the 
execution (which shocked many Ponapeans), but the size and capacity 
of G erm any’s response was a revelation to m ost people, accustomed to 
the odd biennial visit of a light German cruiser.
But it was the quantity, rather than the quality, of the am phibious 
operation that had cowed the Ponapeans. The navy does not deserve 
the credit claimed by its Public Relations Bureau for the rapid com ­
pletion of the campaign. Sokehs Island had been stormed by a few 
officers and the M elanesian police before the main body of G erm an 
troops had even landed, and the rebels had little difficulty in slipping 
through the navy’s cordon and escaping to the m ainland. For over a 
m onth, the rebels successfully eluded the troops, who seemed to have 
a singular capacity for getting lost in the jungle. Such was their 
awkwardness, and their profligate use of am m unition, tha t the G erm an 
navy was the bu tt of many jokes am ong ‘loyal’ Ponapeans during the 
operations. Kersting was more justified in claiming that the work of the 
adm inistration, in organising support facilities and mobilising the 
districts, had put the greatest pressure on Sokehs. 50
Kersting was in a position to capitalise on the Ponapeans’ subdued 
temper. Heinrich Kersting took his job as adm inistrator of the eastern 
Carolines very seriously. Indeed he had, perhaps, an exaggerated view 
of his role in the government of empire, for he foresaw himself as ‘Chief 
of the Island Sphere’, com m anding a sea­borne adm inistration which 
would trip from island to island dispensing edicts and advice. Never­
theless, Kersting showed every sign of respecting the sensibilities of the
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island people, and he com bined an authoritative presence with 
sympathy for the plight of Pacific Islanders under Germ an rule.
He wasted no time in reasserting the priorities set in 1907, in a way 
which would excite least d istrust and resistance. Time was im portant 
to Kersting: if the im plem entation of his predecessors’ reforms were 
allowed to drag on, there was the danger of their objectives being 
diverted. He therefore discarded the plan to survey all land holdings on 
Ponape prior to issuing certificates of freehold tenure. Instead ‘com ­
m issions’ of Ponapeans themselves were charged with the task of setting 
off the limits of each farm stead, erecting boundary  markers and making 
maps of each district. The com missions of seven, several to a district, 
consisted of section chiefs, title holders and the more im portant district 
representatives. M ost of their w ork had been completed by September 
1911. It was an original m ethod of evading the conflict which would 
have inevitably accom panied a European survey of Ponape, a survey 
which it was estimated could have taken twenty years.51
H and in hand with the reform  of land tenure went the regulation of 
inheritance rights. The G erm ans did not like the traditional system of 
m atrilineal inheritance, whereby land fairly autom atically went to the 
descendants of the m other’s bro ther after the death of a tenant, or was 
divided up am ong several m atrilineal descendants. The new land deeds 
provided tha t land should go to the oldest male heir of the tenant, and 
all landless male, as well as female, relatives were expected to farm it 
for the profit of the entire family. In this way the governm ent hoped to 
eliminate the m ultiplication of small, uneconom ic, scattered pieces of 
land. Each family was also required to plant 100 coconuts on its 
farm stead before the new land deed was issued.52
All these measures were intended to give individual Ponapeans a 
greater stake in their own productivity and the incentive to improve it. 
To guarantee that, Kersting now turned his attention  to the demands 
which High Chiefs could traditionally  make on the time and resources 
of their com m oner tenants. Instead of the custom ary twenty­two feasts, 
and the offerings of first fruits and special canoes, which a section was 
expected to provide each year to the N ahnm w arki and N ahnken, the 
land deeds stipulated tha t only one feast, a Feast of H onour, need be 
given by a section to its N ahnm w arki; all further feasts were non­ 
obligatory. M oreover, a High Chief could call on a com m oner to 
provide only one day’s work twice a year. The High Chief was required 
now to w ork his own farm , though he was still paid a ‘salary’ from the 
proceeds of the annual w ork periods, which never faltered under
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Kersting. Kersting refused to abolish this annuity, arguing that it was 
an absolute precondition for continuing good relations between 
government and people.53
It was not Kersting’s intention to emasculate the High Chieftainship 
or eradicate its authority completely. On the contrary, he was anxious 
to preserve the bases of social control and intra­district stability. 
Kersting emphasised the importance of the Nahnmwarkis by promul­
gating regulations in 1911 which gave the chiefs power to try and to 
sentence districts people guilty of a range of offences, from disrespect 
to the High Ones to stealing and bodily harm.54 Thus he was 
implementing the scheme Fritz had projected in 1908: to draw the 
Nahnmwarkis out of their isolation into the administrative system and 
delineate their duties exactly. The Nahnmwarki was transformed into 
a Kaiserliche Richter (Imperial Judge), but a petty Richter, along the 
lines of the pulenu’u in Samoa.
In emphasising the importance of the Nahnmwarkis, Kersting 
protected the Ponapean social system to some extent. Islanders were 
made aware that their new autonomy and economic freedom did not 
eliminate the duty of submission to customary social sanctions, or to 
lawful demands from their High Chief. And, indeed, patterns of social 
behaviour continued much as they had in the past, despite German 
attempts to alleviate the more demanding aspects. People kept offering 
first fruits and special gifts to the Nahnmwarkis, while feasting on a 
grand scale remained an integral part of district relationships and the 
chiefly prestige competition.
It would be erroneous to regard this division of roles between the 
Germans and the High Chiefs as a new balance of power in Ponape. The 
island, its people, their authority structures remained very firmly in 
German hands after 1910. There was no talk now of an advisory 
council. Henry Nanpei’s designs had been suspect from the beginning. 
The mass of the Ponapeans was not behind such an innovation and 
Nanpei probably recognised, as did Hahl and Fritz, that in an open 
break with the Nahnmwarkis the people would follow them, not 
Nanpei. Any chance of the council’s gaining German approval was in 
any case lost in the confusion of the revolt and its aftermath.
However, Nanpei did not suffer from the abandonment of his 
creation, nor from the revolt, though his attitude to that event was 
ambivalent, to say the least. With the German triumph and Kersting’s 
program, Nanpei finally gained indisputable title to the Ant Islands and 
his various estates in Kiti. Ponapeans claim that he did even better from
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the new system, for he persuaded several tenants on his lands to claim 
only m odest portions as their freehold, arguing that the G erm ans were 
going to tax people according to the area of their land. N anpei is then 
alleged to have claimed for his own whatever private land was left.
The future now lay with H enry N anpei, w hether G erm any ruled or 
not. In the final years before war broke out, he increased his standing 
with the Germ ans, sending his sons to be educated in Germ any, and 
visiting the headquarters of the Liebenzeller M ission himself, where he 
was feted as ‘Defender of the Faith’ against the U ltram ontanism  of the 
C apuchin M ission. Since the removal of Sokehs, the old power struggle 
between north  and south more and m ore took the form of a personal 
confrontation  between the Catholic M ission and H enry N anpei. 
N anpei regarded the priests as the one rem aining danger to his position. 
W ith his advisory council lost and G erm any well in control of district 
relations, N anpei’s access to power as leader of the Protestant faction 
was considerably more exposed to any renewed cam paign to extend 
C atholic influence. Catholicism he regarded as a particularly subversive 
political force because of the hold which traditionally  it asserted over 
adherents, especially through the chiefs.
After the exile of the Sokehs district, the Capuchin Fathers did cast 
about for areas in which they m ight carry on their mission to spread 
the Gospel. The rebellion they regarded as the perfect argum ent against 
continued confessional dem arcation of the island. To them it was 
obvious proof of their oft­repeated argum ents tha t religion was not the 
cause of Ponape’s m ajor disturbances and therefore they could envisage 
no objections to peaceful and indiscrim inate proselytism after 1910.55
N anpei saw things in a different light, and he opposed vigorously 
their intensified expansion campaign. His attacks on the mission were 
carried into the Protestant press during his second visit to Germ any in 
1912, and in late 1913 he even brought a libel action against the priests. 
In all this, N anpei m anaged to enlist the sym pathy of Heinrich Kersting, 
who regarded the chief as a Ponapean of unusual enterprise and 
sophistication, and whose own relations with the C atholic mission were 
growing less and less cordial.
Kersting would not argue the m oral rights and wrongs of divided 
spheres of influence when, from his secular point of view, the stability 
of the island depended upon m aintaining them . Kersting knew that the 
Protestant chiefs in the south were w orried for their continuing influ­
ence, especially in the wake of the traum atic social changes now taking 
place, and he would not risk their fear sparking off a new explosion
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against the Catholic Mission. As well, Kersting was increasingly 
im patient with the m ission’s approach to education, which he saw as 
narrow  and partisan. A grand scheme for the island sphere possessed 
Kersting, in which he, as Ruler, would give the education of the 
Islanders into the hands of the Reich and build a new generation of 
colonial subjects dedicated to material im provem ent.56
The adm inistration’s relations with the Capuchins worsened to the 
point of estrangem ent as the mission resorted to a series of petulant 
actions after 1912 in defence of its prestige. The priests became 
convinced tha t the governm ent was collaborating in a conspiracy to 
degrade the mission in the eyes of the Ponapeans, and they osten tat­
iously disdained to cultivate relations with the rest of the European 
com m unity. W hen the new Bishop of the island sphere came to Ponape 
for the first time in 1913, the mission deliberately refused to issue 
invitations to Kersting and the other Europeans; even the officers and 
crew of SMS Cormoran  were ignored.57 The reputation  of the Fathers 
had not been enhanced when, in 1912, the Superior of the mission was 
convicted of a libel action which Georg Fritz had brought against him 
in 1908, and fined 900 marks. On top of this, Kersting had been forced 
to investigate charges that one of the priests had com m itted adultery 
with a Kiti woman. In Awak there were m ounting com plaints that the 
resident priest, Father Fidelis, was encouraging the people to lie to their 
chiefs. How much these incidents were inspired by the hostility of 
Protestant chiefs is difficult to assess, bu t the result was tha t the m oral 
authority  of the mission was considerably weakened in the eyes of 
Protestants, Catholics and the adm inistrator alike.
Ponape was outw ardly ‘pacified’ in 1914, but was a long way from 
being a prosperous and loyal corner of the empire. G erm any had 
obeyed the Ponapean dictum inta puain inta (‘blood buys b lood’) and 
had won the right to impose law and order th roughout the island. But 
law and order and communal peace were no t one and the same. The 
Pacific Islanders of M icronesia, and Ponapeans in particular, remained 
as distant from their rulers in 1914 as they had been in 1900. True, 
changes had been made and accepted: some 1100 individual land deeds 
had been registered, confirming tenants in the possession of their 
farm steads;58 roads encircling Sokehs, and around the m ainland to 
M adolenihm w— projects considered not feasible only a few years 
before— had been constructed; the annual w ork periods after 1911 had 
been performed w ithout dem ur, and the chiefs had agreed that from 
1914 on the work periods should be replaced by a cash tax; the
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N ahnm w arkis had retained their authority , and were vested with new 
powers. Indeed Ponapeans of later generations looked on the G erm an 
period as being the m ost innovative of their history. But in term s of 
enduring social harm ony and econom ic developm ent, Ponape was not 
much further advanced than  it had been when Fritz arrived in 1908. 
N o­one was sanguine about the island’s future. The only certainty was 
that Germany was com m itted, by fear of w ithdraw al, to staying.
Even that certainty was destroyed by the ou tbreak  of W orld W ar I. 
In M ay 1914 Kersting left Ponape on leave. O n 14 July the East Asian 
Squadron, under Graf Spee, sailed in w ithout w arning and stayed for 
several weeks, ‘reprovisioning’. It was to be Ponape’s only contribution  
to the Germ an war effort. O n 6 August, with war declared, the squadron 
cleared for action and sailed away. Exactly eight weeks later, Ponape, 
with the rest of the Carolines and M ariana islands, was occupied by the 
Japanese.
Epilogue
Over 400 men, women and children of Sokehs were sent into exile in 
1910, at first to Yap in the western Carolines. There the men were 
forced to w ork very hard and bear the harshness of the police whom 
the G erm an adm inistrator pu t in charge. Food was insufficient and of 
poor quality, and conditions only im proved after H ahl visited Yap and 
angrily ordered better treatm ent. The exiles were later removed to Palau 
where form er w arriors had to w ork in the Angaur phosphate mines 
while the women and children lived at Aimeliik, on Babelthuap.
W hen Japan  occupied M icronesia, the Sokehs were free to make their 
way back to Ponape. N ow  their cup of bitterness was filled to over­
flowing for they found that the Germ ans had settled 1200 out­islanders 
from the M ortlocks, Pingelap and M okil on their land. These brought 
specialist skills in fishing, canoe­building and navigation, but they have 
been regarded ever since as interlopers, especially by those Sokehs now 
confined to the m ainland.59
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W ar an d  C om m erce Under C om p any Rule
5
It was not until the 1870s that European traders began to exploit on 
a large scale the rich coconut groves and the concentrated coastal 
populations of the Bismarck Archipelago for the copra trade, or the 
abundan t marine products such as beche de mer and pearl­shell. 
G erm an traders were am ong the first. W hen Eduard Hernsheim , a 
H am burger attem pting to set up his own trading empire in the 
south­w est Pacific, anchored in Port H unter, Duke of York group, in 
O ctober 1875 to establish an agency, he found that the native inhabi­
tants were well accustomed to the visits of white traders and could 
understand pidgin English. He also found th a t Port H unter had been 
chosen already as the logical site for a first settlem ent by the Reverend 
George Brown, who had arrived in August to begin w ork for the 
A ustralasian W esleyan M ethodist M issionary Society.
European penetration of the islands of New Guinea developed from 
these foundations. The coasts of the Gazelle Peninsula and New Ireland 
were the earliest choice of whites seeking profits. New Ireland is a long, 
and, at points, extremely narrow  island to the north­east of New 
Britain, overlapping the eastern extremes of the Gazelle Peninsula and 
stretching away to the north­west. The south, with its straight coasts, 
reefs and poor anchorages did not attract much interest, except for the 
labour trade, but in the north there were areas of flat or gently 
undulating land and dense populations where a resident trader could 
make a living.
The Gazelle Peninsula is a distinct structural land unit at the northern 
end of New Britain, separated from the rest of the island by a m ajor fault 
line. There, in an area of 777 square kilometres live the Tolai people, 
estimated in G erm an times to num ber some 40 000, effectively isolated 
from other New Britain groups except for the Baining and Taulil people 
in the m ountains to the west. O n the east coast of the Gazelle Peninsula 
lies Blanche Bay, formed from a giant exploded crater. A round the 
shoreline of the old crater, hills rise steeply, some as high as 610 metres, 
except in the north of the innerm ost bay, Simpson H arbour, where the 
coastal flat is wider. Here, later, arose the town of Rabaul. Three
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dorm ant volcanic cones lie on the outer fringe of Blanche Bay, to the 
north and east. On the inner rim are three active volcanoes, Rabalan­ 
kaia north of Simpson Harbour, M atupit  on the south­eastern arm of 
Blanche Bay and Vulcan across the bay in the west, this last emerging 
from the waters in the 1870s and erupting again with devastating effect 
in 1937. The setting and atmosphere of Blanche Bay is one of tropical 
grandeur, a composition of towering heights and vivid colouring, from 
the deep blue of the fine harbours, through the varied greens of the 
forests to the sandy browns of the mountainsides.
On the steep coasts of this great volcanic lake Europeans tried to gain 
an early foothold. Barely two years after his arrival, George Brown had 
established seven mission stations on the Duke of Yorks, eleven on New 
Britain and five in New Ireland, though most were precarious holds and 
none was situated away from the coast.1 In this earliest phase of 
permanent settlement, the New Guineans dictated the pattern of the 
relations and the rate of development. Local groups on the coast were 
particularly jealous of their traditional economic ties with inland tribes. 
Some coastal ‘big men’ were able to reinforce their own power within 
their residential groups and subject inland neighbours through their 
monopoly over European goods and the introduction of firearms 
which, as in Samoa, became an integral feature of the early copra trade. 
European traders were restricted to the lowest type of barter commerce 
in order to acquire copra. Large quantities were impossible to buy in 
any one place since the New Guineans generally refused to prepare it 
themselves, and it was left to the individual agent not only to collect the 
coconuts but to cut and dry them as well.
In the event of a collision with villagers, there was little redress for 
the isolated trader. Each came as an individual, with his own economic 
status and goals, and each was forced to live on local terms, making 
adjustments for the specific area and circumstances in order to ensure 
his safety and a livelihood. To live on tribal territory and succeed in 
collecting plenty of coconuts, these men were dependent on local 
goodwill and co­operation. M ost took New Guinean wives, perhaps 
several wives, who then worked at drying copra. Traders’ resources 
were few, and the majority were agents for larger firms which provided 
house, boat, implements and the necessary provisions on credit. In 
return, the agent collected his coconuts or pearl­shell quota to pay off 
his usually high debts, hoping to make enough profit to sustain a 
tolerable existence a little longer.
Such men often were outcasts from their own society, men of
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uncom m on energy and indiscipline. C onfrontations with New 
Guineans occurred frequently. Some were the result of m utual m isun­
derstanding, for language was a problem  in those early days. M any 
resulted from a trad er’s drunkenness and his disregard of local custom. 
Traders invariably carried firearms themselves, and they made it clear 
that they expected trouble from the New Guineans. In a tense situation, 
therefore, violence was alm ost a self­fulfilling expectation, both sides 
resorting to arms at the slightest notice. Ten of the twelve agents in New 
Guinea employed by the Godeffroys firm came to a violent end during 
those earliest years of the late 1870s.2 In terms of security it was every 
m an for himself, with only the dictates of his own conscience and the 
instructions of his firm to guide him.
The m ost violent clashes occurred when the newcomers, be they 
traders or missionaries, tried to move inland. In April 1878, four Fijian 
teachers of Brown’s mission, recently installed inland from Ratavul in 
Blanche Bay, were m urdered and eaten, because the local ‘big m an’, 
Talili, feared tha t he would lose his m onopoly over the supply of 
European trade goods to the interior. For the six to seven whites, 
including George Brown, scattered along the eastern coast of the 
Gazelle Peninsula and the Duke of Y ork Islands, the event had much 
wider im plications. Talili wielded a great deal of influence in the 
north­w estern corner of Blanche Bay, and enjoyed a reputation as a 
ruthless despot. The Europeans were convinced that his move against 
the missionaries heralded a general assault against all Europeans. In 
fear at their isolation they organised an expedition with George Brown 
as leader, to dem onstrate to the Tolai tha t Europeans were strong and 
intended to stay. Brown was able to secure the support of those coastal 
Tolai at N odup, M atupit, M alagunan and K abakada who were already, 
to some extent, bound to the European presence by the ties of the 
exchange trade, or who were traditional enemies of Talili. They 
attacked Talili’s area, burnt down his ham lets, pillaged his stores and 
killed nearly a dozen of his followers.3
This reprisal, and the form al peace which subsequently Brown was 
able to conclude, broke Talili’s hold over the interior north­w est of 
Blanche Bay and heralded a new phase of expansion and European 
influence, both by Brown’s missionaries and by European entrep­
reneurs. By 1880 the first two m ainland converts had been baptised at 
Vunam am i, or Kinigunan, a district to the south­east of Blanche Bay, 
and the first Tolai preacher was appointed. In 1881 there were forty 
praying sites, fifty­five converts and 514 school pupils. By 1886 the
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number of converts to Methodism in the Gazelle Peninsula and the 
south of New Ireland had risen to 4000. The local mission was by then 
divided into three circuits, each supervised by a white missionary and 
operating a school for prospective New Guinean teachers.4
Brown, who had borne the burden of expansion, left in 1881. He had 
done little himself to set up schools for New Guineans, preferring to 
plant Methodism widely by travelling and stationing preachers, but he 
had helped to overcome the particularism of Tolai village centres 
nonetheless. By the time he departed, the traditional hostilities of many 
contiguous coastal districts around Blanche Bay were broken and 
people were mixing freely, at least while under the shadow of the 
mission’s presence.
By 1880 commercial competition had accelerated to the extent that 
there were now five firms active in the area. The two main trading 
companies, Hernsheim and the DHPG, successor to Godeffroys, set up 
a network of agencies along the coast of the Gazelle, from Vlavolo on 
the north coast, to Vunamami in the south­east. Hernsheim alone set 
up thirteen between the years 1877 and 1883, as well as nine on New 
Ireland and several on smaller island groups to the north  and east. By 
1884 these two firms were reportedly exporting between 1350 and 2000 
tonnes of copra from the Archipelago.5
They did not have business with the New Guineans all their own way. 
The rates of exchange for tropical produce rose sharply in these years: 
where, in 1875, a length of tobacco would secure twenty­five to forty 
coconuts, by 1880 it was only fifteen, and knives, axes and firearms had 
replaced red cloth, glasspearls and empty bottles as the most sought 
after items of trade. Firearms particularly were coveted by ambitious 
‘big m en’; there were said to be 700 in Tolai hands by 1887.6 New 
Guineans also demanded amounts of native money ( tam bu) in 
exchange for their produce, and Europeans were forced more fre­
quently to finance trips to Nakanai on the north coast of New Britain 
to buy the raw material from which it was made.7
The most important economic and social development of this stage 
of relations between Europeans and New Guineans was the opening up 
of the Kokopo coast from Cape Raluana to Cape Gazelle, south of 
Blanche Bay, and the establishment of the first plantation at Ralum by 
Emma Forsayth and her business partner, Thomas Farrell.8 The 
alienation of large amounts of land became a new and ever more crucial 
point of contention in the eastern Gazelle Peninsula. Land within the 
boundaries of the local residential group (a series of hamlets called a
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gunan or pakanagunan) was controlled by the Senior (alualua) of the 
m atrilineage (vunatarai) on which residence was based, and any 
individual member of the descent group had a claim to land not in use. 
The alualua was not only genealogically senior within the group, but 
was also a m an of enterprise and leadership who combined in himself 
authority  over all aspects of indigenous life, with the exception of the 
principal cults. He could, for instance, delegate the use of uncultivated 
land belonging to the vunatarai. D uring the 1870s and 1880s, parti­
cularly strong alualua, who were also ‘big m en’ th rough their entre­
preneurship and w arrior skills, ‘sold’ land in this way to Europeans, in 
order to acquire firearms for campaigns against o ther ham lets, or goods 
to be distributed for the purpose of building up support for their 
position of influence. The prevailing uncertainty about a ‘big m an’s’ 
power increased the opportunities which a shrewd New Guinean 
possessed of carrying off such a transaction over the heads of his 
fellows. It only became clear later tha t group rights m ight have been 
infringed on a large scale.
It is im portan t to distinguish between purchasing the right to use 
vunatarai land and actually owning it. The conception of possession 
extended only to land tha t was utilised immediately, and the rights 
reverted to the descent group once the land went fallow. N or did the 
transfer of land to an outsider necessarily remove the original ow ners’ 
rights to use fruits and trees planted there, or include sections with 
particular cultic im portance to the group. The Tolai were reasonably 
aware of w hat they were doing in selling small blocks of land for the 
immediate use of a mission or trading station, though they may not have 
understood w hat a ‘sale of land’ m eant in terms of European law. Their 
understanding definitely stopped short in the case of enorm ous areas 
which were not taken into use for several years. And when European 
purchasers deliberately obscured the m eaning of such contracts, as was 
the tendency in the early 1880s, then they could expect only great 
bitterness and determ ined resistance after the land was finally cleared 
for plantations and the villagers expected to move.
There is an interesting description of the typical land purchase 
procedure in Eduard H ernsheim ’s Memoirs. He claims tha t it was 
simply a m atter of signifying to the nearest native group the land desired 
and walking around it to gain a rough measure. Then after ‘the natives’ 
had m arked a European contract paper, suitable trade goods were 
distributed. Hernsheim concludes with the pointed observation:
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That the natives signing the paper were the actual owners of the 
land or understood the contents of the contract was naturally 
impossible to prove, and only actual occupation could guarantee 
possession.9
Such a process obviously begged num erous questions about the true 
ownership of the land and the right of the vendors to sell, but m ost of 
the early land acquisitions in the Gazelle seem to have been made in this 
way. Thom as Farrell claimed to have ‘bought’ 2050 hectares of land 
extending along the coast and inland from Cape Gazelle to Ralum Point 
for £50 in trade goods, as well as other areas on the north coast and 
inland from Port W eber; Richard Parkinson, the German­English 
planter and ethnographer who moved to the Archipelago from Samoa 
in the early 1880s after m arrying Em m a’s sister, is supposed to have 
purchased the entire districts of Kalili and Vairiki for just £10 in trad e .10 
Farrell and Emma were careful to draw up written agreements and have 
them endorsed by the New G uineans; some of their purchases at least 
were concluded on board British warships with the captain as witness.
Ralum ’s trading com petitors were not outdone in the rush for land 
which occurred between 1882 and 1885. Eduard Hernsheim  purchased 
1640 hectares in New Britain and the Duke of York Islands, plus a 
further 3280 hectares in the north of New Ireland and 780 hectares in 
the H erm it group. The DHPG laid claim to nearly 820 hectares in the 
Duke of Yorks. One of Farrell’s own traders, Octave M outon, a 
survivor of the M arquis de Reys expedition, had purchased 2050 
hectares of his own around V unam am i by 1888.11
But it was Ralum which led the way in developing commercial 
plantations on a large scale. By 1886 Ralum already had 180 hectares 
under cotton, coconuts and various experim ental plants, with a work 
force of hundreds. In the next few years the plantation  was to expand 
dram atically, gradually taking over land on which no occupational 
claim had been made at the time of purchase. T hat it could do so 
w ithout resistance, at least until 1890, was largely the influence of 
Emma. As the owner of Ralum , she acted out the local expectations of 
a ‘big m an’, giving occasional feasts and dances and providing trade 
goods for coconuts, so tha t a m utually profitable m arket system 
developed.
In Novem ber 1884, a G erm an warship, SMS Elizabeth, sailed into 
Blanche Bay to hoist the imperial flag over New Britain. The process 
was repeated on New Ireland, in the A dm iralty, H erm it and Anchorite 
groups, and at three places on the north­eastern coast of m ainland New
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Guinea. The area was now under the form al protection  of the Reich. 
The adm inistration and developm ent of the new protectorate was left 
to the New Guinea C om pany, a chartered firm under the hand of the 
powerful Berlin financier Adolf von H ansem ann, w hose’ immediate 
interest lay only in the m ainland, or Kaiser W ilhelm sland as it now 
became. H ansem ann and his Board had plotted a golden and profitable 
future for their tropical foster­child, in which the C om pany was to act 
as land broker and adviser to thousands of im aginary G erm an settlers 
who were expected to flock to New Guinea from the hom eland and the 
A ustralian colonies.
The Archipelago was expected to play second fiddle while this dream 
was m aterialising and for the first few years the only signs of C om pany 
activity in the islands were a m agistrate who resided first on M atupit, 
then in Kerawara, then at Kokopo, and a bewildering array of laws to 
govern every facet of ‘civilised’ life in the tropics. N o attem pt was made 
to impose effective control through an adm inistrative staff, a police 
force or a com m unications network; and to all intents and purposes the 
adm inistration  of the Bismarck Archipelago existed in name only well 
into the 1890s.
There had been a certain measure of inform al and arbitrary  control 
at the centre of perm anent white settlem ent around Blanche Bay, where 
European settlers had been able to take m atters into their own hands, 
at least prior to 1884. Richard Parkinson had m ediated in disputes 
between groups of coastal Tolai and, in some cases, had dictated peace 
with the aid of his own police force— 150 Buka men draw n from Ralum 
plan tation . W hen New Guineans had attacked a European in the area, 
punitive expeditions had been m ounted swiftly and carried ou t with 
severity.
This changed with annexation, as relations between the coastal Tolai 
and the European planting com m unity entered a phase of m utual 
accom m odation and econom ic advantage. The Tolai were quick to 
recognise the need of the plantations for large quantities of native 
foodstuffs to feed their labour lines. As a result, they began to expand 
their gardens and produce a surplus to sell to the plantations. There are 
several striking descriptions of the m arkets which were held every third 
day at Ralum , with perhaps 200 women gathering from as far away as 
twenty kilom etres to sell yams, taro  and bananas under the watchful 
eye of their arm ed m enfolk.12 In 1886 Ralum  was supplied in this way 
with 159 tonnes of taro and yams, and local gardens were being 
extended regularly as the labour force increased. Even this was insuffi­
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d e n t to m eet the needs of the p lantation , and Emma was forced to send 
boats along the coast to buy more and more produce. The copra trade 
was also proving a source of ample profit to the New Guineans, and 
native copra production rose from zero in 1870 to 1371 tonnes in 
1884 .13 By and large this ‘p roduction’ m eant simply collecting the 
available surplus of coconuts to sell, for since m arket gardening and 
coconut collection already provided them with a new and constantly 
rising standard  of living, the Tolai were not interested in increasing the 
p lanting  of coconuts. They were also unwilling to offer themselves for 
wage labour on the plantations. In 1890, when 1044 recruits were 
obtained from New Ireland, only 130 could be enticed from the whole 
of New B ritain .14
The same year saw the first m ajor encounter between the coastal 
Tolai and the p lantation  owners over land on the Kokopo coast. Ralum 
now was occupying systematically its land holdings to the west and east, 
and linking them by roads. But in doing so, it began to encroach 
seriously on the goodwill Emma had built up am ong the Tolai. One of 
the roads from an outstation  to K okopo, the site of the New Guinea 
C om pany’s holdings, was being built along the foreshore, cutting 
through local fishing grounds and a m en’s tubuan  cult place. The Tolai 
had given clear warning that they resented this two­fold infringement: 
trade goods distributed for the purchase of some houses lying on the 
route had been returned, and the num ber of wom en visiting Ralum 
m arket from the affected districts had dwindled considerably over a 
period of weeks.15
But the road building went on, under the supervision of John M oses, 
a Filipino overseer who was arrogant and unpopular with the local 
people. In M arch 1890, when the road reached the houses to be 
dem olished, a group of Tolai attacked Moses and clubbed him to death. 
It was only the beginning. Four m ajor districts along the coast and in 
the h in terland— V unam am i, Keravi, Bitarebarebe and Tingenav­ 
udu— form ed a coalition in late M arch and attacked Ralum. They were 
only narrow ly beaten off. The Europeans, under Richard Parkinson, 
replied with two large reprisals, in which five whites and over eighty 
foreign labourers took part, and they succeeded in driving the Tolai 
forces into the interior, destroying some sixty ham lets and killing eight 
w arrio rs.16 Peace was finally negotiated in April with the exchange of 
pigs and shell money, but the ringleader, the ‘big m an’, To Ruruk, was 
not captured and executed until a year later.
A lthough district fishing rights were safeguarded and various local
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complaints were corrected in the negotiated agreement of April, 1890 
marked the beginning rather than the end of confrontations between 
the Tolai and the Gazelle Europeans over land. The Tolai were prepared 
to make peace in 1890 after compensation had been offered, and 
because they recognised the growth of the New Guinea Company 
plantation at Kokopo, now called Herbertshöhe, as a new opportunity 
for marketing produce and copra. However, as a result of the 1890 
clash, the Tolai were forced to vacate immediately, in favour of Ralum 
plantation, all the coastal land between M alapau  (a western outstation) 
and Ralum that already had been set aside in pre­annexation contracts 
of sale but not yet occupied. By the middle of 1893 Emma had increased 
her cultivated area to 240 hectares of cotton and 350 hectares of 
coconuts. The New Guinea Company possessed about 165 hectares of 
cotton and coconuts east of Ralum and was now occupying land in the 
districts of Malagunan and Tingenavudu.17 Octave M outon  had also 
begun planting on his estate in Vunamami district.
The Tolai were further alienated by the behaviour of imported 
labourers who harassed local women and stole market produce, and 
there was general resentment of the German station manager at 
Herbertshöhe after he closed down for a time the native market at 
Kokopo plantation, depriving neighbouring Tolai of their regular 
trading incomes.
In early July 1893 tension reached a new peak, and the first reports 
of clashes between villages and Company police began to come in. It 
was at this moment that an enterprising young sorcerer further inland, 
Tavalai of Ulagunan, claimed to have discovered an ointment which 
could repel bullets and actually turn them against the person 
shooting.18 ‘Big men’ from the affected areas hastened to Ulagunan to 
pay the 1000 fathoms of shell money which Tavalai demanded for his 
ointment, and by mid­July a conspiracy to attack Herbertshöhe and 
subjugate the whites had been fashioned. There were several reasons 
why inter­district co­operation should succeed at this point. Firstly, 
Tolai settlements were already susceptible to occasional alliances 
through inter­marriage, trading arrangements, and ritual links in the 
tubuan  and ingiet cults. Secondly, in 1893 there were also widespread 
feelings of uncertainty as European plantations took over land which 
they claimed to have purchased years before. Finally, the attack on 
Ralum in 1890 had shown the Tolai that resistance was feasible only 
when they possessed something to fuse the different groups together: 
in this case the ointment proved to be a perfect integrating mechanism.
128
Plate XVI Right: A Pominis of Papitalai (from 
Hiltruper Monatshefte, 1933)
Plate XVII Below: Men from Pak 
Island, Admiralties Group (from  
H. Nevermann, Admiralitäts Inseln, 
1934)
Plate XVIII Left: A Wampar man
during German times (from R. Neuhass, 
Deutsch Neu Guinea, 1911)
Plate XIX Below: Men from Siar, near 
Madang, in the 1890s (from A. B. Meyer 
and R. Parkinson, Album von Papua-Typen, 
Stengel and Markert, Dresden, 1894)
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In September 1893 some 300 warriors from the districts of Mala­ 
gunan, Tingenavudu, Ulagunan, Bitarebarebe, Biretava and Vairiki 
attacked Herbertshohe. The Germans barely managed to repel them. 
Punitive raids were repeatedly mounted on the districts, and inflicted 
heavy casualties (over forty Tolai were killed), but the warriors refused 
to be subdued. Smeared with the magic ointment and singing a ritual 
chant, they flung themselves at the plantation, rooting out cotton 
bushes as they went and offering fierce resistance to the troop columns 
of New Irelanders under European control.
In October the New Guinea Com pany’s Governor, Georg Schmiele, 
arrived from Kaiser Wilhelmsland to try to negotiate a settlement with 
the Tolai, since the disruption of the native food markets was having 
serious consequences on the C om pany’s labour force at Herbertshohe. 
Meetings were arranged with the ‘big men’ of the leading districts, and 
Schmiele demanded nominal amounts of tambu as a traditional surety, 
but at the last moment the Tolai feared betrayal and the negotiations 
broke down. Skirmishes continued on into November amid rumours 
that the entire coastal area south of Blanche Bay was awaiting the final 
defeat of the white men. The hitherto peaceful villagers between 
Herbertshohe and Ralum began to stir, and the Europeans’ last line of 
defence, the imported labourers on the plantations, were more and 
more disconcerted at the fanaticism of the enemy.
On 29 November the small German cruiser, SMS Sperber, arrived 
off Herbertshohe, and Schmiele made a last attempt to bring about a 
negotiated settlement. It failed: only Bitarebarebe district, well inland 
from Herbertshohe and comparatively unaffected by European 
expansion in 1893, was willing to consider peace. The other districts 
kept up their resistance into mid­December, when a combined expedi­
tion of German marines, European settlers and New Ireland labourers 
was launched on them. Only then, after the Europeans and their allies 
had penetrated beyond known settlements, shooting and burning as 
they went, did the Tolai cease hostilities and declare their submission.
Naturally enough, the New Guinea Company and most of the settlers 
attributed the ending of the war to the Sperber expedition and to the 
bombardment of coastal villages which the ship had carried out at the 
same time as the land attack. From the Tolai standpoint, European 
pressure was less decisive. Sources close to the Tolai suggest that they, 
anc not the Europeans, decided that it was no longer practical to 
cortinue the uprising. In his memoirs Octave M outon  describes the 
final, combined expedition in some detail, and in quaint but telling
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prose recounts a decisive moment in the hunt for the massed Tolai 
forces.
Later we arrived at a village on a hill there the natives came from 
all directions uphill to attack us with the exception of one side 
which showed level ground the rest could not be approached by 
climbing to reach us, the native police were uncontrolable and I 
and the officer and the other whites told them not to use our 
ammunition wastefully, the natives came from all directions, at last 
through the level side we saw a fellow painted red and white and 
carrying no arms all he had in each hand a bunch of croton like 
a bunch of flowers, he did not last long as soon seen he was shot, 
from that moment we could have heard a pin drop after a while, 
no sooner the wizard dropped all we could hear was the rush of 
natives through the bush, I cut off one of his ears to show the 
natives of Kinigunan, so that the fact that they really believed the 
wizard and evidently he believed it himself because he was 
unarmed and like a priest leading his followers . . .19
Tavalai had become a victim of his own delusions.
The Tolai themselves report an additional reason for their change of 
heart: an alualua called To Bobo, from Vunabalbal, managed to obtain 
some magic ointment and took it to the Germans who smeared their 
forces with it before going into battle. N o t only did it strengthen the 
resolve of the Melanesian troops, but in the eyes of the enemy it also 
made them invulnerable; thus the Tolai sued for peace.20
W ithout doubt, Tavalai’s death and the use of his ointment against 
them were greater shocks to the Tolai than the whistle of a few artillery 
shells. In the calmer light that prevailed after the war there were 
Germans who saw this. The Sperber expedition quickly became 
notorious as an example of how not to hunt New Guineans. From the 
beginning it was a fiasco: the New Guinea Company manager, Paul 
Kolbe, led a party which got lost in the bush on the way in, then 
proceeded to fire on a detachment from the Sperber on the way out; 
while the Tolai managed to evade a decisive battle altogether. In 
addition to all this, the captain of the Sperber was openly cynical about 
the success of his bom bardm ent since all the target villages were behind 
a hill; the only casualty seems to have been a man who dislocated his 
neck in shock at the whistling shells!21 If Europeans had any dominating 
effect on the ending of the 1893 war it was because, as Schmiele 
recognised, the Tolai were becoming economically dependent on the 
whites and this was a powerful motive for them to accept peace rather 
than total victory.
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The war of the bullet­proof ointment was an important departure in 
the history of the Gazelle Peninsula. For the Germans it inaugurated 
a new phase of expansion in the European economy. By 1897 European 
plantations in the eastern Gazelle had grown to 1295 hectares of 
planted land, and the Big Three companies were exporting 2325 tonnes 
of copra. Ralum alone was said to ‘own’ almost the entire districts of 
Kabaga, Ravalien, Ulagunan, Tingenavudu, Bitarebarebe, Malagunan 
and parts of Kabakaul and Vunamami.22
As for the Tolai, they had shown themselves a force to be reckoned 
with. They had not won the war, but neither had they been defeated 
totally. With the bullet­proof ointment, a feature similar to the Maji 
Maji of East Africa a decade later, the Tolai had for a time successfully 
opposed European self­confidence and superior technology with an 
unconquerable morale.
In addition, the co­operation which the districts had achieved in war 
did not disintegrate entirely with peace. Because of the gradual eco­
nomic and political consolidation imposed on the Gazelle through 
missionary activity, and through the spread of trading and planting, the 
confederation of districts behind Herbertshöhe tended to survive under 
strong leadership. Some Tolai already had accepted that the whites 
could not be driven out, and that they must find some compromise 
solution to the problem of coexistence. One of these was To Bobo, the 
alualua who had helped to bring the war to an end by procuring 
ointment for the Germans. In 1894 he became head of the Vunabalbal 
clan after the death of his elder brother, who had unified the area against 
Herbertshöhe. As a Methodist preacher and ‘big m an’ in his own right, 
To Bobo came more and more into prominence as virtual leader of the 
old confederacy based on his district Vunamami. He was a man who 
recognised the need for peaceful adjustment to the expanding European
o qe conom y/
Few Europeans showed much understanding of the problems which 
faced leaders like To Bobo, or of the resentment which the Tolai 
harboured against the growth of European settlement. In the aftermath 
of the war, even the normally responsive Emma of Ralum declared that 
the only way to guarantee peace in the Gazelle was to give the Tolai ‘a 
sound thrashing and drive them away from our lands’. Georg Schmiele, 
the Company Governor, was one of the few who tried to understand. 
A man who alienated almost every white settler in New Guinea by his 
stiff and priggish manners, Schmiele nonetheless was peculiarly sensi­
tive to the changes being forced upon the Tolai by the pressure of white
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development. As early as 1891 he had recommended that several 
‘trusted agents’ be appointed to act as intermediaries between the racial 
communities. No action was taken. Now he recommended them again, 
and foreshadowed the establishment of reserves to protect the Tolai 
from the complete loss of their land. This time the Company accepted 
his ideas, but too late to enable Schmiele to implement them himself: 
on his way back to Germany in 1895, Schmiele died of fever in the East 
Indies. His ideas remained shelved until the arrival in January 1896 of 
Imperial Judge, Albert Hahl.
Hahl was a man of mixed qualities. He possessed a humane spirit, 
with a genuine interest in the varied cultures of Germ any’s Pacific 
empire, and his open, at times egalitarian personality marked him off 
from his Prussian compatriots. But he combined these qualities with a 
detached, even a callous sense of the brutalities of colonisation, which 
allowed him to regard conquest as a legitimate instrument of 
civilisation.
When Hahl arrived in New Guinea, there existed to all intents and 
purposes no systematic administration, for the New Guinea Company 
was engaged in negotiations to transfer permanent political control of 
the colony to the Reich and considered itself obliged only to a holding 
operation in New Guinea. Hahl, in whose hands the ‘administration’ 
now lay, immediately began moving among the Tolai in an effort to 
understand their language and customs, and to win them for the ideal 
of German colonialism. He had already set about defining the goals of 
the regime. The protectorate’s future lay in its contribution to the 
economy and prestige of the Reich. In H ah l’s vision, economic 
development depended, first, on strengthening the purchasing power 
of New Guineans in an ordered administration, and, in the long term, 
on educating them in the service of European capital.24 These were 
predictably eurocentric objectives, though they were balanced by a wish 
to protect New Guineans in the process, a wish which increasingly 
conflicted with the aims of trading and planting firms in New Guinea.
Albert Hahl early established a tradition of direct, personal and 
dynamic administration by constant travelling, by initiating contacts 
with outlying communities, by leading expeditions and police tours and 
by helping to resolve parochial disputes. Within three months of his 
arrival, Hahl could converse with the Tolai on the Gazelle Peninsula, 
and this stood him in good stead, for he was quickly besieged by Tolai 
leaders anxious to arrest the further encroachment of plantations on 
village land.
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Hahl was aware that many indigenous groups had not grasped the 
implications of land purchase contracts and that certainly they had not 
anticipated European settlement and plantation agriculture on the scale 
it had reached. To Bobo, in particular, was able to persuade Hahl that 
Vunamami hamlets should be allowed to hold on to their extensive 
coconut stands as well as subsistence land. The Governor then agreed 
to negotiate with the owners of Ralum for the establishment of a reserve 
for Vunamami villagers who were currently occupying Ralum ground, 
despite the plantation’s legal claim to the area. Hahl also set out to 
dissuade Emma from carrying out a plan to resettle the inhabitants of 
nine further hamlets on non­Ralum land in the interior in order to take 
up already­purchased land for new plantings. Such a move would 
disrupt the traditional basis of the local economy and remove a vital 
source of food supplies for the plantations. An even more immediate 
danger, which Hahl recognised, was the likelihood of a new wave of 
resistance in the area south of Blanche Bay as the populations of the 
interior came under unwarranted pressure from bitterly anti­white 
refugees migrating inland from the coast.25
This danger did not disappear until well into the 1900s but, as a result 
of H ah l’s early efforts, which were successful though not without 
struggle, some reserves were excised from land already purchased by 
Europeans. Vunamami, for instance, was left with 147 hectares out of 
its original territory of 287 hectares, an area not inequitable in terms 
of 1896 land use.26 The reserves were not gained without conditions: 
Hahl decreed that they should revert to their European ‘owners’ after 
fifty years if the New Guineans had not planted coconuts or populated 
the area more densely in that time. To Bobo’s method of meeting these 
conditions was to lower bride prices by fiat in order to encourage 
marriage and increase the population, thus reinforcing Vunamami 
claims to the land; he also led the way in planting coconuts regularly 
and processing them into copra.
To Bobo prospered under the eye of his new patron, the Government. 
And among his own people he continued to grow in stature, for his 
innovations convinced his followers that he was acting for the common 
welfare, not just his own ambition. Through his leadership he helped 
the Vunamami confederacy come to terms with the growing colonial 
apparatus, and ensured that it could contribute to the shaping of its 
future.
But Vunamami was far from the only beneficiary. The Tolai of the 
eastern Gazelle prospered as a people for the rest of the German period.
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Up to and beyond 1914 they enjoyed a steadily rising per capita income. 
They supplied eighty per cent of all native­produced copra in the 
Bismarck Archipelago, and about fifteen per cent of New Guinea’s total 
copra exports.27 At the same time they strove to remain as independent 
of the European wage economy as possible, refusing to enlist for wage 
labour on plantations where, in most cases, they were regarded merely 
as chattels and not as voluntary employees. A few did enter service for 
the government or the police force, for here, under Hahl at least, the 
relationship was more reciprocal and they could retain a sense of 
economic and social partnership.
Land problems around Blanche Bay and on the north coast of the 
Gazelle were only one facet of H ah l’s concern to provide the security 
necessary for trade and plantation agriculture to floufishT A second 
requirement was control of existing native trade routes from the 
interior, and the construction of new roads at strategic points. The Tolai 
possessed a very extensive system of markets running inland from 
Blanche Bay, but the mutual suspicions and hostilities of local settle­
ments made the system vulnerable to sudden disruption. Capitalising 
on the Tolai’s attraction to better market access and economic gain, and 
with the aid of shell money, iron and M ethodist Mission influence, Hahl 
induced local villagers in 1896 to build a road from Herbertshöhe to 
Raluana. This road enabled him to secure the trading links which ran 
from the hinterland to the Kokopo coast.28 A network of roads was also 
the first stage in any future taxation project.
By the end of Company rule in 1899, additional roads or riding paths 
had been constructed around the rim of Blanche Bay to Simpsonhafen 
(the later site of Rabaul), from Simpsonhafen to N odup  on the 
north­east coast, and from Herbertshöhe south­west to Vunakokor, 
sixteen kilometres from the sea in the Varzin mountains. Hahl did not 
find the same ease in getting the Tolai to maintain the roads: that 
required constant supervision; and by 1898­99 he was using New 
Guinean prisoners to complete much of the work.
The final element in H ah l’s security program was the appointment 
of Schmiele’s ‘trusted agents’. Control by reprisal had always been an 
inadequate policy, even if at times it was the only way for the meagre 
government apparatus to exercise its authority. In August 1896, in 
areas of the Gazelle Peninsula and the Duke of York Islands where the 
Methodist Mission in particular wielded a decisive influence for peace, 
Hahl nominated the first individual New Guineans to convey his wishes 
to groups of hamlets; among them was To Bobo. The new officials,
134
The N ew  Guinea Islands
whom the Germ ans called originally lualuas but later luluais after the 
Tolai nam e for a district w ar leader, were given limited adm inistrative 
and police powers to supervise road construction in their localities and 
to adjudicate small, local disputes. Fines of up to’twenty­five marks or 
ten fathom s of tambu could be imposed, bu t villagers had the right to 
appeal against decisions to the Imperial Judge at H erbertshöhe.
The system of luluais was designed basically to encourage the 
peaceful solution of difficulties, and to act as a lever through which the 
governm ent could ‘draw ’ New Guineans to work within the colonial 
econom y as road builders, p lantation  labourers and, later, taxpayers. 
To delegate a more autonom ous ‘chiefly’ power to these agents was 
impossible, for the social and political authority  of the traditional 
alualua, on which the appointm ents were based, was generally well 
circum scribed, and the Germ ans soon found themselves dealing with 
num erous com plaints against luluais for exceeding their authority. 
M oreover, as the system expanded and single villages were given 
governm ent luluais, the new appointees were not always the natural 
clan elders or ‘big m en’ of their districts, so tha t some experienced 
difficulty in exerting their newly­ascribed authority. By 1900 Hahl had 
appointed forty­four of the new officials in the Gazelle and twenty­three 
on the Duke of York Islands, the only areas which his adm inistration 
could reach effectively.29
But if racial relations in the Gazelle Peninsula were improving in the 
years after 1893, it was not simply the work of the G erm an government. 
M issionaries had been spreading the G ood News during the 1880s and 
1890s, and they share credit, at least indirectly, for an increase in 
stability.
W hen the war of the bullet­proof o intm ent began, the M ethodists 
were perm anently entrenched throughout the northern Gazelle, in the 
Duke of York Islands and on southern New Ireland. Three white 
m issionaries and forty­odd Pacific Island assistants, including the first 
New G uineans, were m inistering to over 5000 followers. By 1899 and 
the end of Com pany rule, the num ber of New Guineans regarded as 
being supporters of the M ethodist M ission had risen to 10 419. The 
mission occupied ninety­five outstations (over fifty in the Gazelle 
Peninsula), run by twenty­nine Polynesian and sixty­six New Guinean 
assistants. In addition there existed a m ajor seminary for the training 
of local teachers on Ulu Island in the D uke of York group, which was 
giving an elem entary education and prom oting econom ic and political 
co­operation among the Tolai village groups.30 At the level of the
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ham let, the M ethodist M ission probably exercised greater influence in 
the 1880s than did the o ther mission society, the Herz Jesu Mission 
(M ission of the Sacred H eart or MSC).
The first Sacred H eart priests arrived in M atupit in September 1882 
to re­establish the Vicariate of M elanesia, which had been virtually 
abandoned since 1855. Three priests and two brothers made up the 
original party , and they settled first in N odup, on the north­east coast. 
W ithin a few years, the headquarters of the mission was transferred to 
an area of land east of H erbertshöhe on the Kokopo coast, to which the 
name Vunapope (‘seat of the Popies’) was given. By 1891 the M ission 
of the Sacred H eart had its own Bishop of New Britain, Ludwig Couppe, 
a Frenchm an of indom itable spirit and tireless energy, plus a comple­
m ent of five priests, six lay brothers and five nuns.31
The same year, the Colonial D epartm ent, under pressure from the 
Imperial Com m issioner residing in Kaiser W ilhelm sland, Fritz Rose, 
officially separated the areas in which the two missions could evange­
lise: the M ethodists were allocated the area to the north and west of 
Raluana point, the MSC the area to the east and south. W ithin a very 
few years both parties, as well as the Berlin authorities, acknowledged 
that the dem arcation was an absurdity. In its sector, the Sacred H eart 
M ission found only a small and scattered population , so continued to 
operate in areas destined for the Wesleyans; by 1897 Couppe claimed 
3700 baptised adherents in the M ethodist districts of M alagunan and 
Vlavolo alone. At Vlavolo rival churches stood only 400 metres apart, 
and the Catholics freely adm itted they had at least thirteen churches in 
M ethodist areas.32 The official division into spheres of influence was 
finally removed in April 1899.
The C atholic M ission was not free in the early days from clashes with 
the Tolai over land, especially on the north coast at V unakam kabi near 
Vlavolo. Nevertheless, C atholic missionaries, like the M ethodists 
before them , soon gained acceptance as men set apart from those 
seeking cash profits in New Guinea. Because of its efforts to mitigate 
the effects of the 1893 w ar on villagers behind H erbertshöhe, the Sacred 
H eart M ission was soon allowed by the Tolai to expand inland from 
V unapope, and the first inland station was set up at T akabur in the 
district of T ingenavudu. Similar intervention on the north coast, where 
the mission obtained a pardon  from death for the ‘big m an’ organising 
resistance against them , paved the way for the conversion of the entire 
district; Couppe also was not far behind Schmiele in actively cam ­
paigning to reserve land for the Tolai in areas they had already sold.
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In taking upon itself the functions of protector and advocate, the 
Catholic Mission won the trust of many Tolai. At the end of 1897 it 
could point to eight stations on the north and east coasts and hinter­
lands of the Gazelle Peninsula. With a staff now of forty Europeans, 
over 4000 baptised New Guineans, and two trained catechists, the 
Catholic Church in German New Guinea was becoming a formidable 
power.
Because of its resources and strongly centralised character, the 
Catholic Mission was able to exert as much, if not more physical control 
in its areas of influence than the German administration during the 
1890s. The first road on the Gazelle Peninsula was actually built by 
Couppe, from Vunapope to Takabur in 1896, while the following year 
the mission armed its own labourers with private firearms to defend the 
Vunakamkabi plantation. Couppe was also the spirit behind H ah l’s 
raids in the late 1890s on the north coast settlements of Massawa, 
Massikonapuka and Ramandu. These raids were designed to break the 
indigenous slave trade which centred on the technologically backward 
and largely defenceless Baining people. M any of the freed victims were 
delivered to the Catholic Mission for rehabilitation, while land was 
confiscated from the slave traders and they were driven out of the 
region. Couppe’s plan of conversion was to collect these former slaves, 
as well as orphans and the illegitimate offspring of white settlers, feed 
and clothe them, and then educate them in Catholic orphanages. Later 
they would be settled in self­supporting peasant communities in the 
interior, and through inter­marriage and instruction, provide the core 
of a new Christian people in New Guinea.
That the mission, rather than the administration, could take the 
initiative in developing relations with New Guineans was in large part 
due to the impotence of officials like Hahl. Throughout the 1890s, the 
New Guinea Company refused to accept full responsibility for the 
internal security of the New Guinea protectorate, arguing that it w'as 
the job of the Reich to protect settlers from New Guineans and the navy 
to carry out police actions and impose European control when and 
where the Company desired. In the Bismarck Archipelago the Company 
did provide a police force of thirty­six Solomon Islanders, but, equipped 
with antiquated Mauser rifles and forced to work most of their days in 
the Company plantation, the Company police force was no more than 
an empty gesture towards the problem of security. The gesture was even 
emptier when the Company refused to supply its own administrators,
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or those of the Reich, with a boat large and fast enough to transport 
the police quickly to areas of unrest.34
Europeans rash enough to live away from the centre of white 
settlement in the eastern Gazelle had to fend for themselves. At the 
fringes of contact beyond the Kokopo coast, the New Guineans 
remained totally in control until the end of the century. Despite his road 
into the Varzin Mountains, Hahl could not entrench German influence 
there because of the power and hostility of the ‘big m an’, To Vagira, 
who was in the habit of spearing anyone found trying to acquire 
European goods. On the north coast, the Kabaira people resisted 
successfully all attempts to punish them for attacks on whites, even a 
major naval expedition as early as 1886. In fact this incident was a good 
example of the limitations of naval intervention in German New 
Guinea. Five hundred men were landed from three warships in June 
1886 in order to capture hostages in retaliation for repeated acts against 
Europeans. Over several days they searched the district back and forth, 
only once contacting the inhabitants at close quarters and failing to 
capture anyone. In the following years fourteen Europeans were killed 
in Kabaira, and as late as 1899 the people were still resisting European 
encroachments on their land.35 The slave traders of the north also 
continued their predatory raids on the Baining people despite H ah l’s 
efforts, and unrest continued there into the early years of the new 
century.
Nowhere were the limitations of the government more clearly visible 
than in New Ireland before 1900. Hostility between coastal groups and 
Europeans had existed since the early 1880s over the labour trade. 
Besides forcible removals, occasional shootings and the indifference of 
some recruiters about returning ex­labourers to their proper destina­
tions, trade was carried on in arms and ammunition. This only 
aggravated the conflicts.
The New Irelanders took their revenge by attacking resident traders. 
Three Europeans were killed in various parts of the island in the last 
three months of 1885, another two were driven from their trading posts, 
while all of Farrell’s stations on the north coast were plundered and 
burned. In September 1886 Hernsheim’s agent, Hermann, was m ur­
dered by the Kapsu people because his predecessor had burned their 
huts in a drunken rage; H erm ann’s successor, Hoppe, shared the same 
fate in December 1888. In the area around Tubtub, another three 
traders had been dispatched by March 1890.36 Part of the trouble was 
the non­return of labour recruits, who had either died on the planta­
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tions of Samoa or extended their contracts; partly it was the desire of 
New Irelanders for firearms and ammunition with which to vanquish 
traditional tribal enemies; while several incidents can be traced directly 
to excesses and acts of violence by traders.
During the 1890s the deteriorating state of relations drove many 
traders out of New Ireland. By the end of 1891 only four were left on 
the north coast. With the New Guinea Company abdicating its 
responsibility for their security, these men were forced to rely on the 
infrequent visits of German warships or take the law into their own 
hands. When they did organise their own expeditions, the New Guinea 
Company promptly fined them for unauthorised use of force; if they 
waited on the navy, it invariably proved to be as inadequate a deterrent 
to New Irelanders as it had been to the Tolai. Before H ah l’s arrival, only 
one naval reprisal was in any way effective. In other reprisals, either 
detachments became lost, or never managed to find the right village, 
or the villagers fled into mangrove swamps where the sailors could not 
follow them.
Despite the continual pressure of the New Ireland traders for a 
hardline attitude, and the arguments of imperial officers for a small 
police force to be stationed permanently in the north, nothing was done 
in these directions by the Company or the Reich. H ah l’s arrival hardly 
helped either, in spite of his energy and good will. W ithout finance, 
sufficient personnel, or a proper police corps, Hahl could carry law and 
order only as far as his whale boat would take him. In 1899 the situation 
away from the east coast of the Gazelle Peninsula was the same as it had 
been two decades before: it fell to individuals to ensure their own safety, 
a task which many undertook with more belligerence than diplomacy.
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In 1899­1900, the Bismarck Archipelago sector of German New 
Guinea was still very much a trading colony, with more than half the 
export copra coming from trade with the New Guineans. Plantation 
agriculture was, however, expanding at a rate which would transform 
New Guinea into a genuine plantation colony by 1914. When the 
imperial government assumed full administrative responsibility for the 
protectorate in 1899, European plantations covered a planted area of 
2582 hectares; Ralum alone had grown to 1010 hectares. The New 
Guinea Company had earned 80 000 marks from cotton in 1898, and 
in the same year exported its first ten tonnes of plantation­grown 
copra .1 A population of 200 Europeans now lived in the Bismarck 
Archipelago, scattered from the Solomon Islands to the Admiralty 
group.
Albert Hahl was called back from Ponape in 1901 to take over as 
Governor of German New Guinea after the first Imperial Governor, 
Rudolf von Bennigsen, had resigned. Von Bennigsen was an old­style 
Prussian army officer, whose scarred face betrayed the number of duels 
fought in his youth. His formula for control of the protectorate was 
brutally direct and simple: expansion by pacification; and his short 
tenure of office is notable for several bloody campaigns against recal­
citrant New Guineans. A man whose sense of honour was absolute and 
unyielding, von Bennigsen is said to have resigned in a fit of pique, after 
Bishop Couppe persuaded Berlin to reverse a decision by the Governor 
not to sell land to the Catholics in the Duke of Yorks group, a Methodist 
preserve.2
H ahl’s approach to the job was more methodical and less openly 
violent. Though he too was convinced of the need to ‘pacify’ and 
‘control’ the population in order to attract investment to the colony and 
encourage expansion, his program was not designed to cow the 
inhabitants, nor simply to keep the peace and let development take its 
own course. By opening up the land and incorporating the people into 
an ordered administration, Hahl hoped to mobilise them for the
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developing economy, either as labour for the plantations or copra 
processors for the traders.
His plan was not as well articulated as Solf’s in Samoa, nor was it 
founded on a particular moral image of the New Guineans as a whole. 
Violence he regarded as an inevitable component of colonialism, a 
political problem not subject to clear­cut moral judgments or judicial 
decisions. Hahl considered that, in the long run, violence would only 
be eliminated by the growth of a sound administration, and by 
education. Thus Hahl preferred to treat individual acts of violence by 
New Guineans as acts of war, not as criminal offences, and his chief 
concern was to restore public peace and order in the quickest, most 
effective way.3 If this sometimes involved punitive expeditions or police 
hunts, with the threat of reciprocal violence, then so be it.
In 1901, after the virtual bankruptcy of Company rule, Hahl had to 
start from scratch. His problems were compounded by the continuing 
shortage of finance and personnel, and by the conditions of the country 
itself: the multitude of cultural groups, of languages, and the physical 
obstacles— reefs, swamps, rain forests and mountain ranges. These 
forced Hahl to concentrate his scant resources in the most advanced 
area, the Bismarck Archipelago, leaving the large plantation concerns 
under the New Guinea Company to carry out the opening­up process 
on the mainland. Outside the areas of white settlement and established 
sources of labour, Hahl intervened only when unrest was of a wide­
spread nature, and then only with a reprisal. Where direct rule was out 
of the question for some time, he accepted as unavoidable the death of 
individual white people if they fell foul of local tribes.
Such a policy meant that the G erm ans’ administrative effort in the 
Archipelago for the first five years was centred on the Gazelle Peninsula, 
northern New Ireland, and regional s tations in southern New Ireland 
and Bougainville, these latter acting largely as labour depots. Direct 
rule, based on H ah l’s original appointment of lualuas or luluais, was 
extended to all these areas, with a district officer keeping the area under 
surveillance and mobilising the inhabitants for government tasks. To 
give weight to his authority, and to impose control by conquest where 
tribes were at war, the district officer was provided with a complement 
of about fifty New Guinean police, drawn predominantly from the 
Solomon Islands area.
Administrative innovations after 1900 included organised public 
works and a poll tax. The former was an integral element of the direct 
control idea: in particular, the construction of roads was intended to
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inprove access to villagers so that they could be taxed. In November 
1903, a Government Instruction (Anw eisung ) authorised officials to 
co­opt all able­bodied men in the areas .of control for up to four weeks 
a year to assist in the construction and maintenance of roads, or to work 
on government plantations.4 By 1914, using this ordinance, the Ger­
mans had built a network of roads in the vicinity of all their main 
settlements, though outside the Gazelle Peninsula none of the roads 
stretched very far into the interior. In the Gazelle there were 209 
kilometres of road between the Warangoi River and the Baining 
M ountains by 1911: a series running north and west of the Kokopo 
coast linked most of the inland districts and reached beyond the Varzin 
to Taulil, while a proper shoreline road was constructed between 
Herbertshöhe and Rabaul. There was also a road from Rabaul over the 
Ratavul pass to Talili Bay on the north coast, and from Weberhafen to 
Massawa on the north­west coast, and into the Bainings.
N o t all these roads, whether in the Gazelle Peninsula or outside, were 
constructed with willing co­operation. More­or­less stern resistance 
occurred in areas where villagers saw no immediate advantage accruing 
(for example, in Bougainville), or where it was part  of a wider and 
deeper protest against white presence flowing from the loss of land 
resources (as was to be the case at Madang, on the mainland). The 
coastal Tolai helped build the first roads willingly enough, because they 
were paid for it, and because roads gave them better access to markets. 
After 1900, however, their attitude changed, particularly under the 
corvee regulations, when it became clear that they were being used to 
extend the road network mainly for the regime’s purposes. Their 
growing distaste for roadwork made the Tolai particularly amenable 
to H ah l’s second new measure, the head tax levy.
When Hahl introduced the head tax to New Guinea in 1906, it was 
designed to act as an alternative to forced road maintenance and to push 
more villagers onto European plantations. For this reason Hahl delayed 
its introduction in the Gazelle Peninsula at least six months, so that he 
could exploit free Tolai labour in order to finish his road­building 
program. Such was the Tolai dislike for the roadworks that Hahl knew 
they would gladly grasp any opportunity that delivered them from it. 
With their comparatively large cash reserves from trading, the Tolai 
would have no trouble paying a tax the moment it was imposed, leaving 
Hahl with insufficient labour to carry out his projects.5 His fears were 
well­founded. When the tax was finally introduced into the Gazelle in 
1907, the Tolai offered no resistance; even when in 1910 it was doubled
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in many areas from five marks a year for every adult male to ten marks, 
people continued to pay it willingly in preference to working on the 
roads.
Between 1900 and 1914 Tolai demand for consumer goods rose 
swiftly, and their material prosperity continued to grow. A district like 
Vunamami saw its per capita income treble during the period, despite 
rapid population growth. European­style businesses began to p ro­
liferate as Tolai took up carpentry, or purchased European boats, carts 
and horses to use as commercial transportation. Copra production rose 
steadily all this time, especially after the plantings on reserves like 
Vunamami began to bear; by 1909 some ‘big men’ were receiving up 
to 300 marks a month from the sale of copra. Up to 1914, four­fifths 
of the native copra produced in the Archipelago continued to come 
from the Tolai people, and they were responsible for perhaps one­third 
of all consumer imports into that area. By 1913 the value of clothes and 
textiles purchased by them amounted to 240 000 marks, and they 
seemed to have little difficulty in paying for the European cigarettes, 
tinned goods, clothes, even houses, which had become status symbols; 
several influential men were reported to have saved up to 10 000 marks 
in silver, one­mark coins.6
Progress and prosperity were accompanied by a selective resistance 
to the European economy. The Tolai still refused to accept wage labour 
on a large scale unless it involved an elite position like domestic servant 
or policeman, where a sense of partnership existed. Only those on the 
inland fringe of Tolai settlement offered themselves as contract lab­
ourers, in order to share in the economic opportunities which were 
lacking on the frontier. By 1910 a mere ten per cent (or 1095) of the 
able­bodied Tolai population were indentured as labourers or soldiers, 
and the vast majority of these were employed close to home in the 
Gazelle itself.7 The head tax failed to alter this pattern of economic 
behaviour, for up to 1914, at least, the coastal Tolai were prosperous 
enough to meet all the levies from their manifold enterprises.
Disputes over land continued to occur as European plantations 
expanded their plantings. At the end of 1902, Europeans claimed 
53 480 hectares of land in the Gazelle, only 5330 of which were planted 
with coconuts, coffee, cotton and kapok .8 Though a dozen land reserves 
for Tolai had been set up by 1902, eight of them around Blanche Bay, 
the basis of their existence was precarious. Hahl had to fight plantation 
owners for every metre and every tree in seeking native enclaves in areas 
where wholesale land alienation had occurred in Company days. Even
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when he was successful, the reserves possessed no legal basis, being 
subject to the continuing goodwill of the land’s European owners. For 
instance, on the Vunamami reserve in R a lum ,T o  Bobo faced constant 
pressure from Emma throughout the 1890s. Finally, in 1901, after 
appeals by To Bobo, Hahl had the area properly surveyed and concrete 
markers erected, by which time reserves in Ralum amounted to 1000 
hectares for some 2000 Tolai.9
Then in 1902 and 1903, imperial ordinances were issued in Berlin, 
giving colonial governors the authority to attach special conditions to 
the European right of ownership of native land, and to expropriate 
legally­acquired land from private persons in order to ensure to local 
inhabitants the possibility of an economic existence. By a regulation of 
July 1904, Hahl put the first of these into effect, probably using as a 
basis the agreement he had reached with To Bobo concerning the Ralum 
reserve in 1896. The conditions elaborated at that time, by which the 
Tolai were allowed to keep their reserves, thus became official policy 
and enabled the administration between 1903 and 1914 to set aside 
over 5740 hectares of previously­alienated land for the residence and 
use of New Guinean groups. In 1914, seventy reserves totalling 13 115 
hectares existed in German New Guinea.10
These measures did not altogether eliminate conflicts over land, for 
the rights of native users of enclosed land were not made hereditary or 
transferable, so that interests created by continued occupation failed 
to be preserved. Moreover, abuses continued to occur in the process of 
acquisition, especially in areas not under permanent government 
control. Officially, purchases of land for Europeans were made by the 
government after assessing a customer’s claim in relation to local needs. 
In practice, a company or group with an interest in a particular area was 
allowed to make an arrangement with the often inarticulate and helpless 
local people, and the claim to a sale of land was then simply confirmed 
by the administration. Official investigation and government purchase 
were all too often an empty formality.
The last great war in the Gazelle Peninsula, in April and M ay 1902, 
can be traced directly to the omissions of German land policy. It 
occurred in the Varzin Ranges, an area which, under To Vagira’s 
influence, had evaded German control and remained hostile to 
Europeans since the 1890s. Armed intervention was necessary in July 
1898, and two more expeditions were carried out within twelve months 
of the imperial takeover, after To Vagira had raided a neighbouring
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district and captured fifteen prisoners for a cannibal feast. None of the 
administration’s attempts to subdue him had been successful.
Because of the entrenchment of the large plantations on the Kokopo 
coast, those seeking to take up land in the eastern Gazelle had to move 
further inland beyond the borders of the New Guinea Company and 
Ralum. One such was a German planter, Rudolf Wolff, who in October 
1900 settled on 500 hectares of land purchased from the local ‘big m an’ 
To Kilang at the foot of the Varzin near Paparatawa, about three 
walking hours from Herbertshöhe. For a while relations with his 
neighbours were good, as Wolff inaugurated a prosperous exchange 
trade in copra with several inland districts, but in March 1902 To 
Kilang disputed the conditions of the original land sale. He claimed that 
Wolff was clearing an area not included in the agreement, an area which 
involved a marawot, land sacred to the ingiet society.11
This was not the first case of New Guineans in the area reclaiming 
land which they had sold in the recent past, so during the next few weeks 
Wolff joined with the Mission of the Sacred Heart, which was fearful 
of impending unrest, in trying to have the dispute adjudicated by the 
administration. Government officials, however, treated the matter in 
a dilatory fashion, seemingly unaware of any urgency. With an official 
survey of the disputed land being continually delayed, Wolff’s Tolai 
neighbours were becoming more and more antagonised by his failure 
to control labourers who were pilfering local poultry. Finally, when 
Wolff took the imprudent action of firing his gun to frighten off a young 
warrior who was a relative of To Vagira, the latter persuaded To Kilang 
that it was time to take matters into their own hands.12
First an ambush was laid to catch and kill Wolff but this failed, so 
on 3 April some two to three hundred warriors from the districts of 
Paparatawa and Tomanariki surrounded his home while he was absent 
and fell upon his wife with their axes as she bargained with them over 
a pig. They then killed the planter’s baby daughter and ransacked the 
house, taking with them thirteen rifles and 1000 rounds of ammunition. 
Wolff himself nearly shared his family’s fate when he rode up to the 
house to investigate and found a solid wall of warriors brandishing their 
weapons. Only by charging his horse through their ranks did he manage 
to escape.
While all this was happening, the Governor lay stricken and delirious 
with an attack of black­water fever. The Herbertshöhe administration 
was in the hands of a young magistrate, also by the name of Wolff. Like 
most of the colonial Powers, Germany lacked experienced adminis­
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trative personnel. Wolff was a good example of the authority bestowed 
on officers who showed initiative in the field; an example, too, of the 
effect which a single individual could have on the pattern of racial 
relations in his area of German New Guinea. Wolff interpreted the 
murders as proof of wide­ranging, acute resentment against white rule, 
and he suspected that some 1200 people in the districts of Paparatawa, 
Tomanariki and Viviren were involved, at least tacitly.13 Instead of 
mounting a quick police raid to seek out the ringleaders, as was the 
normal practice, Wolff responded by arming and releasing onto the 
Varzin districts 2000 labourers offered by white planters.
It was a decision which the Colonial Department later described, with 
masterly understatement, as ‘injudicious’.14 In fact Wolff with this one 
decision turned what had been a local incident into a racial campaign, 
a total war in which leaders of the Tolai finally rejected any idea of 
coexistence. Old inter­group hostilities, dorm ant since pre­contact 
days, were rekindled as coastal people fought inland tribes and New 
Irelanders and Solomon Islanders invaded the territory of the Tolai. A 
war of indiscriminate slaughter followed, in which innocent men and 
women were shot and missionaries threatened, the hostilities pene­
trating far inland to the newly­contacted Taulil people and reaching 
back to pacified districts where the lives of whites and New Guineans 
alike were in fresh danger; even pacified Tolai in reserves between 
Herbertshöhe and the Varzin showed solidarity with the offenders by 
signalling troop movements to them with d rum s.15 For their part, 
Europeans aided and abetted the reprisals because, in their eyes, the 
slaughter of a white woman and her child represented the ultimate 
desecration of the white race. Even the Catholic Mission allowed itself 
to be drawn into the fighting when the war threatened to envelop its 
stations in the more settled districts.
The war lasted into May 1902, with no quarter given on either side. 
To Kilang and To Vagira resisted fiercely, despite the superiority in 
firearms of the European forces. To Kilang was driven inland to the 
Taulil people, traditional enemies, who ambushed his party, killed his 
son and promptly cooked him. To Kilang himself escaped, but fell 
eventually in a battle with police near Paparatawa mission station. To 
Vagira, enemy of the white people to the last, went on fighting even 
when his own people were ready to deliver him up. It was not until 18 
May that he was killed in a gun battle with the police. With To Vagira’s 
death and over eighty dead and wounded, the Varzin rebels were finally
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subdued. Peace was formally sealed with the administration on the 
Empress’s birthday, October 1902.
There is no doubt the whole affair would have been handled 
differently had Hahl been at the helm. Total response was not his 
trademark, though once the campaign had become a general one Hahl 
showed no hesitation in using it to extend control over an area which 
had thwarted him for some years. As a result of the victory, the Germans 
placed a police post at Paparatawa, confiscated half the district land, 
and constructed a road from the Varzin to Weberhafen on the north 
coast, thus opening up the ranges and incorporating the Varzin into the 
regional organisation. By 1904 they could claim to have the entire 
one­language area of the northern Gazelle Peninsula in their control, 
with 107 districts organised under government luluais.1G
N ow  only one area of European settlement in the northern Gazelle 
remained beyond the direct supervision of Herbertshöhe. This was the 
Baining Mountains in the north­west, and here, two years after the 
Varzin war, an incident occurred which showed up the fragility of 
German notions of control, even when an area was formally within the 
regional organisation. The Baining M ountains had been opened up 
only in the late 1890s by the New Guinea Company and the Catholic 
Mission, the Company with an experimental plantation at Massawa­ 
hafen and the mission with 500 hectares at Weberhafen. The Catholics 
also had sponsored H ah l’s anti­slavery raids in the 1890s, and were 
heavily involved in the ‘pacification’ of the area. By 1900 the coast, to 
all appearances, was peaceful, with four mission stations in the region. 
One of them was St Paul, an artificial village among the Baining people, 
some hours inland from Massawahafen and the furthest point of 
German contact from the north coast.
St Paul was founded as the Sacred Heart Mission’s first ‘industrial 
village’, in which slaves and orphans adopted and educated at 
Vunapope were gathered together with land and tools, and expected 
to function as cells of Christian peasant­farmers and artisans amongst 
their heathen compatriots. One of their number in St Paul was a Baining 
man, To Marias, who, after fourteen years as a ward of the mission, 
found himself at variance with Church policy and alienated from the 
way of life now expected of him. To Marias wanted to divorce his wife, 
a mission convert, in order to marry his lover Sa Vanut, who was 
already wife to another man. When the Director of St Paul, Father 
M atthäus Rascher, refused to sanction the divorce, the two lovers fled 
to To M arias’s adoptive father, ‘big m an’ in a nearby village. At
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Rascher’s behest, both were brought back to St Paul on the end of a 
rope, where Rascher proceeded to beat To Marias for his sins while a 
nun dealt the same punishment to Sa V anut.17
The incident only brought to the boil the mood of desperation among 
a small group of the Bainings. N ot all the redeemed slaves welcomed 
the new order of things— the European dwellings, the precepts of 
Christian morality, the Western work ethic and the paternalism of a 
priestly regime. To To Marias in particular the ‘industrial village’ 
represented pain and humiliation. Whether he also saw it as an 
unwarranted deviation from the life the Baining people had always led; 
whether he regarded Rascher as a powerful rival who had to be 
eliminated if he himself were to stake a claim to authority over the area, 
is not clear. Certainly the mission stood in the way of To M arias’s 
freedom and independence. But the discontent went beyond To 
M arias’s particular grievances. Threats of violence had already been 
made by other Bainings against the mission in 1901, for, in setting up 
a large plantation at Weberhafen, it had tended to divert traditional 
market exchanges on the coast in its direction and away from the 
Baining people, who depended on coastal markets for their fish and 
trade goods.
M atthäus Rascher himself must bear some of the responsibility for 
worsening relations. An autocratic disciplinarian who tolerated no 
opposition, nor suffered fools gladly, Rascher was not popular even 
among his own mission confreres. Rascher clashed several times with 
Bishop Couppe, for instance, who was also a man who liked to get his 
own way. Numbers of Rascher’s colleagues regarded him as obstinate, 
impatient and distant, though these may have been simply the outward 
shortcomings of a man whose superior attainments lifted him above his 
fellow workers. Albert H a ’hl admired Rascher’s pioneering spirit, and 
respected greatly the work he had put into learning the language and 
customs of the Baining people. But Hahl, too, considered Rascher 
rather too complacent, particularly where his authority with the 
Bainings was concerned.18
The Bainings themselves had their own reasons for disliking Rascher. 
N ot only was he given to administering beatings for all sorts of failures 
in his little flock, but he also organised the much­disliked public road 
works for the area. Thus he faced the added danger of being identified 
more with the secular government and its demands than with the 
disinterested aims of the Catholic Mission. Rascher did not believe that 
the Baining people could give any serious trouble. In his pioneer
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gram m ar of the Baining language, he wrote that the Bainings were 
'more unwarlike, more irresolute, more untalented and undeveloped 
than the coastal inhabitants’.19 Even after signs of sullen hostility had 
been evident for some time and the first rumours of a plot against his 
life became common knowledge, Rascher refused the Governor’s offer 
of a police detachment for protection until things cooled down. All this 
suggests that the priest was naive about the extent of his authority, and 
guilty, in H ah l’s words, of a ‘lapse in intellect rather than an infringe­
ment of morality or law’.20
The lapse was to cost him dear, for To Marias was fashioning a 
conspiracy against his life. Where Christianity hung lightly on New 
Guinean shoulders, more as a socio­economic alliance than as the 
product of inner conviction, Rascher’s determination to preserve the 
Catholic ideal of marriage was hardly likely to be accepted with 
equanimity. Soon after his detention and punishment, To Marias had 
planned to attack the mission station on 7 August 1904, but the attack 
had to be put off at the last moment because of the arrival of the New 
Guinea Com pany plantation manager, who was well armed. The 
opportunity  came again on 13 August. On that morning, after break­
fast, as was his wont, To Marias asked for Rascher’s rifle in order to 
shoot pigeons for the mission’s kitchen. While Rascher, feeling unwell, 
lay on his bed, To Marias stole up to the priest’s window and shot him 
in the stomach. It was the signal for the conspirators to fall upon the 
rest of the missionaries. Three brothers and five sisters were cut down 
with axes as they went about their daily tasks; at the same time on a 
lonely station at Nacharunep some kilometres west of St Paul, Baining 
people murdered a Trappist monk, Father Rutten, as he sat reading his 
breviary. Those Bainings who were regarded as particular supporters 
of the priests were also killed, though several managed to escape to the 
coast and raise the alarm.
The importance of this episode lies less in the fact that some New 
Guineans were unhappy with the trappings of European rule than in 
the way it exposes the tenuous control which the Germans exercised 
over New Guineans in the early 1900s, even in an area comparatively 
long settled and formally included in the regional organisation. When 
the report of the massacre reached Herbertshöhe on 14 August, Hahl 
and most of his executive officers were absent on patrolling duty in the 
far reaches of the protectorate; there were only twenty police at 
Herbertshöhe itself. The immediate dispatch of sixteen of these to the 
north left the centre of the colony without any administrative leadership
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or security forces. At the same time, labourers on a European plantation 
on the north­east coast made plain the uneasiness between whites and 
New Guineans at large when, on learning what had occurred, they 
wanted to cease work ‘because all the whites were dead’.21 When Hahl 
returned and could divert more police to the area, it still took a month 
of regular expeditions into the Kara range and the Krau valley, where 
the insurrection was centred, before the rebels were suppressed. M any 
of them came from the village of To M arias’s adoptive father, and at 
least fifteen were killed in encounters with the administration’s forces, 
among them To Marias himself whose head was taken triumphantly 
to the coast. Seven of the participants in the massacre were eventually 
hanged, while more than twenty were given long prison sentences. In 
death the rebels achieved a small, if bizarre, victory over Hahl, for he 
was indiscreet enough to pack off the heads of three of the executed 
Bainings to Freiburg University for ‘scientific examinations’, for which 
he was roundly condemned by almost the entire German press.
Recriminations followed the Baining massacre thick and fast. 
Newspapers in Australia and in Germany made it front page news for 
days, and friends and enemies of Catholicism speculated endlessly 
about the reasons for the slaughter. The Superiors of the Sacred Heart 
Order themselves were understandably anxious to play down the role 
of Rascher in the affair, and the Provincial of the New Guinea Mission, 
Father Linckens, argued defensively that the massacre was a case of 
racial hatred, an episode in the black­versus­white struggle in German 
New Guinea.22
Hahl would have none of it. He refused to consider the attack as more 
than an act of violence directed against the immediate cause of 
resentment; a limited affair carried through by a small unrepresentative 
group of the Bainings. The time he toök to ferret out the murderers and 
bring them to justice makes this clear: Hahl wanted no repetition of the 
Varzin war in 1902.
This was not the last of the trouble in the ‘industrial villages’ of the 
Baining Mountains. There was a revival of hostility in 1905 when the 
priests took local children away to school without their parents’ 
knowledge or consent. And in 1911 the mission once more received a 
threat from a local ‘big m an’. Government troops made several more 
forays into the area after 1904, but by and large the north­west Bainings 
were much more tightly organised by the time war broke out in 1914, 
and sufficiently ‘pacified’ for 200 local people to be working on 
government projects and private plantations.23
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The Baining massacre was the last major collision on the Gazelle 
Peninsula, and with its resolution the problem of physical security 
receded into the memory of a frontier past for most of the planters in 
the Gazelle. Questions of economic development, of finding more and 
more New Guinean labour for the plantations had been urgent before 
1904, and now they became the major issue in the settled areas. Hahl 
had already moved to strengthen the planting economy by exerting 
control over proven recruiting grounds outside the Gazelle Peninsula. 
The first choice for a new government settlement from which to carry 
this through fell naturally on northern New Ireland, a prime source of 
recruitment for Gazelle plantations in the past, where by 1900 sixteen 
trading stations also flourished, plus two small plantation businesses 
producing 1000 tonnes of copra annually.
Early in 1900 the imperial administration established its first regional 
station there, at Kavieng on the north­east tip of the island. Under the 
iron hand of Franz Boluminski, a district officer whose fiery eye, awful 
presence and ruthless energy remained fixed in the memory of the 
population for more than a generation, it took only five years to 
transform northern New Ireland into a model province of empire, a
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stable, organised and easily accessible area stretching from Kavieng to 
Pinubit, 155 kilometres to the south. It was in northern New Ireland 
that Hahl first levied his head tax; the area also provided a steady 
stream of villagers to European labour lines, so that by 1914 seventy 
per cent of the adult male population was estimated to have recruited 
for European service during German times.24 Local European planta­
tions prospered from the surge in recruiting: between 1902 and 1914 
planted areas in northern New Ireland expanded some tenfold with the 
help of casual and contract labour from neighbouring villages.25
The success of the Kavieng station reinforced H ah l’s conviction that 
permanent government presence was the key to development, and it 
encouraged, too, the Berlin authorities to provide greater funds for the 
establishment of regional stations in other areas. In 1904 and 1905 two 
more were founded on the frontiers of control in already proven 
recruiting districts: N am atanai in southern New Ireland and Kieta in 
Bougainville. The pacification process in both areas proved to be more 
arduous and bloody than at Kavieng, and in the end the Germans could 
claim tight control only over districts in the immediate vicinity of their 
stations, though roads were built along the coastlines and luluais 
installed over a wide area. Even under these uncertain conditions 
economic expansion went on. By 1911 there were seven plantations in 
southern New Ireland, and by 1914 two large concerns in 
Bougainville.26 In both areas the native inhabitants were taking 
advantage of new opportunities by hiring themselves out as day labour, 
and by regularly planting coconuts to ensure an independent cash 
income for the future.
With these two areas under direct rule and at least formal control, 
H ah l’s attention after 1906 swung to the western half of the protec­
torate. This left the Admiralty Islands as the only large group in the 
archipelago without a permanent regional organisation, a deliberate 
decision because of the untenable position which the imperial govern­
ment inherited there in 1900.
The Admiralties lie off the northern coast of New Guinea. The main 
island is Manus, eighty kilometres long, with a maximum width of 27 
kilometres. It is by far the largest island of the group, mountainous and 
well­forested, with alternating steep coastal slopes and swampy bays. 
The other islands lie to the south of M anus, grouped in a semi­circle 
beginning in the east; the largest of these is Rambutjo. European 
activity during the German period was concentrated in the east of
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M anus and on the out­islands. The crescent­shaped Los Negros Island 
lies at the eastern end of Manus, separated by the very narrow Loniu 
Passage. Seeadlerhafen, where the Germans were to make their head­
quarters, lies within this crescent; so too do Papitalai village and 
harbour, and Loniu village, one of the largest settlements in the group.
The Germans found three major social groups in the Admiralties. The 
Usiai were subsistence agriculturalists scattered in small groups in the 
interior and were considered by the others to be a dependent and 
inferior lot. On the coasts lived the M atankor, who combined agri­
culture with fishing. The third group were the Manus, a truly maritime 
people who lived in lavishly­constructed pile settlements built over the 
waters of swamps and bays. The M anus were— and still are— great 
sailors, in the old days taking their giant outriggers into the west and 
as far south as the Gazelle Peninsula; only for sago, taro, beans and 
timber were they dependent on land dwellers. The three groups together 
were estimated by the Germans to number some 13 000.27
Contacts with the Admiralties had been many and frequent since the 
early seventeenth century, and by the 1880s the inhabitants had 
acquired the reputation of being particularly independent and wild. 
Cannibalism here was supposed to be the worst in the Pacific, and 
continual blood feuds between the M anus and the land dwellers 
endangered the security of most European passers­by. The Forsayth 
concern was the first to establish a trader in the group in 1881; 
Hernsheim and others followed in the 1890s. They survived only with 
difficulty, becoming the pawns in a series of payback murders carried 
out by different Manus groups. The M anus made a specialty of cutting 
off European schooners close inshore and then massacring the crew to 
get to the weapons store. These were then used to give one party an 
advantage in the on­going struggles between rival settlements, with the 
result that the victims in their turn took to plundering passing boats in 
order to retaliate with arms of their own. Six European traders were 
murdered one after another in the decade before 1900; in 1899 there 
were three punitive expeditions to punish raids on whites, all of them 
unsuccessful.
W hen the imperial government took over the protectorate only two 
German and three Scandinavian traders resided in the islands, and there 
was every chance that they would soon be murdered or driven out. In 
the circumstances, with little finance and no ready investment capital, 
with an intransigent population and a negligible number of labour 
recruits from the area, the Germans would not consider extending
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direct rule to the Admiralties in the early years. For most of the period 
the administration sought merely to contain unrest by occasional 
repression, a policy which proved more and more inadequate with the 
passage of time.
The first visit by the new Governor, Rudolf von Bennigsen, in July 
1899, set the pattern. Although friendly contact was made with the 
people of M ouk Island, von Bennigsen used force against the inhabi­
tants of St Patrick Island to punish them for repeated attacks on 
Europeans. Within three months of his departure, another three white 
traders and several New Guineans had been killed, and a schooner 
plundered. The reprisal for these murders was one of the most savage 
the Germans ever carried out in New Guinea. Von Bennigsen and his 
naval reinforcements from SMS Seeadler employed a minimum of 
restraint, raking settlements with machine gun fire, setting loose a party 
of Manus auxiliaries to plunder the villages, and then destroying the 
houses. Twenty­five people were killed in an initial assault on the 
inhabitants of St Patrick Island; several attacks on Pitilu Island off the 
north coast of M anus claimed another twenty lives.28
Von Bennigsen’s brutal methods failed to stop the predatory raids 
by these groups. Until 1 9 1 1 a  major expedition to the Admiralties took 
place at least every eighteen months to punish the people for some 
misdemeanour. Another three Europeans were killed during that time, 
besides several Chinese and Malay traders, and their Melanesian 
assistants. Continued bombardments, police raids and the destruction 
of property had no lasting effect. When a warship appeared, a cunning 
system of signal fires from island to island warned of its approach, and 
guilty villagers had time to ferry themselves and their valuables to safer 
places.
In the early days, Hahl tried the expedient of stationing troops in the 
group temporarily, but without success. War­like villagers scattered by 
the police only became wandering raiders, and the M ouk­M andrian , 
Rubai and Pak peoples in the east of the islands simply turned from 
marauding the centres of European trading to terrorising friendly 
islanders in the vicinity; a hundred people were reportedly killed in a 
single raid on Ponam Island, north of M anus .29
W hat the Germans faced in Manus was not just aimless savagery or 
conservative resistance to change. It was rather a contact situation 
common to many parts of New Guinea. Patterns of hostility and 
alliance which had prevailed in the past among the various groups of 
Admiralty Islanders were now being influenced by the intervention of
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importunate, white newcomers, who claimed the authority to order the 
lives of all villagers and possessed technological marvels capable of 
changing forever the old way of life. The long confrontation between 
one M anus Islander, Pominis, and the Germans is a striking illustration 
of the New Guinean ability to exploit the new sources of power while 
giving precedence to relations with neighbouring groups of islanders.
Pominis was from Papitalai, on Los Negros, a shore­dwelling group 
of M anus people who relied on canoes for fishing, transport and 
fighting; who obtained meat from the sea, from hunting, from breeding 
pigs and dogs, and from cannibalism; and who traded frequently with 
other M anus communities in coconut oil, dogs’ teeth and clay pots. In 
the early days of German contact with M anus, Pominis seems either to 
have recruited for Herbertshöhe as a labourer or been taken there as 
hostage after a punitive expedition. Once in Herbertshöhe he became 
acquainted with the Catholic Mission, acquired an elementary educa­
tion and offered himself as a convert, ultimately reaching the rank of 
catechist. Sometime before 1904 he was returned to Papitalai, where, 
from all accounts, he began evangelising, built two schools and set out 
to educate his village.30
As the only educated, bilingual member of Papitalai, Pominis took 
the lead in adjudicating disputes with neighbours; perhaps the pos­
session of a rifle gave him added authority. When, soon after his return, 
Papitalai was attacked by its long­hostile neighbour, Loniu, it was 
Pominis who led a retaliatory expedition. Loyalty to freshly­acquired 
foreign ethics was of no practical use in dealing with such traditional 
hostilities, and Pominis was quite prepared to use customary methods. 
Unfortunately, from that point on Pominis found himself condemned 
by local Europeans as the worst kind of half­educated savage, branded 
as a cannibal and accused of organising raids on schooners.
In M arch 1904 the German cruiser SMS Condor arrived off Papitalai, 
and the captain ordered Pominis to go with him to Herbertshöhe ‘to 
be questioned’. Pominis showed himself willing at first, but at the last 
moment he was overcome by apprehension and retired into the interior, 
emerging only briefly to offer half his land as compensation for any 
wrong he had committed.31 His offer was refused, and a police party 
finally captured him with the help of people from Pitilu Island.
In considering what to do with Pominis, Governor Hahl, as was his 
custom, took a pragmatic, political view of the matter, rather than one 
based on a strictly legal interpretation of the charges. Hahl did not 
normally interfere in local disputes among New Guineans unless they
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occurred in areas under government control, or posed a serious threat 
to the reputation of the regime. In his eyes, Pominis, the catechist turned 
war leader, constituted just such a threat; he was seen as a political 
delinquent who must be removed. Hahl wasted no time. W ithout 
formal court proceedings, he convicted Pominis as a menace to public 
order and banished him to Kavieng for ten years.32
H ahl’s ‘political’ approach to such disputes enabled him to find the 
quickest and tidiest solution to the problems of inter­communal peace, 
but it also laid him open to charges of expediency and miscarriage of 
justice if his solutions compromised the interests of European colonists 
with powerful friends at home. The reputation of the Sacred Heart 
Mission was directly affected by the banishment of Pominis, for it had 
succoured him and trained him, and now his activities were being 
blamed on its proselytising policies. The tenacious Bishop Couppe was 
a fair match for Hahl. He would never let the good name of the Order 
be so tarnished. Accordingly, Couppe used his considerable influence 
within the German Zentrum spartei to have Pominis’s case reopened. 
It was not long before an investigation by the Colonial Department 
discovered that Pominis’s conviction had been secured in irregular 
fashion: no defence counsel had been provided, nor had Pominis been 
informed of the verdict against him.33 Hahl was rebuked for his haste. 
Pominis was released. Couppe could be well satisfied. Now  Pominis 
returned to Papitalai, this time as the thin end of the missionary wedge 
to sound out the possibility of purchasing land for a station.
Pominis’s case demonstrated, as Police Master Full concluded, that 
the administration could get its fingers burnt by taking sides in what 
were basically ‘native feuds’.34 But if the Sacred Heart Mission thought 
that, as a result of its intervention, Pominis was now their man, they too 
were mistaken. For in the years after 1905 Pominis became more and 
more a law unto himself. Visiting Europeans used his linguistic talents, 
and he became a valued guide and interpreter for government and 
private expeditions to Manus. New complaints against him, that he had 
abducted a woman from a nearby village and planted a skull on a stick 
next to the Christian crucifix in Papitalai, were an unintended testament 
to his growing individualism. Papitalai eventually became too small for 
Pominis, and, after quarrelling with the ‘big m an’, Songan, he agreed 
to leave the village and set up a new one with his followers on M okareng 
Peninsula. By 1912, when Couppe arrived to buy land, Pominis had 
achieved a leading position as spokesman and intermediary for his 
people.
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The Catholic Mission was afterwards to claim that, under Pominis’s 
authority and through his good offices, it had purchased some 500 
hectares in the Papitalai area.35 If this was so— and the Papitalai 
villagers were disputing it as late as the 1960s— then the Catholic 
Mission had been duped by its protege. For later investigations into 
land dealings on Manus make it eminently clear that Pominis had no 
such authority to dispose of land, since genealogically he was from a 
junior branch of land controllers in Papitalai; at most he could dispose 
of ten or fifteen hectares.36 If Pominis did transfer 500 hectares to the 
mission, then he did so without any reference whatever to the rights and 
interests of the real owners.
It is evident from these transactions that Pominis was by now 
independent of all his sponsors, traditional and European, without 
either his own people or the Catholic Mission being certain where he 
stood, or what he was up to. The first to find this out was the mission. 
In November 1913 two priests and a brother arrived at Papitalai to 
claim their estate and till what they thought was prepared ground. 
Instead they found a wilderness. Pominis, who was supposed to set up 
a house and plantation for the newcomers, was nowhere to be seen. For 
three years the priests laboured fruitlessly in Papitalai, the people 
indifferent to their presence and unaware that much of their community 
land was assumed by the priests to belong to them. Finally, in 1916 the 
mission abandoned Papitalai altogether and moved its station to 
Bundralis, sixty­four kilometres to the west, on Manus. Pominis 
remained a maverick to the last. While the priests struggled dispiritedly 
at Papitalai in the years after 1913, he lived at Mokareng as a ‘Catholic 
pagan’, the teachings of his youth all but abandoned. Only many years 
later, when his compatriots had all become Catholic, did Pominis return 
to the fold.
All this was in the future. The disorder and aggression which had been 
a marked feature of the early German period in the Admiralties 
gradually gave way to an acceptance of German hegemony. The turning 
point in the eastern out­islands seemed to come after 1905: at the end 
of that year, after three Buka labourers had murdered their German 
employer, the people of Pak Island surprised the Germans by taking the 
law into their own hands and killing the labourers themselves.
The next step was the extension of direct rule to the Admiralties. The 
first luluais were appointed in 1909, significantly enough on Pak. Two 
years later, a permanent government station was erected in Seeadler­
hafen; the decision to establish the station probably was hastened by
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the need to compensate for the exhaustion of old recruiting grounds. 
German law and order spread so quickly from then on that by 1911 
European businesses had begun to take a secure grip without the worry 
of warding off attacks. Hernsheim by then owned more than 980 
hectares of land in the Admiralties, nearly half of it under cultivation; 
boat building and pearling were two of the industries already estab­
lished; and the final sign of pacification was the jump in labour recruits, 
from a mere seventeen in 1905 to 823 in 1913.37
Manus was an outer point in the gradually­expanding economic 
frontier of German New Guinea. When war rudely shattered the 
colonial enterprise, that frontier, though yet slender and irregular, was 
outwardly impressive in extent. European businesses laid claim to more 
than 185 000 hectares of land, 34 190 hectares of which were planta­
tions under cultivation; planted areas had increased by fifty per cent 
between 1908 and 1912 alone. From a little over 2950 tonnes at the 
beginning of imperial rule, copra exports had risen to 14 260 tonnes 
in 1914; total trade amounted to 16 000 000 marks.38 Governor Hahl 
had mapped out a development program for the years 1914 to 1917 
which, under the benefit of large but decreasing Reich subsidies, would 
round out the local administration with new stations in southern New 
Britain, Bougainville and on the main rivers of the mainland; build up 
the police force, especially the expeditionary corps used to open up and 
‘pacify’ new areas; and increase government schools and health facili­
ties for New Guineans. Within ten years Hahl hoped to have the colony 
independent of imperial subsidies.39
This neat, European model of progress was, however, under strain 
from the New Guinean end. Resistance to German control still ham ­
pered settlement in the Bismarck Archipelago and on the mainland, and 
New Guinean self­sufficiency was proving an obstacle to the conception 
of development which Hahl and the planters held. To begin with, the 
extension of regional stations throughout the protectorate and the 
appointment of native intermediaries were no guarantee of complete 
German control. Though it was basically a system of simple, direct rule 
and luluais were little more than levers through which to mount police 
action or levy taxation and forced labour, the regional organisation fell 
short even of these modest goals in many areas. N o t  all luluais were able 
to gain the respect of their groups; and astute ‘big m en’ tended to avoid 
the office altogether because of the dangers associated with unpopular
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government demands. The Germans also had to deal with many cases 
of partiality, excessive zeal and ignorance on the part of their agents.40
The root of these problems lay in that these managerial positions 
were generally the first institutionalised, political offices in New Guinea 
societies, and cut across customary categories of leadership and power. 
Leaders of local groups were not the only instruments of social control, 
and what influence and policy­making roles they did possess were 
usually circumscribed. They could not and would not sacrifice the 
co­operation of individuals on whom they depended for daily support, 
by making demands in the name of a new abstract authority.
The other main instrument of mobilisation, the poll tax, also had a 
limited effect. Official figures indicate that the tax was paid fairly readily 
throughout New Guinea. Revenue rose steadily from 76 370 marks in 
1908 to 301 550 marks in 1914, and reports mention only minor 
resistance to the tax, probably because it removed some of the forced 
labour obligations to which people like the Tolai took particular 
exception.41 But the head tax was not generally achieving the ends for 
which Hahl had designed it, namely to force ever larger numbers of New 
Guineans onto the labour market and thus accustom them to the 
plantation economy. The coastal Tolai experienced little trouble 
meeting the tax from existing trade incomes, while, on New Ireland, 
villagers in both the north and the south were engaging in day­labour 
at local plantations to earn it, then returning to subsistence gardening 
and coconut cultivation in their home villages. Indeed, the head tax had 
started an upsurge in local coconut plantings so that New Guineans 
might enhance their own trading incomes.
The labour question posed the most serious of all the threats to the 
model of progress that Hahl and the planting community conceived for 
New Guinea. New Guineans, it is true, underwent much greater 
pressure to offer their labour to white planters than did Samoans or 
Ponapeans. In May 1913 Hahl estimated that ten per cent (or about 
20 000) of contacted villagers were engaged in some capacity in the 
service of the non­New Guinean population,42 a high percentage for a 
colony in New Guinea’s stage of development, with a people frag­
mented by topographical, cultural and social factors; in the Kavieng 
area alone more than fifty per cent of the male population had already 
recruited for European work.
These figures, however, only give an indication of the size of the 
economically­active population, those who participated at different 
stages in the European economy. They do not prove that there was a
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vast army of New Guineans assimilated into the plantation economy 
by 1913. In fact no recognisable ‘u rb an ’ work force existed in German 
New Guinea, no pool of permanent wage labour. Employment with 
Europeans was in general a temporary experience: the majority of New 
Guineans returned to their villages after completion of contracts or 
casual labour, and resumed subsistence gardening. Plantations in the 
Gazelle Peninsula were also suffering in 1913­14 from the preference 
of people in old recruiting areas to work locally. In 1913 three­quarters 
of all the recruits from northern New Ireland worked on local planta­
tions, and this region, like southern New Ireland, Bougainville and New 
Britain, experienced a relative decrease over the years in the numbers 
of recruits it contributed to the total labour force.43
Whether this relative economic independence would have continued 
had the war not intervened is at least doubtful. For the fragmented 
societies of German New Guinea were confronted by a growing class 
of pan­German planters, which could, and did, place considerable 
pressure on the policies of the colonial government. Theirs was a crude 
philosophy of colonisation: they considered that colonies belonged to 
the immigrant settler, not to the native inhabitants, nor to the local 
administration. They saw the ‘native’ as a negligible quantity, a mere 
commodity to be exploited in the search for profit; and they viewed the 
government’s first priority as protection of settlers, doing all in its 
power to help them achieve prosperity, in this case by securing more 
and better labour.
Inevitably these beliefs and their intolerance brought the pan­Ger­
man settler clique into conflict with Hahl, who sought to develop New 
Guinea with an eye to the people of the land and their future. Hahl 
appreciated that village New Guineans had a claim to just and 
sympathetic treatment, and to some protection against the conse­
quences of radical social change: hence his work to ensure that villagers 
in areas of wholesale land alienation should have reserves on which to 
fall back. He also fought to regulate the processes of labour recruit­
ment, for, with a practical sense of the colony’s future, he was concerned 
at the depopulation of some areas brought about by excessive 
recruiting. In 1909­10 he wanted to close the entire protectorate to the 
recruitment of women, and he periodically placed an embargo on 
‘worked o u t’ areas so that population balance and local economic 
activity would not be damaged permanently by premature depletion of 
labour.44
But in the end it was the size of white settler communities, and their
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ability to mobilise support back in Germany for their sectional interests, 
which determined the degree of colonial exploitation. German New 
Guinea had a European population of more than 1000 by 1913. Of 
these, some 350 were traders and planters, and the vast majority of 
them were concentrated around the centres of government activity in 
the Gazelle Peninsula and northern New Ireland. Giant companies like 
the New Guinea Company, the DHPG of Samoa fame, and Rudolf 
W ahlen’s H am burg South Sea Company (HSAG), possessed equally 
giant stakes in the economy of the colony. A branch of the highly 
nationalist German Colonial Society had been functioning in New 
Guinea since December 1903, and a Planters’ Society since mid­1904, 
while an additional pressure group was found in the Governor’s 
Council, though until 1914 it was subject to H ahl’s appointments and 
possessed no legislative powers.
Exploiting every avenue of access to the home authorities, the 
planting community managed often to impede Hahl in his efforts to 
protect New Guineans from the effects of European penetration. 
Because of their influence, Hahl was permitted to close only northern 
New Ireland and Nusa to the recruitment of women, instead of the 
whole protectorate. In 1913 the settlers’ unceasing demands for labour 
and the chronic shortage of finance forced Hahl to renew the recruiting 
drive in already hard­pressed areas, with the result that there were 
major outbreaks of violence in southern New Ireland and at Aitape on 
the northern mainland. Hahl was caught also between the conflicting 
pressures of competing entrepreneurs. When, occasionally, the smaller 
settlers found themselves on the Governor’s side against the interests 
of large­scale capital enterprises, it was usually the latter which 
triumphed, not Hahl. Thus he failed to get abolished the continued 
privileged access of the New Guinea Company to labour resources on 
the mainland, or to curtail the right of the DHPG to recruit labour for 
Samoa in the Archipelago.
Because of his attempts to procure equitable treatment for the 
inhabitants of New Guinea and to conserve them into the future, 
Governor Hahl attracted the contempt and genuine animosity of many 
of the planting community. When he left New Guinea in 1914 at the 
end of his term of office, prominent settlers bade him good riddance as 
‘one of the best hated men of the protectorate’.45 And yet, in their basic 
ideals and ultimate objectives, German planters were much closer to 
Hahl than they realised or were willing to accept. At heart Hahl was in 
sympathy with the needs of settler­entrepreneurs. Though he claimed
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in his farewell speech in April 1914 to have recognised the im portance 
of the relationship between the two races for the future of the colony,46 
it was not a claim based on an ideal of equality for New Guineans in 
their own land. R ather it was an admission, and a warning, tha t the 
prosperity of New Guinea lay in the G erm ans’ ability to tap the labour 
of the population by creating an ordered existence. Hahl was adam ant 
that New Guinea life and thought m ust be assimilated to that of the 
Germ an people if the Reich’s national ends were not to be subverted. 
W ith this in mind, it is easier to understand H ah l’s assum ption that 
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The New Guinea mainland’s north­eastern quarter was known to 
European explorers at least two centuries before German settlement. 
Tasman, in 1643, Dampier, in 1700, and D ’Entrecasteaux, in 1792­93, 
all touched at various points on the coasts north of the Huon Gulf. In 
1827, three years after the Dutch took possession of the western 
mainland, Dumont d ’Urville entered Astrolabe Bay, which was named 
after his ship. Until 1871 nothing came of these early visits except for 
a temporary Catholic mission station on Umboi Island.
In 1871 a Russian naturalist, Nikolai Mikloucho­Maclay landed at 
Bongu on the south coast of the deep and open Astrolabe Bay. Here, 
on land which rises gently for nearly two kilometres from the coast, he 
set up camp and remained for three periods of time between 1871 and 
1883. Maclay’s initial reception was far from friendly, for the local 
inhabitants were fearful of his fair skin, his clothes, and of the obvious 
power of the Russian cruiser which had brought him to the area. 
However the Russian possessed a new material culture which drew 
people to him, and his serenity in the face of hostility, his readiness to 
accept death for the advantage of gaining knowledge, finally earned him 
the respect of the Bongu villagers and of settlements along the length 
of Astrolabe Bay.
Maclay enhanced his acceptability by being prepared to make 
suitable gifts to the people, and to engage in the local system of trade 
and exchange. Visitors from as far away as Karkar, the wooded, 
volcanic island north­east of Cape Croisilles, came to trade for 
Maclay’s stock of steel axes and adzes, nails, mirrors, cloth, paint and 
the seeds of new plants. As a source of wealth and the master of new 
and apparently ‘superhum an’ knowledge, Maclay came to be revered 
as a tibud  or demigod. The New Guineans of Astrolabe Bay and the Rai 
coast further south seem to have had some experience of white people 
before Maclay’s arrival, for the people of Bongu and of Siar, a small 
island to the north, possessed an image of a land across the horizon 
called Anut, peopled by whites who lived in large houses, and owned 
iron axes and knives. Maclay was connected with Anut: New Guineans
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therefore concluded that he was one of its deities, come to give them 
the new material culture. Even after his departure, Maclay continued 
to exercise the patriarchal role with which he had been invested, 
pleading with the British and Germans at the time of annexation that 
the Papuans of the Rai coast should be left independent. When he said 
his last farewell in 1883 he warned the Bongu villagers about Europeans 
who might follow him, hinting that only those who identified them­
selves as his brothers should be accepted as ‘good’.1
The people of Astrolabe Bay were therefore ready for the visits of 
Otto Finsch in the early 1880s. He came as an exploring agent for the 
New Guinea Company, the newly­established German consortium run 
by Adolf Hansemann in Berlin. Shouting ‘Oh Maclay’ everywhere he 
landed along the coast, Finsch was able to make friendly contacts and 
buy land in the area, in particular, much of the landing area at Bongu 
and a 148­hectare forest section. In late November 1884 the German 
flag was raised in Friedrich Wilhelmshafen, a small but sheltered 
harbour some thirty­two kilometres north of Bongu, and a Company 
claim was made to the land surrounding it, which appeared ‘uninhab­
ited, uncultivated and apparently no one’s property’.2 By this time 
Finsch had already explored much of the mainland coast, discovering 
and naming the Sepik River (Kaiserin Augusta Fluss), Dallmannhafen, 
Berlinhafen, Hatzfeldthafen and Deutschlandhafen, and at all these 
points he had taken ‘unow ned’ land into possession, mainly to establish 
Germany’s claim to the area. As a result of Finsch’s enthusiastic reports, 
the New Guinea Company chose as the site for its first settlement, 
Deutschlandhafen (now renamed Finschhafen), a densely­wooded 
harbour sheltered by a small peninsula near the south­eastern tip of the 
Huon Peninsula. Presumably because of its geographical prominence, 
Finschhafen was expected to be the node for traffic from the north and 
east, but especially from the south, for the mainland (Kaiser Wil­
helmsland) was to be the scene of the New Guinea C om pany’s great 
experiment in planned colonisation from Australia.
The fiist party of employees, consisting of five Europeans and 
thirty­seven Malays, arrived at Finschhafen on 5 November 1885. They 
received an enthusiastic welcome. One old man clasped the captain of 
the Company vessel to his breast and greeted him as a long­lost friend, 
obviously mistaking the newcomers for manifestations of local ancestor 
spirits.3 On this understanding, the whites immediately purchased land 
in the vicinity of the neighbouring village and put up their houses. With 
gifts they bought the patronage of the ‘big m an’, Makiri, though
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unbeknown to them his authority extended only a few kilometres inland 
and was limited even in his own tribe.
The New Guinea Company initially was irrepressible in its optimism. 
The Directors in Berlin issued instructions to their first Governor 
(Landeshauptm ann), Admiral Freiherr Georg von Schleinitz, to set 
about opening up the land. Once coastal stations had been secured, 
expeditions were to penetrate into the interior of the island to determine 
its topography, note the amount of free, ‘unow ned’ land, and learn the 
language and customs of the inhabitants. Existing trade was to be 
protected and encouraged, and a system of roads constructed to 
maintain communications for the planned network of inland stations. 
The Company anticipated no real difficulties from the New Guineans: 
they possessed ‘neither the strength nor the will’ to resist, and the 
Directors envisaged a wholly peaceful occupation of the country and 
the willing co­operation of its residents.4
The colony was soon overrun by an army of officials trying to 
administer numerous impracticable regulations derived from Prussian 
civil and criminal law. There were bureaucratic absurdities and disor­
ganisation aplenty. The pioneers in Finschhafen found that they could 
not erect their tents because someone had left vital components at 
home; neither had they been supplied with any eating utensils. A huge 
machine to process china grass was sent out long before it was known 
whether china grass would prosper in New Guinea; it d idn’t. Company 
regulations as early as January 1886 fixed the price of copra, and tried 
to cover every possible contingency, even to the return of empty packing 
cases.5 Land purchase regulations were particularly unrealistic since all 
acquisitions, at predetermined prices, had to be approved first by the 
Berlin Directors, a process which could take six months; moreover the 
Directors insisted on retaining all subsoil rights. Land, and many more 
amenities, could be purchased in the Australian colonies at lower prices 
and with easier credit.
No attempt was made to formulate a realistic policy towards the | 
native inhabitants. From the beginning, the New Guineans were ! 
regarded as part of the natural resources of the land, to be exploited 
with a minimum of outlay. Ordinances were drawn up in 1887 and 
1888 to regulate relations with coloured labourers, but these were 
designed less to protect the recruits than to make easier the work of 
organising them. The first draft of the disciplinary ordinance composed 
in New Guinea in 1887 was an unwieldy instrument of 185 provisions; 
von Schleinitz explained away its heavy emphasis on corporal
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punishment with the observation that, from childhood, Pacific Island­
ers, Malays and Chinese ‘were accustomed to blows and other severe 
punishments’.6 One of its compilers had suggested that up to 200 
strokes a month be allowed for some infringements, and the m andatory  
death penalty for many others. When finally issued in October 1888, 
the ordinance was tempered somewhat by the Colonial Departm ent’s 
reservations, but it still sanctioned the reduction of food rations, 
confinement and floggings. The regulation was revised in 1900, but the 
attitudes which had informed it before then continued to find expres­
sion in the actions of white employers well into the period of Australian 
rule.
The Finschhafen people refused to accept lightly the one­sided 
relationship which these plans implied. At Finschhafen the local 
residents never provided more than occasional day labour, at first for 
the novelty of working with iron implements, and then to acquire iron 
themselves in order to trade with inland tribes for traditional valuables 
like dogs’ teeth. But within a couple of years of the Europeans’ arrival 
they became reluctant to work for them at all, out of fear, Makiri 
claimed, that they were contributing to the growth of the whites’ power 
and restricting their own independence.7 From October 1886 onwards 
the Company was forced to import labourers from the Bismarck 
Archipelago. Increasingly harsh treatment from Company officials 
alienated the Finschhafen people further. The foreign labourers from 
Asia and the Archipelago repeatedly abducted women and plundered 
plantations. But particular offence was given by the Austrian station 
manager, Julius Winter, who in 1890 organised a raid against a 
mountain village of the Kai people when they resisted his attempts to 
obtain a concubine for his black personal servant. The resulting 
destruction helped to poison relations among tribes in the entire 
Finschhafen area.
By 1890 local distaste for the New Guinea Com pany had intensified 
to such a degree that a black recruiter was murdered in nearby Busum 
village. On another occasion the Germans received quite a scare when 
all relations were suddenly broken off by villagers, and a fleet of strange 
war canoes appeared in the harbour. Gradually, the local residents 
pulled back away from the station, selling their land and houses to the 
Company. However, they continued to resist attempts by Europeans 
to penetrate the hinterland, for traditionally they had enjoyed a 
monopoly over trade with inland tribes and, since the arrival of the
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Germans, had become prosperous entrepreneurs through the flow of 
trade goods into the interior.
The Finschhafen settlement never prospered. It was little more than 
a collecting point for an army of officials who had less and less to do 
when the expected land rush failed to materialise. Attempts had been 
made at systematic agriculture, but they foundered on the hard coral 
base of the soil. Then, in early 1891, a malaria epidemic struck, killing 
thirteen Company officials and more than thirty labourers in a few 
weeks. Plans had already been mooted to move the Company head­
quarters elsewhere, so Finschhafen was abandoned for Stephansort, 
some 193 kilometres further up the coast, where the shores of Astrolabe 
Bay curve northwards.
The pressure on coastal inhabitants increased dramatically now, as 
the New Guinea Company moved into the area in a grand manner, 
taking up land which its agents claimed to have ‘purchased’ in earlier 
years. One agent in particular, Johann Kubary, manager at the Bongu 
station (now Constantinhafen), exploited the favourable impression 
which Finsch had created in 1884 to set the Com pany’s land­buying 
program in motion.
Between 1887 and 1889 Johann Kubary sailed the coast from 
Constantinhafen to Friedrich Wilhelmshafen ‘purchasing’ most of the 
coastline of Astrolabe Bay, an area of 32 780 hectares. M ost of these 
purchases were carried out in a cavalier manner, judged even by the 
standards which the New Guinea Company set itself. From the people 
of Bilibili Island, south of Friedrich Wilhelmshafen, Kubary presumed 
to buy all the mainland coast between the Gogol and Gum rivers. The 
transactions were concluded, not by careful surveying and the signing 
of contracts, but by Kubary’s sailing along the coast in his pinnace 
noting the names of river mouths and prominent features, without at 
any time landing; Kubary then distributed a trivial collection of trade 
goods to the Bilibili Islanders. This process was repeated with the 
Islanders of Jabob, between Bilibili and Friedrich Wilhelmshafen. From 
them, Kubary purported to buy all land between the Gum River and 
Friedrich Wilhelmshafen, using his boat to note features, dispensing 
trade to the Jabob, and then posting up a sheet of paper on a coconut 
palm to conclude the ‘sale’.8
In this way, for a mere 256 marks 90 pfennings in trade, Kubary 
claimed on behalf of the Company 5500 hectares of coastal land to a 
depth in places of 5000­6000 metres, land which neither the Bilibili nor 
the Jabob had any right to sell, nor any idea that in co­operating with
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Kubary they were doing so. For his part, Kubary acknowledged that his 
exercise had given the Company only nominal rights over the soil, rights 
designed mainly ‘to pave the way to a friendly understanding [with the 
people]’.9
Kubary’s casual business deals did not end there, for the purchases 
were not registered until 1896, a procedure which contravened the 
Com pany’s own instructions. Nevertheless the New Guinea Company 
moved in to take up the land of Friedrich Wilhelmshafen in 1891 and 
renamed the harbour area Madang. It encountered a small population 
of some few hundred people living in four major villages, Siar, Bilia, 
Graged and Panutibun, divided into patrilineal clans, and practising a 
simple root and fruit crop horticulture supplemented by fishing, 
hunting and trading. They were a people whose male cults, the m ulung  
and meziab, played a vital role in social control, and who, through 
common initiation, feasting and dancing, achieved a limited con­
sciousness of unity and mutual assistance across the four villages.10
The inhabitants at first accepted the German newcomers as rentiers 
of the small plot on which the first house was built, but when the whites 
began clearing vast tracts of land nearby, the ‘big m an’ of Bilia protested 
to the recently­arrived Lutheran Mission. It was to no avail: the 
Company insisted on the authenticity of its claims, and the occupation 
of the harbour’s entire foreshores was set in train. In 1893 occurred the 
first dangerous confrontation over land. Administrator Schmiele set out 
to erect a quarantine station on Oertzen Island at the edge of the 
harbour, where the Siar people had fruit trees planted and claimed 
fishing rights off the reefs. Despite the offer of compensation, the Siar 
refused to countenance any encroachment on this preserve, and armed 
themselves to take back the island by force if Schmiele persisted. In the 
end, with Schmiele, too, in no mood to withdraw, only the intervention 
of the Lutheran missionary Bergmann, and his threat to leave the Siar 
to their fate, stopped the Islanders from attacking. Bergmann was 
becoming an important intermediary in the mounting disputes between 
the villagers and the New Guinea Company; at least twice more he had 
to come between the Siar and the rifles of the Company police to prevent 
violence.11
To the villagers around M adang it was soon apparent that the 
German settlers could not be M aclay’s brothers from Anut. Since the 
Germans obviously possessed a superior culture— and firearms— the 
people contrived to resist them in their own way, by remaining as 
independent of the European economy as possible. M arketing produce
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and artefacts brought them a satisfactory standard of living, and they 
refused to enlist as plantation labourers, preferring work done in their 
own gardens at their own pace. They were also able to prevent the 
Com pany from restricting the prices they demanded for food supplies 
and ethnologica by exploiting new arrivals and visitors to the area who 
were willing to pay higher prices. In a certain sense, the Europeans were 
the economically weaker people in the 1890s, for they needed 
increasing supplies of native produce to feed their workers, yet they did 
not find a permanent or increasing demand for trade goods from the 
local inhabitants. A limited amount of iron and trinkets satisfied the 
M adang villagers’ needs, the surplus being used for personal­profit 
trading in traditional valuables with inland tribes. Moreover, since 
stands of coconut were very sparse on the central coasts of the 
mainland, there were few resources on which to base a trading exchange 
of mutual advantage. By 1893 the New Guinea Company was forced 
to look beyond M adang for its supply of contract labour. Between 1887 
and 1894 only about 600 mainlanders recruited for work locally, 
compared with the 2836 brought from the islands.12
The C om pany’s inability to mobilise a local labour force can be 
traced directly to its failure to extend political control ancf bring as 
many of the mainland populations as possible within the framework 
of an ordered administration by direct rule. Throughout the 1880s and 
1890s, the Directors in Berlin kept on insisting that the obligation of 
defence against internal unrest, as well as external attack, lay with the 
Reich, not the Company, and they looked to the imperial navy to act 
as a kind of mobile police force at the beck and call of officials in the 
protectorate. Several collisions occurred in the early years over the role 
of the navy and the C om pany’s right to requisition vessels for punitive 
expeditions. To solve the problem this was causing in all of Germany’s 
colonies, not just New Guinea, the Foreign Office and the German 
Admiralty in April 1887 set firm limits to the navy’s police role and 
issued specific procedural instructions. As a start, captains of warships 
had to give adequate notice of their arrival, while the Company 
Governor was required to make a formal, written requisition and to 
take all preliminary measures necessary for any military action. But the 
new regulations left to the navy, not the Company, the final decision 
whether or not military intervention was physically possible.13
Since the New Guinea Company in following years continued to 
neglect the question of an effective security force of its own, this last 
clause made further arguments inevitable, especially since in many cases
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the naval officer was forced to make a political judgment before acting. 
For instance, in December 1887 Admiral Heusner of the East Asian 
Cruiser Squadron refused a request to punish New Guinean villagers 
near Cape Lambert, since there was some doubt in his mind whether 
they had murdered a German trader. Heusner went on to reject a similar 
request against people at Hatzfeldthafen, arguing that it was probable 
that Europeans were to blame for recent unrest, and impossible anyway 
for German sailors to punish a mountain­dwelling people effectively.14
That sailors, even marines, were not equal to the task of hunting 
down New Guineans frequently made captains hesitate to expose their 
men and ships in punitive expeditions. Some of the earliest confron­
tations admittedly were bloody affairs, in one case so bloody that 
Bismarck suppressed its publication for fear of political repercus­
sions.15 But only rarely did marines operating on land inflict serious 
punishment on New Guineans. In most cases they had difficulty even 
making contact, as at Kabaira in 1886. One of the problems in bringing 
the power of the navy to bear was the relative immobility of 
European­trained soldiers in very rugged country and tropical jungle, 
where New Guineans avoided large concentrations and movement was 
along narrow paths where troops were susceptible to ambush. Jungle 
fighting was still a relatively undeveloped skill for European troops in 
the late nineteenth century, and German marines were continually 
hampered by their uniforms and cumbersome equipment, while mili­
tary formations were adopted which were more suitable to large­scale 
movements in open spaces.
Formidable difficulties accompanied the organisation of naval 
expeditions: native bearers were impossible to hire for more than a few 
days at a time; whites with an adequate knowledge of an area to act as 
guides and interpreters were scarce; above all, it was impossible to keep 
secret the preparations for an extensive campaign, for the report of a 
warship’s arrival spread like wildfire and the villagers who were the 
object of the exercise were immediately on the watch. Even if a naval 
raid were launched inconspicuously, the ship was usually so large and 
so slow that the victims had ample time to escape to the jungle with their 
valuables. New Guineans lost their initial awe of warships very quickly, 
so that before long even artillery bombardments did not overly concern 
them. Around Aitape on the north coast of the mainland, villagers were 
known to collect unexploded artillery shells after bombardments and 
rework them into sago pounders, and if villages were hit by shells they 
could easily be rebuilt. Perhaps the epitome of contempt for the punitive
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power of the German navy is best expressed in the words of a New 
Irelander in 1890:
W hat name you speak belong man­war. Man­war he all same one 
bloody fool, he no save kill ’em kanaka. He make fire house, never 
mind. He no save go bush. Kanaka he no ’fraid belong man­war. 
Man­war he come, kanaka he go bush alright.16
One man who recognised the inadequacy of the navy as police force 
was Fritz Rose, the Imperial Commissioner who virtually ran the colony 
during the interlude of imperial administration from 1889 to 1891. 
After surveying the New Guinea C om pany’s record, Rose felt acutely 
the need to start again from scratch, to establish shipping communi­
cations, to create harbours and landing places, to cut roads and to 
improve relations with the inhabitants. Above all, Rose could see that 
the protectorate was in for serious trouble between the New Guineans 
and the growing German interests, especially in Astrolabe Bay, where, 
as he put it, the people ‘feel themselves cramped; and ignorant of the 
existence of a regime which also protects their interests, they will be 
moved easily to arbitrary acts of violence in their distress’.17
Rose wanted to make that regime more apparent by placing New 
Guinean intermediaries in each settlement along the coast and in the 
interior bordering the mountains. He was the first official to press the 
New Guinea Company for a sensibly­sized police force and a sea­going 
vessel able to cover the protectorate; he saw plainly that the job could 
no longer be left to a navy restricted to short visits and coastal sorties. 
In the end, Rose was fighting for the establishment of a permanent 
imperial government as the one organisation that could tackle suc­
cessfully the problems of security and development.
Neither the New Guinea Company nor the Reich was interested in 
Rose’s solutions in the early 1890s. In April 1892 the Company 
returned to the administration of the protectorate, with plans for 
retrenchment. Several smaller stations were added to the list of those 
which, like Finschhafen and Hatzfeldthafen, already had been aban­
doned. Unprofitable plantations like Jom ba, behind Madang, were also 
closed down. The Company then turned to the north coast to develop 
the area’s recruiting potential, and began to encourage more positively 
exploration of the interior.
Exploration had been part of the Com pany’s program from the 
beginning. According to its 1885 instructions, the fundamental aim of 
scientific expeditions was to observe if conditions in New Guinea
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allowed Europeans to settle and work the land and ‘what modifications 
to domestic life in housing, clothing, nourishment and other matters 
would be made necessary’.18 Explorers were ordered blithely to 
establish the inland borders of German New Guinea and then criss­
cross the intervening land in order to choose sites for a network of 
inland stations. In addition, they were to keep exact diaries, in dupli­
cate, with daily entries on everything noticed along the way.
To those entrusted with the task, these demands were easier made 
than met. Inland expeditions like that of Schrader in 1886, which was 
ordered to report on the ‘geographical, botanical, social and economic 
situation of New Guinea’, were a failure from the start, because parties 
could not obtain New Guinean guides and bearers to take them inland. 
Because of the fragmentation of New Guinea societies, villagers feared 
to venture more than a kilometre or two from their homes in case of 
attack by traditionally hostile neighbours. Europeans who were able to 
find guides and bearers often found their way inland barred by coastal 
groups who wanted to prevent contact with tribes of the interior, for 
this would mean the loss of their trading monopolies in European goods 
from the coast inland. Other explorers were subdued by the sheer 
enormity of terrain and climatic difficulties: the ill­fated O tto  Ehlers 
and his men were reduced to eating grass in their abortive attempt in
1895 to traverse New Guinea from Salamaua, in the Huon Gulf, to the 
Gulf of Papua. Ehlers and his German companion were finally shot by 
their own bearers long before they could reach civilisation.19
Coastal and river explorations were much more successful. In the 
early days von Schleinitz journeyed round the Huon Gulf, entering the 
mouth of the M arkham  for about two and a half kilometres. He was 
followed in late 1886 by Captain Dreger of the New Guinea Company, 
who also went up the M arkham  and into the Labu Lakes to the west 
of its mouth, in the process making a name for the whites as fearsome, 
unfriendly creatures not to be trusted because of their inclination to 
shoot when excited. Von Schleinitz then navigated the Sepik to a point 
above present­day Ambunti. In late 1896, Lauterbach travelled from 
Stephansort west to the Ramu River, then down the river to its mouth 
on the north coast, crossing a fertile, thickly­populated floodplain well 
suited to agriculture on a grand scale, and encountering fierce resistance 
near the river’s headwaters from a people who manifested no know­
ledge or fear of firearms.20
These discoveries did not, however, give the Company new heart. By
1896 the directors had decided that it was impossible to carry out
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Bismarck's original idea of Kolonialpolitik under Chartered Rule, at 
least for New Guinea, and negotiations were begun for the complete 
and permanent transfer of political control to the Reich. The original 
terms proposed gave the New Guinea Company 100 000 hectares in 
land, a seventy­five­year monopoly over economic development in 
Kaiser Wilhemsland, and four million marks in compensation if the 
monopoly were surrendered, but domestic opposition finally reduced 
these to a cash compensation of four million marks and 50 000 hectares 
of land to be taken up by 1902. The New Guinea Company finally 
relinquished control in 1899.21 To that date the Com pany’s record, 
whether of profit or administration, was an unenviable one.
Economically, the firm’s achievements on the mainland were con­
fined to the planting of some 60 000 coconut trees, only a small 
proportion of which were bearing, and the export of a small amount 
of copra and inferior tobacco, 147 tonnes and thirty tonnes respec­
tively, in the year to April 1899. Compared with the Bismarck Archi­
pelago, which exported 3567 tonnes of copra the same year, Kaiser 
Wilhelmsland was a commercial flop. As Heinrich Schnee, Imperial 
Magistrate from 1898 to 1900 declared cynically, the Archipelago was 
‘the only place where the New Guinea Company got a plus’, having 
already earned a profit of 25 000 marks on its initial investment.22
On the mainland, the Germans had established a small foothold on 
the coast, concentrated in Astrolabe Bay where plantations had risen 
and fallen in the last decade of the century. Except for one station on 
the north coast and a few on offshore islands, the Company had been 
driven from its other attempted settlements. Fewer than 100 Europeans 
were yet settled in Kaiser Wilhelmsland. Of rivers, only the mouths of 
the M arkham, the Gogol and the Ramu had been explored, while the 
Sepik had been navigated but in no way ‘opened up ’. In 1899 the 
interior was still a vast unknown, and the Germans were ignorant of 
what lay more than one hour from most of their stations. Little or no 
attempt had been made to provide the prerequisites of development: 
there were no public roads, no health stations, no definitive maps of 
land or sea routes. Furthermore, European security was still an 
uncertain factor in areas where New Guineans had suffered massive 
land alienation or abuses from the Company employees. Three 
instances of violence, including the murder of two Lutheran mission­
aries, fourteen Melanesians and a white trader at Hatzfeldthafen in 
1891, were still unpunished in 1899.
No doubt the climate and topography of the mainland were very real
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impediments to development for the New Guinea Company, as was the 
sparseness of the population in the areas settled. But the firm’s lack of 
experience in Charter imperialism, its ill­judged alienation of land, 
particularly around Madang, its indiscriminate and erratic retaliation 
against New Guineans, and its refusal to establish a viable system of 
internal security were all larger reasons for the Com pany’s failure.
M ost of all, the Company had ignored the New Guineans themselves 
as a variable in the equation of profits. The Directors sitting in Berlin 
considered as automatic and inevitable the ‘native’s’ conversion to the 
philosophy and aspirations of European capitalism, so no definable 
program was drawn up to encourage a permanent economic alliance 
by protecting the land and culture of local groups, by redressing their 
grievances, or by making more equitable use of New Guinean labour. 
It was a short­sighted policy, for in the final analysis profits depended 
on the continuous availability of labour and the acquiescence of 
mainland New Guineans in a cash economy. Between 1895 and July 
1898 the C om pany’s workforce on the mainland dropped from 2000 
to 735, and the majority of these were labourers imported from 
South­East Asia. The number of contract labourers in the plantation 
district the same year was 695, only 414 of whom were New Guineans, 
mostly from the Bismarck Archipelago.2 ’ By passive and active resis­
tance, the local inhabitants helped to foil the New Guinea Com pany’s 
ambitions on the mainland.
The Missions in Kaiser Wilhelmsland
By 1899 three Christian missions were operating on the mainland. 
Because they provide a dramatic contrast to the Company both in their 
motivation and in their acceptance by New Guineans, they deserve 
separate treatment.
Johann Flierl arrived at Finschhafen from Australia in July 1886 to 
found the Lutheran Neuendettelsau Mission to the new protectorate. 
Mission participation in the colonisation of New Guinea was included 
in the C om pany’s program at an early stage, hut Flierl was the first and, 
for some years, the only missionary to overcome the procrastinations 
of the firm and gain its support for his venture. After living for two 
months in Finschhafen with the firm’s employees, Flierl established the 
first mission station at Simbang, a few kilometres east of the settlement. 
His reception among the Yabem people in Simbang was a mixed one: 
while they recognised the material advantages to be gained in the way 
of iron and various trade goods, they had the New Guinean’s inherent
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fear of the stranger and the outsider. Moreover, the villagers of Simbang 
had seen how the Finschhafen people were crowded off their land by 
the coming of the Company, and they regarded Flierl’s arrival as an 
extension of that process, particularly when, out of ignorance, he 
neglected to enter into any agreement with the owner of the land on 
which he settled.24 Only after numerous protestations, gift exchanges 
and a light skirmish with Simbang’s leading warrior was the station able 
to be set up.
The mission’s troubles were far from over. Because of the recurring 
hostility of the local inhabitants, the continued existence of the Simbang 
station remained in doubt for the first year, and only the close proximity 
of the Company saved Flierl from being driven out. The people showed 
a contemptuous indifference to his teachings, regarding him either as 
a trader or a rich philanthropist, and he suffered a great deal from thefts 
of his belongings. Only very slowly, as Flierl adopted a conscious policy 
of setting himself apart from Company employees and their actions, did 
he come to be regarded as a singular type of white man: Flierl went 
about unarmed; he would not trade for profit; he diligently learned the 
local language; and he offered himself as advocate in the peoples’ 
disputes with the Company over land, labour and women. Sensitive to 
local mores and the fears which the villagers had of being pushed out 
by the white people, Flierl had early recognised that the Com pany’s 
station manager at Finschhafen, Julius Winter, was a direct threat to 
the possibility of coexistence with the Finschhafen people, and he joined 
in a campaign with Fritz Rose to have Winter removed.25 By the time 
the Company abandoned Finschhafen in 1891, Flierl and the three 
German companions who by now were with him, had gained accep­
tance among the people of the Finschhafen coast, though the latter had 
as yet manifested no desire for conversion.
Isolation after 1891 brought its own rewards. The mission’s activities 
were no longer compromised by the presence of a commerical enterprise 
and the actions of men whose primary aim was profit. With a secure 
base on the coast, Flierl now attempted to expand into the hinterland 
of Finschhafen. His success was limited at first because of perennial 
village divisions which stopped him from obtaining bearers willing to 
penetrate the interior of the Huon Peninsula. In 1892 he did reach an 
inland plateau 610 metres above sea level and some nineteen kilometres 
north­west of Simbang, which had been discovered by the Schrader 
expedition in 1886 and named the Sattelberg. Here Flierl built his first 
inland station, taking care this time to build well away from the local
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village so as to avoid arousing its resentment. Sattelberg, too, had to 
withstand the ordeal of acceptance, and thefts of Flierl’s belongings 
grew to such proportions that he was forced to construct a palisade 
around the station and equip himself with a rifle. The new station was 
particularly resented by those people living between the coast and the 
plateau, since it destroyed their control over the movement of European 
goods into the interior, and by their constant raids on Flierl’s supply 
trains they finally forced him to seek out another, more difficult and 
circuitous route to Sattelberg.
On the other hand, the inhabitants of Sattelberg itself quickly 
reconciled themselves to the station as a regular and more profitable 
pipeline for the supply of iron, beads and cloth. Though Flierl knew that 
he was regarded as ‘a good but stupid man, endlessly rich and, as a 
stranger, without any rights’,26 he gradually earned the respect of the 
villagers by insisting on reciprocity for every service he performed, and 
by showing himself prepared to shoot anyone who attempted to burgle 
the station. In his desire to establish a reputation as a man of authority 
and determination Flierl was prepared to use the threat of force against 
stealing, though in general he rejected force as an instrument of 
persuasion. By 1893 so considerable had his influence become among 
the people of Sattelberg that they were prepared to leave their weapons 
at home and trust in Flierl’s rifle on mission trips to the coast.27
The mission’s control, however, remained limited well into the 
1900s. Its area of influence in the hinterland depended solely on local 
toleration of its presence, on co­operation in providing bearers and 
guides, and it did not succeed for some time in preventing wars and 
cannibalism, or in countering the fear of sorcery. By 1900 the Neuen­ 
dettelsau Mission could boast of only two adult converts, but it was 
infiltrating villages near Sattelberg with New Guinean youths who had 
accepted work and limited instruction on the mission station and who 
were carrying the mission’s message back to the village.28 It had also 
advanced much further into the territory and lives of New Guineans 
than had the New Guinea Com pany to that date.
To the other Lutheran mission in Kaiser Wilhelmsland, the Rhein­
ische Missions Gesellschaft (Rhenish Mission), New Guinea was a 
stumbling block for many years, and its relations with the inhabitants 
and with other Europeans were far from harmonious. The first mis­
sionaries, Thomas and Eich, arrived in Finschhafen in 1887 only after 
protracted negotiations with the New Guinea Company. Eich surveyed 
Hatzfeldthafen as a site for a first mission settlement, but the hostility
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of the villagers persuaded him to concentrate the mission’s energies 
further south in Astrolabe Bay. In November 1887, after the New 
Guinea Company had refused him land on Bilibili Island, Thomas 
acquired six hectares in the vicinity of Bogadjim, on the coast south of 
Bilibili, and the first station was founded.29 Now  began a succession of 
tragedies which threatened to exhaust the mission’s personnel, and its 
reserves of spirit. Missionary after missionary arrived, only to be struck 
down within months of beginning work. While the Neuendettelsau 
Mission went ahead with its program unaffected by deaths, the Rhenish 
Mission lost ten of the twenty missionaries sent out to Kaiser Wil­
helmsland between 1887 and 1895, more than in all her other mission 
fields combined: one drowned before he even reached Bogadjim; 
another shot himself accidentally; most died from fever.
From the beginning, the Rhenish Mission was apprehensive about 
race relations in the Astrolabe Bay, particularly when it became the 
centre of European settlement after 1891. The deteriorating situation 
between the Company and the New Guineans soon reflected itself in 
local attitudes to the missionaries. In their dealings with the people, the 
missionaries were constantly identified less as friends of the people than 
as whites seeking advantage for themselves and their compatriots on 
the plantations: their preaching voyages to surrounding villages, for 
example, were seen purely as journeys for profitable barter.30 The 
mission inevitably suffered from its association with the European 
community as the pressure on land and the competition for local 
products and labour increased.
Two Rhenish missionaries, Scheidt and Bösch, were murdered at 
Hatzfeldthafen in 1891, at least partly because they were identified with 
European expansion. A Company official and sixteen Company lab­
ourers had accompanied the missionaries to Hatzfeldthafen, and this 
stigmatised them as supporters of the plantation settlement which had 
been causing so much trouble to the local residents. It is also possible 
that Bösch had been indiscreet enough to display openly the large 
collection of trade goods he had brought: resentment and covetousness 
were a consistent formula for New Guinea attacks.
It was Flierl ’s private opinion that, in this case, the Rhenish Mission 
had been at fault in trying to expand too quickly.31 Indeed, the 
missionaries had taken every opportunity to penetrate as far inland as 
possible. Eich and Thomas accompanied the Schrader expedition up 
the Sepik in 1887; the plains of the upper Ramu appear in mission 
reports early in the piece; and missionaries often visited the Gogol plain
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inland from Bogadjim. But, in the end, the loss of personnel forced the 
Rhenish Mission to restrict its activity to a small crescent round 
Astrolable Bay and to consolidate its presence there during the C om ­
pany period. Attempts to place stations in the hinterland were thwarted 
by sickness and by the coastal New Guineans, who refused to share their 
source of special wealth with inland tribes by guiding the missionaries 
into the interior. Thus, by 1900, the mission had four stations and four 
schools in a fifty­kilometre stretch between M adang and Bongu, but 
only 136 pupils could be attracted from surrounding villages.32 As yet 
there were no converts. The people evinced no interest in the spiritual 
world of the whites, no sense of spiritual need. They treated the 
missionaries as traders or doctors or advocates, or rich men whose 
obligation it was to share their wealth. As Reverend Kunze reported 
ruefully, their attitude was summed up by a small boy who told him the 
missionary was there to teach strange songs and writing, and to bind 
wounds: it went no further than that.33 After 1900, this indifferent and 
simplistic view was replaced by a more hostile attitude to the mission, 
as it intensified its attacks on the secret male cults and festivities of the 
M adang coast area.
The third mission on the mainland was Catholic, the Society of the 
Divine W ord (SVD, or known as ‘the Mission of the Holy Ghost in 
Kaiser Wilhelmsland’) which established itself on the north coast in 
1896, at Tumleo Island in Berlinhafen. After an initial struggle with the 
New Guinea Company over the amount of land to be sold to them, the 
Mission of the Holy Ghost settled also on the mainland across from 
Tumleo, and, in November 1899, at Potsdamhafen in Hansa Bay. By 
1900 there were six priests, six brothers and four nuns on the north­east 
coast of the mainland, operating schools which taught over 100 pupils 
reading and writing in the German language. The mission baptised its 
first convert in March 1900.34 At that time, the north coast was still an 
untamed frontier of European settlement with a mere eight traders 
along a 320­kilometre stretch of coastline.
All three missions had contributed more to the pacification of the 
mainland by the end of New Guinea Company rule than had the 
Company itself. The Mission of the Holy Ghost could claim with justice 
that the firm’s recruiting attempts on the north coast would have been 
fruitless without the mission’s civilising influence on the inhabitants. 
The Neuendettelsau M ission’s influence on relations around Finsch­ 
hafen had the same effect in encouraging recruitment; indeed the 
Yabem and Kai from the Huon Peninsula were the only mainland
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peoples to recruit regularly for the plantations of Astrolable Bay. 
Mission activities had established the presence of white people further 
inland by 1899 than any Company station had managed. Sattelberg 
dramatically increased the area in which European material cul­
ture— iron, cloth, beads etc.— was known and used as a medium of 
exchange, and through Sattelberg contact with the interior was 
achieved comparatively quickly in the 1900s. Even in Astrolable Bay 
the Rhenish Mission had tried to encourage the local people to work 
regularly on the plantations. More importantly, the Rhenish Mission 
acted as a pressure valve for New Guineans in their relations with the 
whites. Part of its instructions were to press the Company to provide 
reservations for those villagers deprived of land, and to police the 
treatment of indentured labourers on the plantations; while individual 
missionaries like Bergmann on Siar, acted as ombudsmen for the 
M adang people, passing on their complaints about foreign labourers 
to the Company.35
Because of the missionary’s primary concern for the quality of the 
New G uinean’s existence, there was a conflict of interests with the New 
Guinea Company which occasionally resulted in a breakdown in 
co­operation. Both Lutheran missions were at different times accused 
of hindering development by trying to dissuade their flocks from 
enlisting as plantation labourers, though in the case of the Neuendet­ 
telsau Mission, with the number of local recruits, this was patently false. 
The missionaries were at times angry about the abuses practised during 
the recruiting process and on the plantations, such as deceptions about 
the length of contract, the brutality of overseers and particularly the 
frequency of sickness and death. These were ample reason for New 
Guineans to refuse recruitment of their own accord. One naval report 
in 1896 claimed that in Stephansort workers were dying at the rate of 
eighty a month. By 1898 forty to fifty Yabem people had died there, 
a figure which represented one­twentieth of the Yabem population.36 
Missionaries were, in fact, occasionally endangered by being identified 
in the minds of villagers with the death of kinsfolk on the plantations. 
As for the villagers of M adang and the coast southward, they were 
simply reluctant to tie themselves to the whites by contract. Outside the 
increasing loss of land which embittered them, the area supplied 
sufficient food, and trading, for a moderate and improved standard of 
living without resort to wage labour.
The New Guinea Com pany’s accusations against the missions were, 
in the final analysis, an unconscious tribute to the extent to which the
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missions had been effective in influencing and organising New 
Guineans. The new imperial administration, especially under Hahl, 
recognised that the missions provided a solid base on which to construct 
the model of development anticipated for New Guinea.
Race Relations on the Coastal Frontier 1900­14
Though the New Guinea Com pany’s privilege was whittled down 
considerably by the 1898 treaty with the Reich, the firm remained the 
major force in race relations on the mainland after 1900. In effect it 
retained the power to exploit and monopolise, without being as fully 
responsible for the political consequences of its activities as had been 
the case in the 1880s and 1890s. H ah l’s decision to concentrate on the 
Bismarck Archipelago in the first years of imperial rule only reinforced 
the Com pany’s predominance on the mainland.
The consequences were particularly important in Astrolabe Bay, 
where there was little love lost between New Guineans and the 
Europeans. M adang  and its harbour had become by 1899 almost a 
no­m an’s land for the original inhabitants; a traveller there the same 
year reported that most local New Guineans appeared to have been 
driven back away from the coast.37 This lack of rapport continued into 
the new century. Only during a drought in 1902 did M adang villagers 
offer themselves for plantation work, and then it was always for the 
more remote stations. They openly rejected the enforced government 
labour because it meant neglecting their gardens for a four­week period. 
Local roadworks were continually disrupted by people absconding 
from the job, and then refusing to pay the fines; in 1900 and 1903, 
police troops had to be quartered on Siar before the villagers would 
comply with orders to help in road­building.38
Resentment of the Europeans in Astrolabe Bay reached fever pitch 
in 1904, and every village from Siar to Bongu had grievances about 
European contact. With its reversion to a private enterprise, the New 
Guinea Com pany claimed in absolute ownership all the land which it 
had taken up around M adang, leaving the local inhabitants no rights 
or privileges except by sufferance. Hahl was reluctant to dispute the 
firm’s tenuous ownership in court, lest he thereby hinder the colony’s 
progress and incense influential merchant circles in Berlin, so in 1904 
the administration finally accepted the C om pany’s titular right to the 
5500 hectares which comprised the site of Madang, subject to the 
survey of native reserves.
Between 1900 and 1904, the firm’s land­clearing operations were
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intensified: the Scheering Peninsula and Kalibob were cleared and 
planted, and by 1904 plantations at M adang and nearby Jomba (which 
had reopened in 1900­01) spread over an area of 649 hectares.39 As 
clans (especially among the Bilia and Siar) lost all their land on the 
islands and harbour foreshores, they were forced to rent garden plots 
from other clans. Added to their shame and sense of deprivation was 
the general resentment at the enforced roadworks, the repeated 
punishments for transgressions of the white people’s law, and the 
desecration of totemic objects by road­building or plantation 
development. The Rhenish Mission did not help its cause by con­
demning the secret male cults as paganistic mumbo­jumbo and a 
profligate waste of time. The final aggravation was the rum our that the 
Germans were about to regiment local villagers even further by 
appointing district chiefs as agents of government.40
The people of Siar, Kranket, Yabob and Bilibili finally determined 
to put a stop to the encroachments of the whites.41 At a meziab  
clubhouse on Bilibili, in the presence of the ancestral spirits, the 
influential men of the four islands drew up a plan to kill the whites living 
around Madang. The Siar and Bilibili people were the ringleaders; the 
latter were the ‘patricians’ of Astrolabe Bay, whose potting monopoly 
on the M adang coast was being threatened by European expansion. The 
movement also included the mainland villages of Ragetta, Bogadjim 
and Bongu, though they were more diffident, and decided to wait on 
the success of the attack; in the end Bogadjim and Bongu defected.
According to local and European reports of the plan, Siar, Kranket 
and Bilibili Islanders were to cross over to M adang, enter the district 
office (Hauspepa) and seize the armoury of the native police before they 
had a chance to react. The whites would then be dispatched by a corps 
of former police soldiers among the rebel villagers. N ot even the 
missionaries were to be spared, for they were guilty of collusion with 
the whites, but to be sure that the white m an’s tib u d would not interfere, 
the conspirators buried a volume of the scriptures before starting out.
The plot was well organised, even to the lengths of an alternative 
strategy should it be discovered prematurely. In that case, each group 
would take refuge with the missionaries and try to convince these 
indulgent men of God that they were innocent. Ironically, the mis­
sionaries themselves were the first to know of the conspiracy, for news 
of an uprising leaked out to the Reverend Hanke at Bongu in January 
1904. He gave it no credence, but, when the rum our was repeated in 
February, Hanke notified Wilhelm Stuckhardt, the M adang district
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officer. Stuckhardt did take the matter more seriously, but so well was 
the secret kept that he could find no confirmation of a plot, and his only 
action was to arm the police on duty in Madang. When the revolt did 
come at last, on 16 July, it took the European community completely 
by surprise. Eighty armed men managed to reach a small bridge near 
the district office without detection, and since there were only 
twenty­six whites in the town, very likely they would have succeeded 
in their object if, at the last moment, their plan had not been betrayed 
by Nalon of Bilia, who was houseboy to the local doctor. Stuckhardt 
was able to restore order very quickly: the police secured their firearms 
and fired on the advancing attackers, dispersing them by land and by 
water; one Ragetta man was shot dead in the melee. Even then, most 
whites living in M adang remained unaware of what had occurred.
Since no European had been injured, and because he had no idea of 
the cause of the attempted coup, Stuckhardt did not treat the incident 
as war, but proceeded cautiously with an investigation. The fortuitous 
arrival of the naval survey vessel, SMS M oew e, boosted his authority, 
and by mid­August he was in a position to negotiate the surrender of 
several Siar and Ragetta ringleaders, who were promptly transported 
to Herbertshöhe; the Bilibili people had fled en masse to the Rai coast. 
At this stage the European community was still rather dazed by the 
swiftness of events and took some little time to adjust to their signifi­
cance. Settlers and officials living and working in the area had always 
been complacent about their security, believing that the M adang people 
were incapable of any organisation or secrecy. The sudden realisation 
that they had barely eluded death, and that the plot likely encompassed 
the coast as far south as Bongu, threw them into a panic. In mid­August, 
New Guinea Company officials circulated a petition, over Stuckhardt’s 
head, urging the Governor to take sterner measures against the guilty 
people.42 Since Hahl was in Micronesia, Deputy Governor Knake 
arrived in M adang on 16 August, and, after being subjected to further 
pressure from the settler community, he declared a state of martial law. 
The full facts were now dragged from the people, the complicity of 
Bongu, Bogadjim and Bilibili was established, and Knake there and then 
had six of the leading conspirators executed.
The sequel was particularly disconcerting to the Rhenish Mission 
which, with its first convert in 1903, had been optimistic that the 
obstacles of past years were permanently behind them. Initially, the 
missionaries had refused to believe that they too had been marked for 
the slaughter, and for a month after the attempt the Bongu and
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Bogadjim villagers encouraged them in this belief. Now their peoples’ 
treachery was revealed. The Reverend Weber on Siar learned that his 
boat had been drawn high up on the shore the day of the revolt in order 
to prevent his escaping; Hanke at Bongu and Helmich at Ragetta 
learned that they were to be struck down on their stations. Everyone 
was demoralised by the disclosures, for it was obvious that the mission 
had completely misjudged its position, and that the M adang coast 
villagers were as alien from them in their thoughts and motivations now 
as they ever had been. That the revolt took place in the same year as 
the Herero rebellion in South­West Africa, which was being blamed 
partly on Rhenish Mission policies, was an added cup of bitterness. In 
weariness and disgust, the M adang missionaries petitioned their Bar­
men headquarters to give up New Guinea as a thankless field of 
thorns.43
The M adang revolt revealed that the imperial government’s 
approach to security on the mainland was based on false premises. The 
people were not necessarily ‘docile’ and ‘good­natured’ towards all 
things European, and the large plantation companies, far from gua­
ranteeing security, had helped to undermine it through their unrelenting 
pressure on native resources. The government’s response was to extend 
direct rule to M adang at the end of 1904, with the organisation of the 
first village groups and the appointment of luluais; by 1907 there were 
eleven in the M adang district.44 The head tax was introduced the same 
year.
The Germans then focused their attention on the north coast, a 
thickly­populated area, where villages of 400 to 500 people promised 
a valuable supply of plantation labour, and where local acts of 
resistance had coincided with the M adang revolt. In October 1906, a 
full district station was established at Aitape on the west side of 
Berlinhafen, under Hans Rodatz, an early employee of the New Guinea 
Company. The coastal tribes in the immediate vicinity of the station 
resisted the new invasion so sternly that Hahl several times had to send 
Rodatz police reinforcements. Though the Aitape coast technically was 
subjugated by mid­1911, German control remained incomplete until 
the war, and Hahl was never able to introduce the head tax to the area. 
The Germans did secure the dividend they had been looking for in the 
first place: a steadily increasing number of labour recruits; by 1913, ten 
per cent of all new recruits in the protectorate came through the Aitape 
lists.45
But the mountain hinterland behind Aitape remained closed to the
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recruiters. In the constant feuding between coast and interior, where a 
trip to the sea could result in abuse, theft and murder, few inland 
inhabitants could be enticed to try the German labour lines.
Meanwhile, around M adang in the years after 1904, direct rule was 
proving to be an inadequate solution to questions of pacification and 
peaceful racial relations. Instead of beginning a new era of accommo­
dation and co­operation, the failure of the 1904 revolt and the loss of 
nine men (three more Siar were executed in 1904) led to several years 
of passive resistance by the M adang people.
The vindictive attitude of the settlers following the affair, and the 
continuing failures of German land policy, kept the largely­dispersed 
groups bitter against the European presence. The government had been 
quick to realise that land was at the heart of the 1904 uprising, and the 
same year Hahl signed an agreement with the New Guinea Company 
which provided for a proper survey of the Jomba plains and the excision 
of reserves for the people of M adang (one hectare per head of 
population). Moreover, the villagers were guaranteed fishing rights, 
their dwelling places, and the plantations they occupied at the time of 
survey.46 Unfortunately the ‘time of survey’ receded further and further 
into the future. It still had not been carried out fully by 1910, a situation 
which the Company in defence attributed to a dearth of surveyors with 
qualifications measuring up to government standards. Such ‘civilised’ 
niceties were lost on the M adang villagers, especially as they were 
regularly accused during these years of trespassing on Company 
property when they collected produce from trees planted before the 
C om pany’s ‘purchases’, and when they used traditional clay deposits 
which lay in Company plantation areas.
In response, the M adang people channelled their continuing resent­
ment into a frame of religious belief centred on one of their creation 
myths, and designed to rationalise the defeat of 1904 in New Guinean 
terms and exorcise its effects. In a subtly modernised form, the myth 
explained that colonial rule was the product of a stronger magic 
ordained by the deities. The white people had been given a superior 
material culture, including the firearms used to overcome the villagers 
in 1904, after the New Guineans themselves had rejected it in favour 
of their canoes and spears. However, the myth held out the hope of a 
better future, in which the deities would return to distribute the ‘C argo’ 
more equitably and enable the indigenous races to fight the whites.47 
In a separate version reported by the Rhenish Mission, the deity had 
assured several M adang villagers that the whites had misused the guns
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and bullets given to them, and that retribution was certain. To have the 
whites disappear from their lands, the people needed only to shake their 
heads, or have a certain Catholic priest ‘make a paper’.48
The common belief expressed in these Cargo myths encouraged 
passive resistance in the area for eight years. Until 1912, the M adang 
people reacted to continuing deprivations by obeying the government 
where necessary but obstructing it whenever they could. People in the 
coastal villages from Sek (north of Madang) to Bongu, and on Dampier 
and Bagobag islands, which were drawn into the administrative system 
in 1908­09, had to be forced to complete their labour on the roads even 
after the head tax was introduced, and ‘wearying’ police expeditions 
were always taking place to round up absconders. The government 
luluais, of which there were sixty­seven in the M adang district by late 
1911, found it almost impossible to have their authority recognised or 
German instructions carried out, and most had to be provided with two 
police assistants in order to get anything done.49
A good example is Nalon, from Bilia, the man who in 1904 had 
informed the Germans of the plot against them. He had done so from 
an opportunist, if enterprising, motive, because the revolt had 
threatened to destroy the privilege he enjoyed of riding to the Rai coast 
on the New Guinea Company schooner to trade. But his collaboration 
with the Germans did nothing to solve the crisis which faced Bilia, 
namely the loss of all its land, nor did Nalon possess any natural leading 
status in his village. The Bilia made it clear that they hated the whites, 
and had little but contempt for Nalon as luluai. In the end, his 
impotence forced the administration to appoint another in his stead. 
Unlike Nalon, most of the Madang inhabitants avoided contact with 
the European economy, continuing to reject wage labour for the 
European plantations that occupied their lands. In 1906, only 
twenty­six of the 534 mainland recruits of the New Guinea Company 
came from Madang, and two years later the number had fallen to eight 
out of 4 9 7.50 By that time it was an open secret that ‘away with the white 
m an’ was the catch cry of New Guineans around Madang.
Included among the whites in the minds of the M adang villagers were 
the Lutheran missionaries, who, despite their despair in 1904, had 
remained to carry on their work. Yet their influence grew only slowly 
and their successes remained modest. The first convert did not appear 
until the end of 1903, and by then the mission’s four schools had enticed 
only an additional six pupils in four years. No converts came forward 
in the year of the revolt. After 1904, the Rhenish Mission was hemmed
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in from the north as the Catholic SVD Mission occupied Alexishafen, 
while lack of personnel prevented it from breaking out of the coastal 
crescent from Bongu to Madang. By 1908, the Rhenish Mission’s 63 
converts compared very unfavourably with the Neuendettelsau Mis­
sion’s 1300, and the 1062 of the SVD, while in 1910­11 the number 
of Rhenish converts actually declined from 109 to 83.51 In 1906 there 
had been a dramatic turning point in villages removed from the 
immediate vicinity of Madang. It had started in Bongu, where the 
people reported to the missionaries that they had been visited by a 
strange ‘man from heaven’, who urged them to burn the images and 
instruments associated with the pre­contact cults and to carry the good 
news of peace and friendship to other villages.52 The Bogadjim and 
Bilibili people, who had returned to the Astrolabe coast the same year, 
joined in the movement, and there were scenes of confusion as the 
women, traditionally barred from the cult ceremonies on pain of death, 
were shown the richly­decorated masks, the carved bullroarers and 
whistles, only to cower in anguish and run trembling to hide.
None of this, however, made any impression at the centre of Madang, 
where the village elders kept up a belligerent opposition to mission 
teaching and its attempts to reduce the influence of the male cults. 
Significantly, the Cargo belief had affirmed the intrinsic value of these 
cults by referring to a deity who claimed to have ‘bought’ the cults and 
their secrets from the New Guineans and actually to practise them 
himself. The missionaries and the few converts were harassed at every 
opportunity. At Ragetta and Siar (the centre of the most bitter anti­
pathy), sorcery was used to try and induce the death of the leading 
convert, Malai. The ringleader in this campaign was Sabu, himself a 
former convert and luluai, who finally forced the Germans to remove 
Malai to Herbertshöhe for his own good. In 1909 Sabu tried to have 
the site of the village removed altogether from the vicinity of the mission 
station. Two years later, in 1911, the Rhenish Mission felt compelled 
to strike twenty­seven nominal Christians from its lists in the M adang 
area. Even Malai, who had been the pioneer convert in M adang and 
the great hope of the missionaries, failed their stern test of acceptability, 
and he was abandoned when caught in ‘pagan’ costume, taking part in 
a ‘pagan’ dance.53
The M adang people were astute in playing off mission and 
Government against each other. If services were regularly attended, it 
was only to maintain the friendship of the missionaries in case of a 
confrontation with the regime which the M adang people could not
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handle alone. Yet the New Guineans were quick to complain to Hahl, 
on his occasional visits, of mission coercion to abandon their cult 
festivities and of physical abuse by individual missionaries, abuses 
which were not always figments of the imagination. The Rhenish 
Mission suffered more than once from serious indiscretions by its 
members. The Reverend Helmich was guilty on one occasion of flogging 
several Ragetta villagers who were trying to undermine the mission’s 
position, and at another time he outraged the village elders by using an 
old meziab  cult instrument to chase pigs.
The worst case was that of the Reverend Weber, who was responsible 
for the permanent ill­will against the mission at Siar after the departure 
of Bergmann. Weber was young and impetuous, and a missionary 
whose commitment bordered on the fanatical. Suitably convinced of 
his mission to civilise and discipline the New Guineans, he once 
described himself as ‘a policeman on my right side and only on the left 
a missionary’.54 Weber took it upon himself to administer beatings to 
Siars, and he did not hesitate to chastise the German administration for 
its defects in front of his congregations. His behaviour was not only 
foolhardy but dangerous in circumstances where the inhabitants were 
awaiting only the right moment to reassert themselves. In fact, W eber’s 
acts were the antithesis of most of the ideals for which the Rhenish 
Mission stood, and in 1909 the mission authorities intervened and 
dismissed him from his post.
That did not stop events from coming to a head once more in 1912. 
Plantation clearing had been carried on uninterruptedly since 1904, and 
by 1912 the M adang people were crowded on all sides by planting 
interests of various kinds. North  of Madang, Sarang plantation had 
been purchased in 1910­11, and the Mission of the Holy Ghost was now 
solidly entrenched at Sek, with a plantation of over 1000 hectares and 
a workforce numbering 520.55 The mission developed the harbour 
facilities, ran a sawmill, and was in the process of constructing an 
extensive system of roads. South of M adang, the New Guinea Company 
was now free to develop the Jomba Plains after escaping litigation over 
their ownership. Berghausen, the zealous district officer of Madang, had 
tried in 1910 to establish the legitimacy of the original Kubary 
contracts, but his challenge to the Company was thwarted by Hahl, who 
advised him to drop the legal investigation.56 To Hahl, viewing this 
stage of M adang’s development, the real question was not the legality 
of the Com pany’s land acquisitions south of M adang— for the sake of 
the area’s future, that situation had to be accepted— but the question
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of providing sufficient reserves for local villagers so that they could 
continue to subsist side by side with Germany’s planting empire.
But reserves were not emerging quickly either, particularly for the 
inhabitants of Madang, which remained the area of fastest growth for 
European business. In 1911 alone, three new plantation concerns 
opened in the area, and preparations were being made to divide the 
Meiro Plains among another four in 1912.57 Negotiations with the Bilia 
over the Meiro Plains, and with Siar over the purchase of 1200 hectares 
between M adang and Sek by Norddeutsche Lloyd, suffered from the 
same delays as had the survey of the Jomba Plains. Both the government 
surveyor and the Rhenish Mission warned the authorities that this was 
unsettling the people badly. The Reverend Helmich, perhaps with the 
trauma of 1904 in his mind, was far from sanguine about the possible 
consequences:
. . . The ill feeling of local natives concerning loss of land, which 
is sometimes veiled and covert, and sometimes openly declared, 
makes it more and more clear that the resentment against the 
Europeans is increasing enormously and that the temper of the 
people is like a boiling crater. Serious consideration must be given 
as to whether an eruption is to be feared at an opportune 
m oment.58
Nothing was ever substantiated about what next occurred, but it 
appears that a new, wide­ranging plot to kill the M adang Europeans 
began to be discussed about June of 1912. The lines of the new 
conspiracy resembled those of the old, with one new precaution added: 
this time the conspirators would wait for the night before the steamer 
Koblenz was due to depart, because they knew that the settlers would 
be drowsy or asleep from the effects of heavy drinking. Villagers would 
then attack government headquarters and seize the arms, and so be free 
to kill the Europeans systematically, area by area.59
Whether the movement ever got beyond discussion is difficult to say. 
After the warnings from various sides about the peoples’ agitation, the 
district officer began to get suspicious and searched for signs of 
disaffection. To his mind, he found them in the unaccustomed 
vehemence with which the male cults were being performed and the 
increased interest which villagers were showing in the whereabouts of 
European living quarters. Extra sentries were posted on Cutter Island 
and Bilia, and the main watch on the administration building stren­
gthened, all of which quietened the villagers. But the European com­
munity since 1904 had lived with the conviction that the New Guineans
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would try again, and the first sign of uncertainty tended to panic them. 
There was a false alarm on 21 August. In response, the Europeans 
armed themselves, the police troops were made ready, and suspects 
were rounded up.
From this point, German sources rely entirely on native witnesses 
who suddenly began to testify that there had been an anti­white plot, 
and that several groups were involved. Ironically enough, the ring­
leaders this time were supposedly the Bilia people, but the Siar, 
Panutibun, Ragetta and some Bilibili people were also alleged to be 
involved. A court was hastily convened, and a great deal of conflicting 
evidence was brought forward by hostile and friendly witnesses. In the 
end, the board of officials, which included members from the Lutheran 
Mission, decided that there was sufficient evidence to substantiate the 
allegation of a plot against the whites. Pressed on by the nervous 
settlers, and anxious to remove once and for all the last obstacle to 
European security and economic expansion, the district officer, Scholz, 
banished the accused groups from the area, some to the north coast 
behind Cape Croiselles, the others to the Rai coast, while sixteen of the 
suspected ringleaders were transported to Herbertshohe. This signalled 
the final disarray of the M adang people, and the triumph of the planting 
and trading community.
The M adang ‘revolts’ are not easy to categorise as revolts. There are 
a number of features which weaken the argument that the people of 
M adang were ready to destroy all things European and revert to their 
traditional existence. Firstly, the 1904 venture had been a very tentative 
affair. At least two villages defected at the last moment, while the 
would­be rebels did not even offer token resistance after being found 
out. Secondly, there is no evidence to prove that the 1912 ‘conspirators’ 
actually were planning and organising a rebellion. The ‘p lo t’ may 
simply have been an extension of the Cargo myths which had sustained 
people since 1904, the belief that the time had come for the deities to 
remove the whites from New Guinea, but to retain for New Guineans 
the European way of life and access to its wealth. Significantly, a naval 
report about M adang at the time mentions that the M adang people 
were redistributing European roles among themselves, choosing who 
would be police master or magistrate in the new world, who would live 
in the white people’s houses, and who would ‘marry’ the white 
women.60
O n the other hand, conditions around M adang did lend themselves 
to violence and physical resistance by the villagers. N o t only had they
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lost most of their land to Com pany plantations but, unlike the Tolai 
in the Gazelle, they also lacked the resources to sell to the Europeans 
and establish a prosperous trading exchange. Violence was more likely 
in a situation where the people had no prospects of advancing them­
selves through adaptation to the European economy.
The only exception to the racial confrontations which prevailed on 
mainland coasts during these years lay in the Huon Peninsula. On its 
coasts and in the immediate hinterland, New Guineans and the only 
Europeans in the area, the Neuendettelsau missionaries, had managed 
to cultivate a tolerant relationship based on mutual respect and 
reciprocal behaviour. Using two local languages, Jabem and Kate, the 
mission was able to expand from its two mainland stations and two 
converts in 1899, to eleven stations with 1300 baptised converts and 
4000 to 5000 nominal adherents in 1908, stretched along the south 
coast of the Huon Peninsula to Cape Arkona (Bukaua) and Malalo 
(Salamaua), and deep into the Herzog Ranges. In addition, the mission 
followed the example of the Catholics in the north of Kaiser Wil­
helmsland, and in 1908 purchased the New Guinea C om pany’s 
remaining 1000 hectares of land at Finschhafen, a move as much 
designed to keep the Catholic SVD Mission out as to contribute to the 
Neuendettelsau Mission’s upkeep.61 The absence of large­scale 
European businesses in the H uon Peninsula after 1892 explains much 
of the success which the Neuendettelsau Mission enjoyed in race 
relations.
Its evangelical success was the result of a bold approach to conversion 
adopted after 1899. For many years Flierl and the Reverend Vetter had 
talked of organising their preaching work and the new converts in a way 
that was sensitive to local social structures and, more importantly, to 
the ideas with which contacted groups interpreted their world. The 
Reverend Christian Keysser, who arrived in 1899, laid the base for 
official policy by articulating for the first time the total social philo­
sophy of the Kate and Hube peoples, and laying down guidelines for 
working with them.62 Keysser reasoned that seeking individual con­
versions was counter­productive, for native culture and social rela­
tionships were so integrally connected with the traditional religion that 
individual converts to Christianity would experience ostracism and 
social and spiritual isolation within their communities. In the end they 
would be unable to withstand the pressures from their fellows and must 
fall back into the old waysm The mission’s solution was to move out into 
the villages and concentrate on substituting a social organisation based
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on the Gospel for the old social and religious life. By building Chris­
tianity into the new society, no individual should feel isolation within 
the group. There would be a minimum of dislocation and, the mission 
hoped, a more fundamental metanoia.
The immediate product of this approach was a mass movement 
around Sattelberg in 1904, when, amid scenes of the greatest drama, 
villagers brought cult objects and burnt them on pyres, and veteran 
sorcerers came forward to confess their past deeds. A severe earthquake 
in September 1906 rendered fortuitous assistance to the missionaries’ 
campaign on behalf of the supernatural. Crowds of 700 to 800 attended 
the baptisms as the movement spread, and strong millennial expecta­
tions accompanied it.63
The absence of any developed business on the southern mainland 
(though the New Guinea Company was holding on to more than 4700 
hectares of land at Lae) meant that until 1906­07 the administration 
did not concern itself with the area, leaving it to the peaceful minis­
trations of the Neuendettelsau Mission. The mission had created a 
secure base along the coasts and in the hinterland of the Huon 
Peninsula, from which it could open up the interior ranges and the vast 
trough­like valley of the M arkham  River, that disgorges itself at a 
furious rate into the sea at the head of the Huon Gulf. The mission’s 
way inland had been barred continually by the predatory raids of the 
W am par, or Lae W omba as they were called by the Germans, a warrior 
people of almost legendary ferocity whose ancestral home was on the 
W atut, a south­western tributary of the M arkham. Late in the 
nineteenth century, they began pushing east towards the M arkham 
mouth, driving groups, especially the Ahi people, before them, settling 
the territory north of the river, and then preying on the Lae people, who 
were a mixture of Kawa speakers from Bukaua and Ahi refugees from 
the south bank of the M arkham .64
A government police expedition ventured up the M arkham  in 1905 
to contact the W am par and demonstrate the dangers of trifling with 
Europeans. But the W am par got in the first blow: they attacked the 
party as it bivouacked overnight on the banks of the river, and the 
expedition was forced to retreat with three Europeans and three police 
soldiers seriously wounded.
Success encouraged the W am par to intensify their raids, striking ever 
closer to the coast, and in three attacks on scattered Lae villages in 1907 
they killed over 100 people, a result probably made easier by the loss 
of many young Lae men from the warrior ranks to the plantation
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recruiters. The Lae, scattered and dispirited from constant raiding, were 
finally reduced to sleeping on the beach at Cape Arkona to the east, and 
they refused point­blank to return to ‘place belong plenty fight’. Their 
old settlements were scenes of desolation, with houses razed to the 
ground, gardens laid waste, trade boxes smashed open and their 
contents strewn around. Two further expeditions were organised by the 
Germans, but their power of retaliation was restricted by the modest 
size of the mainland police force and the demands being made on them 
by unrest in Aitape and on the north­east coast. Lack of finance ruined 
any idea of a permanent station in the area in 1907­08.
The Neuendettelsau Mission, whose interests in the security of the 
M arkham  Valley were the most immediate, was striving meanwhile to 
make peaceful contact with the W ampar. In April 1909, the Reverend 
Stefan Lehner, accompanied by the ethnologist Paul Neuhauss and two 
other missionaries, mounted a party to penetrate up the M arkham  into 
W am par territory. For three days they made their way upstream, 
struggling against the current and constantly on the watch lest their 
guides and bearers desert in their terror at entering the enemy’s lair. No 
W am par were sighted but Lehner left a gift of red cloth, tobacco, a 
knife, an axe and a necklace of dogs’ teeth on a tree branch before the 
party returned to the coast. Two weeks later, the Lae excitedly 
presented the missionaries with a wooden sword from the W am par, 
who had offered to make friendship. It was the turning of the corner. 
Some days later, the W am par and the Lae held a giant feast at which 
they exchanged ‘hostages’ as sureties for the peace. In June, Lehner was 
able to visit the area and exchange gifts with the watchful but jubilant 
warriors. Two years later, in 1911, the Neuendettelsau Mission 
founded its first station among the W am par.65
Unfortunately, the new peace and goodwill did not prevail 
throughout the M arkham  Valley. Attacks on the coast had ceased, but 
unrest continued in the valley itself, with repeated clashes occurring 
between the W am par and the Azera, a larger offshoot of the same 
people. In January 1911, a European Bird of Paradise hunter, Richards, 
was killed by W ampars in the Garagos­Wampit area west of the 
M arkham  mouth. Richards was the victim of his own mistiming. The 
village in which he sought overnight accommodation was in the midst 
of celebrating a feast to the ancestors, and, since Richards neglected to 
offer a friendly gift on his arrival, the villagers took him for an intruder 
and a harmful spirit. The logical conclusion in terms of their own 
culture was to cancel out his influence by killing him.66 Two years
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before, on the middle W atut, people from Babwaf village who had never 
seen a white person, attacked Wilhelm Dammköhler, the old New 
Guinea hand, successful explorer and prospector who was searching for 
alluvial gold. Dammköhler died from arrow wounds. His companion, 
Rudolf Oldörp, fearfully wounded, lived to tell the story by dragging 
himself onto a raft and sailing down to the mouth of the Markham.
In 1909 Hahl had refused to send an expedition to avenge Damm­ 
köhler’s death, since he did not have the money to intervene in places 
which could not yet be brought under permanent control. By 1911 this 
had changed: large punitive expeditions were now penetrating west of 
the M arkham  in the interests of permanent security. When war broke 
out in 1914, a census patrol had already been made of eighty villages 
in the north of the H uon Gulf.67
At that stage, the H uon Gulf was the only region where the Germans 
could boast of a limited control further than ten to fifteen kilometres 
inland. Most of this was the product of the Neuendettelsau Mission’s 
peaceful labouring in the area since the 1880s, for while government 
expeditions impressed villagers with the power and efficiency of the 
Reich, it was the missionaries who inspired trust and acceptance of 
many of the white people’s ways. The mission’s policy of communal 
conversion brought about a veritable revolution in living patterns in 
some areas. By 1914 the Kate people in the vicinity of Sattelberg had, 
of their own initiative, introduced new legal sanctions and procedures 
into their social system, and were restructuring the division of labour 
within the larger, regional parish community that had been formed. By 
1914, also, the mission had a permanent missionary at Lae, had pushed 
its way to the 1000­metre­high Cromwell Mountains deep in the Huon 
Peninsula, and was making preparations for a mission presence among 
the cannibalistic Azera people, over a hundred kilometres from the 
Huon coasts.
As for the rest of the protectorate, one can only assess Germany’s 
final hold over the multifarious communities of New Guineans by 
looking at the stages of contact region by region. From this point of 
view, the Bismarck Archipelago seems to fare better than Kaiser 
Wilhelmsland. At the outbreak of war, the Gazelle Peninsula (excluding 
the area beyond the Varzin and the outer Bainings) and northern New 
Ireland were, to all intents and purposes, areas where physical security 
was no longer the first consideration of settlers and administration. 
Large district confederations were being formed, and were concen­
trating on the demands of economic development— public works,
193
Pacific Islanders under German Rule
education, agricultural improvement, and technological innovations 
like copra driers, wagons and horses. Elsewhere in the Archipelago, 
rather crude frontier conditions were the order of the day, conditions 
which meant that the Government still accepted with resignation the 
occasional murder of careless Europeans. The worst was over in the 
older areas of conflict like the Admiralties and northern Bougainville, 
but security of life and of property here were not yet guaranteed. 
Meanwhile, there were vast areas in New Britain and Bougainville 
which were completely uncontacted at the outbreak of war.
On the mainland, north of the Huon Peninsula, the nominal control 
which the Germans claimed over the entire coastline amounted to little 
more than a record of formal contact and a thin veneer of direct rule. 
The authority of the Reich was hardly acknowledged beyond the coastal 
enclaves of European settlement— Aitape, Potsdamhafen­Monumbo 
and M adang— and their immediate hinterlands.
At Madang, racial relations altered dramatically after the exile of the 
1912 ‘conspirators’. Having achieved nothing by active or passive 
resistance, the M adang peoples tried a new tack towards the millennium 
which they believed was imminent. This time they chose limited 
co­operation with the new culture. Their strategy was reflected in a 
startling increase in recruitment for European plantations (from 619 
in 1910 to 1955 in 1913) and in a more forthcoming attitude to the 
Lutheran Mission. Conversions were made thick and fast. The Siar­ 
Ragetta people returned from exile in 1914, after the Australian 
occupation, and immediately started to fill the churches; fifty people 
soon reported for baptism. The number of Christians in the area of 
M adang (including villages inland) multiplied thirteen times in the five 
or six years after 1914.68
Conversion offered a new rallying point and created a new hope: the 
hope that through conversion New Guineans might gain access to the 
white people’s material wealth and self­confidence. Conversion was 
also a new, more subtle form of resistance to social disintegration, and 
carried with it the desire to show Europeans that New Guineans were 
not just primitive savages. In all this there were explicit millenarian 
overtones, for these villagers of the M adang area conceived of the new 
religion as the ritual equivalent of their traditional beliefs and the 
long­sought­for secret to the Cargo. After 1914 this led to the 
development of a ‘secular’ political organisation with its own cult 
leader.69
M adang and the H uon Peninsula were exceptions to the general
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situation on the mainland. The Sepik district, with nearly one­quarter 
of the total population of the protectorate, was quite uncontrolled in 
1914, except for the immediate vicinity of the Aitape station. Still an 
uncertain quantity was the north­east coast, where hostile tribes had 
been pushed back into the mountains as the Germans occupied the 
coast. Completely unknown, though suspected, were the vast popula­
tions and the sophisticated agricultural systems of the New Guinea 
Highlands.
The nominal peace on the coasts was regularly disrupted by the 
invasions of mountain tribes. One of the unforeseen effects of coastal 
pacification, and of the recruitment of able­bodied warriors, was 
increased aggression from inland or mountain tribes, which the Ger­
mans found hard to counter. The hinterland of Aitape, the territory 
inland from Potsdamhafen and Bogia, and the Rai coast ranges were 
the most troublesome. Hahl did make an effort to influence the Sepik 
interior by establishing a staging point for recruitment at Angoram on 
the lower length of the river in 1913. And on the Rai coast the regime 
tried to stop mountain people preying on coastal villages in a series of 
fiercely­fought battles in 1910, but the final effect was only to drive the 
offending tribes deeper into the Finisterre Range.
In all these attempts to impose a physical control over the commu­
nities of their far­flung protectorate, the Germans relied heavily on the 
colonial police force. If Hahl was unable to secure law and order in the 
German manner when and where he wanted it, part of the reason was 
the deficiencies of his police force. Though the largest in the Pacific 
empire, numbering nearly 1000 men by 1914, the New Guinea police 
remained too small to handle unrest throughout the protectorate, 
particularly when unrest occurred in different areas simultaneously.
In 1904 the Bainings massacre ayid its repercussions highlighted the 
ease with which a surprise New Guinean attack might overcome even 
a major centre of European settlement where a station’s complement 
of forty or fifty police was absent on security duties in other parts. The 
M adang revolt the same year very nearly succeeded, in spite of the fact 
that the police were on active sentry duty. Again, in late 1910, when 
news of the Ponape insurrection reached New Guinea, most of the 
better­trained police were in M orobe, M adang or Aitape, or on the 
Anglo­German border expedition, and fewer than 100 of the newest 
recruits and inferior soldiers could be mustered as reinforcements for 
the besieged colony. The most serious deficiency was revealed in 1913, 
when the entire expeditionary force had to be mobilised to deal with
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an uprising in southern New Ireland, and many of the local police 
contingents were also drawn in, leaving the rest of the protectorate 
practically bereft of military protection.
The inadequacy of numbers was overcome in some places by 
recruiting local auxiliaries to assist in punitive operations. Auxiliaries 
played an important role in the 1893 war in the Gazelle Peninsula, in 
Bougainville and in various campaigns on the mainland, but their 
employment was always a risk since they could not be controlled 
effectively in the jungle, and indiscriminate killing was the occasional 
result. The conditions under which the police were used also impaired 
their effectiveness as agents of law and order. When a German district 
officer was opening up new country, the police were often the first 
people to go into an uncontacted village, thereby setting the standard 
for subsequent relations, and there are documented cases of intimida­
tion, rape and pillage by native police, and of their use as press gangs 
to obtain labourers.70
This was a particular risk with the expeditionary troops, a contingent 
of over 100 men developed out of the existing force as an instrument 
to help open up new territory and lay the groundwork of ‘pacification’ 
for civilian administrations. In H ah l’s 1914 three­year plan, the 
expeditionary troops were envisaged as an increasingly essential arm 
of the government, as a ‘vigorous’ means of bringing the vast interior 
within the German orbit. Though this hardly constitutes the estab­
lishment of a standing army, it is clear that H ah l’s plan would have 
leaned ever more heavily on military pressure and forceful pacification. 
Only time would have told how such a program would have been 
received by the New Guineans, especially in the Highlands.
The problems of imposing control aside, time ran out for the 
Germans in 1914. At that stage, relations on the mainland remained 
poised on a thin line between uneasy peace and open war. The Germans 
had reached a stage of partial control best defined by a later military 
observer as:
Where the luluais will respond to a summons to appear at a 
government station, but where it is not altogether advisable for 
traders and others to wander about without protection, where tax 
payments are made only here and there, and at irregular intervals, 
and where the people are prone to disregard orders received from 
the District Officer through their luluais.11
Where every village was a law unto itself, and few larger, regional ties 
existed, the Germans could not be sure of any areas except the very
196
The Mainland: New Guineans under Company and Empire
oldest coastal settlements occupied by the planters and missionaries. 
Security depended on the acquiescence of New Guineans in the presence 
and practices of Europeans. Even in a place like the east coast of the 
Gazelle Peninsula, where the Germans were most dominant, peace was 
less the product of superior Western technology than the voluntary 
realisation by the native people that they stood to gain most, with 










To Europeans of the nineteenth century, violence and conquest were 
inevitable features of colonialism. As we have seen, a man like Governor 
Hahl could dismiss repeated collisions with New Guineans as un­
avoidable in the continuing conflict between ‘culture’ and ‘savagery’. 
In the Pacific, the German regimes confronted Island societies which 
had demonstrated emphatically their capacity to resist European 
interference. As a result, Samoans, Ponapeans and New Guineans were 
treated at various times with caution, as very real threats to the stability 
of the German Pacific empire. The object of the following chapter is to 
show that the Pacific Island answer to German rule ranged through 
varying degrees of accommodation and opposition, dictated by a wide 
variety of considerations, and only in a few isolated cases did it amount 
to rebellion against German hegemony.
The three Island societies with which we have been dealing were 
receptive to the presence of Europeans, and even to limited foreign 
suzerainty. M ost Pacific societies found advantage and profit in the 
arrival of the white people, for they brought new metals, tools and skills, 
as well as strange and inviting ornament. M any of the earliest 
encounters with European explorers ended in bloodshed, but there were 
generally good reasons, either the pressure' put upon scant area and 
food resources, or European ignorance of local custom .1 Seldom was 
such conflict a case of simple, undefined tribal resistance, or of total and 
irreconcilable opposition to the whites and their ways.
M ost societies made an effort to find the basis for a coexistence of 
mutual profit. Beach communities of resident Europeans flourished in 
all corners of the Pacific long before the Powers annexed their empires. 
Later colonists were also accepted, and, depending on their willingness 
to acknowledge local norms of belief and custom, an acceptable level 
of co­operation and exchange was usually worked out, as with the 
London Missionary Society in Samoa before 1900, or Ralum plantation 
in New Guinea before 1893.
Accommodation did not prevent the Pacific Islanders from 
attempting to bargain with a colonial regime, or from using limited
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opposition as a political tactic to get their own way. In many cases the 
actions which Germans interpreted as laziness, deceit or wilful 
obstruction, were efforts by local elites to control change, to create a 
balance between new demands on the socio­political order and estab­
lished patterns of political life, status and social solidarity. For example, 
to call the movement for a Samoan co­operative in 1904 ‘very little 
other than a manipulation of the Samoan national trait to periodically 
rise in political upheavals every five or ten years’, as one later New 
Zealand administrator did,2 is a myopic political judgment bordering 
on wilful prejudice. The Oloa movement was not a blind, irrational 
adventure, nor was it a simple economic response to shifts in the world 
market. Organised by the leading chiefs and speakers in M ulinu’u, its 
aim was to create a power base for these chiefs against the policies of 
the Governor, and to reinforce the M alo's traditional claims to 
authority; in other words, to restore the traditional system of political 
dynamics.
But to explain it as a conservative Samoan response designed to 
perpetuate old rights and freedoms is to see only one side of the coin. 
The Oloa was also an example of the creative realignment of institu­
tions and behaviour patterns, of an endeavour to synthesise old values 
with the new. Through the Oloa, Samoan elites were trying to adapt the 
native copra industry to the vagaries of the world market. Copra 
production had been a critical feature of indigenous economic life for 
more than a decade. Throughout the entire German period Samoan 
plantings (covering more than fifty per cent of the planted area of the 
group) continued to supply the vast bulk of copra exported from 
Samoa; copra sales enabled the Samoans to pay head taxes and mission 
contributions regularly without having to resort to wage labour for 
Europeans. The importance of the industry explains why falling copra 
prices in 1903­04 should so concern many Samoans and attract them 
to the idea of their own co­operative. Samoans’ commercial expecta­
tions may have been unrealistic, and their lack of expertise in the 
management of a co­operative would have been a liability at first, but 
neither of these impediments diminishes the imaginativeness of this 
attempt to update the Samoan copra industry in line with the fluctua­
tions of a world market. In seeking to compete with modern European 
commerce in its own idiom, the Cumpani would have allowed Samoans 
to shape their economic life under colonial rule.
There are other, equally pertinent examples of constructive opposi­
tion in the German Pacific. One is the unrest which Nanpei engineered
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on Ponape in 1908, designed at once to strengthen his own position in 
traditional society and yet to secure for Ponapeans, or at least for some 
Ponapeans, a greater share of political power under the Germans 
through N anpei’s ‘advisory council’. In New Guinea, the Tolai people 
provide another case. They refused to be assimilated into a planters’ 
wage­economy but, instead, enthusiastically developed a system of cash 
cropping which enabled them to rationalise copra production along 
Western lines.
The combination of progressive and conservative aims in these 
various ventures demonstrates what one historian in the African 
context has termed the ‘ambiguity towards modernisation’ manifested 
by the peoples of developing countries.3 The desire for European 
material goods, new technology and institutional improvements was 
balanced by distaste for many aspects of European laws, morality and 
living patterns. Conversion to Western values was not automatic, as 
many Europeans anticipated, nor was it complete. Rather, the history 
of colonial penetration shows that at different times, and according to 
their reading of the situation and the resources at their disposal, Pacific 
Islanders made conscious acts of selection and rejection of European 
culture.
Local choice becomes as important a category of explanation as 
European dynamism. Proto­co­operatives, advisory councils, cash 
cropping, payment of head taxes, even Cargo cults were all original 
responses to colonial rule. Yet there are as many convincing examples 
of the hold of tradition on societies undergoing social change: the Tolai 
refused to jettison shell money as a status indicator amongst themselves 
despite their immersion in a cash economy; the Ponapeans continued 
to make regular votive offerings to their High Chiefs even after the 
German reforms released them from the obligation and the sacrifices 
it entailed; all three societies refused to accept the European work ethic: 
only a handful of Melanesian labourers adopted wage labour as a 
permanent way of life during German times, and the Samoans looked 
on regular plantation work as fit only for serfs.
Sometimes such assertions of the right to contribute to a changing 
society took the form of militant discontent, even intimidation and 
force. But where the Germans refused to recognise Pacific Islanders, 
especially Pacific Island leaders, as political equals, no other course 
existed. There were no official organisations to express protest and 
opposition. Local government structures set up in each colony were 
designed to transmit executive orders to the people, and only inciden­
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tally operated in the opposite direction. This was logical to the 
Germans. The primary concern of imperial administration was to 
encourage the economic productivity, not the political development of 
colonial populations; to create a prosperous peasantry in the employ­
ment of imperial designs. Thus any movement of dissent was defined 
as illegitimate. Moreover, because of the assumption that a subject 
people would automatically resist conquest, signs of opposition on the 
part of Pacific Islanders tended to be interpreted as wholesale rebellion 
against the very idea of German rule.
These, of course, were common reactions among late nineteenth 
century colonial regimes. Only with the era of decolonisation did the 
rhetoric change: colonial opposition movements became respectable 
and their aspirations towards independence were accepted as reason­
able. But in German times, Pacific Islanders were forced to resort to 
expedients like the Vaimea incident, the mau e pule, the 1908 campaign 
in Ponape to try to frighten the regime into conceding some form of 
compromise. Resistance or opposition in this sense was merely an 
extension of ordinary political processes, a calculated tactic with 
limited objectives.
None of this is to deny that there were instances of rebellion against 
colonial subjection, of refusal to submit to the Germans. Herbertshöhe, 
Madang, the Varzin Mountains and the Baining Range were all the 
scenes of large­scale violence against whites in German New Guinea. 
As well, the situation in Ponape did produce finally what can only be 
termed a revolt.
To generalise about these protests is difficult because of the varying 
stages of colonial penetration and the widely differing historical cir­
cumstances in each area. By and large, they were the product of 
overwhelming frustration at German pretensions: the tendency to make 
demands and exploit resources without reference to those affected, or 
without offering some form of compensation. M any New Guinean 
groups, for instance, were prepared to accept German sovereignty on 
New Guinean terms. But they refused to admit the extreme assumptions 
of colonialism— that the colonies existed for unrestrained profit­mak­
ing at the expense of their inhabitants. Europeans made revolutionary 
demands on New Guineans, depriving them of their land, requisitioning 
their labour, proscribing certain economic, religious and sexual cus­
toms. Yet, in return, they treated the people as an untouchable caste, 
restricted their freedom of action, and offered them only the most trivial 
compensation from the white people’s vast material wealth.
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At first glance, then, the history of race relations in German New 
Guinea, and the wider Pacific, would seem to be explained best in terms 
of social and economic deprivation, a sense of despair caused by ‘an 
inability to obtain what the culture has defined as the ordinary 
satisfactions of life’.4 On closer analysis, however, the evidence suggests 
otherwise. ‘Deprivation’ is a relative term, depending very much on the 
horizon of expectations of the people concerned. In the Pacific, there 
is no simple correlation between the number and extent of demands 
made by the German administrations and the instances of rebellion. 
The nature of local response seems to depend on a ‘cost­benefit analysis’ 
by the leadership of each group, as well as on the compensating 
resources which the group possessed.
Ponape, for instance, was the severest test which the Germans had 
to face in the Pacific, yet the colony was not subject to the pressures of 
labour recruitment, excessive land alienation and a vocal white settler 
community which caused so much friction in other colonies. The 
disadvantages of the German land reforms to a chief like Henry Nanpei 
were far outweighed by the security he gained for his personal estates. 
In contrast are the repercussions which land reform had for lesser chiefs 
with fewer resources, especially for the chiefs of Sokehs district. They 
were the most vulnerable to German demands because, along with Net, 
they lived the closest to the seat of the German administration; 
therefore they had to bear the brunt of Boeder’s crusade. Where the 
Ponapean ‘commoners’ stood during the successive crises is harder to 
evaluate, but their close links with section heads and district chiefs, plus 
the fact that they had everything to gain from the Germans’ land 
changes, suggest that generally they played a passive role and followed 
where their chiefs led.
New Guineans experienced the hand of Germany unevenly, 
according to their proximity to major European settlements and the 
consequent ability of the regime to mobilise them in support of its 
demands. But even where the pattern of white settlement and admin­
istrative commands were similar, the response of the local populations 
varied significantly. W hat mattered were the alternative opportunities 
available to the local society. For example, the coastal Tolai of the 
Gazelle Peninsula and the M adang people on the mainland both 
suffered the loss of large scale land resources and had imposed upon 
them the obligations of direct German rule (corvee labour, head tax). 
The Tolai managed to reconcile themselves to this state of affairs after 
the war of 1893, for as a group they were strong and important enough
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to be able to negotiate defined land reserves; moreover, the possession 
of an abundance of coconuts and good transport and marketing 
opportunities enabled them to enjoy an increasing cash income and a 
rising standard of living. For the M adang people, there were few if any 
compensations: most of their land had been lost in the expansion of 
company plantations, and they possessed too few saleable resources to 
provide the basis for a permanent trading economy; even wage labour 
gave them negligible purchasing power. It was the sort of situation, with 
no prospects for advancement through acceptance of the European 
order, which led logically to the physical resistance of 1904 and, 
perhaps, 1912.
This uneven effect of structural changes to economic or political life, 
or to social authority, is the model which prevailed in all three German 
colonies. The southern districts of Ponape, in contrast to Sokehs, 
accepted the German program of reforms voluntarily in 1909, although 
the traditional authority of chiefs was thereby reduced considerably and 
the only source of income for many chiefs through tributary labour was 
abolished. In Samoa, not all the chiefs affected by Solf’s policy of 
diminishing chiefly influence and privileges followed Lauaki in his 
campaign to restore chiefly power. Some chose to collaborate and 
accept roles within Solf’s new local government bureaucracy. Such men 
played an important part in the Lauaki crisis of 1908­09. Co­operating 
fully with the German government’s counter­strategy, or weighing 
carefully the options open to them in the conflict, they gave Solf an 
important lever over the Samoan community and enabled the Islanders 
to avert civil war. New Guineans resisted the European invasion of 
trading monopolies which were established between coastal and inland 
groups and which were an important link in the static subsistence 
economies of both. And many reacted in a hostile manner to the 
depopulation of villages through recruiting, to the enforced relocation 
of settlements, such as at M adang and Herbertshöhe, or to the 
subversion of cults and social sanctions by missionaries. Yet other 
structural innovations, like luluais and the head tax, did not lead to 
widespread resistance, nor did recruitment and mission efforts to 
change the patterns of village life provoke violent clashes in all areas. 
This reinforces the argument that the term ‘deprivation’ must be used 
with caution in trying to explain the causes of Pacific Island opposition.
One of the self­evident causes was the overt racial arrogance of 
German planters, recruiters and administrators, and the abuses which 
sprang from it. The New Guinea Com pany’s disciplinary ordinance of
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1887­88 was quite explicit in treating the New Guinean as a brutish, 
almost subhuman savage, and its assumptions were not softened 
though the ordinance itself was ‘improved’ in later years. The record 
of continual desertions from plantations, of hostility to recruiters, and 
the prominence of ex­labourers in attacks on white people all testify to 
the resentment which the misuse of their labour aroused in New 
Guineans. The sense of racial and moral superiority which some 
missionaries wore like a badge also caused antagonism: the Baining 
massacre and the conspiracies against the M adang missionaries 
demonstrate that New Guineans would not lightly accept these 
pretensions either.
Ponape provides the best example of the emotions which German 
excesses could arouse. Boeder’s constant disregard for Island sensibi­
lities, from the time of his arrival to his murder in October 1910, points 
to a deliberate contempt for the Ponapeans as civilised people, which 
on Ponape with its troubled past and defiant record, was cause enough 
for violence. Yet, significantly, almost nine months elapsed between the 
time the new land and labour system was forced on Sokehs and the 
uprising in October. Resort to violence was in many cases due to the 
failure of the German regimes to respond to local protests against 
abuses and loss of resources. The Sokehs chiefs had made repeated 
attempts to mitigate the effects of Boeder’s policy before their position 
became untenable. Similarly, in the case of the Varzin war in the Gazelle 
Peninsula, To Kilang, the ‘big m an’, had tried avenues of non­violent 
protest without securing any review of his problem before taking 
matters into his own hands.
Beyond the external causes of Pacific Island opposition to German rule, 
whether physical or political, is another, less obvious, but equally 
important set of explanations. Often the actions which Germans 
interpreted as unprovoked aggression or rebellion were the result of 
social and political forces internal to the Island societies and largely 
independent of the Germans.
For example, violence against whites was occasionally the expression 
of traditional community sanctions. Europeans living in or near Island 
communities and entering into the local system of relationships were 
given short shrift if they violated taboos and canons of social behaviour. 
Several of the murders of lone traders in the New Guinea Islands before 
1900 can be traced to this mistake; witness also the attack on Ralum
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in 1890, which followed after Europeans had repeatedly ignored the 
importance to the Tolai of local cult centres and fishing areas.
In New Guinea the practice of ‘blood revenge’ or ‘pay back’ was also 
responsible for a share of European deaths. In cases where a New 
Guinean descent group or residential unit considered that it had been 
seriously wronged by another social group with which it had no close 
ties, then any member of the latter group was liable to be attacked in 
retaliation, either physically or by sorcery. On occasions, a white was 
murdered if a group had suffered from the visit of an earlier European, 
or if the visit coincided with the death of a group member. This group 
solidarity also operated in the Sokehs rebellion in Ponape; in fact, it was 
the primary, if temporary, force which rallied the people of Sokehs 
behind Soumadau in the fight against Germany.
Fear of the outsider was another factor which influenced the 
behaviour of New Guinea village groups towards Europeans. In the 
days before contact, most New Guineans lived in small, highly inte­
grated and self­sufficient residential groups, each suspicious of its 
neighbours and treating the intrusion of any stranger as a possible 
threat to the delicate balance of its existence. Attacks against advancing 
Europeans were usually initiated at this level rather than at the regional 
level, and they were often intended, however unnecessarily, as acts in 
defence of the residential group. The murder of Dammköhler west of 
the M arkham  in 1909, and of Richards, the Bird of Paradise hunter, 
in 1910 can best be explained in this way. European explorers and 
travellers also affronted villagers by their insensitive curiosity about 
peoples’ living habits, and their frequent failure to observe the proper 
decorum in villages. Traditionally, even friends and allies not belonging 
to the territorial unit were objects of distrust, for New Guineans feared 
the sorcery and trouble which might result from non­residents learning 
the intimate details of their lives.
A variation on the theme of internal causes of resistance is to see 
opposition to the Germans as an extension of the balance of power 
among local groups. The relationship between various descent, 
residential or district units was often the key to the way Pacific Islanders 
handled Europeans. One of the dangers of interpreting Pacific history 
from European records is to see that history in terms of a simple 
involvement between Pacific Islanders on the one hand and Europeans 
on the other. In reality, the involvement frequently took the form of an 
encounter among several local groups pursuing their traditional pur­
poses (whether war, alliances or exchanges), in which Europeans were
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only one variable in the equation, and one to be manipulated in pursuit 
of traditional aims. Often an event interpreted by contemporary 
observers as a crisis in the relationship between the colonial regime and 
the Island people was in fact an episode in the changing patterns of 
conflict and alliance among indigenous groups.
The history of Ponape under German rule makes this evident. The 
sequence of threat and counter­threat, of clandestine meetings and raids 
on chiefs’ property which Georg Fritz in 1908 thought was an 
attempted putsch against his regime was a chapter in the struggle 
between the two chiefs of Kiti, Henry Nanpei and Sou Kiti, which 
carried over to their relations with the Germans. As we have seen, 
Nanpei skilfully managed the confusion that resulted from his 
deliberate provocations, with the dual intention of intimidating Fritz 
while enlisting his support against Sou Kiti. Regional jealousies also 
played an important part in the uprising of 1910: the chiefs of Sokehs 
suspected that the German land reforms were N anpei’s inspiration and 
that he had formed an alliance with the Germans against the northern 
districts; Fritz’s approval of Nanpei’s ‘advisory council’, as well as 
Boeder’s general aggressiveness, seemed only to confirm their 
suspicions.
If we turn our attention to Samoa, the mau e pule immediately 
presents itself as an extension of the factional intrigues which had long 
riven Samoan politics. Alongside the restoration of Tum ua  and Pule to 
their old positions of influence, Lauaki aimed to entrench his own 
faction in power under the Germans, and it was Solf’s recognition of 
this which enabled him to split the mass front Lauaki had so carefully 
organised during 1908. The Lauaki crisis then developed along the lines 
of a uniquely Samoan party struggle; the ‘declaration of w ar’ which 
Lauaki made in January 1909 was directed less at the Germans than 
at Lauaki’s Samoan enemies, the chiefs of T um ua}
New Guinea provides perhaps the most diverse set of examples of the 
same process, though they are seldom recognised as such in the 
government records of the time. To take just two cases: mission reports 
and later local additions make it plain that what Hahl regarded as an 
infringement of colonial peace and order in the Admiralties, when 
Pominis led his village in a retaliatory raid on his neighbours, was in 
reality an expression of their long­standing hostility, with no suggestion 
of rebellion. Two years later, the people of Valum village on Pak Island 
killed the three Solomon Islands labourers who had murdered their 
employer Schlehan and retired to Pak Island with the booty. The
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incident initially was considered rough justice by the regime, and the 
turning point in the long and bitter struggle which had been carried on 
since the 1880s to pacify the Admiralty Islanders. But a later patrol 
discovered that the ‘rough justice’ was not justice at all; that in fact the 
Valum people had killed the labourers because the neighbouring village 
of M ogara had given the refugees shelter, and shared in the plunder 
from Schlehan’s trading station.6 Too afraid of government punish­
ment to participate in the pillage themselves, the Valum people had 
acted out of jealousy of their neighbours.
In spite of these local cultural explanations of Pacific Island ‘resis­
tance’, a warning must be entered against rationalising away every act 
of violence in which Europeans and Pacific Islanders were involved. On 
the New Guinea frontier, at least, avarice led to many of the attacks on 
whites. In an area like New Ireland before 1900, where traders were 
isolated and left in charge of large caches of trade goods, the temptation 
to plunder often proved too great for villagers. The same was true of 
the Solomons and the Admiralties, where off­shore Islanders were 
particularly adept at pirating European vessels. There were always 
groups, even friendly to the administration, who were prepared to 
indulge in looting, as with M ogara village on Pak Island, or the Tolai 
district of M alagunan in the attack on Wolff’s house in 1902.
Exasperation at the readiness of New Guineans to appropriate 
anything left lying around is a major theme in many accounts of 
colonial pioneering. The Reverend Flierl recounts how the Sattelberg 
people in the Huon Peninsula brazenly warned him to guard his 
possessions closely, for they were considered fair booty if only the 
villagers could get their hands on them. Flierl also claimed that the 
covetousness of the Simbang people could easily have led to murder at 
Finschhafen in the early days.7
The desire for European material wealth, and the violence such 
desires could generate were not necessarily anti­German or anti­ 
European. With very few exceptions, and all of them in New Guinea, 
none of the uprisings against German rule or expressions of hostility 
to it can be classified as the total rejection of Europeans and their 
civilisation. There may have been present a longing for a simpler past, 
with the certainties of the old ways, but Pacific Islanders were not 
committed to reaction for its own sake, nor, necessarily, were their 
actions designed to overthrow the colonial regime. Campaigns like the 
Samoan Oloa movement, and Lauaki’s mau e pule took the framework 
of colonial rule as established, and sought rather to manipulate its
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institutions and reduce its effects. There is no proof that Lauaki 
intended open rebellion when he began his fight for Tum ua  and Pule 
in 1908; indeed, Lauaki consistently denied any such purpose.8 Perhaps 
to defend Lauaki as being essentially loyal throughout the affair, as did 
Solf’s district officer in Savai’i,9 was going too far. The movement had 
generated its own momentum. Schultz’s action in prohibiting the 
demonstration on Solf’s arrival frustrated Lauaki’s strategy, reducing 
his options and virtually forcing him openly to oppose the adminis­
tration or to back down. But, even after events became explosively 
rebellious, with Tum ua  lining up against Lauaki, there exists little 
evidence to prove that Lauaki sought an open break with the regime, 
or that he intended using violence against the whites in Samoa. The 
compromise which Lauaki so masterfully engineered at Vaiusu, plus the 
fact that he surrendered in the end to save Samoa from war, suggest that 
Lauaki was reluctant to cross the thin line between intimidation and 
physical violence.
In New Guinea, major insurrections occurred in only a few areas, and 
even then they were usually aimed against specific grievances and lasted 
a short time. For instance, considering the economic advantages which 
coastal Tolai gained from the growth of the plantation markets before 
1893, it is doubtful whether the war of the bullet­proof ointment was 
intended to annihilate all Europeans living in the Gazelle Peninsula. 
Since peace persisted so strongly after 1893, more likely it was intended 
to ease pressure on Tolai land, and restore the earlier, more favourable 
relationship of coexistence and mutual economic benefit with the 
whites. The Baining massacre in 1904 was not a general anti­white 
movement either. Planned and executed by a small group of Baining 
people, it was aimed specifically against the Sacred Heart Mission and 
the personalities responsible for the humiliations of St Paul. In the 
rampage that followed the murders, the rebels left alone a white settler 
living in the area, who was married to a New Guinean w om an.10
Even at M adang, where the people were twice accused of plotting to 
destroy the European community, there is a case for arguing that the 
so­called 1912 rebellion was actually an expression of the Cargo beliefs 
that were circulating in M adang villages, where people were discussing 
whether the time had come to expel the whites who were responsible 
for the loss of village land, but to embrace the ‘white’ way of life.11
Finally, when we turn to Ponape and the Sokehs rebellion, it is clear 
that even the militantly independent Ponapeans had never excluded the 
idea of compromise with Europeans. They met the original Spanish
211
Pacific Islanders under German Rule
demands readily enough, and it is likely that all the districts would have 
submitted to the G erm ans’ decrees but for the brutality of Carl Boeder. 
That right up to the moment of rebellion there existed a party of Sokehs 
leaders which opposed such a Draconian solution indicates that, almost 
always, someone was ready to compromise with the Germans; any 
determination to destroy German rule, if it existed, was only lukewarm.
The Sokehs uprising is best interpreted as an explosion of frustration 
against Boeder and his accomplices by the district which suffered most 
from his tyranny. ‘We felt wretched and furious and we did not much 
think . . . ’ , 12 was the judgment of Samuel, the last of the rebel chiefs to 
give himself up. Resistance ebbed rapidly once the German forces 
arrived, and the Sokehs warriors surrendered quietly. Moved by the 
sense of fate that predestined their destruction, Samuel conceded the 
struggle to the Germans ‘so that our souls would be tranquil’. This is 




The Social Dynamics of Protest
Organisation and Leadership
There are no spectacular successes in the history of Pacific Island 
resistance to the Germans. The only two major threats to the empire— 
Lauaki’s mau e pule and the Sokehs rebellion— both ended in exile or 
death for their participants. In retrospect, they never could have 
succeeded. Aside from the fact that German officials could always 
appeal to the home government for help to repress opposition in an 
emergency, the Island communities lacked a number of organisational 
preconditions which were necessary for an effective attack on German 
sovereignty.
Firstly, there were no ‘masses’ in any of the three colonies, no 
politicised peasantry or proletariat which could be used as a lever 
against the German regimes. In 1914, though social changes were 
beginning to have visible effects, Samoa, Ponape and New Guinea still 
contained well­integrated, pre­industrial societies. The Samoans 
remained tied to their local descent groups and village organisations of 
production and distribution; they rejected any efforts to draw them into 
wage labour on a regular basis. The Ponapean reforms emancipated the 
ordinary Islander from the uncertainties of the feudal system without 
altering the traditional mode of economic life or the set of close­knit 
loyalties and obligations within the districts. New Guineans 
experienced much greater mobilisation of labour for the plantations 
and more radical social change, but no urban work force or permanent 
pool of wage labour had emerged before 1914; employment with 
Europeans was generally a temporary experience in those years.1
The explanation for this state of affairs lies partly in the weakness of 
the colonial economy, and its subordination to the imperial economy. 
The home government’s failure to provide sufficient support for rapid 
commercial growth, and the unwillingness of Grosskapital interests in 
Germany to invest where returns were still small and uncertain, saved 
the Pacific colonies from large­scale economic penetration and helped 
to preserve local social structures. The latter, in turn, gave the colonial 
peoples shelter from the economic demands of the regime: the Islanders 
could always choose between growing crops for subsistence or for
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market, or they could sell their labour. The local alternative, with its 
greater independence, was usually preferable. This depended, of course, 
on the availability of land. In an area like Madang, some of those who 
lost land were able to find shelter and support from neighbouring 
groups and still avoid wage labour, while in the Gazelle Peninsula and 
other areas reserves provided some guarantee of a local economic 
alternative to plantation labour. Instead of a growing proletariat, the 
Germans had to deal with a moving labour frontier which receded 
further from the old areas of settlement as cash cropping and other 
forms of economic opportunity became more widely diffused.2 Such a 
frontier was too unstable to act as the focus of mass movements.
We have seen also that colonial rule fell unevenly on social groups 
within the colonies. While chiefs had their powers whittled away, 
ordinary people in the villages remained largely untouched by foreign 
governments, or, as in Ponape, benefited from reforms at the expense 
of their chiefs. Each community or individual elite got something 
different from the colonial system, which made it difficult to organise 
a mass movement against the Germans.
If there was no mass movement of the dispossessed, neither was there 
any new vision of society capable of defining the enemy and unifying 
all the old hostile groups. The appeal to patriotism ( lo to n u ’u) by the 
Samoan M alo  in the Oloa movement may have been more widely 
received in a more sophisticated anti­colonial age, but the rapid 
disintegration of solidarity among the chiefs after the Vaimea incident 
shows that it had little meaning for the Samoan people in 1904­05.
In the two open resistance movements of the German Pacific— 
Lauaki’s mau e pule and the Sokehs rebellion— the ideological call 
which marshalled support initially was not sufficient to sustain revol­
utionary sentiment or create a permanent wider organisation. Lauaki 
was unable to offer all Samoans a more stable, more prosperous life 
than they were already enjoying under Solf’s regime. The importance 
of the A li’i Sili question and the power of Tum ua  and Pule, for which 
Lauaki was fighting, were challenged effectively by Solf’s rule. Tumua  
and Pule were responsible for several disruptions to peace— in 1900, 
1903 and 1904— and the new Samoan administration was proving 
more functional and efficient in 1908­09 than the old M alo  ever had. 
Lauaki’s ideas were an appeal to old ways, but to old ways that were 
not uniformly regarded as perfect ways; Lauaki’s ideas were designed 
to reinforce traditional divisions not to transcend them. Moreover, his
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view of Samoa in 1909 as the cockpit of imperialist rivalries among the 
Great Powers was obsolete, and offered nothing but a return to chaos.3
On Ponape, Soumadau en Sokehs emerges as the legitimate leader 
of the Sokehs uprising. It was not a crusade for Ponape’s liberation, but 
an angry reaction against Carl Boeder’s mounting persecution, and 
most of the districtspeople followed Soumadau in loyalty to clan and 
district. Only one vision moved them all: that was the negative belief 
that Sokehs was to be destroyed, an idea which applied to Sokehs alone, 
and which made the rest of Ponape hang back in fear when Germany 
brought in her military might.
In neither of these cases did Lauaki and Soumadau have sufficient 
strength of personality to make up for the absence of an indigenous 
proletariat or the lack of a revolutionary ideology. There is a sense in 
which both men can be said to have possessed ‘charismatic’ qualities. 
Lauaki, the supreme orator chief, more than any other Samoan, 
embodied the highest values of Samoa in his knowledge of tradition and 
his skill in politics. Soumadau en Sokehs, the warrior chief par 
excellence, had led famous charges against the Spaniards in 1898; he 
was the self­appointed guardian of district honour, the successful store 
owner and erstwhile friend of the German Governor. Both men had all 
the trappings of a magnetic personality, all the hallmarks of potential 
charisma. Yet both lacked the ability to overcome all the instabilities 
inherent in their movements and to commit a broad cross­section of 
people to their campaigns.
It is this which defines a truly charismatic movement. In the view of 
one sociologist, charisma is less an individual quality than a social 
relationship in which the message and the movement itself are more 
important than the greatness of the leader.4 Firstly, true charisma exists 
only within the context of a social movement: until recognised by others 
it does not become real. Secondly, there must be a message which is 
relevant to the people and expresses their unsatisfied wants. The truly 
charismatic leader in these terms is followed because he embodies and 
articulates values and aspirations in which his followers have an 
interest; and because he offers a realisation of those values.
Lauaki’s vision of the restoration of traditional politics did not 
capture the imagination of all, or even of most Samoans. In fact, a large 
group and their leaders perceived it as divisive, selfish and retrograde. 
Only if Self had resorted to force against the orator chief in March 1909 
would Lauaki have received the signs and martyrdom necessary to give 
him a genuinely charismatic role.
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In a similar way, Soumadau was able to draw only his kin and districts 
people to him, in what was generally perceived to be a hopeless gesture. 
His protest, like that of Lauaki’s, was by and large the protest of a 
political elite, with a select following; it represented a crisis for him, 
rather than for the whole people. The only Islanders both men could 
mobilise were those already susceptible to integration through tradi­
tional bonds of authority and social solidarity.
Though these acts of open resistance failed, not all opposition to 
German policy proved fruitless. It is clear from the histories of the three 
colonies that German rule in the Pacific was a process of constant 
compromise between relatively weak and highly personalised admin­
istrations on the one hand and the leaders of Island communities on the 
other. Whether in New Guinea, Ponape or Samoa, the Germans never 
gained absolute control over the politics of their Island populations. We 
have seen, for instance, that the New Guinea policy of permanent 
government presence through the appointment of luluais was con­
stantly subject to disruption and frequently it failed to achieve even the 
minimal organising goals expected of it.5 Other instruments of colonial 
control, like the head tax and compulsory road works, also had only 
a limited effect.
If, in theory, Micronesia and Polynesia contained much more 
penetrable societies than New Guinea, and lent themselves to mani­
pulation through their hierarchical authority structures, in practice they 
proved as large an obstacle to German control as did New Guinea. 
Ponapeans were able to influence German administrative policy right 
up to Boeder’s last brutal acts, since none of the four governments 
between 1899 and 1910 was fully aware of what was going on in the 
districts. The rebellion occurred after Boeder had made it clear by his 
actions that he spurned any idea of compromise between his regime and 
the Islanders. Only when the Islanders had been beaten or cowed into 
subjection by the sheer weight of numbers were the Germans able to 
do what they wanted on Ponape.
Of all three colonies, Solf’s Samoa comes closest to achieving a 
workable system of control and the genuine bureaucratisation of Pacific 
Island authority. In a compact and homogeneous society such as 
Samoa, a great degree of direct involvement between the Island 
community and the colonial Governor was possible. A strong person­
ality like Solf, having a positive conception of his role and a good 
knowledge of, and sympathy for, local custom, was able to influence 
greatly the pattern of inter­communal politics. Solf understood local
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aspirations and the limits to which the Samoans were prepared to be 
pushed. This was manifest in his refusal to bully the Samoans into 
serving only the European economy; in his defence of his paid native 
bureaucracy as a delicate balance between German and Samoan notions 
of sovereignty; in his sympathy for M a ta ’afa Josefo despite his com­
plicity in the Oloa\ and, most importantly, in his reliance, during the 
Lauaki crisis, on a political strategy right up to the brink of civil war 
and total bankruptcy of his administrative conception.
Yet, for all that, not even Solf gained complete control over the 
Samoan polity. If his administration had the appearance of a 
methodical progress towards a political ideal, that was because Solf was 
skilful at rationalising the decisions forced on him by the turn of events. 
In reality, the Solf period was one of experiment and of pragmatic 
solutions to current crises.
From the beginning, Solf had to compromise with those Samoans 
who wielded political power. To gain acceptance for the German regime 
he was forced to allow the continuation of the M alo  style of govern­
ment: a central Samoan administration controlled by the chiefs and 
orators of the victorious party; the dictatorship of the strong. The local 
government which Solf set up in 1900 also represented a delicate 
balance between Samoan and German power. Though it served to 
counteract the old power of Tumua  and Pule chiefs, Solf found he was 
obliged to pay incumbents’ salaries as a kind of indemnity for the 
prerogatives they surrendered when Samoa became a German colony, 
and to use officials who were familiar to local villagers since the people 
would not obey a stranger. In effect this meant that the traditional 
power of village elites was hardly inhibited, and the colonial govern­
ment could exercise relatively little control over them, particularly as 
the wages paid to them were not enough to guarantee loyalty, and 
dismissal could alienate the villagers.6
This balance of interests continued to operate through to the end of 
German rule. Solf had to negotiate the question of the head tax with 
the Samoan elites before implementing it; he had to maintain the 
political fiction of the paramountcy long after he had succeeded in 
undermining the Oloa movement and abolishing the M alo ; he found 
it necessary to allow Lauaki freedom of movement up until late 1908 
despite the fact that Lauaki consistently championed campaigns to 
reinstate the old elites in power. Even when Solf had the upper hand in 
1909 he could not afford to use a military offensive for fear of 
provoking a general rebellion. The final compromise lay in his solution
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to the A li'i S iliquestion. All Solf’s plans for Samoa had revolved around 
the removal of this final obstacle between government and people. But 
here, too, Solf was forced to meet the Samoans halfway. The old, single 
position of A li’i Sili was now replaced by two new ones, the Fautua, 
which created an entirely new relationship between the two royal 
families and the administration. Furthermore, the Germans felt obliged 
to distribute a considerable indemnity to the chiefs to forestall their 
protests. In the light of these constant adjustments of purpose, it 
becomes clear that what one author has called Solf’s ‘thorough, if 
diplomatic absolutism ’, 7 was more diplomatic than thoroughly 
absolute.
In Pacific Island politics, therefore, the role which Islanders them ­
selves played in shaping the character of German rule cannot be 
ignored. Their initiatives, counter­thrusts and general political soph­
istication helped to influence colonial policy even when open resistance 
failed. The key to their success lay with the Island leaders or elites, those 
people with a major influencing or decision­making capacity. Leader­
ship is crucial in explaining any process of socio­political change. In the 
Pacific it has added importance, for Island elites like Nanpei, Lauaki 
and To Bobo not only possessed multiple roles in their societies as 
politicians, businessmen and church officials, but also they were the 
most immediately affected by the impositions of a foreign, centralised 
government.
As we have seen, German colonial rule rarely engaged the whole 
society. Those who lost their prerogatives and their freedom of m an­
oeuvre were men like the cartel of chiefs and orators in Samoa, and the 
higher district chiefs in Ponape. These were the Islanders who resisted 
any encroachment on their powers, or schemed and intrigued in order 
to influence German policy. The history of Pacific Island politics under 
German rule is the history of elites, not mass movements, of interactions 
between leaders of different groups and different cultures. Particularly 
in small colonies like Samoa and Ponape, the major crises of sovereignty 
occurred when Island elites suddenly found themselves forced to choose 
between total dependence on the new regime or stubborn defence of 
their old ways and traditional prerogatives. 8
Lauaki and Soumadau en Sokehs chose the latter course and, on the 
surface, failed. Yet they cannot be dismissed simply as unrepentant 
‘resisters’ or ‘romantic reactionaries’ in contrast to the ‘more deft’ 
collaborators like Nanpei and To Bobo. These are terms which, thanks 
to the work of African historians, have been shown to be outdated and
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misleading.9 ‘Collaborators’ and ‘resisters’ were often the same men in 
the Pacific. Lauaki and Soumadau, after all, did not come to grief until 
late in the German period, when they decided to challenge German rule 
head on. Until that moment they had acted as important spokesmen for 
their people and gained respect as effective leaders in the eyes of the 
Germans. Lauaki had organised the support that had allowed M a ta ’afa 
Josefo to stake a convincing claim to the paramountcy on the eve of 
German rule. He had been involved in the Oloa , an attempt to 
modernise the people’s economy while defending the right of the old 
M alo  to speak for Samoa. In switching his allegiance from Solf to the 
Oloa and then to Solf again in 1904­05, Lauaki proved himself an 
extremely adaptable politician, and he gained an important, if tem­
porary, victory when he persuaded Solf not to deport him along with 
the other ringleaders of the movement in 1905.
As for Soumadau, if the Germans were able to establish a hold on 
Ponape in their early years and work through the district chiefs with a 
minimum of conflict, then Soumadau was one of the chiefs who made 
it possible. Even Carl Boeder is said to have counted Soumadau as a 
special friend and to have cultivated the chief’s friendship in the early 
days of his reign.10 Certainly Soumadau virtually led the negotiations 
over the district’s grievances about work periods in 1910, and he was 
made overseer at a high rate of pay as a tribute to his influence and 
organising capacity.
The Germans clearly needed the co­operation of such men in their 
effort to assert control over the Islands. W ithout the collaboration of 
Lauaki and Soumadau in the early days of German rule, they would 
never have been able to make Germ any’s presence acceptable with so 
little use of force. That Solf, Hahl and Fritz— even Boeder— realised 
this, is implicit in the way they cultivated the friendship of these chiefs 
and sought their support.
In the end both Lauaki and Soumadau were committed to a tradi­
tionalist view of life, a view which led them into open resistance and 
removal from any further influence on their societies. Yet both have 
achieved a new level of influence, perhaps a new kind of charismatic 
appeal, posthumously. Lauaki was resurrected by nationalist Samoans 
of the 1920s and 1930s as the persecuted proto­nationalist of Samoa, 
and even today, in areas well beyond his home district, he is regarded 
as Samoa’s model orator chief. Soumadau and the district of Sokens had 
already gained admiration and respect from the other districts, even 
enemy districts, at the time of the rebellion, because they were prepared
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to make the ultimate sacrifice of their lives to uphold Ponapean 
self­respect in a manner honoured by the people. Soumadau, and the 
districtspeople with him, had proved that they were the embodiment 
of the Island’s warrior ethos. The lesson has lost little over the years. 
In the final analysis, an effective, even a charismatic leader does not have 
to be successful: in the long­term perspective of history, adversity and 
failure can serve as much as success to strengthen faith in a person and 
that person’s goals.
There were, however, other elites who, in the end, did not go the same 
way as Lauaki and Soumadau, elites who never threw down the gauntlet 
to the Germans in the way Lauaki and Soumadau felt compelled to do. 
Once again, to call these men simply ‘collaborators’ would be mis­
leading. They were men who co­operated for a variety of reasons, not 
necessarily from the conviction that all things European were auto­
matically superior. Some, like Saga and Taumei in Samoa, Henry 
Nanpei in Ponape, or To Bobo in New Guinea, were seeking a middle 
way. They never responded inflexibly to the demands of their German 
rulers. They made no permanent choice to serve or to resist, but moved 
between co­operation and opposition according to the pressures upon 
them and their own political and economic objectives.
Perhaps this is the measure of the most successful Islanders under 
German rule, for astute leadership and limited resistance often suc­
ceeded in checking European pretensions, thus enabling the leaders to 
consolidate their own positions and move relatively quickly into 
modern politics. A good example is Henry Nanpei. During German rule 
his position was far greater than his title suggested. He was the leading 
benefactor and organiser of the Protestant Church on Ponape, regarded 
by both Spanish and Germans as the ‘com m ander’ of the Protestant 
forces in the south against the Catholics in the north. In addition he was 
the Island’s largest and most prosperous businessman and its most 
Westernised chief. The Germans counted him, rightly, as the key 
element in their control of the Islanders, at least in the south, and 
successive administrations courted his support and aid for their 
policies.
For his part, Henry Nanpei had grasped quickly the long­term 
meaning of European sovereignty, and he was prepared to try new 
forms of leadership and authority under the Germans: witness his 
‘advisory council’ to act as consultant to the regime. And in accepting 
the land reform scheme, as well as influencing others to do so, Nanpei 
was able to fashion an alliance with the administration which assured
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him of German support and assistance during the remainder of German 
rule.
For all that, Nanpei in no way abandoned traditional values or 
traditional commitments. Sympathy with the direction of social change 
did not exclude loyalty to established patterns of political life. N anpei’s 
major concern remained his position within Kiti district. Fie had 
engineered the disturbances in 1908 in order to deter the Germans from 
penetrating too deeply his stronghold in Ronkiti, just as he had led the 
campaign against the Spanish in 1898; he had set out to intimidate the 
German regime while collaborating with it in order to guard his position 
and landed estates against the encroachments of Sou Kiti; during the 
revolt of 1910 he is said to have succoured the rebels from his own trade 
stores with equipment and foodstuffs.11 The suspicions about Henry 
N anpei’s activities, which flourished in all quarters, among Ponapeans 
as well as among Germans, confirm the ambiguity of his attitude to 
European rule. Though, outwardly, he remained faithful to the German 
regime until 1914, it was probably because he was satisfied that it 
provided him with the best possible support for his position and 
influence in Kiti. The shrewdest assessment of N anpei’s priorities 
throughout German rule was made by Governor Hahl:
His activities were designed constantly to assert his own claims, 
never those of the German regime. He certainly would have 
become a rebel, as in the Spanish period, if he had feared that we 
endangered his reputation or his possessions. In my opinion he 
relied on us] with all possible caution.12
To Bobo in the Gazelle Peninsula is a second example of this cautious 
attitude to the Germans. Like Nanpei, he could see beyond the 
immediate crisis of the 1893 war to the permanent effects of the changes 
going on around his people, and he chose the government to be his 
future patron. As ‘big m an’, preacher, organiser and later luluai, To 
Bobo was an important support to the German administration. But, like 
Henry Nanpei, he remained ambivalent to the Germans and did not 
support their policies under all circumstances. He fought the Germans 
for land reserves, and encouraged independent cash cropping by the 
Tolai rather than the regular wage labour for plantations which Hahl 
favoured. To Bobo is an example of those creative elites who recognised 
colonial rule as a revolutionary situation and encouraged their societies 
to adapt.
A third example is the Manus Islander, Pominis, the ‘cannibal’
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catechist accused of warring on his neighbours and raiding European 
schooners. After selling his village’s land to the mission, Pominis 
abandoned his ministry for the life of a secular ‘big m an’. His case 
illustrates neatly the dual strands of co­operation and resistance in 
emergent Pacific leaders. Pominis’s training enabled him to stake a more 
powerful claim to leadership in his own society, but it did not inhibit 
him from following custom and going to war to protect his group. 
Again, his conversion and work for the mission did not guarantee that 
he would never return to the old ways and old ambitions of material 
power. This was a com m on risk which continually undermined the 
evangelising successes of missionaries in German New Guinea.
Such leaders were able to combine cultural conservatism with 
innovation, were able to exploit new avenues of power and opposition 
while remaining loyal to traditional values. Frequently their motives are 
not altogether fathomable. Some of them wished to encourage their 
societies to adapt to the structural changes and new patterns of 
development. M ost of them, it must be recognised, were primarily 
self­interested, and possessed only a vague vision of betterment for their 
communities. All of them were involved in what one historian has called 
‘the politics of survival’ : 13 the need to come to terms with vastly more 
powerful forces which exercised the ultimate say over the future of their 
societies. But such a phrase, which tends to emphasise the response of 
Pacific Islanders to German rule, must not be allowed to obscure the 
creative side of their political activity. For Pacific Islanders, through 
their leaders and institutions, often took the initiative in colonial 
politics, while the Europeans struggled to make responses which 
accorded with their colonial objectives and their own image of them­
selves. The colonial relationship was never equal, and Pacific Islanders 
were seldom able to maintain their autonomy, but, given the presence 
of sufficiently gifted individuals in influential positions, their societies 
were dynamic enough to adjust of their own accord and to a level upon 
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133, 173, (early rates of exchange) 123; 
Ponape, 83, 89, 114, (potential) 80, 
(planted by Nanpei) 77­8; Samoa, 51, 
(native plantings) 70, (planting ordi­
nance) 35
Coerper, Rear Admiral, 62­4 
Collaborators: importance in history
German rule, 219­22; New Guinea 
(with George Brown) 122, (in Varzin 
war) 146, (role of auxiliary troops) 196, 
(Madang people) 194, (Nalon) 182, 
185, (Pominis) 155­7, 221­2, (To 
Bobo) 130, 131, 134, 220, 221;
Ponape (role during Sokehs revolt) 
107­12, (Nanpei) 78, 90­3, 115­17, 
220­1, (Soumadau) 100, 103; Samoa 
(against Lauaki) 59­62, 206, (district 
officials) 36, (Faipule) 47­8, 51, (Saga 
and Taumei) 60­1
Colonial administration: history of struc­
ture, 19­24; civilian nature in Pacific, 
22­3; reforms to, 21; changing atti­
tudes 1914, 70­1; New Guinea (by 
New Guinea Company) 126, 132, 169, 
(Reich takes over) 173, (Hahl’s 3 year 
plan) 196; Ponape (approach up to 
1907) 81­6, (new priorities 1907) 95; 
Samoa (instructions 1900) 34­5 
Colonial control: limits of, 216­18; New 
Guinea (by Missions) 176, 178­80, 
191­2, (by 1914) 193­7, (by navy) 
170­1, (fragility of) 138­9, 147, 149­ 
50, 153­4, 183­5, 192, (under NGC) 
126, 137­9, 173­4, 180, 183, (Hahl’s 
approach) 134­5, 139­41, 183, 191, 
193, (Rose’s solution) 171; Ponape 
(Boeder’s approach) 99­103, (fra­
gility of) 79­81, 87, 94­7; Samoa, 
35, 49, (difficulties of) 32, (Solf’s 
approach) 67­8; see also Colonial 
administration
Colonial Council, see Kolonialrat
249
Index
Colonial Department, 20, 22, 35, 41, 49, 
79, 85, 136, 146, 156, 166; policy for 
Ponape, 79­80, 82­3; instructions to 
Solf, 34
Colonial development, see Development 
Colonialism: assumptions of, 204; New 
Guinea (Hahl’s philosophy) 132, 141, 
(planter philosophy) 160­2; Samoa 
(Solf’s philosophy) 54 
Colonial Office, 21, 54, 66­7, 87­9, 95, 
97, 99; administrative priorities, 21, 
86; attitude to Ponape, 95­6; attitude 
to Solf system, 65­7
Colonial policy: of new Colonial Office, 
86; limitations of, 105­6; New Guinea 
(Hahl’s) 132; Ponape (in 1900) 79­80, 
(during revolt) 108, 112; Samoa
(German expectations) 36, (Solf’s) 53­ 
5, 67­8
Colonial reform, under Dernburg, 21­2;
see also Colonial administration 
Colonial Secretary, 86, 95; Dernburg, 
66; Solf, 68
Colonial troops: size in Germany’s
colonies, 23; New Guinea (police used 
as) 195­6; Samoa (pressure for) 65­6, 
(against) 66
Colonies, Germany: history of pursuit of, 
17­20; State Secretary for, 21, 68; 
fate in war, 23­4; see also Administra­
tion; African colonies; Colonial ad­
ministration
Commerce: of Germany in the Pacific, 
16­20; in Micronesia, 74, 79; New 
Guinea (early expansion) 122­5, (in 
1900), 140, (in 1914) 158; Ponape 
(chiefly monopoly) 73, (Nanpei’s 
activities) 77­8; Samoa (development 
in German times) 51­3 
Commoners, Ponape, obligations, 10, 114 
Companies, German, see Firms 
Compensation, Samoa, for firearms, 35 
Condor, SMS 47, 83, 94, 96, 155 
Conference, see Berlin Conference 
Conservative Party, see Germany, 
domestic politics
Constantinhafen, 167; see also Bongu
Consuls, Samoa, 18, 34, 42, 66; inter­
ference in Samoan politics, 26, 28; 
rivalries, 27; see also Vice Consul 
Coolies, Samoa, 41; difficulties over 
import, 65
Co­operative, Samoa, 45, 203; see also 
Oloa
Copra: beginnings of trade, 16; German 
export of in Micronesia, 79, 80; New 
Guinea (earliest exports) 123, (exports 
1899) 173, (exports 1914) 158, (New 
Guinean production) 127, 134, 143; 
Ponape (as tax) 89, (difficulties pro­
ducing) 80; Samoa (co­operative 
attempt) 43­50, (DHPG production) 
70, (Samoan production 1909­14) 69, 
(importance to Samoans) 43, 51, 202 
Cormoran, SMS, 69, 103, 108, 117 
Corvee labour, 205, 216; New Guinea 
(at Madang) 180, (regulations) 141­2; 
Ponape, 94­101, 117, (as part of 
reforms) 89, (under Boeder) 99­104; 
Samoa (pressure for) 40­1, 53, (during 
Saipan exile) 71
Cotton, New Guinea, 125, 128, 140 
Council, see Advisory Council 
Couppö, Bishop Ludwig, 136, 137, 140, 
148, 156
Court­martial, Ponape, 112 
Cromwell Mountains, 193 
Cumpani, 44, 45, 46, 49, 202; see also Oloa 
Cutter Island, 188
Dallmannhafen, 164 
Dammköhler, Wilhelm, 193, 208 
Dampier, William, 163 
Dampier Island, 185 
Dar­es­Salam, 98
Deeken, Richard, 53, 64, 70; arrival in 
Samoa, 38­9; opposition to Solf, 39­ 
43, 65­6; role in Oloa, 49; blamed for 
Lauaki affair, 64­5; departure Samoa, 
67





Deportation, Samoa, 38, 40, 47, 64; of 
Lauaki and supporters, 62­4; see also 
Exile
Deprivation, explains resistance, 205­6 
Deputy Governor: New Guinea, 108, 
112, 182; see also Knake; Oswald; 
Ponape, 80, 81, 82, 91; see also Hahl; 
Samoa, 56, 68; see also Schultz­Ewerth 
Dernburg, Bernhard, 66, 86, 95, 96;
portrait, 21; see also Colonial reform 
De Quiros, see Quiros 
De Saavedra, see Saavedra 
Deutsche Handels ­ und Plantagen ­ 
Gesellschaft der Südsee Inseln zu 
Hamburg, see DHPG 
Deutsche Samoa Gesellschaft, see DSG 
Deutschlandhafen, 164; see also Finsch­ 
hafen
Development, economic, limits of in 
Pacific, 213­14; New Guinea (early 
expansion) 122­5, (by 1914) 158,
(under NGC) 173, (Hahl’s priorities) 
132, 140­1, 158 (Tolai share in) 126­8, 
133­4, (urgency of labour question) 
151­2, 159­62; Ponape, 80, 83­4, 
(limitations) 95­6, (reforms to en­
courage) 114­15; Samoa (after 1905) 
51­3, (pressure for by Deeken) 40, 
(Solf’s priorities) 41; see also Com­
merce
DHPG, 17­19, 28, 32, 39, 50, 53, 60, 70, 
123, 125, 161; relations with Solf, 40­1; 
see also Plantations; Labour 
Dipwenpahnmei, 104 
Direct rule, New Guinea, 132, 150, 152, 
157, 171, 183, 193; appointment of 
luluais, 134­5, 147, 157, 183, 185; by 
1914, 196­7; limitations, 158­9, 184 
Disarmament: Ponape, 83­4, 105;
Samoa, 35, 84
District administration, comparison 
Africa and Pacific, 22 
District Officer: independence of, 22, 
105­6, 141, 196; New Guinea (Aitape) 
183, (Boluminski) 151, (Madang) 181 — 
2, 188­9; Ponape, 87; Samoa, Savai’i, 
49
Districts: Ponape, 10, 79, (division by 
religion) 76­8, 85­6, 90, (conflict 
between) 91, 107; Samoa, 37, (role in 
Lauaki movement) 56­62, (wars 
between) 26 
Doane, Edward T., 75 
Dreger, Captain, 172 
DSG, 39, 41, 65, 66, 70 
Duke of York Islands, 119, 120, 122, 125, 
134, 140; Ulu Island, 135 
D’Urville, Dumont, 163
East Africa, 82, 98; Maji Maji rebellion, 
21, 131
East Asian Squadron, see Navy, German 
Education: Ponape, Kersting’s vision, 
117; Samoa (role of LMS) 25, 
(Samoans thirst for) 52 
Ehlers, Otto, 172 
Eich, Rev., 176, 177
Elites: and resistance, 202; key to 
colonial politics, 218­22; Samoa, 36, 
47, 217; definition of, 6; power in 
1900, 32
Elizabeth, SMS, 125 
Emden, SMS, 108­11 
Enipein, 89, 230
Etscheit, Dominic, 80; background, 229 
Europeans: New Guinea (and land
sales) 124­5, (population on mainland 
1899) 173, (protectorate 1914) 161; 
Ponape (first contacts) 73, (popula­
tion) 80; Samoa (manipulate Samoans) 
27, (resist militarisation) 66, (role in 
Lauaki affair) 64 
European settlers, see Settlers 
Execution: New Guinea (of Baining 
rebels) 150, (at Madang) 182, 184, (of 
To Ruruk) 127; Ponape (of Sokehs 
rebels) 112­13, 231
Exile: New Guinea (of Pominis) 156; 
Ponape (of Sokehs rebels) 112­13, 
118; Samoa (of Lauaki and supporters) 
64, 71­2; see also Deportation 
Expeditionary troops, see Colonial troops; 
Police
Expeditions, see Punitive expeditions
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Exploration, of New Guinea, 165, 171­3;
on Anglo­German border, 195 






Fa’asaleleaga, 6, 45, 58­60, 63, 64 
Fa'a Samoa, 36, 46, 51, 58, 59 
Factoria Espanola, 79 
Faipule, 38, 46, 48, 49, 55, 56, 58; 
creation of, 34; intrigues, 42; after 
1905, 47, 53, 57 
Falefa, 69
Farrell, Thomas, 123, 125, 138 
Fautua, 67, 69, 218
Feast of Honour, Ponape, 114; see also 
Tribute
Feasts, Ponape, importance of, 114­15 
Feudal system, in Ponape, 81 
Fidelis, Father, 117 
Fiji, 60; German interests in, 17 
Fine mats, Samoa, 7, 69 
Finisterre Range, 14, 195 
Finsch, Otto, 164, 167 
Finschhafen, 164­7, 171, 174­6, 178, 
190, 210
Firearms, 32, 35; see also Guns 
‘Firm, the’, see DHPG 
Firms, 123; New Guinea, 131­2, 161; 
see also DHPG; DSG; Factoria; 
Forsayth; Godeffroy; Hernsheim; 
Mouton; New Guinea Company; 
Robertson & Hernsheim 
Fitafita, 32, 66; see also Colonial troops 
Flierl, Johann, 190, 210; initial reception, 
174­6
Flogging: New Guinea, 166; Ponape, by 
Boeder, 99, 102­3 
Fogapoa, 72
Fono, 31, 45, 59, 63, 69; of Faipule, 53, 55, 
61
Fono Fa’alenu’u, 4
Foreign Office, Germany, 19, 20, 68, 79, 
169
Forsayth, Emma, 123, 125, 127, 128, 
131, 133, 144; background, 232; firm 
in Admiralties, 153; see also Queen 
Emma
France, 22, 68; colonial army in Africa, 
23
Freibriefen, 19
Freisinnige Party, see Germany, domestic 
politics
Friedrich Wilhelmshafen, 164, 167, 168; 
see also Madang
Fritz, Georg, 87­98 passim, 105, 106, 115, 
117, 118, 156, 209, 219; attitude to 
Ponapeans, 98; land reform scheme, 
88­9; portrait of, 87­8, 98 
Full, Police Master, 156
Garagos, 192
Garrison: Ponape (request for) 94, 95, 
(Spanish) 76; Samoa, Deeken’s pres­
sure for, 49­50, 65­6 
Gatoaitele, see Tafa'ifa titles 
Gazelle Peninsula, 122­61 passim, 193, 
196, 197, 205, 207, 211, 214, 221; 
description of, 119­20; alienation of 
land in, 124­5, 128, 131 
Gebhardt, Father, 105 
German Colonial Society, 161 
German commerce, see Commerce 
German East Africa, see East Africa 
German Foreign Office, see Foreign 
Office
Germania, SMS, 108
German New Guinea, see New Guinea, 
German
German rule: limits of, 216­18; New 
Guinea (achievements mainland 1899) 
173, (extended to Admiralties) 157­8, 
(under Hahl) 140­62 passim; Ponape, 
12, 82 (unease about) 94 
German Samoa, see Samoa, German 
German traders, see Traders 
Germany: as Kulturstaat, 54; attempts to 
annex Micronesia, 74, 79; commerce 
in Caroline Islands, 74; domestic 




1879; not trusted by Samoans, 27; 
supports M ata’afa 1899, 30; and
partition Samoa, 31; see also Colonies 
Gilbert Islands, 71; source of German 
labour, 27
Girschner, Max, 106­8, 112 
Godeffroy, J . C. und Sohn, 16, 27, 39, 
74, 122, 123; and land dealings Samoa, 
26; collapse of, 17 
Gogol River, 167, 173; plain, 177 
Governor: eastern Carolines, 74­6, 81; 
New Guinea, 22, 40, 82, 87, 88, 133, 
140, 145, 154, 155, 182; see also Hahl; 
New Guinea Company, 129, 131, 165, 
169; see also Schleinitz; Schmiele; 
Samoa, 22, 32­71 passim, 202; see also 
Schultz­Ewerth; Solf 
Graged, 168 
Gray, Mr, 85 
Grosskapital, 213 
Gulf of Papua, 172 
Gum River, 167 
Gunan, 124
Guns: New Guinea (as trade items) 120, 
123; Ponape, 83­4, (hoarded) 95, 
(by Sokehs rebels) 106; Samoa, 26, 28, 
35
Hafner, 104, 105
Hahl, Albert, 40, 80­162 passim, 180, 
182, 187, 193, 195, 209, 221; back­
ground, 229; New Guinea (land 
policy) 133­4, 143­4, 180, 184, 187­8, 
(relations with planters) 160­2, 
(political view of violence) 141, 155­6, 
201, (portrait) 132; Ponape (attitude 
to Ponapeans) 82, (land reforms) 87, 
88­9, (native policy) 81­2, 87; see also 
Deputy Governor; Governor, New 
Guinea
Hambruch, Paul, ethnologist, 103 
Hamburg, role in colonial administra­
tion, 19
Hamburg South Sea Company, 161 
Hanke, Rev., 181, 183 
Hansa Bay, 178
Hansemann, Adolf von, 19, 126, 164 




Hawaiian Islands, German commerce in, 
17
Headley, James, 77 
Helmich, Rev., 183, 187, 188 
Herbertshöhe, 38, 128­49 passim, 182, 
186, 189, 204, 206
Herero, war against Germany 1904, 21, 
23, 50, 60, 183 
Hermann, 138 
Hermit Islands, 125
Hernsheim, Eduard, 119, 123­5, 138; 
firm in Admiralties, 153, 158; see also 
Robertson & Hernsheim 
Herz Jesu Mission, 136; see also Catholic 
Mission; Sacred Heart Mission 
Herzog Range, 190 
Heusner, Admiral, 170 
High Chief: Ponape, 74­115 passim, 203, 
(new powers) 114­15; see also Nahnm­ 
warki; Wasai Sokehs; Samoa, 34, 69; 
see also Ali’i Sili; M ata’afa Josefo 
Highlands, of New Guinea, 14 
Hollborn, Otto, 100­5 
Home Offices, instructions to consuls, 27 
Hoppe, 138 
Hottentot elections, 20 
Hube people, 190 
Huon Gulf, 163, 172, 190­3 
Huon Peninsula, 164, 175, 178, 190­4, 
210
Hurricane, Samoa, 4
Ideology, role of in resistance, 214­16 
Ifoga, 47 
I’iga Pisa, 58, 62 
Imperial Civil Service, 20 
Imperial Commissioner: in Marshall
Islands, 19; in New Guinea, 136, 171; 
see also Rose
Imperial Judge, 45, 80, 115, 132, 173; 
see also Hahl; Schnee; Schultz
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Industrial village, New Guinea, MSC 
concept, 147, 148
Industry, European: New Guinea in 
1914, 158; Samoa in 1914, 70 
Influenza epidemic, Samoa, 72 
Ingiet, cult, 128, 145
Inheritance, Ponape: by Nanpei, 77, 78, 
89, 91; of land traditionally, 81; 
regulation of by Germans, 114; see also 
Land; Titles
Inta puain inta, 117; see also Payback 
Intermediaries, New Guinea, see Luluais 
Ipwin pohn warawar, 91; see also Born 
Upon the Ditch 
Iron, as trade item Ponape, 73 
Island sphere, 113; see also Kersting;
Micronesia 
Isokelokel, 10
Jabob Island, people of, 167 
Jaguar, SMS, 64, 94, 96 
Jaluit Gesellschaft, 79, 100; foundation 
of, 19; concession awarded to, 80 
Jomba, 171, 181, 184; plains, 187, 188 
Japanese, occupy Micronesia, 118 
Japanese traders, see Traders 
Jugendbund für entscheidendes Christentum, 
85; see also Liebenzeller Mission
Kabaga, 131 
Kabaira, 138, 170 
Kabakada, 122 
Kabakaul, 131 
Kai people, 166, 178 
Kaiserin Augusta Fluss, 164; see also 
Sepik River
Kaiserliche Richter, 115; see also Imperial 
Judge
Kaiser, Wilhelm II, 31, 33, 34, 43, 45, 
48, 49, 65, 67, 69, 102; see also Tupu 
Sili
Kaiser Wilhelmsland, 126, 129, 136, 164, 






Käte: language, 190; people, 193




Kersting, Heinrich, 114­18; attitude to 
Ponapeans, 111, 116; native policy, 
113­14; relations with Capuchins, 
116­17; strategy against rebels, 109­13 
Keysser, Rev. Christian, 190 
Kiautschou, 62, 94 
Kieta, 22, 152
Kingmakers, Samoa, 7, 29, 56; see also 
Tulafale
Kingship: Ponape, 77; Samoa (re­
nunciation of) 30, (candidates 1908) 
56, (final solution to) 67; see also 
Monarchy 
Kinigunan, 122 
Kiti, 10, 22, 73­115 passim, 221 
Knake, Deputy Governor, 182 
Koblenz, steamer, 188 
Koblenz­Ehrenbreitstein, 43 
Kokopo, 123, 126, 128 134, 136, 138, 
142, 145
Kolbe, Paul, 130
Kolonia, 9, 91, 92, 95, 97, 101; in danger, 
106­8
Kolonialpolitik, 18, 54, 173 
Kolonialrat, 21 
Kranket, 181 
Krätke Range, 14 
Krau Valley, 150
Kubary, Johann, 168, 187, 229; methods 
of land purchase, 167 
Kulturkampf, 74 
Kumunlai, 112 
Kusaie, 9, 74, 84
Labour, recruitment: New Guinea (by 
NGC) 169, 174, (Hahl tries to regulate) 
160­1, (increase Admiralties) 158, (on 




Ireland) 151­2, (Tolai share of) 127,
143, (urgent problem 1914) 159­61; 
Ponape (escape pressures for) 205; 
Samoa (DHPG privilege) 39, (threat 
to DHPG sources) 17, (use of coolies) 
41­2, 65
Labourers: New Guinea, regulations to 
protect, 165­6, 207; Ponape, hard to 
get, 80
Labu Lakes, 172 
Lae, 193
Lae people, 191, 192 
Lae Womba people, 191; see also Wampar 
Lafoga Oloa, 44, 45 
Lahdeleng, 103, 104 
Land: New Guinea (and Catholic
Mission) 136­7, 156­7, (and NGC) 
165, 167­8, (conflict over alienation of) 
123­34 passim, 143­7, 168, 180­4, 
(establishment of reserves) 132­4, 
143­4, 184, 188, (held by Europeans) 
140, 143, 158, (method of purchase) 
123­5, 144, (regulations to protect)
144, 184, (Tolai system of tenure) 
123­4; Ponape (and inheritance) 11, 
81, (and Sokehs revolt) 105, (history 
of attempted reforms) 81, 87­101, 
114­15, 117, (lack of alienation) 205, 
(traditional rights to) 11; Samoa 
(early alienation by Europeans) 26­7, 
(history of land reforms) 52­3, 
(Samoan needs) 53, (cultivation of 
1914) 70
Landeshauptmann, 165; see also Governor, 
New Guinea Company 
Landowner, Samoa, 35; see also Matai 
Lands Commissioner, Samoa, Schultz, 45 
Langar, harbour, 9, 108 
Lauaki Namu lau’ulu Mamoe, 31­71 
passim, 206, 211, 213, 214, 217, 220; 
background, 225; portrait, 37, 215­16, 
219; resistance to Solf, 37­8, 55­67, 
71; deficiencies of movement, 214­15; 
limits of resistance, 209, 211; role in 
1899, 30; role in Oloa, 48­9; death, 
71­2
Lauterbach, 172
Leadership: deficiencies in resistance
movements, 214­16; key to colonial 
politics, 218­22; New Guinea 
(traditional) 15, (new leaders) 131, 
133, 155­7, (limitations of luluai
system) 158­9; Ponape (by Nanpei) 
78, 89, 90; Samoa (changes under 
Germans) 34­7, 47­9, 51, 58­9, 67­9, 
71; see also Authority 
Lebenskraft, of Samoans, 69 
Lehner, Rev. Stefan, 192 
Leipzig, SMS, 62, 63, 108 
Leo X III, Pope, 18, 74 
Lepen Net, 75 
Lepen Ririn, 103­5 
Letasi Tuilagi, 62 
Leulumoega, 57
Libel, by Capuchin priests, 116, 117 
Liebenzeller Mission, 85, 116 
Linckens, Father, 150 
Lindequist, Friedrich von, 68 
Local administration, Samoa: creation, 
34­5; difficulties, 36; see also Native 
policy
London Missionary Society, 25, 26, 30, 
34, 37, 52, 63, 201 
Loniu, 153, 155 
Los Negros Island, 153, 155 
Lotonu'u, 214; see also Patriotism 
Loyalists, Ponape, 107, 109, 110, 113;
see also Collaborators 
Lualua, 141; position of, 15; see also 
Luluai
Lufilufi, 47, 57
Luluai, 141, 147, 152, 157, 183, 185, 186, 
196, 206, 221; limitations of system, 
135, 158­9, 216
Lutheran Missions, New Guinea, 168, 
185­7, 189, 190­3; history in New 
Guinea, 174­80 passim, 185­7; see also 
Neuendettelsau Mission; Rhenish 
Mission
Maclay, see Mikloucho­Maclay 
Maclay coast, see Astrolabe Bay
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Madang, 142, 168­95 passim, 204­7, 211, 
214; villagers of, 168­9; revolt 1904, 
180­3; revolt 1912, 187­9; see also 
Friedrich Wilhelmshafen 
Madolenihmw, 9, 10, 74­117 passim 
Maji­Maji, rebellion, 21, 98, 131 
Makada, purchase of harbour, 16 
Makiri, 164, 166 
Malaeulu, 45, 46, 62 





Malaria, New Guinea, epidemic Finsch­ 
hafen, 167
Malays: in New Guinea, 164, 166; in 
Ponape as police, 81
Malietoa, 30, 31, 37, 55; Laupepa, 18, 
26, 29; deportation, 28; Talavou, 26; 
Tanumafili I, 29, 30, 55, 69; re­
nounces kingship, 30; Vai’inupo, 25 
Malo o Samoa, 31, 33, 34, 37, 38, 40, 
42­9passim, 56, 59, 202, 214, 217, 219; 
intrigues, 31­5, 37, 38, 44; limits of 
power, 8; dissolution 1905, 47 
Malua, 25, 52 
Manila, 75
Manono, 3, 6, 7, 31, 57, 59, 60, 62, 64 
Manus Island, 152­8; people of, 153, 
155, 221 
Marawot, 145
Mariana Islands, 20, 64, 88, 95, 118;
German acquisition, 18, 79 
Marist Fathers, Samoa, 30, 52 
Markets, 142; Gazelle Peninsula, 126 
Markham River, 14, 172, 173, 191, 193, 
208; valley, 192
Marquis de Reys expedition, 125 
Marshall Islands, 9, 16, 19, 20, 80;
annexation of, 18 
Massawa, 137, 142 
Massawahafen, 147 
Massikonapuka, 137
Mata’afa Josefo, 29­69 passim, 217, 219; 
rebels against Tamasese 1888, 28; 
renounces kingship, 30; question of
M ata’afa—continue d
successor, 55­6; attitude to Lauaki 
movement, 57, 60­1; death, 69 
Malai, 35, 36, 64; role in village, 4, 6 
Matankor people, description, 153 
Matautu, Savai’i, 63 
Matrilineage, New Guinea, Tolai, 124 
Matupit, 16, 120, 122, 126, 136 
Mau e pule, 58, 204, 209, 210, 213, 214 
Me, collection, 52 
Mea alofa, 69 
Meiro Plains, 188
Melanesia, source of German labour, 27 
Melanesians.: as police in New Guinea, 
130, 137, 195­6; in Ponape, 81, 94, 95, 
101, 103, 104, 108, 109­13; in Samoa, 
63, 66; see also Police 
Mercenaries, Ponape, danger of, 95 
Mesenieng, 75, 76, 91; see also Kolonia 
Methodism, 123
Methodist Mission, New Guinea, 119, 
134, 140, (early history Gazelle) 122­3, 
135­6; Samoa, 63 
Meyer­Delius, 32
Afyziab, cult, 168, 181, 186, 187; and 
Rhenish Mission, 178 
Micronesia, 34, 80, 88, 108, 117, 216; 
and German annexation, 18, 74; see 
also Commerce
Mikloucho­Maclay, Nikolai, 168; visits 
to New Guinea, 163­4 
Millenarianism, New Guinea, 184­6, 
189, 191, 194; see also Cargo myth 
Mioko, purchase of harbour, 16 
Missionaries: as colonisers, 68; New 
Guinea (as intercessors) 168, (in­
discretions) 147­50, 187, (murdered) 
122, 149, 173, 177, (racial attitudes) 
207, (role in creating stability) 131, 
135­7; Ponape, role in history, 86; 
Samoa, early influence, 25­6; see also 
Missions
Mission of the Holy Ghost, 178; see also 
SVD Mission
Missions: New Guinea (history) 120­3, 
135­7, 147­50, 155­7, 163, 174­80, 




ment) 179, (and pacification) 176, 
178­80, 191­2, (changing attitudes to) 
186, 190­1, 194, (relations with
administration) 136­8, 150, 156, 174— 
80, 187; Ponape (history) 73­6, 78, 
116­17, (attitude to crisis 1908) 93, 
(role in revolt) 110, 112; Samoa (early 
history) 25­6, (relations with Solf) 52, 
(role in Lauaki affair) 62­4 
Modernisation, see Social change 
Moefaauo, 47, 48 
Moeu/e, SMS, 182 
Mogara, 210 
Mokareng, 156, 157 
Mokil, 118
Monarchy, Samoa, 31; not suited to 
Samoa, 27, 29 
Monumbo, 194 
Moors, H. J., 64­5 
Morobe, 22, 195
Mortlock Islanders, 104, 105, 118 
Moses, John, 127 
Mouk Island, 154 
Mouk­Mandrian people, 154 
Mouton, Octave, 125, 128, 129 
MSC, see Catholic Mission; Sacred 
Heart Mission 
Mulifanua, 4, 6 
Mulinu’u, 4, 25­59 passim, 202 
Mulung, cult, 168
Municipality of Apia, 28, 32; creation 
and purpose, 27 
Mwalok, 97, 104
Myths, New Guinea, see Cargo myths 
Nacharunep, 149
Nahnken, 12, 77, 91, 96, 100, 101, 103, 
114; powers of, 11 
Nahnku, 77
Nahnmwarki, 11, 12, 75, 89, 91, 96, 114, 
115, 118; powers of, 10­11 
Nakanai, 123 
Nalon, 182, 185 
Naluk, 89 
Nankiop, 110, 111
Narna, war against Germany 1904, 21
Namatanai, 152
Namulau’ulu Pulali, 45­8, 62, 63, 71 
Nan Madol, 84, 104
Nanpei, Henry, 75­116 passim, 205, 209, 
218; as Protestant leader, 77­91, 116; 
as collaborator, 115­16, 220­1; atti­
tude to land reforms, 89­91; conflict 
with Sou Kiti, 89­94; portrait, 77­9, 
91
Nationalism, Samoa: and Lauaki, 219; 
after 1914, 70
National Liberal Party, see Germany, 
domestic politics
Native money, New Guinea, 123; see also 
Tambu
Native policy: New Guinea, of NGC, 
165­6, 174; see also Hahl; Ponape, 
81­2, 87­9, 91­2, 94­6, 99­104, 113­ 
18; see also Boeder; Fritz; Kersting; 
Samoa: 22, 36, 40, 47­9, 53­4, 65­9, 
71; see also Solf
Native Secretary, Samoa, 68; see also 
Schultz­Ewerth 
Naturvölker, 88
Navies, European, limitations Samoa, 29 
Navy, German: beginnings of Pacific 
patrols, 16; role in colonial administra­
tion, 23, 169­70; deficiencies as police 
force, 23, 170­1; East Asian Squadron, 
23, 62, 69, 101­2, 108, 118, 170; New 
Guinea, role in colonial control, 129— 
30, 137, 138; Ponape, 76­7, 84, (role 
in Sokehs revolt) 108­13; Samoa 
(intimidation of Samoans) 26­7, (role 
1899) 30, (role in Lauaki affair) 62­4 
Neil, Rev. E. G., 63
Net, 10, 12, 76, 78, 90, 92, 97, 101, 104, 
107, 205
Neuendettelsau Mission: history in New 
Guinea, 174­80 passim, 190­3; con­
verts 1908, 186, 190; evangelising 
policy, 190­1; role in pacification, 
190­3; see also Lutheran Missions 
Neuhauss, Paul, ethnologist, 192 
New Britain, 14, 16, 119, 120, 123, 125, 
127, 136, 158, 160, 194 
Newell, Rev. John, 63, 64
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New Guinea, 34, 74, 79, 80, 82, 87, 94, 
105, 106, 108; physical description of, 
12­13; German entry, 18, 119, 164; 
centre for DHPG labour, 18; obstacles 
to German rule, 141
New Guinea Company, 126­87 passim, 
190, 206; Directors, 165, 169, 174; 
State Charter for, 18, 19; native
policy, 165­6, 174, 206, 207; land 
purchases, 167­8, 174; and missions, 
174­80; failures of, 19, 165­74 passim, 
180, 184; surrenders political control, 
171, 173
New Guineans: attitude (to colonialism) 
204, (to missions) .175­80, 186, 190­1, 
194, (to navy) 170­1; dictate earliest 
relations, 120, 123; differential
response to Germans, 205­6; manipu­
late European alliances, 154­5, 186­7, 
208­9; resist land alienation, 124, 
127­31, 133, 145­7; self sufficiency of 
1914, 158­60; see also Baining;
Madang; Manus; Tolai; Wampar 
New Ireland, 14, 119­61 passim, 193, 196, 
210
New Zealand, 45, 65; agitation for 
annexation Samoa, 17­18; relations 
with Samoans, 70, 71 
Nodup, 122, 134, 136 
Norddeutsche Allgemeine, 65 
Norddeutsche Lloyd, 188 
Nos en Net, 112 




Ointment, see Bullet­proof ointment
Oldörp, Rudolf, 193
0  le mau, 58; see also Mau
Oloa, 56, 58, 65, 210, 214, 217, 219;
history of, 43­50; dual aims of, 202 
Orator Chief, 56, 72, 215, 217; see also 
Tulafale 
Orion, SMS, 108
Oswald, Deputy Governor, 108, 112
Pacification, see Colonial control; Security 
Pacific Islanders: manipulate European 
alliances, 208­9, 222; resist selectively, 
201­4; role in colonial politics, 218­22 
Pakanagman, 124 
Pak island, 157, 209; people, 154 
Palangi, 48
Palau Islands, 20, 112, 118; German 




Pan Germans: New Guinea, pressure on 
Governor, 160­2; Samoa, opposition 
to Solf, 41, 66 
Pan Kadara, 104 
Panutibun, 168, 189 
Paparatawa, 145­7 
Papitalai, 153, 155­7 
Papua, 12
Paramount Chieftaincy, Samoa, 7, 27, 
34; question of succession to, 55­6; 
solution to succession question, 67­9; 
see also Ali’i Sili 
Parkinson, Richard, 125­7 
Partition, see Samoa, partition 
Patriotism, Samoa, in Oloa, 44, 46, 214 
Pay­back, custom, 208; Ponape, 117 
Petition, Samoa: by Europeans, 49, 65;
by Samoans, 45; Lauaki’s demands, 56 
Pflanzerverein: New Guinea, 161; Samoa, 




Pitilu Island, 154, 155 
Planet, SMS, 108, 109 
Plantations: New Guinea (early ex­
pansion) 123­7, 131, (of NGC) 171, 
173, (conflict over) 127­31, 133, 145— 
7, 180­3, 187­9, (growth after 1900) 
140, 143, 145, 158, 180­1, 187­8; 
Ponape (existing 1900) 80, (owned by 
Nanpei) 78, (potential of island) 80; 
Samoa (beginnings) 16, (of DHPG) 
17, 39, (inspectors for) 35, 51 (new 
companies) 51, 52, (extent 1914) 70
258
Index
Planters: racial arrogance, 206­7; New 
Guinea (colonial philosophy) 160, 
(relations with Hahl) 160­2, (popula­
tion 1914) 161; Samoa (new arrivals 
1902) 38­9, (relations with Solf) 53­4, 
65­6
Planters’ Society, see Pflanzerverein 
Police: NewGuinea, 130, 141, 183, (under 
NGG) 128, 137, (deficiencies of) 149­ 
50, 195­6, (Hahl’s plans for) 158; 
Ponape, 81, 94­6, 102, 104, 106, 108, 
(role in Sokehs revolt) 109­13; see also 
Fitaflta; Melanesians 
Politics, see Traditional politics 
Poll tax, see Head tax 
Polynesia, 74, 216
Pominis, 209; manipulates Europeans, 
155­7; new leader, 221­2 
Ponam Island, 154
Ponape, 10, 22, 140, 195; physical
description of, 9; social structure on, 
10; see also Sections
Ponapeans: attitude (to disarmament) 
84, (to Germans) 112, (to land 
reforms) 87, 205, 206, (to Nanpei) 78, 
90, 91, 93, (to Sokehs revolt) 107, 205, 
219­20, (to Spanish) 77, 211­12; 
reputation for resistance, 73; situation 
1914, 117­18
Population, European, New Guinea: in 
1900, 140; in 1914, 161 
Port Hunter, 119 
Port Weber, 125
Posadillo, Captain, 74, 75; see also 
Governor, eastern Carolines 
Potsdamhafen, 178, 194, 195 
Powers, see Three Powers; Western 
Powers
Proletariat, absence of in German 
Pacific, 213­14
Proselytism, religious, Ponape, conflict 
over, 85, 116­17
Protestant Mission, Ponape, 75, 78; see 
also Boston Missionary Society 
Protestants: Ponape, conflict with
Catholics, 76, 77, 81, 85, 94, 116­17, 
220; Samoa, 47
Puin en lolokon, 90, 98; see also Advisory 
council
Pule, 7, 34, 38, 46­8, 55­60, 62, 209, 211, 
214, 217
Pulenu'u, 36, 48, 115 
Pullack, 44, 45, 49
Punitive expeditions, New Guinea, 138, 
139, 141, 144; against Tolai, 122, 
127­31; by navy, 170; in Huon 
Peninsula, 191, 193, 195; to Admiral­
ties, 153­4
Puritanism, of Boston Mission, 74 
Pweipwei, 92, 93
Queen Emma, 232; see also Forsayth 
Quiros, Ferdinand de, 73
Ralum Point, 125 
Ramandu, 137 
Rambutjo Island, 152 




Race relations: key to resistance, 206­7; 
New Guinea (and Rhenish Mission) 
177­8, (at Madang) 180­3, (in Huon 
Peninsula) 189­91, (in Varzin 1902) 
146, (St Paul massacre) 150; Samoa, 
deteriorating 1914, 71 
Ragetta, 181­3, 186, 187, 189, 194 
Rai coast, 163, 164, 182, 185, 189, 195 
Raluana, 134
Ralum, 126, 127, 131, 133, 140, 144, 201, 
207; first plantation, 123; expansion, 
125, 127­8, 131; causes conflict, 127— 
31, 133
Rascher, Matthäus, role in St Paul 
massacre, 147­50 
Ratavul, 122, 142 
Ravalien, 131
Rebellion: categorisation, 204, 210­12; 
explanation of, 205­7, 208; New
Guinea (at Madang) 180­3, 187­90, 
(in Bainings) 147­50; Ponape (against 
Spanish) 75­9, (possibilities 1900) 79­ 




Sokehs) 104­13, 208, 211­15, 221; 
Samoa (nearness to 1909) 60­3,
(Lauaki as ‘rebel’) 58, 64; see also 
Lauaki; Resistance
Rebels: New Guinea, 149­50, 182, 189; 
Ponape, 106­13
Reichstag, 21, 34, 41, 43, 65; Budget 
Commission, 20; role in colonial 
affairs, 20
Religion: New Guinea, sanctions resist­
ance Madang, 184­5, 189; Ponape, 
reinforces political divisions, 85, 90, 
116
Reserves, land, New Guinea: creation, 
132­4, 143­4; conditions for retaining, 
133
Resistance: explanation of, 201­12;
German attitude to, 203­4; importance 
of leadership in, 214­22; limited 
nature of, 201­3, 210­12; organisation 
of, 213­14; New Guinea (at Kabaira) 
138, (by Madang people) 168­9, 
180­9, 206, (by Manus people) 153­4, 
(by Talili) 122, (by Wampar) 191­2, 
(in New Ireland) 138­9, (in Varzin 
mountains) 145­7, (to explorers) 172, 
(to inland penetration) 122, 166­7, 
172, 176, 178, 206, (to land alienation) 
124, 127­31, 133, 145­7, (to MSC in 
Bainings) 147­50, (to NGC) 166, 174, 
(to Rhenish Mission) 177, (to road 
building) 142, 180­1, 185, (to traders) 
122, 138­9, 153, (to wage labour) 143, 
166, 168­9, 185, 203, (primary) 183, 
191, 195­6, (in 1914) 158­60. Ponape 
(reputation for) 73, (by Sokehs) 75, 84, 
97­113 passim, (by southern districts) 
76­9, (rumours of 1908) 92, (to Boeder) 
100­6, (to Spanish) 75­9; Samoa, 34,
41, (ambush of German marines 1888) 
28­9, (attack on Europeans 1899) 30, 
(by Malo) 38, 42, (by Lanaki) 37­8,
42, 56­67, (to European copra in­
dustry) 43­50, (to forced labour) 40, 
(to head tax) 36, 42, (to local adminis­
tration) 36, (to racism) 71
Revolt, see Rebellion 
Rhenish Mission: history in New
Guinea, 176­80 passim, 185­7, 194; 
and Madang revolts, 181­7, 189;
relations with NGC, 179 
Rheinische Missions Gesellschaft, 176;
see also Rhenish Mission 
Richards, 192, 208 
Rifles, see Guns
Roads: New Guinea (by Catholic
mission) 137, (construction in Gazelle) 
134, 142, (through corvee labour) 
141­2, 180, 185; Ponape (German 
attempts to construct) 91­103 passim; 
Samoa (compulsory maintenance of) 
35, 36
Robertson and Hernsheim, 19 
Rodatz, Hans, 183 
Roggeween, Jacob, 25 
Roman Catholic Church, see Catholic 
Mission; Catholics; Missions 
Ronkiti, 9, 89, 92, 221; river, 78 
Rose, Fritz, 136, 175; plans for adminis­
tration, 171 
Rubai people, 154 
Rutten, Father, 149
Saavedra, Loaisa y de, 73 
Sabu, 186
Sacred Heart Mission, 136, 145, 147, 
156, 211; Provincial of, 150 
Safotulafai, 31, 37, 55, 57, 58, 63 
Saga, 60, 61, 220 
Saipan, 64, 69, 71 
Sakau, 74, 229 
Salamaua, 172, 190 
Saleaula, 57, 63, 64 
Saluafata, 4
Sä Malietoä, 26, 30, 38, 55; allegiances 
to, 7
Samoa, physical description of, 3­4; 
district organisation, 6­7; social 
structure, 4­6; traditional political 
structure, 6­9; village organisation, 
4, 6; first European contact, 25; 
history before 1900, 25­31; partition, 
9, 18, 31; see also Politics
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Samoa, American, 3; protest against 
administration, 45
Samoa, German, 105, 161; economic and 
social development, 51­3; history of 
Oloa, 43—50; history of Lauaki affair, 
55­67, 71; prospects 1909­14, 69­71 
Samoan government, see Malo 
Samoanische Leitung, 42, 50, 57, 61 
Samoans: attitude to education, 25, 52; 
attitude to forced labour, 40, 203; 
attitude to Germans, 27, 31; attitude 
to Solf system 1908, 58­9; manipulate 
Europeans, 29, 42, 65, 208­9; loyalty 
to Solf, 68; triumph over Solf, 67 
Samuel, chief, 212 
Santos, Eliu, 103 
Sapapalii, 63 
Sarang, 187
Sattelberg, 179, 191, 193, 210; founda­
tion of station, 175­6 
Satupaitea, 63, 64 
Sä Tupuä, 28; allegiances to, 7 
Saudeleurs, 10
Savai’i, 6, 7, 22, 25, 29­31, 37, 53­63 
passim, 72, 211; physical description of, 
3
Sa Vanut, 147, 148 
Scheering Peninsula, 181 
Scheidt, Rev., murdered, 177 
Schlehan, 209, 210
Schleinitz, Admiral Freiherr Georg von, 
165,172
Schmiele, Georg, 129, 130­2, 136, 168 
Schnee, Heinrich, 38, 66, 173 
Scholz, 189
Schrader, 171, 175, 177 
Schultz­Ewerth, Erich, 45, 46, 49, 53, 
56, 57, 68—71, 211; see also Deputy 
Governor, Samoa; Governor, Samoa 
Schutztruppe, 23; see also Colonial troops 
Sections: of Ponape, 10; heads of, 92; 
Soumadau’s, 97
Security, New Guinea: priorities, 134—5, 
138­9, 140­1, 152, 158, 180, 190; in 
Gazelle, 151; on mainland 1899, 173; 
by 1914, 193­7.
Seeadler, SMS, 154
Seeadlerhafen, 153, 157 
Sek, 185, 188
Sepik River, 14; discovery of, 164; 
district, 195; exploration of, 172, 173, 
177
Settlers, European: Ponape, lack of
pressure from, 205; Samoa (new 
arrivals 1902) 38­9, (pressures for 
power 1914) 70 
Sialata’una, 59 
Siar, 163, 168, 179­94 passim 
Simbang, 174, 175, 210 
Simpsonhafen, 119, 120, 134 
Slave trade, New Guinea: in Bainings, 
137, 147
Social authority: New Guinea, 14­15;
Ponape, 11; Samoa, 4­6 
Social change: Islander attitudes to, 203; 
limits of under Germans, 213; New 
Guinea, Hahl tries to limit, 160; 
Ponape (effects of land reforms) 89, 
105, (protection against) 115; Samoa, 
71
Social Darwinism, 54 
Social structure: New Guinea, 14­15, 
(Tolai) 124; Ponape, 10­12; Samoa, 
4­7
Societe Commerciale de l’Oceanie, 17 
Society Islands, German commerce in, 17 
Society of the Divine Word, 178; see also 
SVD Mission
Sokehs, 9, 12, 74­118 passim, 205­7, 209, 
219; attitude to Nanpei, 90, 91; 
expectation of destruction, 104, 111; 
rebellion of, 99­113, 208, 211­15, 221 
Solf, Wilhelm, 141, 32­71 passim, 106, 
141, 211, 214, 215, 219; attitude to 
Oloa, 44; attitude to Samoans, 32—3, 
53­4; background, 225; handling of 
Lauaki affair, 57­67; hostility to 
Deeken, 41­3, 49; limits of control in 
Samoa, 216­18; native policy, 33­7, 
47­50, 53­4, 65­9, 71, 206; relations 
with missions, 52; his system of rule, 
43, 51, 53, 65­6; as Colonial Secretary, 
68­71; see also Native policy; Samoans 




Sou Kiti, 89, 90, 92, 93, 101, 209, 221; 
importance of, 230
Soumadau en Sokehs, 97, 100­5, 208; as 
leader, 215­16, 219­20; tactics during 
revolt, 107­12; death of, 113 
Soun Kawad, 97, 103­4, 107, 110 
South­West Africa, Herero war, 21, 23, 
50, 183
Souwenim Metipw, 75 
Spain: and arms trade Ponape, 77, 83; 
colonisation of Ponape, 12, 74­9, 96, 
102, 112; destroys Chamorros, 94; 
protests annexation Micronesia, 18, 
74; relations with Boston Mission, 
75­9; sells Ponape to Germany, 79; 
threats to German commerce, 17; war 
with America, 18, 77­9; see also 
Nanpei; Soumadau
Spanish rule, Ponape, history of, 74­9, 
81; see also Spain 
Spee, Graf, 23, 118 
Sperber, SMS, 129, 130 
State Secretary for Colonies, see Colonies 
Stephansort, 166, 172, 179 
St Patrick Island, 154 
St Paul, station, massacre at, 147­50, 211 
Stückhardt, Wilhelm, 97, 181, 182 
Stuebel, Consul, 28
Succession, see Inheritance; Titles, 
Ponape
SVD Mission, history in New Guinea, 
178­80, 186, 187, 190
Tafa'ifa, 8, 26, 59; titles, 7, 28, 29, 34, 69;
see also Paramount chieftaincy 
Tagaloa, 62
Taimua, 47, 56; creation of, 37





Tamasese Tupua, 1909, 55, 69; Tupua 
1888, 28
Tamasoali’i, see Tafa'ifa





Taulil, 142; people, 119, 146 
Taumei, 60, 61, 220 
Tavalai, 128, 130 
Tax, see Head tax; Lafoga Oloa 
Tetens, Alfred, 74 
Tcvaga Matafa, 62 
Theocracy in Ponape, 74 
Thomas, Rev., 176, 177 
Three Powers, Samoa, 28, 29, 31, 32, 35, 
37, 52, 56, 63, 215; co­protectorate by, 
18; impose kingship on Samoans, 29; 
Commission 1899, 30, 35 
Tibud, 163, 181
Tingenavudu, 127­9, 131, 136 
Tirpitz, Admiral, 23
Titles: Ponape (structure of) 10­11, 
(inheritance of) 11, (of Nanpei) 91; 
Samoa, 4­7; see also Tafa'ifa 
To Bobo, 130, 134, 144; as new leader, 
131, 133, 218, 220, 221 
Togo, 110
To Kilang, 145, 146, 207 
Tokyo, 68
Tolai people, 14, 122­3, 126­7, 132, 146, 
190, 203, 205, 208, 211; attitude to 
road building and head tax, 142­3, 
159; population, 133­4; prosperity of 
under Germans, 133­4, 143; resist 
land alienation, 127­31; traditional 
leadership, 15 
Tomanariki, 145, 146 
Tomara, 110, 111
To Marias, role in St Paul massacre, 
147­50
Tonga, 31, 60 
To Ruruk, 127 
To Vagira, 138, 144­6 
Trade, see Arms trade; Commerce 
Traders: New Guinea (and violence) 
138­9, (early Germans) 119, (in 
Admiralty islands) 153, 154, (way of 




Micronesia) 78­9; Samoa, 26, (ruth­
lessness of) 27 
Treason, see Rebellion 
Treaty, between Germany and Samoans 
1879, 27; with Tonga, Gilbert, Ellice, 
Marshall, Society, Samoan Islands, 
16
Tribute, Ponape, 87, 88; importance to 
chiefs, 100; paid by Spanish, 77, 78; 
reforms to, 114, 206
Tridominium, in Samoa, 29; see also 
Three Powers
Trimborn, Deputy, 43, 65, 66 
Trood, Thomas, 63, 66 
Truk, 9, 80, 83­5, 95, 96 
‘Trusted agents’, New Guinea, 132, 134, 
171, 181; see also Luluai 
Tuamasaga, 6, 7, 59 
Tuasivi, 64 
Tubtub, 138 
Tubuan, 127, 128 
Tuia'ana, see Sä Tupuä 
Tui A'ana, see Tafa'ifa 
Tui Atua, see Tafa'ifa 
Tuimalealiifano, 55, 69 
Tulafale, 6­7, 11, 37, 48; powers of, 6 
Tumleo Island, 178
Tumua, 7, 34, 38, 47­8, 55­9, 61, 
209, 211, 214, 217; opposes Lauaki, 
58­62
Tupua Tamasese, see Tamasese Tupua 
Tupu Sili, 31, 34, 67, 68; see also Kaiser 
Tutuila, 3, 31, 45, 58, 61 
Typhoon, Ponape, 83, 95
Uh, 10, 85, 90, 91,92, 96, 101, 107 
Ulagunan, 128, 129, 131 
Ultramontanism, 116 
Umboi Island, 163 
United States, see America 
Unshelm, August, 16 
Upolu, 22, 26, 31, 53, 56­62 passim; 
physical description of, 3­4; districts 
of, 6
Usiai people, description, 153
Vailele, 28
Vaimea, 47, 49, 204, 214; chiefs’ break­ 
in, 46; Lauaki’s role in, 226 
Vairiki, 125, 129 
Vaitele, 60
Vaiusu, 59, 60, 64, 211 
Valum, 209, 210
Varzin Mountains, 134, 138, 142, 144, 
193, 204; war in, 145­7, 150, 207 
Vatican, 74 
Venantius, Father, 105 
Vetter, Rev., 190 
Vicariate of Melanesia, 136 
Vice Consul, Samoa, British, 66 
Violence: as part of colonialism, 141, 
162, 201; New Guinea (against
Catholic mission) 147­50, (at 
Hatzfeldthafen) 173, (at Madang) 
180­3, 190, (early days) 122, (in 
Admiralties) 153­4, (over land) 127— 
31, 144­7, (new outbreaks 1914) 161; 
Samoa, threat of 1909, 60­3; see also 
Resistance 
Vlavolo, 123, 136 
Vollerthun, Captain, 109, 111 
Von Schleinitz, see Schleinitz 
Vulcan, 120 
Vunabalbal, 130, 131 
Vunakamkabi, 136, 137 
Vunakokor, 134
Vunamami, 122, 123, 125, 127, 128, 131, 
133, 143, 144 
Vunapope, 136, 147 
Vunatarai, 124; see also Matrilineage
Wahlen, Rudolf, 161 
Wampar people, resistance and peace­
making, 191­2; see also Lae Womba 
Wampit, 192
W ar: Herero­Nama, 21, 23, 50, 183; 
New Guinea (in Varzin mountains) 
144­7, (of bullet proof ointment) 127— 
31, 205­6, 221; Ponape, use of
guerrilla tactics, 110, 113; Samoa, 




Wasai Sokehs, 75, 77, 99­104, 108, 111 
Watut River, 191, 192 
Weber, Rev., 183, 187 
Weber, Theodor, 16, 26; founds planta­
tions Samoa, 26; imports labour, 27 
Weberhafen, 142, 147, 148 
Weltpolitik, 31 
Werner, Kapitan von, 16 
Wesley ans, see Methodist Mission 
Western Powers, 25; see also Three 
Powers
Western Samoa, 3; see also Samoa 
Whalers, in Ponape, 73, 77, 83 
Wilhelmstrasse, 21, 33 
Willaumez Peninsula, 14 
Williams, Rev. John, 25
Williams, Richard, 49, 211 
Winter, Julius, 166, 175 
Wohltmann, Dr F., 39, 53 
Wolff, Assessor, 145, 146 
Wolff, Rudolf, 145, 210
Yabem: language, 190; people, 174, 178, 
179
Yabob Island, and people of, 181 
Yap, 74, 98, 110, 118 
Yokohama, 68
Zanzibar, 96 
Zentrumspartei, 40, 156
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